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I N D I A

In the BRITISH PERIOD

Being Part III

of the

Oxford History of India

by
49357

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FROM THE PREFACE

THE purpose of this book is to provide in one volume of moderate bulk and price a compendious up-to-date History of India as a whole, based on the results of modern research and extending from the earliest times to the end of 1911. It has been designed with the desire to preserve due proportion throughout in the Ancient, Hindu, Muhammadan, and British Periods alike, the space being carefully allotted so as to give prominence to the more significant sections. The author has sought to attain scrupulous accuracy of statement and impartiality of judgement, so far as may be. The subject has engaged his attention for nearly half a century.

While foot-notes have been confined within narrow bounds, the authorities used are indicated with considerable fullness. The lists of authorities are not intended to be bibliographies. They merely mention the publications actually consulted. Chronological tables, maps, and other aids for the special benefit of professed students have been provided, but it is hoped that the volume may prove readable by and useful to all persons who desire to possess some knowledge of Indian history and do not find a mere school-book sufficient. No book on lines at all similar is in existence. . . . The British Period, the subject of innumerable books, offers less opportunity for novelty or originality of treatment than the earlier periods do.

Notwithstanding the obvious truism that no man can be master in equal degrees of all the parts of India's long story, it is desirable in my opinion that a general history should be the work of a single author. Composite histories, built up of chapters by specialists, suffer from the lack of literary unity and from the absence of one controlling mind so severely that their gain in erudition is apt to be outweighed by their dullness.

The memorable visit of Their Majesties the King-Emperor and

FROM THE PREFACE

his consort at the close of 1911 seems to be the best stopping-place for the narrative. The years since that event have been passed for the most part under the shadow of the Great War, with which history cannot yet dare to meddle. A bare list of some of the happenings during those terrible years is appended.

The spelling of Asiatic words and names follows the principle observed in my work on Akbar, with, perhaps, a slight further indulgence in popular literary forms. The only diacritical mark used as a general rule is that placed over long vowels, and intended as a guide to the approximate pronunciation. Consonants are to be pronounced as in English. Vowels usually have the Italian sounds, so that *Mīr* is to be read as 'Meer' and *Mūl*- as 'Mool-'. Short *a* with stress is pronounced like *u* in 'but', and when without stress as an indistinct vowel like the *A* in 'America'. The name *Akbar* consequently is pronounced 'Ukbur' or 'Ukber'. No simpler system is practicable, for we cannot revert to the barbarisms of the old books.

Much research and care have been devoted to the collection and reproduction of numerous illustrations.

My acknowledgements are due to the Secretary of State for India for general liberty to use illustrations in official publications, . . . and to K. Panikkar, Esq., for the loan of an engraving of *Māhādājī Sindia*. A few coins have been copied from the *Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, by permission. . . .

NOTE.—As the book probably will be used in colleges, it seems well to say that the two sections of the Introduction are not intended for junior students, who may leave them unread.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- A. C.—After Christ.
 A. D.—Anno Domini.
Āīn.—*Āīn-i Akbarī*, by Abu-l Fazl, transl. Blochmann and Jarrett.
 B. M.—British Museum.
 E. I. Co.—East India Company.
I. G.—*Imperial Gazetteer of India* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1907, 1908).
Ind. Ant.—*Indian Antiquary*, Bombay, 1872 to date.
 I. O.—India Office, London.
J. A. S. B.—*Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Calcutta.
J. B. O. (or *J. B. & O.*) *Res. Soc.*—*Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*.
J. P. H. S.—*Journal of the Panjab Historical Society*.
J. R. A. S.—*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, London.
J. U. P. H. S.—*Journal of the United Provinces Historical Society*.
 N. W. P.—North-Western Provinces.
 R. I.—Rulers of India Series.
 U. P.—United Provinces of Agra and Oudh.

NOTE.—An index number above the title of a book indicates the edition ;
 e. g., *Annals of Rural Bengal*⁷ means the 7th edition of that work.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

THE relevant entries in the list of Additions and Corrections printed in the first edition of the whole work have now been incorporated with the text and notes.

The opportunity has been taken by the author to rectify sundry minute slips or errors, to insert a few additional references, and to modify the wording of three or four passages liable to misconstruction. The principal corrections of matters of fact will be found on pages xvi *note*, 488, 492, 551 *note*, 606, 617, 640, 767, and 781 *note* 1.

INTRODUCTION

SECTION 1

The geographical foundation ; diversity in unity and unity in diversity ; the scenes and periods of the story ; sea-power ; forms of government ; the history of thought.

The geographical unit. The India of this book is almost exclusively the geographical unit called by that name on the ordinary maps, bounded on the north, north-west, and north-east by mountain ranges, and elsewhere by the sea. The extensive Burmese territories, although now governed as part of the Indian empire, cannot be described as being part of India. Burma has a separate history, rarely touching on that of India prior to the nineteenth century. Similarly, Ceylon, although geologically a fragment detached from the peninsula in relatively recent times, always has had a distinct political existence, requiring separate historical treatment. The island is not now included in the Indian empire, and its affairs will not be discussed in this work, except incidentally. Certain portions of Balôchistan now administered or controlled by the Indian Government lie beyond the limits of the geographical unit called India. Aden and sundry other outlying dependencies of the Indian empire obviously are not parts of India, and the happenings in those places rarely demand notice.


Vast extent of area. Formal, technical descriptions of the geographical and physical features of India may be found in many easily accessible books, and need not be reproduced here. But certain geographical facts with a direct bearing on the history require brief comment, because, as Richard Hakluyt truly observed long ago, 'Geographie and Chronologie are the Sunne and the Moone, the right eye and the left eye of all history.' The large extent of the area of India, which may be correctly designated as a sub-continent, is a material geographical fact. The history of a region so vast, bounded by a coast-line of about 3,400 miles, more or less, and a mountain barrier on the north some 1,600 miles in length, and inhabited by a population numbering nearly 300 millions, necessarily must be long and intricate. The detailed treatment suitable to the story of a small country cannot be applied in a general history of India. The author of such a book must be content to sketch his picture in outlines boldly drawn, and to leave out multitudes of recorded particulars.

Continental and peninsular regions. Another geographical fact, namely, that India comprises both a large continental, sub-tropical area, and an approximately equal peninsular, tropical area, has had immense influence upon the history.

Three territorial compartments. Geographical conditions

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divided Indian history, until the nineteenth century, into three well-marked territorial compartments, not to mention minor distinct areas, such as the Konkan, the Himalayan region, and others. The three are : (1) the northern plains forming the basins of the



INDIA PHYSICAL.

Indus and Ganges ; (2) the Deccan plateau lying to the south of the Narbadā, and to the north of the Krishnā and Tungabhadrā rivers ; and (3) the far south, beyond those rivers, comprising the group of Tamil states. Ordinarily, each of those three geographical compartments has had a distinct, highly complex story of

its own. The points of contact between the three histories are not very numerous.

Dominance of the north. The northern plains, the Āryāvarta of the old books, and the Hindostan of more recent times, always have been the seat of the principal empires and the scene of the events most interesting to the outer world. The wide waterways of the great snow-fed rivers and the fertile level plains are natural advantages which have inevitably attracted a teeming population from time immemorial. The open nature of the country, easily accessible to martial invaders from the north-west, has given frequent occasion for the formation of powerful kingdoms ruled by vigorous foreigners. The peninsular, tropical section of India, isolated from the rest of the world by its position, and in contact with other countries only by sea-borne commerce, has pursued its own course, little noticed by and caring little for foreigners. The historian of India is bound by the nature of things to direct his attention primarily to the north, and is able to give only a secondary place to the story of the Deccan plateau and the far south.

No southern power ever could attempt to master the north, but the more ambitious rulers of Āryāvarta or Hindostan often have extended their sway far beyond the dividing line of the Narbadā. When Dupleix in the eighteenth century dreamed of a Franco-Indian empire with its base in the peninsula he was bound to fail. The success of the English was dependent on their acquisition of rich Bengal and their command of the Gangetic waterway. In a later stage of the British advance the conquest of the Panjāb was conditioned by the control of the Indus navigation, previously secured by the rather unscrupulous proceedings of Lords Auckland and Ellenborough. The rivers of the peninsula do not offer similar facilities for penetration of the interior.

Changes in rivers. The foregoing general observations indicate broadly the ways in which the geographical position and configuration of India have affected the course of her history. But the subject will bear a little more elaboration and the discussion of certain less conspicuous illustrations of the bearing of geography upon history. Let us consider for a moment the changes in the great rivers of India, which, when seen in full flood, suggest thoughts of the ocean rather than of inland streams. Unless one has battled in an open ferry-boat with one of those mighty masses of surging water in the height of the rains, it is difficult to realize their demoniac power. They cut and carve the soft alluvial plains at their will, recking of nothing. Old beds of the Sutlaj can be traced across a space eighty-five miles wide. The Indus, the Ganges, the Kosi, the Brahmaputra, and scores of other rivers behave, each according to its ability, in the same way, despising all barriers, natural or artificial. Who can tell where the Indus flowed in the days of Alexander the Great? Yet books, professedly learned, are not afraid to trace his course minutely through the Panjāb and Sind by the help of some modern map, and to offer pretended identifications of sites upon the banks of rivers which certainly


were somewhere else twenty-two centuries ago. We know that they must have been somewhere else, but where they were no man can tell. So with the Vedic rivers, several of which bear the ancient names. The rivers of the Rishis were not the rivers of to-day. The descriptions prove that in the old, old days their character often differed completely from what it now is, and experience teaches that their courses must have been widely divergent. Commentators in their arm-chairs with the latest edition of the Indian *Atlas* opened out before them are not always willing to be bothered with such inconvenient facts. Ever since the early Muhammadan invasions the changes in the rivers have been enormous, and the contemporary histories of the foreign conquerors cannot be understood unless the reality and extent of those changes be borne constantly in mind. One huge river-system, based on the extinct Ilakrā or Wahindah river, which once flowed down from the mountains through Bahāwalpur, has wholly disappeared, the final stages having been deferred until the eighteenth century. Scores of mounds, silent witnesses to the existence of numberless forgotten and often nameless towns, bear testimony to the desolation wrought when the waters of life desert their channels. A large and fascinating volume might be devoted to the study and description of the freaks of Indian rivers.

Position of cities. In connexion with that topic another point may be mentioned. The founders of the more important old cities almost invariably built, if possible, on the bank of a river, and not only that, but between two rivers in the triangle above the confluence. Dozens of examples might be cited, but one must suffice. The ancient imperial capital, Pātaliputra, represented by the modern Patna, occupied such a secure position between the guarding waters of the Sōn and the Ganges. The existing city, twelve miles or so below the confluence, has lost the strategical advantages of its predecessor. Historians who forget the position of Pātaliputra in relation to the rivers go hopelessly wrong in their comments on the texts of the ancient Indian and foreign authors.

Changes of the land. Changes in the coast-line and the level of the land have greatly modified the course of history, and must be remembered by the historian who desires to avoid ludicrous blunders. The story of the voyage of Nearchos, for instance, cannot be properly appreciated by any student who fails to compare the descriptions recorded by the Greeks with the surveys of modern geographers. When the changes in the coast-line are understood, statements of the old authors which looked erroneous at first sight are found to be correct. The utter destruction of the once wealthy commercial cities of Korkai and Kāyal on the Tinnevely coast, now miles from the sea and buried under sand dunes, ceases to be a mystery when we know, as we do, that the coast level has risen. In other localities, some not very distant from the places named, the converse has happened, and the sea has advanced, or, in other words, the land has sunk. The careful investigator of ancient history needs to be continually on his guard

against the insidious deceptions of the modern map. Many learned professors, German and others, have tumbled headlong into the pit. The subject being a hobby of mine I must not ride the steed too far.

The scenes of Indian history. Emphasis has been laid on the fact that most of the notable events of Indian history occurred in one or other of the three great regions separated from each other by natural barriers. Hindostan, the Deccan, and the far




• CHANGED COURSE OF SŌN.

south continued to be thus kept apart until the rapid progress of scientific discovery during the nineteenth century overthrew the boundaries set by nature. The mighty Indus and Ganges are now spanned by railway bridges as securely as a petty water-course is crossed by a six-foot culvert. The No Man's Land of Gondwāna—the wild country along the banks of the Narbadā and among the neighbouring hills—no longer hides any secrets. Roads and railways climb the steepest passes of the Western Ghāts, which more than once tried the nerves of our soldiers in the old wars. The magnificent natural haven of Bombay always was as good as it is now, but it was of no use to anybody as long as it was cut off from the interior of India by creeks, swamps, and

INTRODUCTION

mountains. The changes in modern conditions, which it would be tedious to enumerate, have made Bombay the premier city of India. Royal command may decree that the official head-quarters of the Government of India should shift from Calcutta to Delhi, but no proclamations can make the inland city of the Moguls the real capital of India, so long as the Indian empire is ruled by the masters of the sea. The claim to the first place may be disputed




NORTH-WESTERN PHYSICAL FEATURES.

between Calcutta and Bombay. No rival can share in the competition.

Fortresses. The progress of modern science has not only destroyed the political and strategical value of the natural barriers offered by mountains, rivers, and forests. It has also rendered useless the ancient fortresses, which used to be considered impregnable, and were more often won by bribery than by assault. Asirgarh in Khândēsh, which in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was reckoned to be one of the wonders of the world, so

that it was 'impossible to conceive a stronger fortress', defied the arms of Akbar, yielding only to his gold. Now it stands desolate, without a single soldier to guard it. When Lord Dufferin decided to pay Sindia the compliment of restoring Gwālior Fort to his keeping, the transfer could be effected without the slightest danger to the safety of the Empire. The numberless strongholds on the tops of the hills of the Deccan before which Aurangzēb wasted so



NORTH-WESTERN PASSES AND COUNTRIES.

many years are now open to any sightseer. The strategical points which dominated the military action of the Hindu and Muhammadan sovereigns are for the most part of no account in these days. The sieges of fortresses which occupy so large a space in the earlier history will never occur again. Modern generals think much more of a railway junction than of the most inaccessible castle.

The northern record. One reason why the historian must devote most of his space to the narrative of events occurring in northern India has been mentioned. Another is that the northern

record is far less imperfect than that of the peninsula. Very little is known definitely concerning the southern kingdoms before A. D. 600, whereas the history of Hindostan may be carried back twelve centuries earlier. The extreme deficiency of really ancient records concerning the peninsula leaves an immense gap in the history of India which cannot be filled.

Sea-power. The arrival of Vasco da Gama's three little ships at Calicut in 1498 revolutionized Indian history by opening up the country to bold adventurers coming by sea. The earlier maritime visitors to the coasts had come solely for purposes of commerce without any thought of occupation or conquest. It is needless here to recall how the Portuguese pointed out to their successors, Dutch, French, and English, the path of conquest, and so made possible the British empire of India. The country now is at the mercy of the power which commands the sea, and could not possibly be held by any power unable to control the sea routes. The strategical importance of the north-western passes has declined as that of Bombay and Karāchī has risen.

Endless diversity. The endless diversity in the Indian sub-continent is apparent and has been the subject of many trite remarks. From the physical point of view we find every extreme of altitude, temperature, rainfall, and all the elements of climate. The variety of the flora and fauna, largely dependent upon climatic conditions, is equally obvious. From the human point of view India has been often described as an ethnological museum, in which numberless races of mankind may be studied, ranging from savages of low degree to polished philosophers. That variety of races, languages, manners and customs is largely the cause of the innumerable political subdivisions which characterize Indian history before the unification effected by the British supremacy. Megasthenes in the fourth century B.C. heard of 118 kingdoms, and the actual number may well have been more. Even now the Native or Protected States, small and great, may be reckoned as about 700. In all ages the crowd of principalities and powers has been almost past counting. From time to time a strong paramount power has arisen and succeeded for a few years in introducing a certain amount of political unity, but such occasions were rare. When no such power existed, the states, hundreds in number, might be likened to a swarm of free, mutually repellent molecules in a state of incessant movement, now flying apart, and again coalescing.

Unity in diversity. How then, in the face of such bewildering diversity, can a history of India be written and compressed into a single volume of moderate bulk? The difficulties arising from the manifold diversities summarily indicated above are real, and present serious obstacles both to the writer and to the reader of Indian history. A chronicle of all the kingdoms for thousands of years is manifestly impracticable. The answer to the query is found in the fact that India offers unity in diversity. The underlying unity being less obvious than the superficial diversity, its

nature and limitations merit exposition. The mere fact that the name India conveniently designates a sub-continental area does not help to unify history any more than the existence of the name Asia could make a history of that continent feasible. The unity sought must be of a nature more fundamental than that implied in the currency of a geographical term.

Political union. Political union attained by the subjection of all India to one monarch or paramount authority would, of course, be sufficient to make smooth the path of the historian. Such political union never was enjoyed by all India until the full establishment of the British sovereignty, which may be dated in one sense so recently as 1877, when Queen Victoria became Empress of India; in another sense from 1858, when Her Majesty assumed the direct government of British India; and in a third sense from 1818, when the Marquess of Hastings shattered the Marāthā power, and openly proclaimed the fact that the East India Company had become the paramount authority throughout the whole country. Very few rulers, Hindu or Muhammadan, attained sovereignty even as extensive as that claimed by the Marquess of Hastings. The Mauryas, who after the defeat of Seleukos Nikator held the country now called Afghanistan as far as the Hindu Kush, exercised authority more or less direct over all India Proper down to the northern parts of Mysore. But even Asoka did not attempt to bring the Tamil kingdoms under his dominion. The empires of the Kushāns and Guptas were confined to the north. In the fourteenth century Muhammad bin Tughlak for a few years exercised imperfect sovereign powers over very nearly the whole of India. Akbar and his historians never mention the Tamil states, and so far as appears never heard of the powerful Hindu empire of Vijayanagar, which broke up in 1565. But the Great Mogul cherished a passionate desire to subdue the kingdoms of the Deccan plateau. His success, however, was incomplete, and did not extend beyond Ahmadnagar in the latitude of Bombay. His descendants pursued his policy, and at the close of the eighteenth century Aurangzēb's officers levied tribute two or three times from Tanjore and Trichinopoly. Thus Aurangzēb might be regarded as being in a very loose sense the suzerain of almost all India. The Kābul territory continued to be part of the empire until 1739. The periods of partial political unification thus summarily indicated afford welcome footholds to the historian, and are far easier to deal with than the much longer intervals when no power with any serious claim to paramountcy existed.

The political unity of all India, although never attained perfectly in fact, always was the ideal of the people throughout the centuries. The conception of the universal sovereign as the Chakravartin Rājā runs through Sanskrit literature and is emphasized in scores of inscriptions. The story of the gathering of the nations to the battle of Kurukshetra, as told in the *Mahābhārata*, implies the belief that all the Indian peoples, including those of the extreme south, were united by real bonds and concerned in

INTRODUCTION

interests common to all. European writers, as a rule, have been more conscious of the diversity than of the unity of India. Joseph Cunningham, an author of unusually independent spirit, is an exception. When describing the Sikh fears of British aggression in 1845, he recorded the acute and true observation that 'Hindustan, moreover, from Caubul to the valley of Assam, and the island of Ceylon, is regarded as one country, and dominion in it is associated in the minds of the people with the predominance of one monarch or one race'.¹ India therefore possesses, and always has possessed for considerably more than two thousand years, ideal political unity, in spite of the fact that actual complete union under one sovereign, universally acknowledged by all other princes and potentates, dates only from 1877. The immemorial persistence of that ideal goes a long way to explain the acquiescence of India in British rule, and was at the bottom of the passionate outburst of loyal devotion to their King-Emperor so touchingly expressed in many ways by princes and people in 1911.

Fundamental unity of Hinduism. The most essentially fundamental Indian unity rests upon the fact that the diverse peoples of India have developed a peculiar type of culture or civilization utterly different from any other type in the world. That civilization may be summed up in the term Hinduism. India primarily is a Hindu country, the land of the Brahmans, who have succeeded by means of peaceful penetration, not by the sword, in carrying their ideas into every corner of India. Caste, the characteristic Brahman institution, utterly unknown in Burma, Tibet, and other border lands, dominates the whole of Hindu India, and exercises no small influence over the powerful Muhammadan minority. Nearly all Hindus reverence Brahmans,² and all may be said to venerate the cow. Few deny the authority of the Vedas and the other ancient scriptures. Sanskrit everywhere is the sacred language. The great gods, Vishnu and Siva, are recognized and more or less worshipped in all parts of India. The pious pilgrim, when going the round of the holy places, is equally at home among the snows of Badrināth or on the burning sands of Rāma's Bridge. The seven sacred cities include places in the far south as well as in Hindostan. Similarly, the cult of rivers is common to all Hindus, and all alike share in the affection felt for the tales of the *Mahābhārata* and *Rāmāyana*.

India beyond all doubt possesses a deep underlying fundamental unity, far more profound than that produced either by geographical isolation or by political suzerainty. That unity transcends the innumerable diversities of blood, colour, language, dress, manners, and sect.

Limitations of unity. But the limitations are many. Caste, which, looked at broadly, unites all Hindus by differentiating them from the rest of mankind, disintegrates them by breaking

¹ *History of the Sikhs*² (1853), p. 283.

² The Lingāyats of the Kanarese country are the principal exception, but others exist.

them up into thousands of mutually exclusive and often hostile sections. It renders combined political or social action difficult, and in many cases impossible ; while it shuts off all Hindus in large measure from sympathy with the numerous non-Hindu population. The Muhammadans, by far the largest part of that population, are not concerned with most of the reasons which make all Hindus one in a sense. An Indian Muslim may be, and often is, far more in sympathy with an Arab or Persian fellow-believer than he is with his Hindu neighbour. The smaller communities, Christians, Jews, Parsees, and others, are still more distant from the Hindu point of view.

Nevertheless, when all allowances are made for the limitations, the fundamental unity of Hindu culture alone makes a general history of India feasible.

Dravidian culture. The Brahmanical ideas and institutions, although universally diffused in every province, have not been wholly victorious. Prehistoric forms of worship and many utterly un-Aryan social practices survive, especially in the peninsula among the peoples speaking Dravidian languages. We see there the strange spectacle of an exaggerated regard for caste coexisting with all sorts of weird notions and customs alien to Brahman tradition. While it is not improbable that the Dravidian civilization may be as old as or even older than the Indo-Aryan Brahmanical culture of the north, which was long regarded in the south as an unwelcome intruder to be resisted strenuously, the materials available for the study of early Dravidian institutions are too scanty and imperfectly explored to permit of history being based upon them. The historian's attention necessarily must be directed chiefly to the Indo-Aryan institutions of the north, which are much more fully recorded than those of the south. An enthusiastic southern scholar has expressed the opinion that 'the scientific historian of India . . . ought to begin his study with the basin of the Krishnā, of the Cauvery, of the Vaigai [in Madura and the Pāndya country] rather than with the Gangetic plain, as it has been now long, too long, the fashion'. That advice, however sound it may be in principle, cannot be followed in practice at present ; and, so far as I can see, it is not likely that even in a distant future it will be practicable to begin writing Indian history in the manner suggested.

Lack of political evolution. The interest attaching to the gradual evolution of political institutions is lacking in Indian history. The early tribal constitutions of a republican, or at any rate, oligarchical character, which are known to have existed among the Mālavas, Kshudrakas, and other nations in the time of Alexander the Great, as well as among the Lichchhavis and Yaudhēyas at much later dates, all perished without leaving a trace. Autocracy is substantially the only form of government with which the historian of India is concerned. Despotism does not admit of development. Individual monarchs vary infinitely in ability and character, but the nature of a despotic government

remains much the same at all times and in all places, whether the ruler be a saint or a tyrant.

Extinction of tribal constitutions. The reason for the extinction of the tribal constitutions appears to be that they were a Mongolian institution, the term Mongolian being used to mean tribes racially allied to the Tibetans, Gürkhas, and other Himalayan nations. The Mongolian element in the population of northern India before and after the Christian era was, I believe, much larger than is usually admitted. When the Mongolian people and ideas were overborne in course of time by the strangers who followed the Indo-Aryan or Brahmanical cult and customs, the tribal constitutions disappeared along with many other non-Aryan institutions. The Brahmanical people always were content with autocracy.¹ I use the term 'autocracy' or the equivalent 'despotism' without qualification intentionally, because I do not believe in the theory advocated by several modern Hindu authors that the ancient Indian king was a 'limited' or constitutional monarch. Those authors have been misled by taking too seriously the admonitions of the text-book writers that the ideal king should be endowed with all the virtues and should follow the advice of sage counsellors. In reality every Indian despot who was strong enough did exactly what he pleased. If any limitations on his authority were operative, they took effect only because he was weak. A strong sovereign like Chandragupta Maurya was not to be bound by the cobwebs of texts. Long afterwards, Akbar, notwithstanding his taste for sententious moral aphorisms, was equally self-willed.

Village and municipal institutions. Much sentimental rhetoric with little relation to the actual facts has been written about the supposed indestructible constitution of the Indo-Aryan village in the north. The student of highly developed village institutions, involving real local self-government administered on an elaborately organized system, should turn to the south and examine the constitution of the villages in the Chola kingdom as recorded for the period from the tenth to the twelfth centuries of the Christian era, and no doubt of extremely ancient origin.² Those institutions, like the tribal constitutions of the north, perished long ago, being killed by rulers who had no respect for the old indigenous modes of administration. The development of municipal institutions, which furnishes material for so many interesting chapters in European history, is a blank page in the history of India.

History of Indian thought. The defects in the subject-matter of Indian history pointed out in the foregoing observa-

¹ On this obscure subject see the author's papers entitled 'Tibetan Affinities of the Lichehkhavis' (*Ind. Ant.*, vol. xxxii (1903), pp. 238 foll.; and 'Tibetan Illustration of the Yaudhēya Tribal Organization' (*ibid.*, vol. xxxv (1906)), p. 290); and K. P. Jayaswal, 'Republics in the Mahābhārata' (*J. O. & B. Res. Soc.*, vol. i, pp. 173-8). A well-executed treatise on the subject would be welcome.

² *E. II. I.*³ (1914), pp. 459, 464, with references.

tions undoubtedly tend to make the political history of the country rather dry reading. The more attractive story of the development of Indian thought as expressed in religion and philosophy, literature, art, and science cannot be written intelligibly unless it is built on the solid foundation of dynastic history, which alone can furnish the indispensable chronological basis. Readers who may be disposed to turn away with weariness from the endless procession of kingdoms and despots may console themselves by the reflection that a working acquaintance with the political history of India is absolutely essential as a preliminary for the satisfactory treatment of the story of the development of her ideas.

I have tried to give in this work, so far as unavoidable limitations permit, an outline of the evolution of Indian thought in various fields. Students who desire further information must consult special treatises when such exist.

Divisions of the history. The main divisions of a book on Indian history hardly admit of variation. I have drawn the line between the Ancient Period and the Hindu Period at the beginning of the Maurya dynasty as a matter of convenience. In the Hindu Period the death of Harsha in A.D. 647 marks a suitable place for beginning a fresh section. The subdivisions of the Muhammadan Period, occupying Books IV, V, VI, and including the Hindu empire of Vijayanagar, are almost equally self-evident. Three books, VII, VIII, and IX, are devoted to the British Period. The dividing line between Books VII and VIII should be drawn in my opinion at the year 1818, and not at the close of the administration of the Marquess of Hastings. The significance of the events of 1858, when the series of Viceroys begins, cannot be mistaken.

AUTHORITIES

The subject-matter of this section has been treated previously by the author in several publications, namely, in *E. H. I.*³ (1914), Introduction; *Oxford Student's History of India*, latest ed., chap. i; and the *Oxford Survey of the British Empire* (1914), chap. vii. A good formal geographical book is the *Geography of India* by G. PATTERSON (*Christian Literature Soc. for India*, London, 1909). See also *I. G.* (Indian Empire), 1907, vol. i, and the Atlas of the same work (1909). The little book entitled *The Fundamental Unity of India* (Longmans, 1914), by Prof. RADHAKUMUD MOOKERJI is well written, learned, and accurate, notwithstanding its avowed political purpose. The influence of sea-power upon Indian history is expounded by Sir A. LYALL in *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India* (Murray, 1910).

SECTION 2

The Sources, or the Original Authorities.

Undated history before 650 B.C. A body of history strictly so-called must be built upon a skeleton of chronology, that is to say, on a series of dates more or less precise. In India, as in Greece, such a series begins about the middle or close of the seventh century before Christ.¹ Nothing approaching exact chronology being attainable for earlier times, the account which the historian can offer of those times necessarily is wanting in definiteness and precision. It is often difficult to determine even the sequence or successive order of events. Nevertheless, no historian of India and the Indians can escape from the obligation of offering some sort of picture of the life of undated ancient India, in its political, social, religious, literary, and artistic aspects, previous to the dawn of exact history. The early literature, composed chiefly in the Sanskrit, Pāli, and Tamil languages, supplies abundant material, much of which is accessible in one or other European tongue. The thorough exploration of the gigantic mass of literature, especially that of the southern books, is a task so vast that it cannot ever be completed. Large fields of study have been hardly investigated at all. But a great deal of good work has been accomplished, and the labours of innumerable scholars, European, American, and Indian have won results sufficiently certain to warrant the drawing of an outline sketch of the beginnings of Indian life and history. Although the lines of the sketch are somewhat wanting in clearness, especially with reference to the Vedic age and the early Dravidian civilization, we moderns can form a tolerably distinct mental picture of several stages of Indian history prior to the earliest date ascertained with even approximate accuracy. Such an outline sketch or picture will be presented in the second chapter of Book I.

Chronological puzzles. Definite chronological history begins about 650 B.C. for Northern India. No positive historical statement can be made concerning the peninsula until a date much later. Even in the north all approximate dates before the invasion of Alexander in 326 B.C. are obtained only by reasoning back from the known to the unknown. The earliest absolutely certain precise date is that just named, 326 B.C.

The student may be glad to have in this place a brief exposition of the special difficulties which lie in the way of ascertaining precise

¹ 'The first exact date we have bearing on the history of Greece' is April 6, 648 B. C., when an eclipse of the sun occurred which was witnessed and noted by the poet Archilochus (Bury, *Hist. of Greece*, ed. 1904, p. 119). But the earliest really historical date known with any approach to accuracy seems to be that of Cylon's conspiracy at Athens, which is placed *about* 632 B.C. The archonship of Solon is put in either 594-593 or 592-591 B.C. (*ibid.*, pp. 178, 182).

dates for the events of early Hindu history. Numerous dates are recorded in one fashion or another, but the various authorities are often contradictory, and usually open to more than one interpretation. Dates expressed only in regnal years, such as 'in the 8th year after the coronation of King A. B.', are not of much use unless we can find out by other means the time when King A. B. lived. Very often the year is given as simply 'the year 215', or the like, without mention of the era used, which to the writer needed no specification. In the same way when modern Europeans speak of the 'year 1914', everybody understands that to mean 'after Christ', A. D. or A. C. In other cases an era may be named, but it is not certain from what date the era is to be reckoned. For example, many dates recorded in the Gupta era were known long before historians could make confident use of them. When Fleet was able to prove that Gupta Era, year 1 = A. D. 319-20, the whole Gupta dynasty dropped at once into its proper historical setting. The fixation of that one date brought order into several centuries of early Indian history. Dated inscriptions of the Indo-Scythian or Kushān kings are even more abundant, but up to the present time we do not know to which era a record of theirs dated, say, 'in the year 98' should be referred; and in consequence an important section of Indian history continues to be the sport of conjecture, so that it is impossible to write with assurance a narrative of the events connected with one of the most interesting dynasties. That chronological uncertainty spoils the history of religion, art, and literature, as well as the purely political chronicle, for the first two centuries of the Christian era.

More than thirty different eras have been used in Indian annals from time to time.¹ Difficulties of various kinds, astronomical and other, are involved in the attempt to determine the dates on which the various eras begin. Although those difficulties have been surmounted to a large extent many obscurities remain.

Synchronisms; old and new styles. Several puzzles have been solved by the use of 'synchronisms', that is to say, by the use of stray bits of information showing that King A. of unknown date was contemporary with King B. of known date. The standard example is that of Chandragupta Maurya, the contemporary of Alexander the Great for some years. The approximate date of King Meghavarna of Ceylon in the fourth century A. C. is similarly indicated by the 'synchronism' with the Indian King Samudragupta; many other cases might be cited.

The testimony of foreign authors is specially useful in this connexion, because they often give dates the meaning of which is known with certainty. Indian historians obtain much help in that way from the chronicles of Greece, China, and Ceylon, all of which have well-known systems of chronology. The subject might be further illustrated at great length, but what has been said may suffice to give the student a notion of the difficulties of

¹ Cunningham's *Book of Indian Eras* (1883) discusses 27, and many more are mentioned in records.

Hindu chronology, and some of the ways in which many of them have been cleared away.

In the Muhammadan period chronological puzzles are mostly due to the innumerable contradictions of the authorities, but trouble is often experienced in converting Muslim Hijrī dates exactly into the terms of the Christian era. Akbar's fanciful Ilāhī, or Divine Era, and Tippoo Sultan's still more whimsical chronology present special conundrums. In the British period nearly all dates are ascertained with ease and certainty, subject to occasional conflict of evidence or confusion between the old and new styles, which differ by ten days in the seventeenth and by eleven days in the eighteenth century.¹

Six classes of sources of Hindu history. The nature of the sources of or original authorities for Hindu history from 650 B. C. will now be considered briefly. The native or indigenous sources may be classified under five heads, namely : (1) inscriptions, or epigraphic evidence ; (2) coins, or numismatic evidence ; (3) monuments, buildings, and works of art, or archaeological evidence ; (4) tradition, as recorded in literature ; and (5) ancient historical writings, sometimes contemporary with the events narrated. The sixth source, foreign testimony, is mostly supplied either by the works of travellers of various nations, or by regular historians, especially the Cingalese, Greek, and Chinese. The value of each class of evidence will now be explained.

Inscriptions. Inscriptions have been given the first place in the list because they are, on the whole, the most important and trustworthy source of our knowledge. Unfortunately, they do not at present go further back than the third century B.C. with certainty, although it is not unlikely that records considerably earlier may be discovered, and it is possible that a very few known documents may go back beyond the reign of Asoka. Indian inscriptions, which usually are incised on either stone or metal, may be either official documents set forth by kings or other authorities, or records made by private persons for various purposes. Most of the inscriptions on stone either commemorate particular events or record the dedication of buildings or images. The commemorative documents range from the simple signature of a pilgrim to long and elaborate Sanskrit poems detailing the achievements of victorious kings. Such poems are called *prasasti*. The inscriptions on metal are for the most part grants of land inscribed on plates of

¹ Pope Gregory XIII undertook to reform the Roman calendar by correcting the error which had gradually grown to inconvenient dimensions in the course of centuries. Accordingly he decreed in 1582 that October 5 by the old calendar of that year should be called October 15. The reform was adopted either immediately or soon by Portugal, France, and several other nations ; but in Great Britain and Ireland the change was not effected until 1752, Parliament having passed an Act enacting that September 3 of that year should be deemed to be September 14, new style ; eleven days being dropped out of the reckoning. Russia still adhered to the old style until 1917 and was then nearly 13 days in error.

copper. They are sometimes extremely long, especially in the south, and usually include information about the reigning king and his ancestors. Exact knowledge of the dates of events in early Hindu history, so far as it has been attained, rests chiefly on the testimony of inscriptions.

Records of an exceptional kind occur occasionally. The most remarkable of such documents are the edicts of Asoka, which in the main are sermons on *dharma*, the Law of Piety or Duty. At Ajmēr in Rājputāna and at Dhār in Central India fragments of plays have been found inscribed on stone tablets. Part of a treatise on architecture is incised on one of the towers at Chitōr, and a score of music for the *vinā*, or Indian lute, has been found in the Pudukottai State, Madras. A few of the metal inscriptions are dedications, and one very ancient document on copper, the Sohgaura plate from the Gorakhpur District, is concerned with Government storehouses.

The inscriptions which have been catalogued and published more or less fully aggregate many thousands. The numbers in the peninsula especially are enormous.

Coins. The legends on coins really are a class of inscriptions on metal, but it is more convenient to treat them separately. The science of numismatics, or the study of ancient coins, requires special expert knowledge. Coins, including those without any legends, can be made to yield much information concerning the condition of the country in the distant past. The dates frequently recorded on them afford invaluable evidence for fixing chronology. Even when the outline of the history is well known from books, as is the case for most of the Muhammadan period, the numismatic testimony helps greatly in settling doubtful dates, and in illustrating details of many kinds. Our scanty knowledge of the Bactrian, Indo-Greek, and Indo-Parthian dynasties rests chiefly on inferences drawn from the study of coins.

Archaeological evidence. The archaeological evidence, regarded as distinct from that of inscriptions and coins, is obtained by the systematic skilled examination of buildings, monuments, and works of art. Careful registration of the stratification of the ruins on ancient sites, that is to say, of the exact order in which the remains of one period follow those of another, often gives valuable proof of date. The excavations on the site of Taxila, for instance, have done much to clear up the puzzle of the Kushān or Indo-Scythian chronology already mentioned. The scientific description of buildings erected for religious or civil purposes, such as temples, *stūpas*, palaces, and private houses, throws welcome light on the conditions prevailing in ancient times. The study of works of art, including images, frescoes, and other objects, enables us to draw in outline the history of Indian art, and often affords a most illuminating commentary on the statements in books. The history of Indian religions cannot be properly understood by students who confine their attention to literary evidence. The testimony of the monuments and works of art is equally important,

and, in fact, those remains tell much which is not to be learned from books. Intelligent appreciation of the material works wrought by the ancients is necessary for the formation of a true mental picture of the past. Such observations apply equally to the Hindu and the Muhammadan periods.

Tradition almost the sole source of undated history. The knowledge, necessarily extremely imperfect, which we possess concerning ancient India between 650 and 326 B.C. is almost wholly derived from tradition as recorded in literature of various kinds, chiefly composed in the Sanskrit, Pāli, and Tamil languages. Most of the early literature is of a religious kind, and the strictly historical facts have to be collected laboriously, bit by bit, from works which were not intended to serve as histories. Some valuable scraps of historical tradition have been picked out of the writings of grammarians ; and several plays, based on historical facts, yield important testimony. Tradition continues to be a rich source of historical information long after 326 B.C.

Absence of Hindu historical literature explained. The trite observation that Indian literature, prior to the Muhammadan period, does not include formal histories, although true in a sense, does not present the whole truth. Most of the Sanskrit books were composed by Brahmans, who certainly had not a taste for writing histories, their interest being engaged in other pursuits. But the Rājās were eager to preserve annals of their own doings, and took much pains to secure ample and permanent record of their achievements. They are not to blame for the melancholy fact that their efforts have had little success. The records laboriously prepared and regularly maintained have perished almost completely in consequence of the climate, including insect pests in that term, and of the innumerable political revolutions from which India has suffered. Every court in the old Hindu kingdoms maintained official bards and chroniclers whose duty it was to record and keep up the annals of the state. Some portion of such chronicles has been preserved and published by Colonel Tod, the author of the famous book, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan*, first published in 1829, but that work stands almost alone.¹ The great mass of the Rājās' annals has perished beyond recall.¹ Some fragments of the early chronicles clearly are preserved in the royal genealogies and connected historical observations recorded in the more ancient Purānas ; and numerous extracts from local records are given in the prefaces to many inscriptions. Thus it appears that the Hindus were not indifferent to history, although the Brahmans, the principal literary class, cared little for historical composition as a form of literature, except in the form of *prasastis*, some of which are poems of considerable literary merit. Such Sanskrit histories as exist usually were produced in the border countries, the best being the metrical chronicle of Kashmir, called the *Rāja-taranginī*, composed in the twelfth century. Even that

¹ The survey of Rājputāna literature now in progress will disclose many more historical works.

work does not attain exactly to the European ideal of a formal history. Several Brahman authors, notably Bāna in the seventh century, wrote interesting works, half history and half romance, which contain a good deal of authentic historical matter. Our exceptionally full knowledge of the story of Harsha vardhana, King of Thānēsar and Kanauj, is derived largely from the work of Bāna entitled 'The Deeds of Harsha'.

Historical or semi-historical compositions are numerous in the languages of the south. The Mackenzie collection of manuscripts catalogued by H. H. Wilson contains a large number of texts which may be regarded as histories in some degree.

Foreign evidence. The indigenous or native sources enumerated above, which must necessarily be the basis of early Hindu history, are supplemented to a most important extent by the writings of foreigners. Hearsay notes recorded by the Greek authors Herodotus and Ktesias in the fifth century B. C. record some scraps of information, but Europe was almost ignorant of India until the veil was lifted by the operations of Alexander (326 to 323 B. C.) and the reports of his officers. Those reports, lost as a whole, survive in considerable extracts quoted in the writings of later authors, Greek and Roman. The expedition of Alexander the Great is not mentioned distinctly by any Hindu author, and the references to the subject by Muhammadan authors are of little value. Megasthenes, the ambassador of Seleukos Nikator to Chandragupta Maurya in the closing years of the fourth century, wrote a highly valuable account of India, much of which has been preserved in fragments.

Formal Chinese histories from about 120 B. C. have something to tell us, but by far the most important and interesting of all the foreign witnesses are the numerous Chinese pilgrims who visited the Holy Land of Buddhism, between A. D. 400 and 700. Fa-hien, the earliest of them (A. D. 399-414), gives life to the bald chronicle of Chandragupta Vikramāditya, as constructed from inscriptions and coins. The learned Hiuen Tsang, or Yuan Chwang, in the seventh century, does the same for Harsha vardhana, and also records innumerable matters of interest concerning every part of India.* I-tsing and more than sixty other pilgrims have left valuable notes of their travels. A book on the early history of Hindu India would be a very meagre and dry record but for the narratives of the pilgrims, which are full of vivid detail.

Alberūnī. Alberūnī, justly entitled the Master, a profoundly learned mathematician and astronomer, who entered India in the train of Mahmūd of Ghaznī early in the eleventh century, applied his powerful intellect to the thorough study of the whole life of the Indians. He mastered the difficult Sanskrit language, and produced a truly scientific treatise, entitled 'An Enquiry into India' (*Tahkik-i Hind*), which is a marvel of well-digested erudition. More than five centuries later that great book served as a model to Abu-l-Fazl, whose 'Institutes of Akbar' (*Āin-i Akbarī*) plainly betray the unacknowledged debt due to Alberūnī.

Muhammadian histories. Muhammadans, unlike the Brahmans, always have shown a liking and aptitude for the writing of professed histories, so that every Muslim dynasty in Asia has found its chronicler. The authors who deal with Indian history wrote, as a rule, in the Persian language. Most of the books are general histories of the Muslim world, in which Indian affairs occupy a comparatively small space, but a few works are confined to Indian subjects. The most celebrated is the excellent and conscientious compilation composed by Firishta (Ferishta) in the reigns of Akbar and Jahāngīr, which forms the basis of Elphinstone's *History of India* and of most modern works on the subject.

A comprehensive general view of the Indian histories in Persian is to be obtained from the translations and summaries in the eight volumes of *The History of India as told by its own Historians* (London, 1867-77) by Sir Henry Elliot and Professor John Dowson. Sir Edward Bayley's incomplete work entitled the *History of Gujarāt* is a supplement to Elliot and Dowson's collection. The English translations of the *Tabakāt-i Nāsiri* by Raverty; of the *Āin-i Akbari* by Blochmann and Jarrett; of the *Akbarnāma* and the *Memoirs of Jahāngīr* by H. Beveridge; of Badāoni's book by Ranking and Lowe; and Prof. Jadunāth Sarkar's learned account of Aurangzēb's reign may be specially mentioned. Many other important books exist. The author of this volume has published a detailed biography of Akbar.

The modern historian of India, therefore, when he comes to the Muhammadan period, finds plenty of history books ready made from which he can draw most of his material. He is not reduced to the necessity of piecing together his story by combining fragments of information laboriously collected from inscriptions, coins, traditions, and passing literary references, as he is compelled to do when treating of the Hindu period. His principal difficulties arise from the contradictions of his authorities, the defects of their mode of composition, and endless minor chronological puzzles.

The epigraphic, numismatic, and monumental testimony is needed only for the completion and correction of details.

The histories written in Persian have many faults when judged by European standards, but, whatever may be the opinion held concerning those defects, it is impossible to write the history of Muhammadan India without using the Persian chronicles as its foundation.

Foreign evidence for the Muhammadan period. Foreign testimony is as valuable for the Muhammadan period as it is for the Hindu. From the ninth century onwards Muslim merchants and other travellers throw light upon the history of mediaeval India. Some scanty notes recorded by European observers in the fifteenth century have been preserved; and from the sixteenth century numerous works by European travellers present a mass of authentic information supplementary to that recorded by the Muslim historians, who looked at things from a different point of view, and omitted mention of many matters interesting to foreign

observers and modern readers. The reports of the Jesuit missionaries for the Mogul period possess special value, having been written by men highly educated, specially trained, and endowed with powers of keen observation. Large use is made in this volume of those reports which have been too often neglected by modern writers. References to the works of the leading Jesuits and the other foreign travellers will be given in due course.

Authorities for Indo-European history and British Period.

State papers and private original documents of many kinds dating as far back as a thousand years ago are fairly abundant in most countries of Europe, and supply a vast quarry of material for the historian. In India they are wholly wanting for both the Hindu and the pre-Mogul Muhammadan periods, except in so far as their place is supplied by inscriptions on stone and metal. A few documents from the reigns of Akbar and his successors survive, but most of what we know about the Moguls is derived from the secondary evidence of historians, as supplemented by the testimony of the foreign travellers, inscriptions, and coins. The case changes with the appearance of Europeans on the scene. The records of the East India Company go back to the beginning of the seventeenth century, and the Portuguese archives contain numerous documents of the sixteenth century.

From the middle of the eighteenth century, the commencement of the British period, the mass of contemporary papers, public, and private, is almost infinite. Considerable portions of the records have been either printed at length or catalogued, and much of the printed material has been worked up by writers on special sections of the history, but an enormous quantity remains unused. In the composition of this work I have not attempted to explore manuscript collections, and have necessarily been obliged to content myself with printed matter only so far as I could manage to read and digest it. No person can read it all, or nearly all. The leading authorities consulted will be noted at the end of each chapter.

Present state of Indian historical studies. A brief survey of the present state of Indian historical studies will not be out of place in connexion with the foregoing review of the original authorities.

No general history of the Hindu period was in existence before the publication in 1904 of the first edition of the *Early History of India*. The more condensed treatment of the subject in this volume is based on the third edition of that work, published in 1914, but much new material has been used; and the subject has been treated from a point of view to some extent changed. Many sections of the story need further elucidation, and it is certain that research will add greatly to our knowledge of the period in the near future. Numerous eager inquirers are now at work, who contribute something of value almost every month.

The Muhammadan period. The publication in 1841 of Elphinstone's justly famous *History of India* made possible for the

first time systematic study of the Indo-Muhammadan history of Hindostan or Northern India down to the battle of Pānīpat in 1761. Although Elphinstone's book, mainly based on the compilations of Firishṭa and Khāfī Khān, is of permanent value, it is no disparagement of its high merit to say that in these changed times it is no longer adequate for the needs of either the close student or the general reader. Since Elphinstone wrote many authorities unknown to him have become accessible, archaeological discoveries have been numerous, and corrections of various kinds have become necessary. Moreover, the attitude of readers has been modified. They now ask for something more than is to be found in the austere pages of Elphinstone, who modelled his work on the lines adopted by Muslim chroniclers.

The history of the Sultans of Delhi is in an unsatisfactory state. Much preliminary dry research is required for the accurate ascertainment of the chronology and other facts. The subject is not attractive to a large number of students, and many years may elapse before a thoroughly sound account of the Sultanate of Delhi can be written. A foundation of specialized detailed studies is always needed before a concise narrative can be composed with confidence and accuracy. I have not attempted in this volume to probe deeply among the difficulties connected with the histories of the Sultanate, but venture to hope that I may have succeeded in presenting the subject with a certain amount of freshness, especially in dealing with the reign of Muhammad bin Tughlak. Although considerable advance has been made in the study of the history of the Bahmanī empire and other Muslim kingdoms which became independent of Delhi in the fourteenth century, there is plenty of room for further investigation. The chapters on the subject in this volume are based on the examination of various and sometimes conflicting authorities. The story of the extensive Hindu empire of Vijayanagar (1336-1565) has been largely elucidated by the labours of Mr. Sewell, whose excellent work has been continued and in certain matters corrected by several authors of Indian birth. In these days some of the best historical research is done by Indian scholars, a fact which has resulted in a profound change in the presentation of the history of their land. The public addressed by a modern historian differs essentially in composition and character from that addressed by Elphinstone or Mill.

The true history of the Mogul dynasty is only beginning to be known. The story of Bābur, Humāyūn, and Akbar has been illuminated by the researches of Mr. and Mrs. Henry Beveridge, and the study of Akbar's life by the author of this volume includes much novel matter. The interesting reign of Jahāngīr has been badly handled in the current books, Elphinstone's included. The publication of a good version of that emperor's authentic *Memoirs*, and the use of the forgotten third volume of Du Jarrie's great work, not to speak of minor advantages, have enabled me to give an abbreviated account of Jahāngīr's reign, which, so far as it

goes, may fairly claim to be nearer to the truth than any narrative yet printed.

The reign of Shāhjahān, prior to the war of succession, still awaits critical study, based on the original authorities; but my treatment of the material available will be found to present a certain amount of novelty. The long and difficult reign of Aurangzēb is being discussed by Professor Jadunāth Sarkār with adequate care and learning. His work, so far as it has been published, is an indispensable authority. The dreary history of the later Moguls has been considerably elucidated in the monographs by Irvine and other works by specialists.

The British Period. James Mill's famous work, the *History of British India*, published between 1806 and 1818, brought together for the first time, to use the author's words, 'a history of that part of the British transactions, which have had an immediate relation to India'. Mill's book, notwithstanding its well-known faults, will always be valuable for reference. But it is a hundred years old, and much has happened since it was written. A history of the British period, whether long or short, must now be planned on somewhat different lines, and must include at least the whole of the nineteenth century.

No really satisfactory work on the period exists. The reason perhaps is that the material is too vast to be handled properly. The absence of any first class work on a large scale renders impossible at present the preparation of a condensed history capable of satisfying the ideals of an author or the requirements of skilled critics. The composition of a sound, large work on the subject would be more than sufficient occupation for a long life. A writer who aims only at producing a readable, reasonably accurate, and up-to-date general history of India within the limits of a single volume, must be content to do his best with so much of the overabundant material as he has leisure to master.

Changed methods. It will be apparent from the foregoing summary review of the present condition of Indian historical studies, that the writer of a comparatively short history, while enjoying various advantages denied to his predecessors even a few years ago, is not at present in a position to supply a uniformly authentic and digested narrative in all the sections of his work. In some fields the ground has been thoroughly, or at any rate, laboriously cultivated, whereas in others, it has been but lightly scratched by the plough of investigation.

The value and interest of history depend largely on the degree in which the present is illuminated by the past. Our existing conditions differ so radically from those which prevailed in the times of our grandfathers and great-grandfathers, and our positive knowledge of the facts of the past has increased so enormously that a new book on Indian history—even though avowedly compressed—must be composed in a new spirit, as it is addressed to a new audience. Certain it is that the history of India does not begin with the battle of Plassey, as some people think it ought to begin, and

that a sound, even if not profound knowledge of the older history will always be a valuable aid in the attempt to solve the numerous problems of modern India.

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BOOK VII

THE RULE OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO 1818

CHAPTER 1

The South ; French and English ; Haidar Ali and Mysore.

Period of transition, 1761-1818. Anglo-Indian history does not attain any semblance of unity until 1774, when, under the provisions of the Regulating Act of the preceding year, Warren Hastings was appointed the first Governor-General of Bengal and invested with a certain amount of ill-defined control over the other British settlements in India. The distinct recognition of the East India Company, representing the British Government, as the paramount authority in India was deferred until 1818.

The period between 1761 and 1818 which will be now discussed was one of transition. The Mogul emperor, whose acts had previously filled the pages of history, had shrunk into an insignificant phantom, almost powerless to influence the course of events. The traditional authority of the court of Delhi during the earlier years of the period merely served as the means of giving a colour of legality to the forcible and essentially lawless proceedings of the various parties who from time to time invoked the sanction of the imperial seal. After 1803 the ghost of imperial control was finally laid and the successor of Akbar became a purely titular sovereign, subsisting as a pensioner of the East India Company.

In the years following the disaster of Pānīpat, which had destroyed the first Marāthā confederacy and annihilated for the moment Hindu hopes of supremacy, the predatory armies of the Marāthās under the leadership of Sindia, Holkar, and other independent chiefs recovered strength with surprising rapidity, and soon acquired a position offering a reasonable prospect of renewed Hindu domination in both the Deccan and Hindostan. Two Muhammadan kingdoms in the south, ruled respectively by the Nizam and the upstart Haidar (Hyder) Ali, and also the Muslim Sūbadār of Bengal, disputed the Marāthā claims to levy systematic blackmail and so to exercise substantially sovereign authority over all the states within their reach.

Meantime the foreign settlers on the coast had begun to realize the practical value of European superiority in armament, the art of war, and general knowledge. They had learned, even before the close of the seventeenth century, that the 'country powers', to use the old phrase, were eager to compete for the help to be derived from small bodies of European gunners and disciplined

soldiers.¹ The two principal European nations represented by the factories on the coast were drawn into conflict with each other and as allies of one or other of the warring neighbouring states. Within the brief space of fifteen years between 1746 and 1761 the European rivalry was decided once and for all in favour of the English, French influence both in the south and in Bengal being reduced almost to nothing. Subsequent French efforts did not affect the result of the conflict which had been decided nine days after the carnage of Pānīpat.

Treatment of the subject. The transactions of the transitional period thus summarily reviewed in outline are fully recorded in a multitude of documents and books written in French and English, not to mention Dutch or other tongues. The history, although crowded with incidents of a stirring and often heroic character, has lost much of its interest by reason of the lapse of time and the complete disappearance from the Indian scene of all the parties to the ancient quarrels, save the sole survivor. Few modern readers can brace themselves to the task of mastering in detail the copious narratives of Orme and other writers of the olden time, who seem to belong to a vanished world. People living in the twentieth century are more interested in studying the causes and effects of the events of the eighteenth century than in the particulars of the events themselves, which are apt to seem petty or trivial.² But an author whose fate it is to write while the whole world is convulsed in the agonies of the Great War, when an army of 100,000 men is regarded as a small force, must be on his guard against the illusion produced by mere bigness. The battles of the eighteenth century, fought upon a narrow stage where tens perished as compared with the thousands of to-day, were as significant as the gigantic struggles now (1917) in progress and were often more decisive. Clive won the rich prize of Bengal at the cost of twenty-two killed and forty-nine or fifty wounded. Even at Assaye (1803), where the number of wounded was considered to be 'fearfully large' and the enemy had at least a seven-fold superiority in numbers, the killed on the British side were less than four hundred, and the tale of wounded was estimated to be between fifteen and sixteen hundred. Yet the battle of Assaye had consequences far more definite and of more obvious political value

¹ In 1676 François Martin took by assault the fort of Valdūr for a local prince named Shēr Khān. 'Donc, pour la première fois avec F. Martin et dès l'époque de Louis XIV, longtemps avant Dumas, Dupleix ou Bussy, on voyait des Français entrer dans les querelles des souverains indigènes, commander et encadrer leurs troupes, espérant se faire payer de ces services en concessions territoriales ou commerciales' (Kaeppelin, p. 161).

² Wilks, when justifying himself for giving unusually detailed accounts of the Anglo-French fighting, gives as his excuse 'the extraordinary character of the war of Coromandel, in which the operations of a handful of troops assumed the political importance, and outstripped the military glory of the mightiest armies' (reprint, i. 207).

than many of the nameless wholesale massacres of these latter years.

The high importance of the period in question in the story of India's development demands attentive study of its essential features, although people no longer have leisure to acquire an intimate knowledge of local military operations or of the intrigues of forgotten potentates. In this book room cannot be found for more than a sketch of the period, and numberless deeds of heroism which it would be a pleasure to rescue from oblivion must be passed by in silence. It is convenient to begin with the transactions in the south.

The French possessions. It is needless to linger over the early feeble efforts of the French to secure a share of the Indian trade by setting up agencies (*loges* or *comptoirs*) at Surat and other ports.¹ The first serious effort to compete with the Dutch and English in common was marked by the establishment in 1664 of the French East India Company (*La Compagnie des Indes Orientales*), organized by Colbert, the correspondent of Bernier and finance minister of Louis XIV. Ten years later François Martin, accompanied by sixty other Frenchmen driven out of St. Thomé and Masulipatam by the Dutch, landed at the village of Pondicherry, eighty-five miles south of Madras, and by permission of the local authorities built a small commercial agency or factory, which was slightly fortified in subsequent years. The site of the village was purchased in 1683 and a town began to grow. The adventurers, equipped with extremely limited resources, were unable to resist the Dutch, who seized the settlement in 1693 and held it for six years, until they were constrained to restore it under the provisions of the treaty of Ryswick (1697).

During the following half-century Pondicherry was fortunate in its governors, who included F. Martin, Dumas, and Dupleix. Under their care the settlement prospered and its trade attained considerable dimensions. Dupleix assumed charge in 1742.

Chandernagore (Chandarnagar), the second in rank of the French settlements, was occupied first about 1673 and acquired permanently fifteen years later. Dupleix, who was in charge of the town before his transfer to Pondicherry, did much to improve the buildings and develop trade. Its situation on the Hooghly (Hūglī) above Calcutta prevented the settlement from ever possessing political importance. It is now a quiet country town with little external trade.

The other French settlements, Mahé on the Malabar coast, Kārikāl on the Coromandel coast, and Yanāon in the delta of the Godāvarī, acquired at various dates, are and always were insignificant.

The French possessions as a whole, notwithstanding the efforts of Dupleix and his predecessors, continued to be far inferior to the British in strength, wealth, and trade.

¹ For full details see H. Castonnet Des Fosses, *L'Inde Française avant Dupleix*, Paris (Challamel), 1887.

Madras taken by the French. The European war of the Austrian Succession extended to India in 1746. An English squadron which appeared on the Coromandel coast was weakly handled and retired without doing anything effectual. The way was thus opened for the French privateer captain, La Bourdonnais,¹ who attacked and captured Madras in September without the loss of a man. No serious resistance was offered and the town was held to ransom for eleven lakhs of pagodas, equal to about forty-four lakhs of rupees, payable in bills falling due at intervals. The attack had been arranged with the approval and aid of the Governor and Council of Pondicherry.



LA BOURDONNAIS.

La Bourdonnais argued that the commission which he held as admiral made him independent of the Pondicherry authorities, while Dupleix maintained that as head of the French settlements it was his business to settle the fate of the town. On that point he seems to have been in the right. La Bourdonnais, acting on his assumption of independence, had promised to restore the town in three months, but Dupleix repudiated the promise, and held possession until 1749, when he was compelled to relinquish it in accordance with the terms of the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. The fleet of La Bourdonnais was disabled and almost destroyed by a storm in October 1746; and subsequently the

commander was taken prisoner by the English, who released him and allowed him to return to France. On his arrival he was treated as a traitor and imprisoned in the Bastille. After three years' confinement he was liberated, but only to die. The circumstances of the surrender of Madras and the consequent quarrel between La Bourdonnais and Dupleix have been the subject of prolonged controversy, especially in the pages of French authors. The evidence, as now ascertained, establishes clearly that before the capitulation treaty was signed La Bourdonnais exacted an engagement to pay him personally 100,000 pagodas, of which 88,000 were actually paid over in cash, bullion, and jewels.² Dupleix carried his point

¹ The name is written by several French authors as in the text, but the more accurate form is de la Bourdonnais.

² The proof is given by H. D. Love, *Vestiges of Old Madras* (Ind. Records Ser., Murray, 1913), vol. ii, pp. 369, 270, 584 n.

and kept the town until he was forced to give it up by the action of his superiors. He failed in an attempt on the other small English settlement on the Coromandel coast called Fort St. David, formerly known as Tegnapatam.

Defeat of the Nawāb. Anwaru-d dīn, the Nawāb of the Carnatic, whose capital was at Arcot, resented the pretensions of the French to dispose of Madras without his permission, and sent a considerable army under the command of his eldest son to capture the place. A tiny force of Frenchmen under Paradis won a complete victory over the Nawāb's host commanded by his son at Maillāpur (Mylapore) or St. Thomé close to Madras. All historians are careful to point out the importance of that fight as proving the helplessness of an old-fashioned Indian army against an extremely small body of disciplined Europeans.

A naval attack on Pondicherry was repelled with heavy British losses in 1748 by Dupleix, whose reputation was justly enhanced by the success. His wider political ambitions may be dated from about that time. In his earlier days he had been concerned with bold commercial speculations rather than with high politics.

Disputed successions.

The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748 ought to have definitely stopped all fighting between the French and English on Indian soil, but it did not;

and the opposition between the local representatives of the two nations soon developed into an unofficial war waged without the sanction of the governments in Europe. At that time the English set the example of interfering in the tortuous politics of the principalities of the Far South by taking a side in a quarrel concerning the succession to the Rāj of Tanjore. The death of the old Nizam Āsaf Jāh, at an advanced age in 1748, gave rise to disputes among his sons and grandsons, which were complicated by somewhat similar contentions in the Carnatic, in all of which the local French and English authorities judged it expedient to intervene.¹



NAWĀB MUHAMMAD ALI.

¹ It is convenient to designate the ruler of the Deccan throughout as the Nizam. Āsaf Jāh held the title of Nizāmu-l Mulk, but is generally referred to by his contemporaries as the Sūbādār or Sūba of the Deccan. Macaulay calls Anwaru-d dīn 'Anaverdy Khan', and similar corruptions are found in other writers. So Muzaffar is disguised as 'Mirzapha', &c.

The succession to the Nizam's throne was not then claimed by the eldest of his six sons, who was employed in high office at the court of Delhi. Nāsir Jang, the second son, and Muzaffar Jang, a grandson, son of a daughter of Āsaf Jāh, fought for the vacant throne. A little later Anwaru-d dīn, whom Āsaf Jāh had appointed to be Nawāb of the Carnatic, was killed, and his heritage was claimed by his illegitimate son, Muhammad Ali, of the one part, and Chanda Sahib, the son-in-law of a former Nawāb, of the other part.

The French for reasons of their own backed Muzaffar Jang for the Nizāmat and Chanda Sahib for the Nawābī, while the English

favoured Nāsir Jang and Muhammad Ali respectively. After the death of Anwaru-d dīn in 1749, Muhammad Ali took refuge in the fort of Trichinopoly supported by British troops, while Chanda Sahib with the aid of his French allies obtained possession of the rest of the Carnatic. Towards the close of 1750 Nāsir Jang was killed, and Muzaffar Jang, his rival, was solemnly installed at Pondicherry as Nizam. He paid the French well for their services and professed to recognize Dupleix as the titular sovereign of southern India from the Krishnā to Cape Comorin, or, in other words, of Mysore, Tanjore, and Madura. Soon afterwards, in 1751, Muzaffar Jang was killed and replaced by the old Nizam's third son,




STRINGER LAWRENCE.

Salābat Jang, under French protection.

Temporary French success. So far the French seemed to have won the game. They had succeeded in raising two nominees of theirs in succession to the throne of the Deccan, and had secured the Carnatic, except Trichinopoly, for their friend Chanda Sahib. The local English authorities being unwilling to allow Muhammad Ali to be utterly crushed, sought to relieve Trichinopoly, a task for which the means at their disposal were inadequate.

Clive and Arcot. At this point Robert Clive entered upon the scene and turned the tables on the French. Clive, who had come out as a writer in the service of the East India Company, had been permitted to join the small military force of the Madras government under Major Stringer Lawrence, an officer of exceptional



TRICHINOPOLY FORT

capacity, and in 1751 held the rank of captain, being then twenty-six years of age. In order to relieve Trichinopoly he proposed to attack Arcot, Chanda Sahib's capital, and so divert the besiegers from Trichinopoly. The plan was approved.

'Fort St. David and Madras were left, the one with 100, the other with less than 50 men, in order to supply the greatest force that could be collected for this enterprise.'

After all was done the force consisted of only 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys, led by eight officers, four of whom were civil servants. The little band was allowed to occupy Arcot without opposition. The fort was ruinous and at first sight seemed incapable of defence, but Clive and his men worked wonders and threw up improvised fortifications.. 'The acquisition of the fort of Arcot soon produced the effect which had been expected from it,' and attracted a large force of the enemy from under the walls of Trichinopoly. That force battered the tiny garrison of Arcot for fifty-three days (September 23 to November 14), and at last made one attempt at storm, which was repulsed with heavy loss to the assailants.



AUTOGRAPH OF CLIVE.

That failure disheartened Chanda Sahib's army, which suddenly withdrew from before the town. The heroic garrison had lost 45 Europeans and 30 sepoys killed, besides a large number of wounded.

The gallantry of the defence, in which the sepoys had taken a most honourable part, made a deep impression throughout India. The British and their allies presently gained further successes at Kāveripāk east of Arcot and at other places, with the result that in 1752 the French resigned all claims to Trichinopoly. Chanda Sahib, having surrendered to the Rājā of Tanjore, was perfidiously executed, at the instigation of Muhammad Ali, by order of the Rājā, who desired apparently to get rid of an embarrassing prisoner.¹ Chanda Sahib is given a good character by Orme, who describes him as

'a brave, benevolent, humane and generous man, as princes go in Indostan. His military abilities were much greater than are commonly found in the generals of India, inasmuch that if he had had an absolute command over the French troops, it is believed he would not have committed the mistakes which brought on his catastrophe, and the total reduction of his army.'

The military successes and the death of Chanda Sahib made Muhammad Ali undisputed Nawāb of the Carnatic. His worthless and discreditable life lasted until 1795.

Bussy. In 1751 Muzaffar Jang, having been made Nizam, was escorted to Aurangabad, then treated as the capital, by a distinguished French officer, usually known as Bussy.² On the death of

¹ See Wilks, reprint, i. 177.

² His full designation was Charles Joseph Patissier, Marquis de Bussy-Castelneau. In 1751 he was thirty-five years of age.

Muzaffar Jang and the accession of Salābat Jang in the same year, Bussy became the adviser and guide of the new Nizam, whose government he directed for seven years with eminent skill, until he was recalled by Lally. In 1753 Bussy obtained the assignment of the revenue of the 'Northern Circars' for the payment of his troops, but the country had been so devastated by long continued fighting that the revenue actually realizable was not large.¹ His temporary successful administration of the Deccan produced no lasting results and did not directly affect the course of the events in the Carnatic briefly summarized in the preceding pages, except that Bussy supplied Dupleix with funds to a certain extent. Incidentally, he amassed an immense fortune for himself, and 'in the course of a year passed from poverty to opulence'.

Recall of Dupleix. In 1753 Dupleix became conscious of the failure of his plans, which had aimed at the complete expulsion of the English from India, including Bengal, and the establishment of France as the paramount power. He therefore opened negotiations with the Madras authorities, whom he attempted to deceive by producing a forged imperial grant purporting to appoint him Nawāb of the Carnatic. The negotiations came to nothing.

Meantime the Governments of both France and England

were much disturbed by the advices received from India. The countries being officially at peace, the home authorities regarded it as intolerable that their servants should dare to wage unofficial wars in the Far East and enter into alliances with Indian princes on their own account without the slightest authorization. The whole scheme of ambitious policy pursued by Dupleix was directly opposed



DUPLEIX.

¹ Wilks (reprint, i. 209) writes that Bussy obtained the 'absolute cession of the whole of those provinces, now denominated the northern Circars'. Mr. Roberts (*Historical Geography, India*, p. 111) denies that there was any unconditional grant of territory, asserting that merely an assignment of revenue was granted for the support of Bussy's troops 'as long as they were in the service of the Sūbadār'. While Bussy retained power the practical result was the same.

The Northern Sarkārs were equivalent to the modern Districts, Guntūr, Godāvāri, Kistna (Krishnā), Ganjām, and Vizagapatam, of the Madras Presidency.

to the standing orders of the French East India Company and of the king's Government. The official documents published by Cultru permit of no doubt on the subject. In 1752, for example, the Directors wrote that

'it is not compatible either with the Company's interest or with prudent conduct on your part to engage in wars in the interior of India . . . a solid and durable peace is the sole end at which you should aim . . . the object of the Company is not to become a land-power', and so on.

Accordingly the Governments of both countries agreed to stop the irregular proceedings in India. The French authorities deputed M. Godeheu, one of the Directors, to proceed to India with stringent orders requiring him to arrange terms of peace. Dupleix was recalled and Godeheu was authorized to arrest him if he should be disposed to resist. Dupleix, however, submitted to the royal orders without the slightest attempt at opposition and returned to France, where he lived until 1763. Godeheu has been abused most unfairly for his action. He simply did his unpleasant duty in carrying out the king's commands expressed in the most positive terms. He might, perhaps, have shown less harshness in his manner, but it is clear that he expected resistance and thought it necessary to be peremptory. Dupleix was not condemned to poverty by his superiors. On the contrary, he was given liberal passage money, and was allowed to retain a *jāgīr* assignment of revenue bringing in a large income, although the acceptance of the *jāgīr* had been a breach of French law. It was his misfortune that the almost immediate renewal of war between the two countries in 1756 stopped his Indian income. He had been granted the title of Marquis in 1752.

The Seven Years' War ; Lally. The outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 (May 17) again involved the French and English settlements in India in authorized hostilities. In those days communication between Europe and India was so slow that Count de Lally, the general selected by the French Government to drive the English into the sea, did not arrive at Pondicherry until April 1758.¹ By that time the relative positions of the two nations in India had changed radically, because the English were in firm possession of Bengal, and whatever might happen to Madras their footing in India was secure. At the time that fact, now obvious, was not so well understood, and Lally did not feel conscious of having been sent on a hopeless errand. He even cherished hopes of conquering Bengal. One of the first steps that he took was to recall Bussy and so to destroy French influence at the Nizam's court.

¹ His full personal style was Thomas Arthur, Comte de Lally, Baron de Tollendal. Two documents invested him with full powers, (1) as Lieutenant-General, commander-in-chief; and (2) as Commissary of the King, empowered to exercise complete control over all persons military and civil in the French settlements in India, as well as in Madagascar, the Ile de France or Mauritius, and Bourbon. The first bore date November 19, and the second December 31, 1756.

Failure of Lally. Lally, the son of an Irish exile and a French lady, was born in 1700, and from a very early age had taken an active part in the continental wars of the period, attaining high military distinction and marked favour at court. In 1756, when selected to represent his sovereign in the East, he was regarded as 'one of the wealthiest as well as one of the bravest men in the French army'. The Government which sent him out evidently believed him to be the best officer available for the purpose, and willingly furnished him with such men, ships, and money as could be spared. At that time France was deeply concerned for the defence of Canada, and was obliged to withdraw for that purpose certain forces originally intended for India. From the start Lally was pursued by ill luck. The admiral delayed on the voyage most unreasonably and never showed either a good fighting spirit or readiness to co-operate with the commander-in-chief of the land forces. The local authorities at Pondicherry, who knew that the royal commissary possessed full powers and carried strict orders enjoining him to suppress the numerous abuses in the administration, were deliberately negligent and almost openly hostile. They had made no preparations whatever for war, and had failed even to collect information, although they had been given full notice by ships which arrived long in advance of Lally.¹ He displayed the most feverish energy, and, in spite of want of supplies and every imaginable difficulty, quickly captured Fort St. David and other small places. His countrymen left his army to starve, so that the troops became mutinous. The attack which Lally launched against Madras in 1758 was hampered by the apathy of the Pondicherry Government, resisted by the able defence of Mr. Pigot and Stringer Lawrence, and finally stopped by the appearance of a British fleet. Lally, reduced to a condition of starvation and extreme distress, was constrained to give battle to a superior force commanded by Eyre Coote at Wandiwash in 1760, and was utterly defeated. He retired with difficulty to Pondicherry, which he defended gallantly from May 1760 to January 16, 1761, when he was forced by hunger to capitulate at discretion. It is said that towards the end food was so scarce that a dog sold for twenty-four rupees. Lally was sent to England as a prisoner of war. When he returned to France, at the close of hostilities in 1763, his enemies succeeded in having him arrested and confined in the Bastille. After two and a half years he was 'convicted of having betrayed the interests of the king, his dominions, and the Company of the Indies; of abuses of authority, &c.', and condemned to death. The sentence was executed with accompaniments of cruel insult a few days later.

Execution of Lally. Nobody now doubts that his condemnation was unjust and brought about by the malignity of his numerous

¹ The above accords with the narrative of Malleson and most authors. Wilks, who was very hostile to Lally, says, on the contrary, that 'no useful energy was omitted in seconding the impracticable orders of M. Lally' (reprint, i. 243). Lally certainly succeeded in 'putting everybody's back up' and had himself to thank for much grudging service.

enemies. It is also true that Lally was ill fitted for service in India. He neither knew nor cared anything about the customs of the country and made no effort to restrain his violent temper. An English writer notes that

'Monsieur Lally is arrived amongst us. Notwithstanding his fallen condition, he is now as proud and haughty as ever. A great share of wit, sense, and martial abilities, obscured by a savage ferocity, and an undistinguished contempt for every person that moves in a sphere below that of a General, characterizes this odd compound of a man. . . . He was so generally hated (if I may be allowed the expression) that the very dogs howled at him. It is a convincing proof of his abilities, the managing so long and vigorous a defence in a place where he was held in universal detestation.'

He was equally hated, and with good reason, by the natives of the country, whom he had outraged in various ways. After the revolution had begun the parliament of Paris reversed his condemnation and restored his estates to his son, in 1778.

Destruction of Pondicherry. The English victors felt bound to take stern measures for their own security. When Lally captured Fort St. David he had allowed the inhabitants only three days to evacuate the town, which he then destroyed. It was known that his orders directed him to 'demolish all the maritime places that he might take from the English, and to transport all the Europeans he should find in them to the Island of Bourbon'. Mr. Saunders, the able President of Madras, who took over Pondicherry, felt the necessity of making his own settlement safe. The fortifications and most of the buildings in the captured town were accordingly demolished, the inhabitants being allowed nearly three months in which to move. 'In a few months more', to quote Orme's words, 'not a roof was left standing in this once fair and flourishing city.'

Result of the operations. The result of the operations thus briefly sketched may be described in the words of Thornton :

'From the time when Pondicherry fell, the French power in the Carnatic was virtually at an end. Gingee [Jinjī] still remained in their possession, as did also Thiagur, which had been restored by the Mysoreans on their departure : but the former yielded to a force under Captain Stephen Smith ; and the latter, after sustaining sixty-five days of blockade and bombardment, capitulated to Major Preston. Mahé, and its dependencies on the coast of Malabar, also surrendered ; and early in the year 1761 the French had neither any regular force in any part of India,¹ nor any local possessions, except their factories of Calicut and Surat, which were merely trading establishments.'

Chandernagore had been captured by Clive and Watson in 1757.

The districts near the Godāvarī commonly known as the Northern Sarkārs ('Circars'), of which the revenues had been assigned by the Nizam to Bussy, were occupied (Guntūr excepted) in 1758-9 by a force dispatched from Bengal by Clive and landed at Vizaga-

¹ Parties of French gunners and other adventurers continued for many years to help Haidar Ali and other enemies of the British.

patam in October 1758.¹ Clive had responded to an appeal made by the Hindu Rājā of Rājahendri, and, regardless of risk, had denuded Bengal of troops in order to make the expedition a success. The commander, Colonel Forde, a capable officer, completely defeated the army under French command at Kundūr (Condore), forty miles from Rājahendri, stormed Masulipatam, and took possession of the districts. Subsequently he returned to Bengal and defeated the Dutch of Chinsūra.

General defeat of France. Orme, when commenting on the results gained in India by the British forces, observes :

‘ For two years before, the fortune of France had been declining in every other part of the world ; they had lost their settlements on the coast of Africa, half their West India islands, the whole region of Canada ; their naval force was utterly ruined, and their armies were struggling under defeats in Germany.’²

Capture of Manilla. The comprehensive policy of Pitt had aimed yet another blow at the enemy by means of an expeditionary force sent from Madras in 1762 to seize Manilla in the Philippine Islands, then belonging to Spain, an ally of France. The combined naval and military operations on the spot occupied only twelve days. The town was stormed with small loss to the assailants, and honourable terms were accorded to the garrison and inhabitants. The brilliant feat of arms had no permanent effect, and is now almost forgotten, because the colony was restored to Spain in the following year, 1763, when the general peace of Paris was signed. A Manilla trophy at Madras is the only visible memorial of the temporary British occupation of the Philippines, which have been annexed by the United States of America as the result of operations extending from 1898 to 1901.

Causes of French failure. The collapse of the French power which had seemed to occupy such a strong position from 1746 to 1751 demands explanation more explicit than that to be deduced from perusal of a summary narrative of the Anglo-French wars. Many causes contributed to the result.

The French East India Company was far inferior to its English rival in constitution, enterprise, and wealth. It was merely a minor department of the king’s government and was usually administered badly in France. The shareholders, who were assured

¹ The Districts, excepting Guntūr, were ceded formally in 1765 ; Guntūr being reserved as the *jāgīr* of Basālat Jang, a son of the old Nizām. It came definitely into British possession in 1788, but the cession was not confirmed finally until 1823.

² In 1759 Wolfe captured Quebec in Canada ; the French were defeated at Minden in Germany, and several times at sea. In 1760 Canada submitted. Senegal in West Africa and several West Indian islands, which had been occupied during the war, were ceded to England at the peace in 1763. Although Pitt had resigned in October 1761, the Manilla expedition had been planned by him. The student should remember that in those days Prussia was the ally of England and was supported against her enemies by British efforts.

of a fixed dividend, took no active part in the management of the Company's affairs. The spirit of bold individual and corporate effort, so often exhibited in the doings of the English adventurers, was rarely imitated by the French, and few of their local officials were men of mark. Funds were always deficient. The home Government, entangled as it was in unceasing wars in Europe and America, could not furnish the money required for the successful working of ambitious schemes in India. Except Dupleix, and to some extent Bussy, the Company's representatives at the settlements rarely desired to meddle much with the politics of the adjoining states. They were content to hold only so much territory as sufficed to provide opportunities for unmolested trading on a modest scale. They were not prepared to support bold projects for acquiring sovereign power over extensive territories. Dupleix himself was a trader for the greater part of his career, somewhat daring in commercial speculations, and not always successful, but no politician. His plans of extended dominion are not traceable before 1748, when the possession of Madras and his justifiable elation at the successful defence of Pondicherry inclined him to entertain large ambitions. The compulsory restoration of Madras in 1749 was a severe blow to him. The loss of Arcot in 1751 and of Trichinopoly in 1752 ruined his prospects. His failure, however, did not depend merely on such local mishaps. His resources never were adequate for his purposes, and the British conquest of rich Bengal in 1757 rendered his dream of empire absolutely incapable of realization, no matter what happened in the course of fights near the extremity of the peninsula. The mastery of the sea, which usually, although not invariably, remained in British hands, gave the opponents of the French an advantage which no minor successes on land could balance. In April 1758, when Lally arrived, he was too late. The position of the French was then hopeless, and would have been equally past remedy if Dupleix had not been recalled in 1754. His continuance in office would not have made any difference. He was a ruined man before Godeheu's arrival. Bussy's influential position at the court of the Nizam afforded little support, beyond some financial assistance, to the grand projects of the governor of Pondicherry. Neither Bussy nor Dupleix singly, nor both combined, had a chance of success against the government which controlled the sea routes and the resources of the Gangetic valley. It is futile to lay stress upon the personal frailties of Dupleix, Lally, or lesser men in order to explain the French failure. Neither Alexander the Great nor Napoleon could have won the empire of India by starting from Pondicherry as a base and contending with the power which held Bengal and command of the sea. No southern potentate had ever either attained or seriously sought to attain the sovereignty of India. Even a local peninsular empire like that of Vijayanagar in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was unattainable in the conditions of the eighteenth century.

Character and merits of Dupleix. The character and achieve-

ments of Dupleix hardly merit the admiration which they have generally received. The hero worshipped by Malleson and Hamont loses much of his lustre under close inspection. Thornton's description of him as 'this man, in whose character, ambition, vanity, and duplicity reigned in a degree which makes it impossible to determine which predominated', although not exactly untrue, does not do Dupleix full justice. The ambition, vanity, and duplicity were all there, but ambition in a man who aspires to be a statesman cannot properly be counted as a vice. The vanity of Dupleix is undoubted and appears prominently in the intimate disclosures of Ānanda Ranga Pillai, now in course of publication. Vanity, however, is a weakness common to many great men. The Marquess Wellesley, who resembled Dupleix in ambition and contempt for his employers, was notoriously vain. The large plans of the French governor and the considerable success which he attained may be deemed sufficient cover for some personal frailties. The accusation of duplicity cannot be denied, although it is going too far to brand the repudiation of the treaty of La Bourdonnais as an act of 'atrocious perfidy'. Dupleix had a good case against the admiral, who rated his official powers too high. Putting that affair aside, there is no doubt that Dupleix was prone to tortuous intrigue and too ready to use the disreputable trickery practised by the decadent Indian princes of his time. He was content to be a Nawāb or Sūbadār, without much regard for veracity. His morality in money matters was of a low standard, and his wife, a Portuguese half-caste, was a shameless bribe-taker. Dupleix was not gifted with military talents, and was reputed to be somewhat lacking in personal courage. He was a capable administrator, but failed as a statesman mainly because he could not adjust the measure of his grand schemes to that of his limited resources. He deserves credit for the dignified fortitude with which he received his abrupt dismissal. The harshness displayed by Godeheu seems to have been due, not to malignity, but to a genuine fear that Dupleix might revolt.

Rise of Haidar Ali. While in the Peninsula the conflict between the French and English was in progress and in Bengal events of equal or greater importance were happening, which will be narrated presently, a new and formidable power under a Muhammadan prince was growing up in the south. The Mysore country, roughly equivalent to the mediaeval Hoysala kingdom, had been included in the empire of Vijayanagar. When that empire was broken up in 1565 the territory of Mysore gradually passed under the rule of the Hindu Wodeyar dynasty. That dynasty in the middle of the eighteenth century had lost its energy, and its weakness offered an opportunity to a bold adventurer.

Such an adventurer was Haidar (Hyder) Ali, born in 1722, the son of an officer of the Mysore Government. He secured the favour of Nanjarāj, the powerful minister, by organizing a small body of troops better equipped than the rest of the Rājā's army. His appointment in 1755, when he was thirty-three years of age, as

Faujdār or commandant of Dindigul may be regarded as the beginning of his successful career. At a later date he received the district of Bangalore as his *jāgīr* and became commander-in-chief of the Mysore army. In 1761, the year of Pānīpat and the fall of Pondicherry, he controlled directly more than half of the dominions of his nominal sovereign and actually was ruler of the whole kingdom. His fortunes then underwent a temporary eclipse, but two years later, in 1763, he emerged victorious.

Fate of Khandē Rāo. A cunning Brahman named Khandē Rāo who owed his advancement to Haidar Ali had presumed to join his patron's enemies. When the combination was defeated,

'Kundē Row was given up and confined; and his official servants as well as himself were of course plundered to the utmost extent of their means. Before it had been determined that Kundē Row should be surrendered, a joint message was sent to Hyder from the Raja and the ladies of the palace praying for mercy towards that unfortunate man as a preliminary to the adjustment of public affairs. Hyder replied that Kundē Row was his old servant, and that he would not only spare his life, but cherish him like a parrot; a term of endearment common in conversing with women, from that bird being a favourite pet in the harems of the wealthy. When he was afterwards gently admonished of his severity to Kundē Row, he ironically replied that he had exactly kept his word; and that they were at liberty to inspect his *iron cage* and the rice and milk allotted for his food; for such was the fate to which he had doomed Kundē Row for the remainder of his miserable life.'

The unhappy captive survived for a year. In 1786, when Robson was writing, the cage containing the dead man's bones was still to be seen in the public bazaar of Bangalore.

Conquest and sack of Bednūr. In the same year, 1763, which saw the defeat of Khandē Rāo, Haidar Ali conquered Bednūr (Bednore), now represented by a petty country town or large village called Nagar in the western part of the Mysore State, but then a place of such importance that Wilks felt justified in describing it as 'the most opulent commercial town of the east; eight miles in circumference, and full of rich dwellings'. The same author affirms that the booty 'may, without risk of exaggeration, be estimated at twelve millions sterling'.

The huge figure suggests scepticism, but Wilks was in a good position to judge and no materials exist for forming a closer estimate.¹ Haidar Ali always spoke of the Bednūr windfall as 'the foundation of all his subsequent greatness'.

Career of Haidar Ali, 1766-9. The death of the Rājā of Mysore in April 1766 still further increased the power of the upstart, who ruthlessly plundered the palace, although he went through the form of recognizing a new Rājā.

The following three years were occupied by obscure complicated

¹ Mark Wilks, F.R.S., colonel and major-general, was born about 1760 and died in 1831. He quitted India in 1808, having been Resident in Mysore from 1803. Previously he had held various offices at Madras. The first volume of his great book was published in 1810.

intrigues and fights in which Muhammad Ali, the scoundrelly Nawāb of the Carnatic; the corrupt and weak government of Madras, his tools and abettors; the vacillating Nizam; the greedy Marāthās; and ambitious Haidar Ali were concerned in varying combinations. In 1767 the Nizam and Haidar Ali, who had joined forces for the moment, were severely defeated at Trinomalai by Colonel Joseph Smith. But the inefficient rogues at the Presidency so mismanaged the war that early in 1769 Haidar Ali appeared under the walls of Madras, and dictated a treaty providing for the mutual restitution of conquests, and binding each party to help the other if attacked. Thus ended the First Mysore War.

Double government. The 'double government' of the Madras Council and the Nawāb at that time was quite as bad as or worse than the similar arrangements in force in Bengal between 1757 and 1772. Corruption was rampant, and the country was horribly oppressed. Wilks, who had an intimate knowledge of all the persons concerned, observes that

'the strange combination of vicious arrangements, corrupt influence, and political incapacity which directed the general measures of the Government of Madras have been too constantly traced to demand recapitulation'.

CHRONOLOGY

The French Settlements

Establishment of the French East India Company (La Compagnie des Indes orientales)	1664
Foundation of Pondicherry	1674
Dutch occupation of Pondicherry	1693-9
Dupleix became Governor of Pondicherry	1742
Recall of Dupleix	1754

The First Anglo-French War

(War of the Austrian Succession)

Madras captured by the French	1746
British attack on Pondicherry repulsed; treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle; death of Asaf Jāh, Nizam	1748
Restoration of Madras to the English; death of Anwaru-d dīn, Nawāb of the Carnatic	1749

The Second Anglo-French War

(unofficial)

Siege of Trichinopoly by Chanda Sahib and the French; defence of Arcot by Clive	1751
Trichinopoly given up by the French; death of Chanda Sahib	1752
Recall of Dupleix and end of the war	1754

The Third Anglo-French War
(*The Seven Years' War*)

War began	1756
Chandernagore taken by Clive and Watson; the Northern Sarkārs occupied by Bussy	1757
Lally arrived in India; captured Fort St. David, &c.; failed to take Madras; Col. Forde occupied the Northern Sarkārs	1758
Battle of Wandiwash	1760
Fall of Pondicherry	1761
Capture of Manilla by the British	1762
Peace of Paris; end of the Seven Years' War	1763
Execution of Lally	1766

Haidar Ali and the First Mysore War

Haidar Ali born	1722
Haidar Ali appointed Faujdār of Dindigul	1755
Haidar Ali became master of Mysore	1761
Defeat of Khandē Rāo by Haidar Ali; capture and sack of Bednūr	1763
Defeat of Haidar Ali and the Nizam by Col. Joseph Smith at Trinomalai	1767
Treaty of Madras; end of the war	1769

AUTHORITIES

It is unnecessary to describe the well-known general histories by MILL, THORNTON, MARSHMAN, &c. The small book by P. E. ROBERTS, *History of India to the End of the E. I. Co.* (in *Historical Geography of the British Dependencies*, Clarendon Press, 1916), is a generally sound and judicious summary of the history of the period treated in this chapter and of the whole Anglo-Indian history to 1858.

The story of the French Settlements is best told in P. KAEPPÉLIN, *La Compagnie des Indes Orientales* (Paris, Challamel, 1908); and H. WEBER, *La Compagnie Française des Indes* (Paris, Rousseau, 1904).

The leading authority on Dupleix is P. CULTRU, *Dupleix* (Paris, Hachette, 1901). G. B. MALLESON'S work, *History of the French in India* (1st ed., 1867; 2nd ed., Edinburgh, Grant, 1893), has much merit, but is more French than the French and spoiled by adulation of Dupleix. It was written with very imperfect knowledge of the documents in Paris. The same author's views are expressed on a smaller scale in *Dupleix* (Rulers of India, 1890), and reaffirmed by T. HAMONT, *Dupleix*, Paris, 1881.

Stringer Lawrence by Col. J. BIDDULPH (London, Murray, 1901) is a good little book, with an excellent portrait of Dupleix.

Copious details of the Anglo-French wars in the peninsula will be found in R. ORME, *A History of the Military Transactions, &c.* (London, 1763, 1778);¹ and in M. WILKS, *Sketches of the South of India, &c.* (London, 1810, 1817). Both those works rank as first-class original authorities. Wilks gives an excellent account of Haidar Ali.

The scarce *Life of Hyder Ally* by Captain FRANCIS ROBSON (London, Hooper, 1776); and the anonymous compilation, *Memoirs of Count Lally* (London, Kiernan, 1766), have been consulted, besides other works. *Haidar Ali and Tipū Sultan* by LEWIN B. BOWRING (Rulers of India, 1893) is a valuable book, illuminated by accurate local knowledge.

¹ Orme was corrupt and extortionate; see *Vestiges of Old Madras*, vol. ii, especially p. 519.

CHAPTER 2

Bengal affairs; Sirāju-d daula; battles of Plassey and Buxar; the 'double government'; the famine of 1770.

Low standard of public life. In the eighteenth century, during the anarchical period which intervened between the death of Aurangzēb and the establishment of the British supremacy, the character of the princes and other public men of India had sunk to an extremely low level. Nearly all the notable men of that age lived vicious lives, stained by gross sensuality, ruthless cruelty, and insatiable greed.

Nawāb Shuj'āu-d dīn. One of the few good men of that evil time was Shuj'āu-d dīn, the Sūbadār or governor of the eastern provinces from 1725 to 1739, who is recorded to have been 'universally regretted as a man of strict veracity, general philanthropy, and unbounded liberality'. His administration of the provinces was marked by impartial justice, and he refrained from advancing pretensions to independence, being content to remit regularly the tribute due to his sovereign at Delhi.

Usurpation of Allahvardī Khān. Sarfarāz Khān, the son and successor of that admirable man, was scrupulous in performing all the ceremonies of his religion, but indifferent and incapable as a ruler. At the time of his accession the governor of Bihār was a brave, able, and unscrupulous officer, named Mirzā Muhammad Ali, but better known by his title of Allahvardī (or Alīvardī) Khān, who had been raised from obscurity by Shuj'āu-d dīn, and had been appointed by him prime minister.

Allahvardī Khān, taking advantage of the troubles resulting from Nādir Shāh's invasion, and basely ignoring the debt of gratitude due to the son of his patron, revolted. Sarfarāz Khān having been killed in the ensuing battle, Allahvardī Khān took his seat upon the vacant provincial throne. He had previously bought from the corrupt court of Delhi letters patent appointing him governor of the eastern provinces. Having secured condonation of his rebellion and usurpation by further lavish presents to Muhammad Shāh and his courtiers, he never sent a rupee of tribute again, and ruled until the end of his life as an independent sovereign.

Allahvardī Khān as Nawāb. For eleven years Allahvardī Khān was mainly occupied in efforts to repel the plundering inroads of the Marāthās, who overran all Bengal to the west of the Ganges at one time or another. In 1742, Calcutta being threatened, the English inhabitants caused to be dug the imperfect fortification known as the Marāthā Ditch, which long formed the boundary of the settlement. Two years later the Nawāb secured a temporary respite by the treacherous massacre of Bhāskar Rāo Pundit, with nineteen of his retinue. More definite relief was attained in 1751 at the cost of the cession of Orissa (Cuttack) and the promise to pay twelve lakhs of rupees annually as the *chauth*

of Bengal. Orissa remained under the heel of the banditti until 1803.¹ The Marāthās never attempted to establish any civil administration in the province, being content to allow the local chiefs to rule as they best could, subject to the necessity of satisfying so far as possible the boundless rapacity of the robber state.

Allahvardī Khān in his latter days, being then between seventy and eighty years of age, showed the weakness of an old man by bestowing doting affection on his grandson, Mīrzā Mahmūd (or Muhammad), infamous under his title of Sirāju-d daula. The young man, who was the son of the Nawāb's youngest daughter, a dissolute woman, was almost wholly evil.² In 1750, when he had dared to revolt against his grandfather, the dotard not only showed no resentment, but confirmed the youth's right of succession and allowed him to control the government. Allahvardī Khān to some extent atoned for his many political crimes by a strictly moral private life, and by carefully regulated administration much better than that of most of the contemporary princes. But he was in his eightieth lunar year when he died in April 1756, and for some time previously had become inefficient.

He had declined to act on advice to expel the English merchants from his dominions and is reported to have used this remarkable language :

‘What have the English done against me that I should use them ill ? It is now difficult to extinguish fire on land, but should the sea be in flames, who can put them out ?’

Nawāb Sirāju-d daula. Sirāju-d daula, then about twenty-eight years of age, succeeded to his grandfather's throne without much serious opposition, although his vices were notorious.³ Disregarding the old man's sage counsels concerning the strangers who had come across the sea, the young Nawāb longed to seize the riches of the foreign merchants, which were magnified by report far beyond the reality. Grievances sufficient to give a plausible excuse for war were not wanting. The tiny English factory at Kāsimbāzār (Cossimbazar) near Murshīdābād, the capital of Bengal, was easily taken, and Sirāju-d daula moved on Calcutta with an army of about 50,000 men. The settlement was ill prepared for

¹ The Cuttack (Katak) province was distinct from the part of Orissa in British hands, comprising the Midnapur District and part of Hooghly (Hūgli).

² See the tract by S. C. Barman and B. N. Banerji entitled *Begams of Bengal*, Calcutta, Mitter & Co., 1915.


³ The statement that Sirāju-d daula was only nineteen at the time of his death is found in Orme and most books, but Busteed (ed. 4, p. 7) makes him to be ‘about 25 years old’ at the time of his accession. That must be nearly correct, as he had rebelled six years earlier, and he could not have done so at the age of twelve or thirteen. Ives (p. 154) says : ‘He had not quite completed his 25th year, and but one of his reign, when he thus fell.’ Law of Lauriston writes : ‘Telle fut la fin de Souradjotdola, à la fleur de son âge, ayant à peine 25 ans’ (*Mémoire*, ed. Martineau ; Paris, Larose, 1913). But he was really 29 or 30 (*Bengal Past and Present*, xii. 244).

resistance. The fortifications had been neglected and were commanded by private houses which had been allowed to grow up close to the walls. 'The garrison did not amount to two hundred; not more than a third of their number were Europeans, and few, if any, had ever been in action.' The militia was useless and deserted soon after the siege began. A determined enemy could have taken the place in an hour. The Nawāb appeared before the town on June 16, equivalent to the 17th of Ramazān, the month of the Muhammadan fast. On the 19th of that month the outposts were captured. The final capitulation took place in the afternoon of June 20, Ramazān 21. Mr. Drake, the governor, a peaceful merchant, who at the beginning of the operations, according to Stewart, 'had not betrayed any signs of personal fear, but exposed his person on the ramparts', did not maintain his courage to the end. He was afraid of being put to death if captured, yielded to disgraceful panic, and slipped away down the river in a ship, accompanied by the Commandant and all those who could get on board the vessels. Mr. Holwell, a member of the Council, was thus left behind with about 190 Europeans. He too, it was alleged, would have embarked if he could, but was unable to do so. He then made a gallant and determined defence for a short time, until he was forced to capitulate on the afternoon of June 20.

The 'Black Hole' tragedy. It is unnecessary to repeat in detail the oft-told story of the horrors of the Black Hole. But it is indispensable to observe that recent attempts to discredit the story as an invention are not well founded. The incident certainly occurred, although some uncertainty may exist concerning one or other detail. The Nawāb was not personally and directly responsible for the atrocity. He left the disposal of the prisoners to a subordinate who forced them all into a stifling guard-room, barely twenty feet square, and not large enough to hold a quarter of the crowd. Although the Nawāb did not personally order the barbarous treatment of his prisoners, he did not either reprove his officers for their cruelty or express any regret at the tragic result. It is generally stated that 146 were put in for the night, of whom only 23, including one lady, came out alive in the morning; but the exact number of the sufferers is not certain, and there is good reason for believing that the prisoners confined included several women of whom only one survived.

The fugitives at Faltā. The fugitives from Calcutta landed at Faltā, now in the Diamond Harbour subdivision, the site of an old Dutch factory on the Hooghly, a considerable distance below the capital, and there passed a miserable time until they were relieved in the following January. Many perished from a malignant fever. Mr. Drake dispatched a small vessel with news of the disaster to Madras, where the tidings caused much excitement and debate. It so happened that Admiral Watson with a small British squadron was then at Madras, and had Clive, now a colonel, with him. The squadron had sailed from England early in 1754.

The Gheria expedition. Clive, who had gone home in 1753 after his successes in the unofficial war in the south, returned in 1755 and landed at Bombay with three companies of the king's artillery intending to operate with the aid of the Marāthās against the French. The peace or truce negotiated by Godeheu and Saunders having rendered hostilities against the French impossible, the civil, naval, and military authorities agreed that the opportunity should be seized of rooting out the nest of troublesome pirates at Gheria or Vijayadurg, an excellent harbour on the coast,



GHERIA FORT.

170 miles south of Bombay. The expedition was entirely successful, and the important stronghold was captured at the expense of no more than twenty killed and wounded on the British side. About 250 'pieces of cannon' were taken with much other valuable booty.¹

Bānkōt, with nine dependent villages, was ceded by the Marāthās, and thus

'became the first British possession on the mainland of western India. It was renamed Fort Victoria, and was highly valued as supplying Bombay

¹ Surgeon Ives gives a vivid account of the Gheria operations illustrated by good plates.

with provisions, and also as affording the inhabitants a change of air and scene.'

The fortress of Gheria was made over to the Marāthās.

Recapture of Calcutta. Watson and Clive sailed from Gheria to Madras, where they heard the bad news from Bengal. The local authorities, as early as July 20 (Orme), had sent a detachment of 230 or 240 men under Major Kilpatrick to Bengal, hoping that it would be in time to relieve Calcutta, the fall of which was not known until August 5. The climate and conditions at Faltā were so deadly that nearly all the men perished. According to Ives, only about thirty were alive and ten fit for duty when the larger relief force arrived in December. After two months' debate Clive was selected to command the land forces dispatched with Watson's ships. The squadron sailed from Madras on October 16. The voyage was difficult and dangerous owing to the season and the strength of the currents, so that the expedition did not reach Faltā until December 14. A series of successful operations brought the ships under the walls of Fort William on January 2, 1757. The enemy evacuated the fort without serious resistance, and Admiral Watson replaced the runaway Drake in his office as governor. The town of Hooghly (Hūglī) was then stormed. The admiral dispatched an officer to England with the news in a tiny sloop of only 60 tons. At the present time a steamer of 5,000 tons is considered to be rather small to carry the Calcutta mail.

Capture of Chandernagore. The commanders now had to consider the problem of meeting the Nawāb, who was marching from Murshīdābād with a large army. Complicated negotiations ensued, fully narrated and illustrated by documents in the vivid pages of Surgeon Ives. War with France having begun again, the fleet under Watson and the troops under Clive took the French settlement of Chandernagore in March, after a spirited resistance which caused many naval casualties. Clive described the place as being 'a large, rich, and thriving colony', of which the loss was 'an inexpressible blow to the French Company'. The French inhabitants mostly took refuge in the Dutch settlement of Chinsūra adjoining Hooghly. Later, in 1759, a stern decree commanded the utter demolition of the buildings, public and private. We have seen that the same policy was pursued at Pondicherry when it was taken in 1761. Both towns had to be rebuilt after the peace of 1763.

Plot with Mīr J'afar. The danger from the French having thus been removed, the admiral renewed his correspondence with the Nawāb, who, in February, had signed a treaty, which each party accused the other of violating.

In June, Clive, supported by Mr. Watts, resolved to depose Sirāju-d daula and replace him by Mīr J'afar, who had married Allahvardī Khān's sister, and was now engaged in a secret plot against his young master. Mīr J'afar accordingly executed a treaty, which was signed on the British side by Admiral Watson, Colonel Clive, and Counsellors Drake and Watts.

The forged treaty. This was the occasion on which Clive devised the notorious trick played on Amīrchand (Omichund), the rich Sikh banker, who was concerned in the plot, but had threatened to divulge it, unless his silence was bought by a payment of thirty lakhs, or three millions of rupees, subsequently reduced to two millions. After the battle of Plassey Clive deceived the banker by showing him a forged duplicate containing the promise of payment, which was omitted from the original genuine treaty. His signature was then appended by Mr. Lushington under Clive's direction. It is impossible to justify Clive's action in this matter, and the special pleading of the authors who have attempted to defend the fraud is sophistical. Amīrchand at the time naturally was overwhelmed with disappointment, but the story that he lost his reason is untrue. Subsequently he resumed business with the English, and in his will bequeathed a considerable sum to the Foundling Hospital in London.¹ He also left money to the Sikh shrine of Guru Gobind.


The secret agreement with Mīr J'afar rendered a fight with the Nawāb inevitable. Accordingly, on June 13 Clive wrote a long letter reproaching him for various delinquencies, and ending with the intimation that as the rains were approaching and an answer could not be received in time, the writer found it necessary to 'wait upon' his correspondent immediately.

Battle of Plassey. The same day Clive marched northwards. His small force consisted of about 3,000 men in all, with eight six-pounder guns, and one howitzer, or two, according to Orme. The fort at Katwa (Cutwa) was yielded by the enemy without serious resistance, and a welcome addition to the supplies of the British force was obtained. The Nawāb's army, said to comprise 50,000 foot, 18,000 horse, and about fifty guns of heavy calibre, entrenched on the bank of the Bhāgirathī river near the village of Plassey.² On June 23, Clive, after some hesitation whether he should fight at once or wait for the close of the rains, encamped in a mango grove which had partly disappeared in 1780 when Rennell drew his plan, and has now been wholly carried away by the river. The traitor Mīr J'afar was on the extreme left of the Nawāb's line. The enemy's intention was to envelop the small force under Clive's command, but the manœuvre was not successful. About three o'clock in the afternoon the Nawāb's host retreated to its entrenched camp, being considerably hampered by the cumbrous heavy guns, each of which was drawn by forty or fifty pairs of oxen, many of which were killed. A sudden attack by Eyre Coote caused a general

¹ 18,750 rupees in 1762, then equivalent to about £2,000 (Secretary's letter to author dated December 5, 1910). The banker, as Orme points out, owned the best houses in Calcutta and had many interests there which he could not afford to sacrifice.

² Clive held a council of war, voting in the majority of thirteen for postponing action, while Eyre Coote led the minority of seven. Most writers state that Clive changed his mind an hour later, but the papers used by Forrest give another account.

BATTLE OF PLASSEY GAINED BY COLONEL CLIVE JUNE 23RD, 1757



- A. Position of the British Army at 9 in the Morning.
- B. Four guns advanced to check the fire of the French Party at the tank D.
- C. The Nabob's Army.
- D. A Tank from whence the French Party cannonaded till 3 in the Afternoon, when part of the British

Army took Post there, and the Enemy retired within their Entrenched Camp.

- E { A Redoubt and mound taken by Assault at $\frac{1}{2}$ past 4, and which completed the Victory.
- F {
- G. The Nabob's Hunting House. The dotted line BE shows the encroachment of the River since the Battle.

root, the only people on the Nawāb's side who fought at all steadily being a party of 'vagabond Frenchmen' under a leader named Sinfray or St. Frai. The rest of the host lacked confidence in their cause and failed to display courage or any other soldierly quality. The pursuit was continued for six miles. The Nawāb's whole camp with the guns, baggage, elephants, and horses fell into the hands of the victors, whose loss was extremely small, amounting to about 22 killed and 49 or 50 wounded. The enemy were supposed to have lost about five hundred killed, including their best general, Mīr Madan, whose death at an early stage of the contest much discouraged the Nawāb and his troops.¹ As a battle the fight at Plassey does not deserve critical examination. Mīr J'afar took care to do nothing but wait and see which side would win.

Results of the battle. However contemptible the battle might appear to a professional soldier, it was sufficient to decide the fate of Bengal, and, in a sense, of all India.

Sirāju-d daula fled starving and almost naked, but accompanied by Lutfu-n nisā, his wife or favourite concubine, whose fidelity casts a gleam of light on a dark and unpleasant story. Near Rājmahāl he was betrayed by a man in whose hut he had taken refuge, and was brought back to Murshīdābād, where Mīr J'afar's son Mīran caused him to be brutally hacked to death.

Mīr J'afar received the reward of his treason, and was formally installed as Nawāb by Clive, who exercised the real power. It is only fair to remember that Mīr J'afar had been grossly insulted by Sirāju-d daula, and that his treachery was not altogether unprovoked. The new ruler was made to pay well for his promotion. Clive and the other officials concerned obtained large sums for themselves, while the compensation due to the inhabitants of Calcutta for their losses was calculated on a liberal scale, beyond the immediate capacity of the provincial treasury, which contained far less than had been supposed. Clive received the gigantic sum of £234,000, and members of council from £50,000 to £80,000 each. A little later Clive also obtained from the Nawāb an assignment of revenue on the lands south of Calcutta, which was known as 'Clive's *jāgīr*', and brought in nearly £30,000 a year. Dupleix, it may be remembered, had enriched himself in similar fashion. Such transactions were not condemned by the public opinion of the age as they would be now, but discussion of their morality may be deferred until Clive's character as a whole comes under review. The exactions certainly imposed an excessive burden on the finances of Bengal and from that point of view were politically wrong and injurious.

The 'Twenty-four Parganas'. The somewhat complicated

¹ The figures concerning the strength of the armies, the details of the forces, and the number of casualties vary slightly in different contemporary authorities. The Nawāb certainly had numbers twenty-fold those of Clive, not to speak of his huge park of heavy artillery opposed to Clive's nine or ten little pieces.

transactions which gave the Company the rights of a zemindār or landholder, not those of a sovereign, over a large tract near Calcutta and led to the grant of 'Clive's *jāgīr*' are best described in the precise language of a writer in the *Imperial Gazetteer* (s.v. 'Twenty-four Parganas') :

'After the battle of Plassey in 1757, the Nawāb Nāzim of Bengal, Mir Jafar, ceded to the East India Company a tract of country which lay principally to the south of Calcutta and comprised about 882 square miles, known as the *zamīndārī* of Calcutta, or the Twenty-four Parganas *zamīndārī*. Under this grant the Company acquired the rights of a *zamīndār*;¹ and in the following year they obtained from the emperor's chief officer a *dīwānī sanad*, which particularized the lands held by them and fixed the assessment at Rs. 2,22,958, equivalent to nearly £28,000 at that time. In 1759 the emperor confirmed the grant by a *farmān* which gave the Company a perpetual heritable jurisdiction over the land. Meanwhile, by a deed of gift executed in 1759 Lord Clive had been presented, as a reward for services rendered by him to the Nawab Mir Jafar, with the revenue of the District due from the Company; and this sum continued to be paid to him till his death in 1774, when, by a deed sanctioned by the Mughal emperor, the whole proprietary right in the land and revenues reverted to the Company.'

It is necessary to add that the Company, after some hesitation and controversy, had freely sanctioned the enjoyment of the *jāgīr* income by Clive until his death, and accepted the reversion when that event should occur.

Defeat of the Shāhzāda and the Dutch. During 1759 the Shāhzāda, or Prince, the Mogul emperor's son, who was in rebellion against his father, invaded Bihār, with the aid of the ruler of Oudh. Clive used effectually the Company's troops to repel the invasion, and to suppress certain rebellions.

The same year saw an unofficial war with the Dutch whose country was officially at peace with England. The endless intrigues of the period included secret negotiations between the Dutch of Chinsūra and Mir J'afar, the Nawāb, who was uneasy under his new masters.² The Dutch settlement, it must be remembered, lay on the bank of the Hooghly close to the town of that name, and more than twenty miles above Calcutta. First one Dutch ship arrived. About two months later six more from Batavia, 'crammed with soldiers', appeared in the river, and Mir J'afar held a formal reception of the Dutch authorities, who enlisted troops, and addressed a threatening remonstrance to the government at Calcutta complaining of various grievances. The danger to the British was obvious, but nerve was required to meet a risk

¹ The text of art. 9 of the treaty with Mir J'afar (1757) is : 'All the land lying to the south of Calcutta, as far as Kalpi, shall be under the Zamindari of the English Company; and all the Officers of those parts shall be under their jurisdiction. The revenues to be paid by them (the Company) in the same manner with other Zamindars' (Aitchison, ed. 4, vol. i, p. 185).

² Law of Lauriston, like earlier writers, notes that nothing at an Indian court was secret. 'A peine le nabab a-t-il formé un projet qu'il est aussitôt sçu du dernier de ses esclaves' (*Mémoire*, p. 107).

due to the hostile preparations of a technically friendly power. Clive took the responsibility on himself and made all arrangements to fight the Dutch both on the water and on the land. He conscripted all the European and half-European men in Calcutta, as well as the Armenians, and so put every person available into the field, to the number of 700 or 800. Colonel Forde, who had returned from the successful expedition to the Northern Sarkars, was placed in command of the small military force, while Captain Wilson, with a squadron much inferior to the enemy in apparent strength, attacked the Hollanders' ships and captured them all. On the next day, November 25, Colonel Forde achieved an equal success. At a village called Biderra between Chandernagore and Chinsūra he utterly defeated the much larger Dutch force under the command of a French officer. The action, which was 'short, bloody, and decisive', resulted in the complete submission of the Dutch and their final withdrawal from the field of Indian politics. For that reason the battle of Biderra, the very name of which is seldom mentioned or remembered, has been reckoned by Colonel Malleeson among the fifteen decisive battles of India. Chinsūra was left in the possession of Holland, which retained it until 1825, when it was ceded to the British Government in exchange for certain settlements in Sumatra. The place now forms part of the town of Hooghly.

Departure of Clive. In February 1760 Clive, who had been long desirous to quit India, sailed for England, making over charge to Mr. Holwell, pending the arrival from Madras of Mr. Vansittart, who had been appointed Governor of Bengal. The new Governor assumed office on July 27, 1760. Thus ended the memorable first administration of Clive, which may be reckoned as having lasted just three years from February 1757 to February 1760. During that time, whatever his official designation might be, his was the moving spirit. He was in his thirty-fifth year, 'in the midst of life's path', when he departed from the stage on which he had played so brilliant a part.

Tribute to the navy. While the conquest of Bengal and the suppression of Dutch hostility must always be credited mainly to Clive, the writers and readers of history often forget and ignore the large share in the operations taken by the navy. The transport of the relieving force from Madras to Faltā and up the river to Calcutta was a triumph of seamanship, the merit of which can be realized fully only by perusal of the details furnished by Surgeon Ives. The skill and gallantry displayed by the naval force in the attack on Chandernagore have never been surpassed, and the defeat of the Dutch ships was an equally brilliant achievement.

Admiral Watson, who had done so much to recover Calcutta, unfortunately died of a malignant fever two months after Plassey at the age of forty-three. The character of Charles Watson remained unstained during thirty years of honourable service. No action of his calls for either regret or apology. His friend was justified when he wrote that 'in a word, no man ever lived

more esteemed, or died more regretted than Admiral Watson'. His merits received due recognition from his country. A monument to his memory was erected in Westminster Abbey at the cost of the East India Company, and his son was created a baronet.

A time of temptation. We now turn to the doings of men who were not deserving of much esteem when alive or much regret when dead. Their failings, which look so black on the page of history, were in large measure the outcome of the extraordinary circumstances in which they were placed by events wholly unexpected. The merchants and factors of the Company, trained solely with an eye to business conducted in a country where public opinion was wanting to check abuses, and accustomed to deal with corrupt, unscrupulous officials, whose favour they had been wont to court by intrigue and bribery, suddenly found themselves masters of an enormous territory and in a position to make and unmake kings. Riches were to be had for the asking, nay, without asking. The sudden affluence thrust upon the Calcutta community by the lavish compensation paid for the losses sustained at the time of the capture of the city and the huge 'presents' given by the new Nawāb as the price of his elevation turned the heads of all, and led to a scramble for riches which brought into painful prominence the evil features of human nature. Gentlemen, who in the ordinary course of nature would have been content to retire as successful traders and end their days in respectable obscurity, were tempted to sell their souls for gain and so condemned to leave for the scorn of posterity names tarnished by the stain of ignoble greed. The temptation was great and we must not be surprised that it was too much for the virtue of most of the persons exposed to its snares.

The unpleasant details of the period, and especially of the years during Clive's absence in England, which, unfortunately, have been recorded fully, may be passed over lightly in a book like this. The scandals which occurred were almost inevitable, and it is well to remember that they lasted only a short time. From 1772 a serious effort was made to reform the administration, and Warren Hastings, as Governor of Bengal from that year to 1774, did all that could then be done to lay the foundation of a better system.¹

¹ Warren Hastings, when writing to the Directors on November 11, 1773, justly observed that 'whatever may have been the conduct of individuals or even of the collective members of your former administrations, the blame is not so much imputable to them as to the want of a principle of government adequate to its substance, and a coercive power to enforce it'. He then pointed out the absurdity of trying to govern a great kingdom by the organization of a trading company. 'Among your servants, who for a course of years have been left at large in possession of so tempting a deposit, it is not to be wondered at that many have applied it to the advancement of their own fortunes. . . . Few men are inspired with so large a share of public virtue as to sacrifice their interests, peace, and social feelings to it, and to begin the work of reformation on themselves.' In

Inherent difficulties. The inherent difficulties of the situation in which the officials of the Company found themselves placed were enormous, and could not have been wholly overcome if every Englishman in Bengal had been an angel of light. The Indian governments with which the British had to deal were thoroughly debased. Treachery and murder of the most atrocious kinds were almost universally recognized as ordinary methods of statecraft. English officials who had to transact business with the Indian public men of the eighteenth century could hardly help themselves from suffering a certain amount of moral deterioration or from yielding to the temptation of meeting guile by guile. The court of Delhi was hopelessly vicious and corrupt. Every one of the Pādshāhs or so-called emperors after the death of Bahādur Shāh in 1712 was absolutely worthless, and most of them were worse than worthless. The ministers were utterly unscrupulous, and nobody pretended to entertain patriotic sentiments. The minor courts, as a rule, were no better, and it would be difficult to name an honest man among the prominent Indian notables of the time, whether in the north or in the south.

The legal position of the personages claiming authority was confused and obscure. For instance, the ruler of Bengal whom the English overthrew at Plassey was supposed to be the subject and tributary of the Pādshāh of Delhi. As a matter of fact he was neither, and the theoretical suzerainty of the Great Mogul was valuable only as a salable commodity. Everybody and everything was on sale. Those disagreeable facts must be realized before judgements of unrelenting severity are passed on the failings of the foreigners who had to work in such an atmosphere, and to deal with authorities who never actually were what they professed to be. The political position was further complicated by the existence of the predatory Marāthā power. The Marāthā government lived by and for plunder. It would be difficult to exaggerate the wickedness of the leaders of the Marāthā hordes and their allies the Pindāris. The rapid introduction of good government into a country so disorganized was impossible. The Company could not possibly find competent rulers either in its own ranks or among the natives of the country. So we come back to the proposition that the disorders of the state in the years following the revolution caused by the battle of Plassey were unavoidable to a large extent. Grapes cannot be gathered from thistles, and thistles were an abundant crop in the India of those days.

Situation in 1760. In the beginning of 1760 both the Shāhzāda and the Marāthās again invaded the provinces which were reduced to a state of intense distress. Mir J'afar was utterly incompetent to deal with his difficulties, and Clive's intention to leave to him all the responsibilities of government, while the English should a later letter (December 18) he writes: 'God forbid that the government of this fine country should continue to be a mere chair for a triennial succession of indigent adventurers to sit and hatch private fortunes in' (Gleig, i. 368, 377).

'attend solely to commerce, which was our proper sphere and our whole aim in these parts', was frustrated. The situation when Mr. Vansittart took over charge in July 1760 is well described by Mill :

'The new governor found the treasury at Calcutta empty, the English troops at Patna on the very brink of mutiny, and deserting in multitudes for want of pay ; the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay totally dependent upon Bengal for pecuniary resources ; the provision of an investment actually suspended ;¹ the income of the Company scarcely sufficient for the current expenses of Calcutta ; the allowance paid by the Nabob for the troops several months in arrear ; and the attainment of that, as well as of a large balance upon his first agreements, totally hopeless. Some change by which the revenue of the Company could be placed on a level with their expenditure was indispensable. . . . From the administration of Jaffier, resigned as he was to a set of unworthy favourites—old, indolent, voluptuous, estranged from the English, and without authority—no other consequences were to be expected than those which had already been experienced.'

Mīr Kāsim appointed Nawāb. The Calcutta authorities, being forced to make some change, resolved to transfer the control of the administration to the Nawāb's son-in-law, Mīr Kāsim, who appeared to be the most worthy member of the ruling family, and to leave Mīr J'afar on the throne as nominal Nawāb. Arrangements were made accordingly. Mīr J'afar's son, Miran, a debauched and tyrannical man, having died suddenly, and perhaps been assassinated, Mīr J'afar retired, and Mīr Kāsim became Nawāb. The English promised military aid to their nominee, recouping themselves by securing the cession of the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur, and Chittagong for the payment of the troops—the first instance of the system of 'subsidiary alliances' adopted later on a large scale by Lord Wellesley.²

The story of Mīr Kāsim. So far the arrangements made might be justified as offering a prospect of better government and the

¹ The 'investment' meant the supply of goods for export in the trade of the Company. Cash advances were made to the weavers and others who supplied the goods.

² Treaty dated September 27, 1760 ; articles 4 and 5 are : '(4) The Europeans and *Telings* [Madras sepoys] of the English Army shall be ready to assist the Nawab, Mīr Mahomed Kasim Khan Bahadur, in the management of all affairs ; and in all affairs dependent on him they shall exert themselves to the utmost of their abilities. (5) For all charges of the Company and of the said Army, and provisions for the field, &c., the lands of Burdwan, Midnapur, and Chittagong shall be assigned, and *Sanads* [grants] for that purpose shall be written and granted. The Company is to stand to all losses and receive all the profits of these three countries, and we will demand no more than the three assignments aforesaid' (Aitchison, ed. 4, vol. i, p. 215). The current official story that Miran was killed by lightning which fired his tent, was disbelieved by Jean Law of Lauriston, who was of opinion that Miran was assassinated, the tent being set on fire during a thunderstorm to conceal the crime (*Mémoire*, ed. Martineau, Paris, 1913, p. 452).

restoration of financial solvency. They were spoiled and rendered suspect by the greed of the majority of the Company's officials, who exploited the change in the government to their personal profit. The new Nawāb was a man far more competent than his father-in-law, and might have done well if he had been given a fair chance. Vansittart and Warren Hastings, then a young man, who had been brought into the Council in 1761, were anxious to be just, but they were outvoted by their greedy colleagues, who wrongfully claimed a right to carry on the inland trade in country produce free of duties, while their Indian competitors should have to pay them.¹ The claim, which was utterly baseless, was enforced with much oppression and disregard of justice. The Nawāb sought an escape by moving his court to Monghyr (Mungir) much higher up the Ganges, where he occupied the ruinous fort then haunted by tigers, and evaded the demands of the Council by announcing that the trade of all parties alike should be free of duties. Watts and the other members of the majority of the Council disallowed the Nawāb's proposals, which Vansittart and Hastings had approved. A Mr. Ellis stationed at Patna was especially violent in his opposition to the Nawāb, who was driven into hostilities. Mir Kāsim was 'rendered frantic', to use Vansittart's words, and in October 1763 retaliated in a barbarous fashion by the massacre of all the Europeans in his power, save one, Dr. Fullarton. Ellis was among the victims, who numbered about 200. The majority, about 150, were slaughtered at Patna by a brutal foreign adventurer named Walter Reinhard, commonly known by his nickname of Sombre, Sumroo, or Samrū, who survived until 1778. His widow, the famous Bēgam, had a long and adventurous career. Mir Kāsim, defeated in several engagements, took refuge in Oudh, and old Mir J'afar was brought back as Nawāb. He died in January 1765, and was succeeded as titular ruler by a son named Najmu-d daula. All these changes were utilized by the majority of the Council as opportunities for making fortunes by the exaction of huge 'presents' from each successive prince.² Even Vansittart, who had held out for a time, yielded to the temptation and took five lakhs of rupees in 1762. Warren Hastings did not soil his hands.

Battle of Buxar. The notice of Mir Kāsim's fate in the preceding lines has anticipated the story of his final military defeat which was accomplished at the battle of Buxar, on October 23, 1764. Mir Kāsim, whose army was more efficient than was usual in those times, had the half-hearted support of the titular emperor Shāh Ālam and the Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh. The British force was commanded by Major Munro, afterwards Sir Hector, a king's officer, who had come from Bombay with reinforcements,

¹ The Company was concerned only with the foreign trade. The claim to conduct the inland trade duty-free was based on a forced and inequitable interpretation of the *farmān* of Farrukhsiyar, which was loosely worded.

² For the details as disclosed to the House of Commons committee in 1773 see Mill, ed. 5 (1858), vol. iii, pp. 257-60. The student should note that the name of Warren Hastings is *not* in the list.

and had suppressed a sepoy mutiny with terrible but necessary severity. He led an army of 7,072 men, including 857 Europeans, and had a train of artillery comprising 20 field-pieces. The force of the allied enemies was variously estimated as numbering from 40,000 to 60,000 men. The fight, which was fiercely contested, lasted from nine in the morning until noon, when the enemy gave way. Pursuit was stopped by the destruction of a bridge of boats two miles distant from the battle-field. The enemy left 2,000 dead on the ground, in addition to about the same number drowned. The British lost 847 in killed and wounded, a large figure for an Indian battle. The victory, which was absolutely decisive, completed the work of Plassey. The emperor submitted, and came under British protection. In the following February the fortresses of Chunar and Allahabad were captured, so that the power of Shuj'au-d daula, the Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh, was broken for ever.

Appointment of Clive. The Directors in London were aghast at the news of the misrule in India, and on April 26, 1764, avowed that they were 'at a loss how to prescribe means to restore order from this confusion'. They were obliged, under pressure from the proprietors, to invoke the aid of Clive, who had been created Baron Clive of Plassey in the peerage of Ireland as a reward for his earlier services.¹ A Select Committee was appointed to assist him, and the Directors could 'only say, that "we rely on the zeal and abilities of Lord Clive and the gentlemen of the Select Committee to remedy"' the evils of the state.

Clive arrived at Calcutta on May 3, 1765, armed with strict instructions and ample powers to reform abuses.

Contemporary events. Before proceeding to study the proceedings of Clive's second administration from May 1765 to February 1767, the reader should bear in mind the course of contemporary events outside of Bengal, and remember that in 1761 the Marāthā power had been temporarily shattered at Pānīpat, that in the same year French influence had been finally destroyed by the capitulation of Pondicherry, and that Haider Ali had become supreme in Mysore. The battle of Buxar in 1764 had closed the story of the military conquest of Bengal and Bihār, which from that date were substantially British territory, however the fact might be obscured by confused legal fictions concerning the Pādshāh of Delhi, the Sūbadār of Bengal, and other personages whose real position differed widely from that officially ascribed to them. During the five years of Clive's absence from India (1760-5) the situation had changed radically, and strong measures were needed to check the gross abuses prevalent and to prepare the way for a decently ordered administration.

¹ Governments in the eighteenth century were slow to confer a peerage of the United Kingdom, or rather of Great Britain (England and Scotland), which carried with it a seat in the English House of Lords. An Irish peer ranked in England as a commoner and could become a member of the House of Commons, as Clive actually became.

Covenants and inland trade. Clive brought with him two members of the Select Committee nominated to assist him; the other two, General Carnac and Mr. Harry Verelst, being then employed in Bihār and at Chittagong respectively.¹ The orders of the Directors commanding the instant cessation of their servants' interference in the inland trade and the execution of covenants prohibiting the acceptance of 'presents' except within certain narrow limits, although received in January, had been laid aside by the Calcutta councillors, who simply ignored them. Clive insisted on the immediate execution of the new covenants; but, in accord with the Select Committee, disobeyed and tried to evade the perfectly clear orders from home concerning the participation of the Company's servants in the inland trade, which was forbidden absolutely by the Directors. Clive and his colleagues formed the opinion that in the circumstances then existing the limited amount of lawful trade open to the servants of the Company was insufficient to provide them with adequate remuneration. Their salaries, as is well known, were mostly of nominal amount. The Directors and proprietors of stock had always displayed a strong dislike to the appearance of a heavy charge for salaries on the face of the accounts. They took no heed of the enormous perquisites often amassed by individual officials, so long as there was no public scandal. Clive and his colleagues accordingly did not propose the obvious remedy of assigning adequate salaries to the officers and prohibiting them altogether from practising trade. That remedy had to come a little later, but at that time the Directors could not have been persuaded to sanction it.

The Society of Trade. Clive unfortunately was induced by his colleagues to accept and defend a fantastic scheme for enriching the senior servants of the Company, civil and military, by instituting a Society of Trade, for carrying on the forbidden inland trade in salt, betel-leaf and opium. The operations of the Society in practice were almost confined to salt, in which a strict monopoly was created. The enormous profits were shared in certain proportions by the Company and the officers concerned. Clive himself held five shares, which he sold in 1767 to his colleagues, Messrs. Sumner, Verelst, and Sykes, for the considerable sum of £32,000.² The Directors rightly disallowed absolutely the monstrous scheme, but full effect was not given to their orders until September 1768. The proceedings relating to the business were too complicated for detailed exposition in this place. The reader who is curious about the particulars of an unpleasant affair will find everything concerning it in the pages of Bolts on one side and of Verelst on the other.

¹ The Select or Secret Committee took charge of all political and foreign affairs, thus becoming the parent of the Foreign Department of the Government of India. Ordinary administration remained in the hands of the Council.

² Bolts gives the text of the deed without date, which must have been in 1767.

Political arrangements. The victory of Buxar in 1764 had relieved Clive from the necessity of directing military operations and had left him free to devote his attention to political and administrative problems. The chief political questions, all closely connected one with the other, concerned the Nawāb or Sūbadār of Bengal, Shāh Ālam, the titular emperor or Pādshāh, and Shuj'āu-d daula, the Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh. The new Nawāb of Bengal was disposed of by converting him into a titled pensioner stripped of all power. Clive in one of his letters states that the young man was pleased with the arrangement and observed, 'Thank God, I shall now have as many dancing-girls as I please'. Nevertheless, Clive insisted on keeping up the fiction of the 'double government', and conducting the administration in the name of the Nawāb, whose authority was vested in two Nāibs or Deputies, Muhammad Razā Khān for Bengal, and a Hindu, Mahārājā Shitāb Rāi, for Bihār. The titular emperor, who was not in a position to have a will of his own and was thankful to get what he could, was provided for by the treaty of Allahabad. The districts of Allahabad and Korā, the latter being often described as Korā (Corah) and Karā (Kurrah),¹ were cut off from Oudh and assigned to Shāh Ālam, who was also granted an annuity of twenty-six lakhs of rupees (2,600,000) from the revenues of Bengal. The Mogul, in return, was required to resign all further claims on the revenue and to confirm formally the right of the Company to the territories in their possession.² He thus became in substance a dependant and pensioner of the Company.

Grant of the Diwānī. Shāh Ālam was further directed to grant to the Company the Diwānī of the whole of Bengal, Bihār, and Orissa. The province last named then included only Midnapur and part of the Hooghly District, the rest of Orissa or Cuttack (Katak) being in Marāthā hands since 1751. The Grant of the Diwānī in 1765, as it is commonly called, meant that the emperor, so far as he could, conferred on the Company the appointment of Diwān or coadjutor to the Nawāb in all matters connected with the revenue.³ The general administration was still in the hands of the officers who posed as Deputies of the Nawāb. The Company did not take up the duties and responsibilities of Diwān

¹ Korā is a town in the Fatehpur District, about 100 miles NW. of Allahabad. It was the capital of a *sarkār* or District in Akbar's time. Karā, about 40 miles NW. of Allahabad, is a small town in that district, which played a considerable historical part in earlier ages. Some of the early English documents speak of 'Corah' only, but the territory often is described as 'Corah and Kurrah' (Strachey, *Rohilla War*, p. 37 n.).

² Namely, the Twenty-four Parganas near Calcutta, the Districts of Burdwan, Midnapur, and Chittagong; and the Northern Sarkārs (Circars).

³ Lord Mahon comically, although with all gravity, observes that 'Clive obtained from the fallen Emperor a Dewannee or public deed conferring on the English Company the sole right of administration throughout the provinces of Bengal, Orissa, and Bahar' (*The Rise of our Indian Empire*, ed. 1858, p. 85).

until seven years later. The so-called 'grant' was a paper transaction designed to give a show of legality to the Company's irregular position. English Supervisors appointed to superintend the operations of the Indian revenue officials were not a success.

Combination of officers. In 1766 a dangerous mutinous combination of the British officers of the Company's military forces, not quite amounting to open mutiny, took place, which needed Clive's strong nerve for its suppression, and seemed at one time to threaten a revolution. The Directors, eager for financial economies, insisted on the field allowance or *batta* to the officers being stopped. It had been doubled by Mir J'afar, and the Company regarded the increased charge as a serious grievance. On the other hand, many of the junior officers could not live on their small pay without the allowance, and undoubtedly had substantial grounds of complaint when the extra pay was suddenly stopped. Many of the Company's civil servants sympathized with the officers and subscribed in support of their cause. The army had been organized by Clive in three brigades stationed respectively at Monghyr, Allahabad, and Bankipore near Patna. The officers of the third brigade at Bankipore remained loyal, but those of the other two brigades arranged to resist the orders for the stoppage of the allowance by throwing up their commissions simultaneously, hoping that the pressure thus exercised would compel Clive and the Select Committee to refrain from enforcing the Director's orders. The European privates and the Indian sepoys on the whole kept clear of the combination. Clive met the danger with unflinching firmness and within a fortnight had conquered it. Most of the officers submitted and were allowed to remain in the service, but a few were treated with vindictive severity and shipped to Europe with the accommodation provided for common sailors, a harsh measure of at least doubtful legality. Clive deserves full credit for the resolution which he displayed in a perilous emergency, but the details of the hard cases are not pleasant reading.

Departure and death of Clive. At the beginning of 1767 Clive felt himself free to return to England, which he had quitted unwillingly. While making no direct personal profit from the trip, he provided handsomely for his surgeon and two other members of his personal staff by dividing among them his large profits derived from the Society of Trade. He stated, and no doubt truly, that he himself was nearly six thousand pounds poorer than when he left England.

In February 1767 he left India for ever. The remaining seven years of his life, largely occupied by party conflicts at the India House and in Parliament, concern his biographer rather than the historian of India and need not be further noticed here. Those years were clouded by depression resulting from painful maladies and enhanced by the excessive use of opium taken to relieve the suffering. In 1774 he cut his throat at his London house in Berkeley Square.

Verelst and Cartier. He left the territories in his charge in

a state of perfect outward tranquillity to his successor, Mr. Harry Verelst, an experienced man of considerable ability, and superior in character to many of his colleagues and contemporaries. Two years later Verelst handed on the government to Mr. John Cartier, who also enjoyed a good reputation and retired with a fortune deemed modest in those days.¹ Although Clive's exertions had done something to clear the air, grave abuses continued to exist, as will appear from the next chapter.

Policy and character of Clive. The acts commonly specified as those staining Clive's reputation are the deception practised on Amīrchand (Omichund) and the acquisition of an immense fortune by accepting from Mir J'afar cash 'presents' on a vast scale to the amount of £234,000 besides the *jāgīr* worth about £28,000 a year. It is needless to discuss minutely the forged treaty business. Although Clive refused to repent of his action, which certain writers have tried to justify, the trick unquestionably was indefensible, both morally and politically. The matter of the 'presents' and the *jāgīr* is much more complicated when due consideration is given to the time and circumstances. Clive felt that as a conqueror he was entitled to help himself freely to prize-money, which in those days and long afterwards was claimed by victorious armies in a way which now would be deemed discreditable. Clive urged in his defence before Parliament that the Directors his masters had not merely approved his acts but had sent him out again to India, in order to retrieve their affairs by his 'zeal and abilities'. They had not only condoned the acceptance of the *jāgīr*. His enjoyment of the grant for a term of years was formally sanctioned and the reversion of it to the Company was secured. In 1773. Clive, when examined before the committee of the House of Commons, argued that

'at that time (1757) there were no covenants existing: the Company's servants were at liberty to receive presents: they always had received presents. . . . He never made the least secret of the presents he had received: he acquainted the Court of Directors with it: and they, who are his masters, and were the only persons who had a right to object to his receiving those presents, approved of it.'

The propositions thus stated are all true in fact, and the defence, so far as it went, was sound. The House of Commons, while expressing general disapproval of the practice current sixteen years earlier, refrained from formulating a personal condemnation of Clive and wisely recorded their judgement that 'Robert, Lord Clive, did at the same time render great and meritorious services to his country'.

Clive's proceedings respecting the Society for trade in salt, betel-leaf, and tobacco formed by him and the Select Committee in 1765 and continued in operation until September 1768, in defiance of the Directors' repeated positive orders and in violation of his

¹ Both Verelst and Cartier are given good characters by an anonymous writer in 1790, as quoted by Miss Monckton Jones (*Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772-4*, p. 114 n.).

own express undertaking to abstain from trade, seem to me far more discreditable than his early acceptance of excessive 'presents'. It would be impossible to justify that judgement without entering upon a lengthy disquisition unsuitable for a book like this ; and it must suffice to say that for once I agree with Mill in regarding the affair of the Society as being 'in its own nature shameful', and in rejecting as altogether unconvincing the elaborate arguments adduced in its defence by H. H. Wilson, Verelst, and other authors.¹



CLIVE.

It appears to me impossible for the impartial historian to deny that Clive was too willing to meet Asiatic intrigues on their own ground ; too greedy of riches, and too much disposed to ignore delicate scruples in their acquisition. That verdict undoubtedly tarnishes his memory and precludes the historian from according to him the unqualified admiration which his heroic qualities seem to exact. His most outstanding characteristic was an inflexible will which guided his conduct to success in affairs, whether military or civil. His military genius and his gift for leadership were

¹ For a full statement and an ample supply of documents see the work of Bolts on one side and that of Verelst on the other.

abundantly manifested both in the peninsula and in Bengal. His abilities as a statesman were exhibited chiefly in his second administration, when he confronted extraordinary difficulties with unflinching courage. The merits and demerits of that administration probably will continue to excite differences of opinion nearly as marked as those expressed in his lifetime. His affection for the dubious scheme of 'double government' was largely influenced by his desire to veil from rival European states the real position of the British masters of Bengal as 'the umpires of Hindostan'.¹ That policy is expressed with perfect clearness in a letter signed by Clive and his colleagues on January 24, 1767 :

'We may, in our present circumstances, be regarded as the spring which, concealed under the shadow of the Nabob's name, secretly gives motion to this vast machine of government, without offering violence to the original constitution. The increase of our own, and diminution of his power, are effected without encroachment on his prerogative. The Nabob holds in his hands, as he always did, the whole civil administration, the distribution of justice, the disposal of offices, and all those sovereign rights which constitute the essence of his dignity, and form the most convenient barrier between us and the jealousy of the other European settlements.'²

The argument advanced in the last clause is an inadequate foundation for such a structure of make-believe. There is no reason to suppose that anybody was deceived by all the pretending. It is, however, proper to note that the French, although beaten and powerless on Indian soil, still retained a naval base at the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean, and consequently were in a position to threaten trouble. From the Indian point of view Clive's second administration may be contemplated with some satisfaction as the beginning of the end of an evil time. From the British point of view the controversy concerning his qualities and defects is best closed by the resolution of the House of Commons quoted above.

Famine of 1770. The administration of Mr. Cartier, otherwise of little interest, was signalized by the famine of 1770, a disaster which, as Hunter truly observed, is 'the key to the history of Bengal for the succeeding forty years'. The famine was due to the early cessation of the rains in 1769, which caused the minor autumn crop of rice to wither and prevented the growth of the main crop due for cutting in December. The lack of roads and the other unfavourable circumstances of the time sufficed to produce a famine of unsurpassed intensity from that one failure of rain. Dacca and the south-eastern districts escaped nearly unhurt. The rest of Bengal and Bihār both north and south of the Ganges was rendered desolate, 'a silent and deserted province'. Yet the trouble was completely over, so far as the crops were concerned, in November 1770, and in the three following years the produce

¹ The remarkable phrase used by Verelst on March 28, 1768 (*A View, &c.*, App. p. 41). Nearly three years earlier Clive had written 'The Company are sovereigns in India' (*ibid.*, p. 252).

² Verelst, *op. cit.*, App., p. 41.

was more than usually abundant. The worst suffering was endured between May and September. The best estimates indicate that one-third of the population perished. The effects of depopulation were long felt, so that even in 1789 Lord Cornwallis could describe Bengal to the extent of one-third as 'a jungle inhabited only by wild beasts'. The puny efforts of private charity, which seems to have been generous, could do little to alleviate the overwhelming distress. At Murshīdābād the Resident reported that the living were feeding on the dead and that the streets were choked with corpses. Such scenes were no novelty in India. They had been witnessed twice even in the reign of victorious Akbar, and many times throughout the centuries.

The obligation to relieve famine at any cost and to strain every nerve of the administration in order to save life, which was never acknowledged by any native government. Hindu or Muhammadan, was very imperfectly recognized even by the Anglo-Indian government before 1873. In 1770 such notions concerning the duty of a ruling power had not occurred to anybody, Indian or European, and if they had occurred, the means for putting them in practice did not exist. The East India Company's officers cannot be blamed for the failure to deal with the famine on modern lines. They did not then administer the country, of which the revenue affairs were solely in charge of Muhammad Razā Khān, who did not worry about the sufferings of the people. He collected the revenue almost in full and added 10 per cent. for 1771.

Warren Hastings, in his masterly review of the state of Bengal dated November 3, 1772, addressed to the Directors, tells the terrible truth about the methods of revenue administration under the 'double government' system.

'The effects of the dreadful Famine which visited these Provinces in the Year 1770, and raged during the whole course of that Year, have been regularly made known to you by our former advices, and to the public by laboured descriptions, in which every Circumstance of Fact, and every Art of Languages, have been accumulated to raise Compassion, and to excite Indignation against your Servants, whose unhappy lot it was to be the witnesses and spectators of the sufferings of their fellow-creatures.

But its influence on the Revenue has been yet unnoticed, and even unfelt, but by those from whom it was collected; for, notwithstanding the loss of at least one-third of the inhabitants of the Province, and the consequent decrease of the Cultivation, the nett collections of the year 1771 exceeded even those of 1768, as will appear from the following Abstract of Accounts:'

which follow, but need not be quoted.

'It was naturally to be expected that the diminution of the Revenue should have kept an equal pace with the other Consequences of so great a Calamity. That it did not, was owing to its being violently kept up to its former Standard. To ascertain all the means by which this was effected will not be easy.'

Hastings proceeds to dilate on the difficulties of the investigation

and to denounce specially an iniquitous tax called *najai*, which was ruthlessly levied.

'This Tax, though equally impolitic in its Institution and oppressive in the mode of exacting it, was authorised by the antient and general usage of the Country. It had not the sanction of Government, but took place as a matter of course.'

The consideration of the writer's further observations on the revenue system or lack of system in that age is reserved for the next chapter, which will deal with his memorable, although seldom mentioned administration of Bengal as governor for more than two years.

CHRONOLOGY

Shuj'au-d dīn Sūbadār of Bengal	1725-39
Allahvardi Khān Sūbadār of Bengal	1740-56
Cession of Orissa (Cuttack) to the Marāthās	1751
Gheria expedition of Watson and Clive	1755
Sirāju-d daula Sūbadār or Nawāb of Bengal ; capture of Calcutta	1756
Recapture of Calcutta ; storm of Chandernagore ; battle of Plassey ; cession of Twenty-four Parganas ; Mir J'afar Sūbadār or Nawāb	1757
Defeat of the Dutch at Biderra	1759
Departure of Clive ; Vansittart governor of Bengal ; Mir Kāsim appointed Nawāb or Sūbadar of Bengal	1760
Massacre of Europeans at Patna and elsewhere ; restoration of Mir J'afar as Sūbadār or Nawāb	1763
Battle of Buxar	1764
Death of Mir J'afar ; Clive governor of Bengal ; Select Committee	1765
Mutinous combination of European officers	1766
Departure of Clive ; Verelst governor of Bengal	1767
Cartier governor of Bengal	1769
Famine	1770

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The long-promised *Life of Clive* by Sir G. FORREST appeared in September, 1918. The subject has been treated by Sir JOHN MALCOLM (Murray, 1836) ; GLEIG, G. R. (Murray, 1861) ; MALLESON (*Rulers of India*), and other authors. The *Life* bearing the name of CARACCIOLI, CHARLES (London, 1775, 1777), is a venomous libel written in the interest of the mutinous

officers of 1766. The book, *Considerations on Indian Affairs* by BOLTS, W., is almost equally hostile and needs to be read with caution (London, 1772). In the same year VERELST, HARRY, replied by *A View of the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the English Government in Bengal*. VANSITTART, H., defended his administration in *A Narrative of the Transactions in Bengal, 1760-4* (3 vols., London, 1766). The four works last named include the texts of the treaties and numerous other documents.

All essential information about the famine is given in HUNTER, Sir W. W., *Annals of Rural Bengal* (London, Smith, Elder, 1897). For the strange career of William Bolts, who was a Dutchman, see *Ind. Ant.*, 1917, p. 277.

CHAPTER 3

Warren Hastings as governor of Bengal, 1772-4; the Rohilla war; the Regulating Act.

Early life of Warren Hastings. The creditable conduct of Warren Hastings in the transactions of Mir Kāsim's time has been briefly mentioned, but a more explicit statement of the leading facts of his early official career is needed to make his position fully intelligible. Unfortunately it is impossible to relate in this place the fascinating story of his life. The most material facts stated in the briefest possible manner are these.

Warren Hastings, a descendant of an ancient and honourable, although impoverished family, was born in December 1732, and came out to Calcutta as a writer in the East India Company's service before he had completed eighteen years of age. After an apprenticeship employed in office work he was posted to Kāsim-bāzār (Cossimbazaar). When Sirāju-d daula captured that factory Hastings was made prisoner. He escaped, joined his countrymen at Faltā, and served under Clive, who recognized his merit. In 1761, being then in his twenty-ninth year, Hastings became a member of council at Calcutta. He went home in 1764, and returned to India in 1769 as second in council at Madras, where he was employed chiefly on commercial business. He did his work so well and honestly that the Directors selected him to succeed Mr. Cartier as governor of Bengal. He took charge of that office in April 1772 in the fortieth year of his age and the fullness of his intellectual powers.

Confidence of the Directors. It is important to note that Warren Hastings throughout the whole of his earlier service enjoyed the confidence of his superiors in an exceptional degree. The Directors, when sending him to Madras, bore testimony to his 'great ability and unblemished character'. In May 1771 the Secret Committee gave him still stronger marks of their esteem by writing confidentially to him that 'they could not have evidenced more clearly the confidence they repose in your abilities, zeal, and integrity than they have done by their appointment of you to preside in their council in Bengal'. Two years later they expressed their 'entire approbation' of his conduct,

and their 'utmost satisfaction', offering at the same time their 'assurances of protection and support'.

The eulogy pronounced by the Prime Minister was still more emphatic and significant :

'On the passing of the Regulating Act in 1773, he [Lord North] stated in the House that as first Governor-General "he should propose a Person who, though flesh and blood, had resisted the greatest temptations—that tho' filling great Offices in Bengal during the various Revolutions that had been felt in that Country, never received a single Rupee at any one of them, and whose Abilities and intense application would be apparent to any gentleman who would consider what he had done during the first six months of his Administration"'.¹

The man who had earned such trust by twenty-three years of faithful service could not possibly have become in the next year the corrupt tyrant depicted in the outrageous libels which poisoned half of his life and still exercise an improper influence on current opinion. It was the misfortune of Hastings that from 1774 he became the object of the 'vile malevolence' of Philip Francis, who schemed incessantly to usurp his office, and spared no efforts in the attempt to ruin the man whom he envied and hated. The malignant spirit which had composed the venomous *Letters of Junius* found equally congenial occupation in organizing a conspiracy against Hastings,² contrived so artfully that even Pitt and Burke were beguiled.

Difficulties of Hastings. It is hardly possible to exaggerate the difficulties which confronted Hastings. The imperfect reforms begun by Clive had produced little real improvement, and a government worthy of the name did not exist. The task of Hastings was the creation rather than the amendment of a tolerable administration. Three months after taking charge he wrote that 'the new government of the Company consists of a confused heap of undigested materials, as wild as the chaos itself'. Various branches of business were 'all huddled together', no clear separation of departments being recognized. Arrears of work going back for years had to be cleared away, and honest men were extremely scarce. The small supply of competent officials had been so much diminished by the massacre of Patna in 1763 that mere youths had risen to positions far above their deserts or capacity. The young gentlemen who had been appointed to control the collection of the revenue, called Supervisors at first and Collectors later, monopolized the trade of the country, especially in grain, and were themselves the tools of their Bengālī 'banyans', or men of business, whom Hastings described as

¹ Quoted by Miss Monckton Jones in *Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772-1774*, p. 104 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1917), from B.M. Add. MS. 29209, 9. The passage does not seem to have been published previously.

² The first series of the political pamphlets, 70 in number, entitled the *Letters of Junius*, appeared in the *Public Advertiser* between January 21, 1769, and January 21, 1772. The conclusive evidence that Francis was the author is cited by Busteed, *Echoes from Old Calcutta* (1908), p. 59.

'devils'. The courts of justice were a byword; the country was ravaged by gangs of savage dacoits or brigands, and huge armies of marauders figuring as religious devotees (Sanyāsīs) ranged over the province in their thousands. The currency was in hopeless confusion, and coin was insufficient in quantity. The list of evils might be much prolonged, but it is sufficient to say in general terms that everything was wrong. Hastings, who had received stringent confidential instructions from the Directors to ferret out abuses regardless of persons, found it impossible to do all that

was required of him, even though, as he said, his hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him. As it was, he confessed mournfully some years later that his loyal exertions had cost him 'a world of enemies'. He worked with untiring industry, and did all that man could do, but with necessarily imperfect success. He was forced sometimes to compromise and even to tolerate 'jobs'. His work laid the foundation on which Lord Cornwallis, more favourably situated, was able to build a coherent system. The actual achievement of Hastings will now be described in a summary fashion, omitting much.



WARREN HASTINGS
(as a young man).

The achievement of Hastings. The Company having resolved to 'stand forth as Diwān', the task of collection of revenue was

transferred from Murshīdābād to a Board of Revenue at Calcutta,¹ which thus became the official capital of British India from 1772, a distinction which it continued to enjoy until 1912, when royal command transferred the head-quarters of the Government of India to Delhi.

The allowance of the young Nawāb of Bengal, who had become merely a distinguished nobleman, was cut down by one-half, but economies in useless expenditure left him more money to spend

¹ The whole Council sat as the Board of Revenue. Strachey gives the number of councillors as nine; other books state it as twelve, and the latter number was advocated by Hastings. The number seems to have varied from time to time.

than he had had before. The appointment of Mannī Bēgam as guardian of the Nawāb was afterwards made the subject of foul and absurd charges preferred by Nandkumār and his base English associates. It is sufficient to say that the appointment was sanctioned unanimously by the Calcutta Council and warmly approved by the Directors. The titular emperor, eager to return to Delhi, had thrown himself into the hands of the Marāthās, who kept him practically a prisoner and used him as a tool.¹ He was constrained to make over to them the provinces of Allahabad and Karā which had been assigned to him for support. Hastings rightly withdrew the tribute or allowance of twenty-six lakhs which had been assigned to him as a dependant of the English. It would have been the height of absurdity to continue the payment for the benefit of the Marāthās, the most formidable enemies of the Company. Hastings kept on friendly terms with Shuj'āu-d daula, the ruler of Oudh, whose territories he regarded as a buffer state interposed between the British provinces and the Marāthās. His steady support of Shuj'āu-d daula involved him in the Rohilla war, the subject of so much lying declamation.

Hastings did what he could to improve the administration of justice, and constituted courts of appeal at Calcutta for both civil and criminal cases. The arrangements made were necessarily crude, and had to be so largely modified later that it would be useless to give details.

Some decision concerning the assessment of the land revenue, or 'settlement' in Anglo-Indian technical language, being urgently required, Hastings and his Council did the best thing then possible by granting farming leases for five years, which in 1777 were replaced by more objectionable annual contracts.² The system of farming leases, although far from ideal, was the only tolerable one practicable at the time.

The Council supported their President as a rule, with the exception of Sir Robert Barker, the Commander-in-Chief, who offered a factious opposition based on personal supposed grievances. Hastings uniformly displayed a conciliating, forbearing temper, and went a long way in his efforts to secure the willing support of his colleagues.

Trial of the Deputies. The Directors had insisted that Muhammad Razā Khān and Mahārājā Shitāb Rāi, nominally the deputies of the Nawāb, but in reality the governors of Bengal and Bihār respectively, should be put on their trial for alleged embezzlements on charges preferred by Nandkumār and other rascals. The necessary arrests were cleverly effected by Hastings, who entered on the business unwillingly, especially as regards Shitāb Rāi, a man of exceptionally high character. In him Hastings found 'no defect', observing that he had proved himself to be an 'able financier'. Some years earlier Shitāb Rāi had

¹ The reader should remember that Shāh Ālam had received no tribute from the Nawābs. The 26 lakhs were 'new money'.

² The change for the worse was due to Francis and his hostile colleagues.

earned from Captain Ranfurlie Knox, a brilliant officer, the high praise : 'This is a real Nawāb ; I never saw such a Nawāb in my life.'¹

Both the accused officers were honourably acquitted. Muhammad Razā Khān subsequently accepted office under the Company, but Shitāb Rāi died soon after his acquittal. The whole conduct of Hastings in the distasteful business forced upon him was highly creditable to his character.

Varied activity. Hastings, the greatest of Anglo-Indian rulers, resembled Akbar, the greatest of the earlier sovereigns, in possessing a genius for organization, and in combining a grasp of broad original principles with an extraordinary capacity for laborious attention to detail. When Hastings took over charge of Bengal he knew nothing about the complex revenue system of the provinces, and was obliged to learn, as he said, 'the whole science' from its rudiments. That was not an easy task in the days when no books of reference existed, and all details had to be got somehow out of cumbrous Persian files. Hastings was a master of Persian and Bengālī, had a good working knowledge of Urdū, and seems to have known some Arabic. His varied knowledge was essential to his masterly handling of every department. Although, as he remarked, 'we have not a lawyer among us', he understood the true principles of legal reform, and, if he had had his way, the absurd Supreme Court of the Regulating Act never would have been constituted. In his letter to Lord Mansfield dated March 21, 1774, when forwarding part of Halhed's work on Hindu law, he stated that he 'desired to found the authority of the British government in Bengal on its ancient laws', and that he hoped Halhed's book might 'serve to point out the way to rule this people with ease and moderation according to their own ideas, manners and prejudices'. It is no wonder that a man with such ideas was almost worshipped by the natives of the country. He held the balance even between Hindus and Muhammadans, and was as anxious to promote the accurate knowledge of Muslim law as he was to reveal the mysteries of Hindu jurisprudence. At that time no European knew Sanskrit, and Halhed was obliged to work on a Persian version of the abstract of Hindu law prepared in the sacred language by ten pundits. The famous Muhammadan college, the Calcutta Madrasah, was founded in 1781 by Hastings as Governor-General.

Like Akbar, he was full of eager, intelligent curiosity about subjects of all kinds. He was deeply interested in geography, and in the distribution of useful plants and animals. Major Rennell, the 'father of Indian geography', who had been appointed Surveyor-General of Bengal as early as 1764, was a valued friend of his. Rennell's wonderful *Bengal Atlas* bears the date of 1781.²

¹ *J. B. O. Res. Soc.*, iii. 127.

² For the progress of the survey to 1768 see Verelst, *A View*, App., p. 109.

A few years later Hastings supported Sir William Jones in founding the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Hastings sent two missions to Tibet. The first, under George Boyle, visited the Teshu Lama in 1774; the second, under Samuel Turner, saluted a new Teshu Lama nine years later. The instructions given to the envoys bear witness to the intellectual versatility of their chief. Hastings all through his life took a lively interest in literature and art, and always found time to read an immense number of books. It is sickening to think that the reputation of such a man should have been blackened first by the 'impish malignity' of Francis, and then, after it had been rehabilitated, destroyed a second time by Macaulay's false magazine article, which still holds the public ear in spite of endless annotation and refutation.¹

In the time of Hastings the criminal law administered was still that of the Muhammadans, which included the infliction of the barbarous penalty of mutilation, 'too common a sentence of the Mahometan Courts'. Nobody knew precisely how far English law was in force within the limits of Calcutta, which had courts of its own, but it is certain that natives of the country had been sentenced to death for forgery in accordance with the stern law of England long before Nandkumār's case occurred. The dacoits or brigand gangs committed terrible depredations, and when convicted were punished with ruthless severity.

Thē Sanyāsīs. Even more formidable were the ravages of the Sanyāsīs, which are best described by quoting the language of Hastings from a letter dated March 9, 1773.

'The history of this people is curious. They inhabit, or rather possess the country lying south of the hills of Tibbet from Caubul to China. They go mostly naked. They have neither towns, houses, nor families, but rove continually from place to place, recruiting their numbers with the healthiest children they can steal in the countries through which they pass. Thus they are the stoutest and most active men in India. Many are merchants. They are all pilgrims, and held by all classes of Gentoos [Hindus] in great veneration. This infatuation prevents our obtaining any intelligence of their motions, or aid from the country against them, notwithstanding

¹ The concluding pages of Miss Monekton Jones's book contain a fine appreciation of the character and achievement of Hastings.



SIR WILLIAM JONES.

very rigid orders which have been published for these purposes, insomuch that they often appear in the heart of the province as if they dropped from heaven. They are hardy, bold, and enthusiastic to a degree surpassing credit. Such are the Senassies, the gipsies of Hindostan.'

The Sanyāsī bands, often numbered several thousand men in each, and at one time no less than five sepoy regiments were engaged in hunting them down. Their incursions into Bengal ceased in the second year of the administration of Hastings, and history does not mention any further depredations by them in other provinces. The bands evidently melted away when the Bengal hunting-ground was closed by the vigilance of the governor. At the present day many queer criminal tribes and organizations still exist, little known except to the magistrates and police officers who have to deal with them, but nothing at all resembling the Sanyāsī hordes has been known for generations. I do not know what race supplied the nucleus of their bands, which, as Hastings tells us, were recruited by kidnapped children, who must have come from all classes.

Opium and salt. Hastings put the management of the manufacture and sale of both opium and salt on a sound financial basis. His regulations of 1773 formed the foundation of the modified system in force in our own time. The recent orders discouraging the cultivation of the poppy and the sale of opium have rendered the constitution of the opium department almost obsolete, but the licensed manufacture of salt continues.¹ Hastings also began the reform of the coinage and introduced the 'sicca rupee'.

The princes and the Crown. The views of Hastings concerning the desirable relations between the Crown and the rulers of the Native States were original and daring. When writing to Lord North, the Prime Minister of England, on February 26, 1775, he expressed himself in the following remarkable words :

'I am and always have been of opinion that whatever form it may be necessary to give to the British dominion in India, nothing can so effectually contribute to perpetuate its duration as to bind the powers and states with which this Government may be united, in ties of direct dependence [on] and communication with the Crown. This system has been adopted with respect to the Nabob of Arcot, and, I believe, has met with rational approbation. I thought it might be adopted with the same success in regard to the powers on this side of India. Their confidence would be strengthened by such a relation, which would free them from the dread of annual changes and of the influence of individuals ; and their submission, which is now the painful effort of a necessary policy, would be yielded with pride by men who glory in the external show of veneration to majesty, and even feel the respect which they profess where they entertain an idea of the power to command it. . . . I conceive that the late Act of Parliament [the Regulating Act], by admitting the King into a participation in the management of all the Company's affairs, and almost the sole control of their political concerns of course makes him the principal in them, and entitles him to those pledges of obedience and vassalage from the

¹ See *Imp. Gaz. of India* (1907), vol. iv, chap. viii.

dependents of the British empire in India, which the ideas of the people and immemorial usage have consecrated to royalty.'¹

Hastings, when he wrote that passage, was thinking specially of Oudh, which no longer exists as a separate state. Things have changed so much since his time that his suggestion that each principal Indian state should have its accredited diplomatic representative in London, which seems to have been his meaning, is no longer suitable or practicable; but he was right in recognizing the existence of the desire felt by the Indian princes to be in touch directly with their hereditary sovereign and not merely with the ever-changing officials of an administration. The reality of that desire was plainly manifested when Their Majesties personally received the loyal homage of the ruling chiefs in December 1911, and all legitimate means should be adopted to satisfy it.

The Rohilla war. The material facts of the much debated Rohilla war having been clearly established by study of the documents and embodied in books easily accessible, the matter may be disposed of in a few words, without the formal discussion and refutation of fairy tales. The country lying to the north-west of Oudh between the Ganges and the hills, comprising the ancient Hindu provinces of Katchiar and Sambhal, was and is known as Rohilkhand, because during the 'great anarchy' Afghan tribesmen called Rohillas, being for the most part Yūsufzī from the neighbourhood of Peshāwar, had conquered the land. The bulk of the population consisted of Hindu peasants, but there were several considerable towns, including Bareilly and Pilibhūt. No natural frontier separated Rohilkhand from Oudh, and the Nawāb-Vizier's dominions were most easily accessible to an enemy through the Rohilla territory. The Rohillas were not strong enough to keep out the Marāthās who raided their country several times. The Rohilla chiefs, who had temporized and intrigued with both the Marāthās and the Nawāb-Vizier, in June 1772 signed a treaty by which they promised to pay him forty lakhs, or four millions of rupees, if he would expel the Marāthās. Early in 1773 the freebooters returned, but were compelled to retire when threatened by the forces of Oudh and the Company. The Nawāb-Vizier, who had been put to much expense in equipping his army, demanded payment of the forty lakhs, but, as might be expected, got nothing.

In August of the same year Hastings, accompanied by two members of council, met Shuj'āu-d daula and concluded the treaty of Benares, which transferred Korā and Allahabad from the titular emperor, then a mere tool in Marāthā hands, to the Nawāb-Vizier in consideration of a payment of fifty lakhs. An agreement also was made that the Calcutta government should lend a brigade to the Nawāb-Vizier for the reduction of Rohilkhand at his demand on certain reasonable financial terms. The ruler of Oudh deferred action for various reasons, and the government of Bengal, which

¹ Note the phrase 'the British empire in India' used only eighteen years after the battle of Plassey. The quotation is from Gleig, i. 508.

doubted how far an apparently adventurous policy might be approved in England, welcomed the delay. In February 1774 the Council was surprised by receiving from Shuj'au-d daula a demand for the promised brigade. It was sent accordingly under the command of Colonel Champion. The Rohillas were defeated on St. George's Day, April 17, at Mīran Katra in the Shāhjahānpur District, and their gallant leader, Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, was killed. Their province was annexed to Oudh, and some 18,000 or 20,000 Rohillas crossed the Ganges to the territory of their countryman, Zābita Khān. The Oudh troops burnt some villages and committed a certain amount of ravaging, but no extraordinary violence was used, and the peasantry resumed their daily life at once. One of the Rohilla chiefs was allowed to retain his rule in a portion of the territory, and is now represented by his descendant the loyal Nawāb of Rāmpur.

'Judged by its results,' Sir John Strachey observes, 'the policy of Hastings was eminently successful. . . . More than forty years elapsed before the power of the Marāthās was finally swept away, but during the whole of this time they never attacked or seriously threatened Rohilkhand. The occupation of that province gave to Oudh and to Bengal that permanent protection against the most dangerous of our enemies which it had been the aim of Hastings to secure.'

The proposition thus stated is absolutely correct. Hastings explained his policy to Colonel Champion in a letter dated June 4, 1774, as follows :

'The several propositions (made by Champion) . . . are diametrically opposite to the principle on which the Rohilla expedition was undertaken, which was not merely on account of the pecuniary acquisition of forty laes of rupees to the Company—for, although this might be an accessory argument, it was by no means the chief object of the undertaking. We engaged to assist the Vizier in reducing the Rohilla country under his dominion that the boundary of his possessions might be completed, by the Ganges forming a barrier to cover them from the attacks and insults to which they were exposed by his enemies either possessing or having access to the Rohilla country. This our alliance with him, and the necessity for maintaining this alliance, so long as he or his successors shall deserve our protection, was rendered advantageous to the Company's¹ interest, because the security of his possessions from invasion in that quarter is in fact the security of ours.'

There was nothing to be ashamed of in the policy of the Rohilla war. The House of Commons had the good sense to refuse to include the subject among the articles of impeachment.

Financial difficulties. Many committees of the House of Commons charged with the duty of investigating Indian affairs have sat from time to time. The earliest, appointed in 1766, resulted in the passing during 1767 of five Acts of Parliament, including one which required the Company to pay to the Treasury £400,000 annually for two years. At the moment everybody believed that the new Indian acquisitions were capable of yielding untold wealth. The Company soon discovered the baselessness of

that pleasing belief. While the proprietors of the shares in the Company clamoured for high dividends, the expenses of governing immense territories swallowed up the expected profits, so that in 1773 the Company was almost insolvent and was forced to beg the ministry for the loan of a million sterling.

Need of legislation. The pressure of urgent financial difficulties and the obvious necessity of providing some form of legalized government for the Indian possessions of the Company forced Lord North's government to undertake legislation. It is unnecessary to relate in this work the course of the prolonged discussions in Parliament and at the India House which preceded the enactment of laws settling the disputes. Those discussions may be read at length in the works of Mill, Thornton, and many other authors. India is concerned only with the result, which was embodied in two Acts of Parliament. One disposed of the financial questions at issue, requiring among other things that the Company should submit half-yearly accounts to the Treasury.

Control of Parliament. The other (13 Geo. III, c. 63), commonly known as the Regulating Act of 1773, created a new form of government for India, and definitely subjected the Company to the control of the Crown, or, in practice, to the control of the ministry of the day, and ultimately of Parliament to which such ministry is always responsible.

The 'constitution' of India. The enactment of the Regulating Act may be regarded as the starting-point of the modern constitutional history of India. Although the idea of a 'constitution' is foreign to the traditional Indian modes of thought, which usually have been content to leave government in the hands of an autocrat or despot, the peculiar nature of the connexion of the Indian administration with a parliamentary monarchy in Great Britain has led to the gradual development of an extremely complicated Anglo-Indian constitution. By the term 'constitution' I mean the mixed body of positive law and established practice which regulates the form of the Indian government both in England and in India; determines the relations between the Home Government and the Government of India, sometimes called the Supreme Government; defines the power of the Supreme Government over the provincial administrations; delimits the functions of the legislature or law-making authority as distinct from the executive power; prescribes the powers of the judicial courts; lays down the principles of internal administration; and, last but not least, guides the adjustment of the delicate relations between the sovereign, the Government of India, and the rulers of the Native or Protected States.

Elements of the 'constitution'. That body of mixed law and custom rests primarily upon the statute law of Parliament, comprising about fifty enactments, more or less. Subsidiary, although by no means unimportant, elements in its composition are the prerogative power of the Crown as expressed sometimes by charters, sometimes by proclamations; orders issued by the Directors of the East

India Company, or by the Board of Control, or the Secretary of State ; rulings of the Privy Council or House of Lords ; laws or regulations passed or issued in India ; survivals of ancient Indian institutions ; and a long course of settled custom or practice.

The body thus constituted is a growing organism subject to incessant growth and development, which has proceeded at a rapid rate since the beginning of the twentieth century. No man can foresee the constitutional consequences of the Great War.

Analysis of the Regulating Act. The Regulating Act of 1773, which forms the basis of the Anglo-Indian constitution, dealt with several distinct subjects. My discussion of it and connected matters follows the competent guidance of Sir Courtenay Ilbert. Certain changes were made regulating the appointment of Directors of the Company and the voting by the proprietors of stock or shares which did not concern India closely and need not be further specified. It is, however, important to note that the Directors were required to submit to the king's ministers copies of all material correspondence concerning the affairs of the Company. A separate Act, as already mentioned, directed the submission of half-yearly accounts to the Treasury. The subjection of the Company to parliamentary control through the ministry was thus made complete.

Sovereignty. 'For the government of the Presidency of Fort William [Calcutta] in Bengal, a governor-general and four counsellors were appointed, and the Act declared that the whole civil and military government of this presidency, and also the ordinary management and government of all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the kingdoms of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, should, during such time as the territorial acquisitions and revenues remained in the possession of the Company, be vested in the governor-general and council of the Presidency of Fort William, in like manner as they were or at any time theretofore might have been exercised by the president and council or select committee in the said kingdoms.

The avoidance of any attempt to define, otherwise than by reference to existing facts, the nature or extent of the authority claimed or exercised by the Crown over the Company in the new territorial acquisitions is very noticeable, and is characteristic of English legislation.'

The clear assertion of the sovereignty of the king over India was deferred until 1858, and was further extended on January 1, 1877, by the Proclamation of Queen Victoria as Empress of India.

Persons appointed. The Governor-general and the four counsellors appointed to start the new government were named in the Act and secured in their positions for five years. That time limit thus fixed by statute in the first instance has been applied by custom to the subsequent appointments of lieutenant-governors and other high officials. Ample salaries were provided, namely, £25,000 a year for the governor-general, and £10,000 for each counsellor.¹ They were all forbidden to trade, receive presents, or otherwise add to their income by irregular means.

The persons appointed were : Governor-general, Warren

¹ The salaries have been much reduced.

Hastings, Esquire, recommended by Lord North in glowing language which has been quoted; members of council: (1) Lieutenant-General John Clavering, a distinguished officer, who was knighted two years later; (2) the Honourable George Monson, who had been in Parliament and had served in the army as second in command at the siege of Pondicherry in 1760; (3) Richard Barwell, Esquire, who had been in the Company's service since 1758; and (4) Philip Francis, Esquire, who had been employed as a secretary and in the War Office.

Supremacy of Bengal. 'The supremacy of the Bengal Presidency over the other presidencies was definitely declared. The governor-general and council were to have power of superintending and controlling the government and management of the presidencies of Madras, Bombay, and Benccoolen,¹ so far and in so much as that it should not be lawful for any Government of the minor presidencies to make any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war, against any Indian princes or powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty with any such prince or power without the previous consent of the governor-general and council, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the arrival of their orders, and except also in cases where special orders had been received from the Company. A president and council offending against these provisions might be suspended by order of the governor-general and council. The governors of the minor presidencies were to obey the order of the governor-general and council, and constantly and dutifully to transmit to them advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters relating to the government, revenues, or interest of the Company.

The governor-general and council were to be bound by the votes of a majority of those present at their meetings, and in the case of an equal division the governor-general was to have a casting vote' [in addition to his ordinary vote].

The Supreme Court. The Act further empowered the Crown to establish by charter a Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William, consisting of five barristers, namely, a Chief Justice, with a salary of £8,000 a year, and three judges, each with a salary

¹ In Sumatra, also called Fort Marlborough. The place was given up to the Dutch in 1824 in exchange for the town of Malacca and certain other stations.



SIR PHILIP FRANCIS.

of £6,000 a year.¹ Sir Elijah Impey, an old schoolfellow of Hastings at Westminster, was appointed Chief Justice; his colleagues being Robert Chambers, subsequently knighted, John Hyde, and Stephen Caesar Lemaistre. Impey and Chambers were men of considerable distinction, but their two junior colleagues had not earned any notable reputation prior to their appointment. The court was given civil, criminal, admiralty, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction.

‘Its jurisdiction [subject to certain limitations] was declared to extend to all British subjects who should reside in the kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, or any of them, under the protection of the United Company. And it was to have “full power and authority to hear and determine all complaints against any of His Majesty’s subjects for crimes, misdemeanours, or oppressions, and also to entertain, hear, and determine any suits or actions whatsoever against any of His Majesty’s subjects in Bengal, Behar, and Orissa, and any suit, action, or complaint against any person employed by or in the service of the Company or of any of His Majesty’s subjects”.’

The Act contained many minor provisions concerning the judicial system and other matters which it would be tedious to enumerate.

Defects of the Act. Ilbert observes that

‘the provisions of the Act of 1773 are obscure and defective as to the nature and extent of the authority exercisable by the governor-general and his council, as to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and as to the relation between the Bengal Government and the court’.

The ambiguities and obscurities of the Act and the charter framed under it produced a plentiful crop of disputes, some of which will be noticed in the next chapter. Nobody could tell what law was to be administered by the court.

‘The Act was silent. Apparently it was the unregenerate English law, insular, technical, formless, tempered in its application to English circumstances by the quibbles of judges and the obstinacy of juries, capable of being an instrument of the most monstrous injustice when administered in an atmosphere different from that in which it had been administered.’

Nobody knew how to define the classes of persons, European or Indian, who came under the jurisdiction of the court, or how far the court had power outside the limits of the European settlement. Endless problems arose out of the loose wording of the Act, and from the manifest absurdity of applying the English law of the eighteenth century to the natives of Bengal. Unfortunately, the statute had been drawn by persons who knew nothing about India and who failed to consult Hastings or anybody else who had some knowledge on the subject. The judges administering the law were equally ignorant of Indian conditions.

Another grave defect in the Act was the provision which allowed the Governor-general to be outvoted and overruled whenever three members of his council chose to combine against him. That foolish enactment wrought much mischief. Some of the most glaring faults of the Act were remedied after a few years’ experience,

¹ The salaries are now lower.

but not until grave injustice had been done and the security of the state imperilled.

The rest of India. Marāthā affairs and the various happenings in Bombay, Madras, and other parts of India during the two and a half years of the rule of Hastings in Bengal as governor, before the arrival of the new members of council, will be more conveniently noticed in the next chapter in connexion with events slightly later in date.

CHRONOLOGY

Warren Hastings governor of Bengal	April 1772
Numerous reforms	1772-4
The Regulating Act	1773
The Rohilla war	1774

AUTHORITIES

The two special authorities, both based on an exhaustive study of original documents, are : STRACHEY, Sir JOHN, *Hastings and the Rohilla War* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892); and M. E. MONCKTON JONES, *Warren Hastings in Bengal, 1772-1774* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1918). I have been favoured with the perusal of the proofs of the second book named, which is an excellent work, and should rank as the standard authority on the subject, excepting the Rohilla war, which has been disposed of in Sir John Strachey's conclusive monograph.

Other books on the Hastings period will be named at the end of the next chapter.

The Regulating Act is best studied in ILBERT, Sir COURTENAY, *The Government of India*³ (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1915).

CHAPTER 4

Warren Hastings as Governor-general; the policy and character of Hastings; Sir John Macpherson.

The new government. The Judges of the Supreme Court, who arrived in Calcutta on October 17, 1774, were followed two days later by the three Members of Council, General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis, in another ship. The next day, before Mr. Barwell had taken his seat, the Council met to hear the Directors' instructions. By the orders from home a separate Board of Trade was established for the purpose of relieving the Council from a portion of the purely commercial business of the Company; strict economy in the military expenditure was enjoined; the land revenue system established by Hastings was approved; correspondence with the 'country powers'—or 'Political business' in modern official language—was to be conducted by the Governor-general, subject to the condition that every letter received or sent by him should be laid before the Council; inquiry was to be made into abuses; and, finally, all the members were enjoined to work together in harmony with

a view to the preservation of peace, the safeguarding of the Company's possessions, and the due advancement of the Company's interest.

Hostility of Clavering, Monson, and Francis. The triumvirate from England at once fastened on the order to inquire into abuses, and displayed open hostility to Hastings. The meeting was adjourned until the 25th in order to allow Mr. Barwell to join, and from that date the Council was divided into two sections, Clavering, Monson, and Francis on one side, Hastings and Barwell on the other. The constitution of the body threw all real power into the hands of the majority and subjected Hastings to the mortification of seeing the officers of his choice dismissed and all his measures, so far as practicable, reversed. That state of affairs lasted for almost two years, until September 1776, when the death of Colonel Monson restored power to Hastings, who could do what he pleased with the help of his casting vote.

Disputes in council. The details of the unseemly wranglings in council during those two years need not be recounted at length. The members spent their time in firing off minutes against each other from day to day. They seem to have put everything in writing on the spot, and the unedifying recriminations may now be read in print in the 'consultations'. The biographer of Hastings must wade through the dreary mass in order to understand the personal position of his hero and to realize the astonishing endurance of the man, but the particulars of the disputes have little interest for the historian as distinguished from the biographer. In most respects the selfish spite of the triumvirate produced effects of only a temporary character, but a good deal of more or less lasting mischief was done, especially in relation to Oudh, which was compelled to cede the Benares province. The majority in council relied upon support from the Ministry in England, where Indian affairs were then closely intertwined with party-politics. Both General Clavering and Mr. Francis aspired to the office of Governor-general, and were resolved to employ every means to drive Hastings into retirement before the expiration of the period of five years for which he had been appointed by Act of Parliament.¹ Happily they failed, and Hastings enjoyed eight and a half years of power from September 1776 to February 1785, which enabled him to save the nascent British empire in India from destruction and to establish it upon firm, well-laid foundations.

The case of Nandkumār. The most famous incident of the personal struggle between Hastings and his hostile colleagues is the case of Mahārājā Nandkumār (Nuncomar), the wealthy and influential Brahman who was executed for forgery on August 5, 1775. That case, like the other incidents of the struggle, has a biographical rather than historical interest, which means that the execution of Nandkumār in itself was a matter of no importance so far as the history of India is concerned. The immense bulk which the case assumes in English literature and in the eyes of

¹ His term of office was subsequently extended from year to year.

the general public is due to the malignant cunning of Philip Francis, who knew how to use the genius of Edmund Burke as his tool. The result of the joint labours of Francis and Burke, supplemented by the disingenuous partisanship of James Mill and the specious rhetoric of Macaulay, has been the growth of a legend almost wholly fictitious. The existence and acceptance of that legend have most unjustly besmirched the characters of Warren Hastings and Sir Elijah Impey, and have done much harm by producing in the public mind an unwarranted belief that the Indian empire rests upon foundations stained by the blood of the victim of a judicial murder, planned and executed by the Governor-general and Chief Justice. Nandkumār's case when looked at from that point of view is of historical interest and importance, and it is therefore necessary to set forth the essential facts.

The majority in council, eager to supplant Hastings, and professing to investigate abuses, invited charges against the Governor-general. Nandkumār, a thorough scoundrel, whose misdoings had been familiar to Hastings for many years, had ample reason to expect personal advantage from the overthrow of the Governor-general, who knew too much, and the victory of his enemies who knew nothing.

Nandkumār's false charges against Hastings. Accordingly, in March 1775 (11 and 13) Nandkumār responded to the manifest wishes of the majority of the council by submitting through Francis papers charging Hastings with gross corruption, and enclosing a letter purporting to be from Mannī Bēgam, the widow of Mir J'afar, offering a bribe. The counsellors proceeded with indecent haste to assume the truth of all the charges, and to require the Governor-general, their President, practically to be tried by them. The letter purporting to come from the widow, a manifest forgery, was accepted without question. The papers having been sent home were submitted in 1776 to the law officers of the Company, who declared that the information of Nandkumār, even upon the *ex parte* case before them, could not possibly be true. Nothing more was heard about those accusations against Hastings until thirteen years later in 1789 when Burke founded a charge (No. III) upon them, and failed to convince the House of Lords, which unanimously acquitted Hastings in the matter. That fact is often forgotten.

Nandkumār prosecuted for conspiracy. To come back to Calcutta. After Nandkumār had made his accusations in March, Hastings and Barwell retorted in April by bringing a charge of conspiracy against him and others. The case came before all the Judges of the Supreme Court, who in their capacity of justices of the peace considered the evidence for a whole day (April 20) from 10 a.m. to 11 p.m., and allowed Nandkumār and the other accused persons to be on bail till the 23rd.¹ On the 21st Francis

¹ See Gleig and the extracts from Barwell's letters in Stephen; the *Story of Nuncomar*, chap. xvii. and sundry passages in Gleig, not to speak of the documents of the trial and the impeachment proceedings.

and his colleagues were shameless enough to pay an official call on Nandkumār. On the 23rd Hastings was bound over to prosecute at the next assizes. The trial took place in July, when all the defendants were acquitted of conspiring against Hastings, but Nandkumār and a Mr. Fowke were convicted of conspiracy against Mr. Barwell.

Nandkumār prosecuted for forgery. Before July came other things had happened. On May 6 Nandkumār had been arrested on a charge of forgery preferred by one Mohan Parshād, attorney for a party in a civil suit. On that date, after an investigation lasting from 9 a.m. to nearly 10 p.m., Judges Hyde and Le Maistre, acting in their capacity as Justices of the Peace, committed Nandkumār for trial on the charge of forgery and lodged him in jail. The proceedings for forgery arose naturally out of an old civil suit, and the complainant had decided to prosecute even before the Supreme Court was established. The delay which made the prosecution coincident in time with the conspiracy case was caused by the difficulty in getting hold of the document alleged to be forged. Marshman truly observes that the coincidence in time was 'purely accidental'.

Trial and execution of Nandkumār. The actual trial of Nandkumār for forgery began on June 9, and lasted until 4 a.m. on the 16th. The Court never adjourned, sitting in the hottest season of the year even on Sunday the 11th, from 8 a.m. until late at night, and on the last day until 4 a.m. All the four judges were present throughout, Hyde and Le Maistre asking more questions than Impey or Chambers. Nandkumār challenged eighteen persons on the panel whom he suspected of being unfavourable to him and was convicted by a unanimous jury of twelve Europeans. The rule prohibiting the appearance of counsel for the defence in felony cases was relaxed in his favour, and probably he would have been acquitted but for the evident perjuries committed in his defence, which made a deep impression on the jury. No man ever had a fairer or more laborious trial. The fairness of his trial is the only relevant issue. All the judges agreed as to the legality of the proceedings, and their law seems to have been correct. The only special share in the proceedings which fell to Impey 'was the summing up, a task performed by him fairly and impartially. After conviction legal objections were heard, so that sentence was not passed until June 24, and the execution was deferred until August 5. The Court could not recommend the home authorities under the provisions of the Charter to grant a reprieve, because all the judges were satisfied that the conviction was right, while the petition for respite disclosed no legal grounds for action. Clavering, Monson, and Francis refused positively to take any steps towards obtaining a reprieve.

Comment. Hastings had nothing to do with the case, and Impey simply did his duty, which he shared with three unanimous colleagues. The prisoner was convicted, not by the judges, but by an independent sworn jury, who alone had the task of passing

a verdict on the facts. It is folly for critics now to retry the case. The attempt to impeach Impey many years later completely broke down. Macaulay's abuse of the Chief Justice is wholly undeserved. The above is a plain statement of the most material relevant facts, which are not open to serious dispute.¹ Hastings's oath that he had nothing to do with the forgery case is in exact accordance with the facts established by the record. The propriety of Impey's conduct in every stage of the proceedings is manifest to anybody who reads the papers with due attention. There is not the slightest foundation for Macaulay's denunciations of the conduct of either Hastings or Impey in connexion with the execution of Nandkumār. The critics of Warren Hastings may make out a case against him in regard to the Rohilla War, Rājā Chait Singh, or the Bēgams of Oudh. The facts of all those cases admit of divergence of opinion concerning his action, but nobody who has really understood the Nandkumār affair can believe it possible that a judicial murder was committed. The procedure was regular, legal, and deliberate, and the actual trial by jury was more laborious and exhausting, probably, than that of any other case on record. Everybody concerned, without regard to his health or convenience, toiled in the terrible heat of a Calcutta June for eight days from early morning until late at night to get at the truth, and no reason whatever exists for holding that any illegality or injustice was committed by either the four judges or the twelve jurymen.

That is enough, perhaps more than enough, about Nandkumār and the intrigues of Clavering, Monson, and Francis. We may now proceed with the history of India, stopping merely for a moment to note the final collapse of the opposition to Hastings in the council, and to discuss at some length the serious quarrel between the executive government and the Supreme Court.

Death of Monson and Clavering. The wearisome story of the incessant squabbling in council, of Hastings's action in empowering his agent in London to tender his resignation, and then cancelling the power, of the acceptance of the offer by the Directors and Ministry, of the complicated intrigues in London, and the final victory of Hastings need not be retold. Those matters concern the biographer rather than the historian. It may suffice to state that, as already mentioned, the death of Colonel Monson in September 1776 gave Hastings and Barwell the powers of the majority

¹ Many irrelevant matters have been introduced into the discussion by many writers. Questions of law were within the province of the judges who were much more likely to be right than their critics. Chambers had been Vinerian Professor at Oxford. So long as the judges decided honestly and in good faith, as they did, it is absurd to abuse them because other people might hold a different opinion on obscure points of law. 'Pitt, I think with perfect propriety, "treated the accusation of a conspiracy between Impey and Hastings for the purpose of destroying Nuncomar as destitute of any shadow of proof"' (Stephen, i. 88). The jury alone, it cannot be too often repeated, were responsible for the verdict on the facts. The rest followed in course of law.

by means of the Governor-general's casting vote, and that in June 1777 General (Sir John) Clavering made a rash attempt to seize on the office of Governor-general, in the belief that it had been vacated by the supposed resignation of Hastings. A dangerous crisis extending over four days was ended by the decision of the Supreme Court that Hastings had never actually resigned and that consequently no vacancy existed to be occupied by Sir John Clavering. A few months later, in November, Clavering also died. In August 1780 the Governor-general, in accordance with the code of honour observed at the time, fought a duel with Francis, who was wounded and went home after his recovery.¹ He had his revenge later.

The executive government and the Supreme Court. Before entering on the history of the relations between Hastings and the native states and the story of the Marāthā and Carnatic wars, it will be convenient to notice in some detail the violent conflict between the Supreme Court and the executive which came to a head in 1780, long after the recovery by the Governor-general of his power in council. For several years the executive and the Court had usually kept on good terms, in spite of the difficulties caused by the imperfect constitution of the government, the unsuitability of the Court and its law to the country, and the failure of the Regulating Act to determine the jurisdiction and powers of the Court, or to protect adequately the powers which every executive government must keep in its own hands. Hastings declared in December 1774 that

'the court of justice is a dreadful clog on the government, but I thank God the head of it is a man of sense and moderation. In all England a choice could not have been made of a man more disposed to do good and avoid mischief, which, however, is not wholly in his power, and I am sorry for it.'

In the following year, 1775, the Governor-general recorded his desire that the Chief Justice might be given either 'a fixed or occasional seat at the Council Board' for purposes of legislation and legal advice, thus foreshadowing the appointment of a Legal Member, which was not carried out until Macaulay was appointed in Lord William Bentinck's time. In 1777, as already noted, the Court unanimously supported Hastings against the violent usurpation attempted by Clavering, impartially condemning at the same time a foolish resolution passed by Hastings and Barwell that Clavering had forfeited his seat in council.

¹ 'My antagonists sickened, died, and fled. I maintained my ground unchanged, neither the health of my body, nor the vigour of my mind for a moment deserted me' (Confidential letter of W. H. to David Anderson, September 13, 1786, in Gleig, iii. 304). The extraordinary quarrel at Madras between Lord Pigot, the governor, and his council had some features in common with the case of Hastings. It occurred in 1776-7. The affair was too complicated and local to merit detailed description in this work. It could not be made intelligible without full exposition of the particulars.

But later, the temptations to assert the large powers apparently granted to the Court by the Regulating Act proved too much for the self-control of the judges, who allowed themselves to take action which threatened the very existence of the government. The fault lay more with the puisne judges than with Impey, the Chief Justice. The conflict was most marked in the conduct of two famous cases, the Cossijurah case and the Patna Cause, which must be briefly explained. Macaulay's account, largely based on Mill, is, as Stephens bluntly observes, 'false from end to end'. But, although we cannot accept the lurid picture painted by the essayist, the mischief actually done was serious and had to be stopped somehow.

The Patna Cause. To take the Patna Cause first. The litigation was between the widow and the nephew of a deceased rich Muhammadan, who left a large property in the Patna District of Bihār. The Court claimed jurisdiction over the nephew as being a farmer or contractor of the revenue, and so in the service of the Company, within the words of the Act. The Court further found that the proceedings of the local Company's officers, acting ostensibly as a court under the designation of a Provincial Council, were null and void, the Provincial Council having allowed its functions to be usurped by the Muhammadan muftis and *kāzis*, whose proper duty was merely to advise as assessors on points of Muslim law and practice. Ultimately, the Court awarded heavy damages amounting to about £34,000. The Company allowed the time for appeal to the Privy Council to lapse, and, when granted an extension of time by a special statute in 1781, the Directors failed to prosecute the appeal which had been formally lodged. Thus the judgement of the Supreme Court held good, and the damages were paid by the Company.

The proceedings produced a good effect by drawing public attention to the impossible situation in Bengal. The powers claimed by the Supreme Court over people in the districts away from Calcutta, while justified by the language of the Regulating Act and the Charter of the Supreme Court, could not be exercised without fatal weakening of the authority of the executive. Accordingly, the Act 21, George III, c. 70, deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in any matter concerning the revenue or its collection, and even went so far as to sanction customary 'severities' in the collection, which might mean a good deal in practice. It also legalized the Company's courts, and enabled the Indian government to make Regulations.

The Cossijurah case. The Cossijurah case may be more briefly dismissed. A creditor sued the zemindar of Cossijurah, a place about eighty miles distant from Calcutta, for debt in the Supreme Court, averring by affidavit that the defendant came within the jurisdiction of the Court as being a person 'employed' by the Company. Mr. Justice Hyde issued process. When it was resisted the Sheriff tried to enforce the orders of the Court by a posse or force of fifty or sixty sailors and other people collected for the

purpose. The posse seized the zemindar's belongings in a rough fashion, regardless of Indian customs. Hastings, when he heard of it, sent an officer with a force of sepoy to arrest the sheriff's men, which they did. Impey never could persuade the government to submit the questions at issue to the king in council for decision, and apparently the legal aspect of the case was never settled. The violent action taken by the executive practically had the effect of confining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to Calcutta.

Sir James Fitzjames Stephen held that 'the Council acted haughtily, quite illegally, and violently, without any adequate

reason for their conduct'. The illegality may be admitted, but the position was difficult, and the pretensions of the Court had to be resisted somehow, if the Government was to continue to exist. A ruler sometimes finds himself forced to transgress strict law.

Impey made head of the Company's courts.

One other connected topic remains—the expedient by which Hastings and the council (Francis dissenting) patched up the quarrel. In October 1780 Impey was induced to accept the duty of supervising the Company's courts as president of the Chief Civil Court (*Sudder Dewanee Adalat*). After a short time the salary of Rs. 5,000 a month was attached to his new office in addition



SIR ELIJAH IMPEY.

tion to the salary which he drew under the Act of Parliament as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The transaction, being obviously open to objection, was disapproved at home with the result that Impey was recalled and an unsuccessful attempt to impeach him on various grounds was made. He does not appear to have actually drawn any of the additional salary, or at any rate to have retained the money, if he ever drew any. The papers prove that both he and Hastings were actuated by creditable motives in making the arrangement, believing that in no other way could the prolonged conflict be adjusted. Macaulay's epigram that 'the Chief Justice was rich, quiet, and infamous' is wholly false. Impey stated the facts correctly when he wrote :

'I have undergone great fatigue, compiled a laborious code [Reg. vi

of 1781], restored confidence to the suitors and justice and regularity to the courts of justice, and settled the internal quiet of a great empire, without any reward, and for my recompense shall have lost my office, reputation, and peace of mind for ever.'

Character of Impey. Impey afterwards entered Parliament and survived until 1809. He was a good judge and in no way deserving of the abuse showered upon him by Burke, Mill, Thornton, Macaulay, and a host of lesser detractors. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen observes :

'I have read everything I could find throwing light on Impey's character, and it appears to me that he was neither much blacker nor much whiter, in whole or in part, than his neighbours. He seems to me to have resembled closely many other judges whom I have known. . . . He seems to have had an excellent education both legal and general, to have been a man of remarkable energy and courage, and a great deal of rather commonplace ability. I have read through all his letters and private papers, and I can discern in them no trace of corruption.'

The same author closes the discussion of the subject by the observation that 'slightly to adapt the famous remark of De Quincey in his essay on *Murder as a Fine Art*, Impey has owed his moral ruin to a literary murder of which Macaulay probably thought but little when he committed it.'

Hastings's foreign policy. The period of about eight and a half years, from September 1776, when Monson died, to February 1785, when Hastings retired, during which he possessed the power as well as the rank of Governor-general, included the years of the most intense strain to which the kingdoms of Great Britain and Ireland have ever been subjected, save only in the darkest times of the Revolutionary War and the Great War. During those years of strain the British Government had to fight France, Spain, Holland, the revolted American colonies, besides the Marāthās, and Haidar Ali, and to appease formidable discontent in Ireland by the dangerous concession of an independent Parliament. It is impossible to pass a fair judgement on the policy of Hastings unless it is considered in relation to the events outside of India.

The overland route. He was a man of large ideas and wide vision who understood thoroughly that the part played by him in India was only one of many parts played by many various actors on the stage of the world. His prescience and breadth of view are well illustrated by the fact that in 1778 he had organized an overland service via Suez for rapid communication with Europe, through which he received timely accounts of the ill progress of the American war and of the peril arising from French intervention, which enabled him to take measures for defence in India with the necessary promptitude. The strenuous opposition of the Sublime Porte obliged the Directors to discontinue the service, which was not resumed until the time of Lord William Bentinck.¹

Bombay intervention in Marāthā politics. Bombay has been rarely mentioned so far. The reason is that the settlement

¹ See *Bengal Past and Present*, vol. iv, July-December 1909, pp. 563-76, 586.

there had continued for more than a century after the cession to Charles II by the Portuguese to be a purely commercial station of no political importance. The territory of the presidency was confined to the narrow limits of the island of Bombay and Bānkōt or Fort Victoria, ceded in 1756 by the Marāthās in exchange for Gheria. But in 1775 the President in Council of Bombay, who was ambitious, sought to acquire the neighbouring island of Salsette, and the port of Bassein twenty-eight miles distant, which had been taken by the Marāthās from the Portuguese some years earlier. The Bombay government resolved to attain that object by intervening in domestic Marāthā politics and supporting one of the claimants to the office of Pēshwā, then in dispute. The government at Calcutta was not consulted in the first instance under the provisions of the Regulating Act because the Bombay authorities had not knowledge that the new government at Calcutta had been installed. That intervention of the Bombay government led to the First Marāthā War, which lasted until the treaty of Sālbaī in 1782.¹

Origin of the First Marāthā War. The temptation to which the Bombay government succumbed arose in this way. Mādho Rāo, the fourth Pēshwā, an able man, and the last to exercise much personal authority, died in 1772, and was succeeded by the fifth Pēshwā, Nārāyan Rāo, who after nine months was murdered by the adherents of his uncle, Raghunāth Rāo, commonly called Ragoba. Civil war ensued between the partisans of the Regent, acting for an infant alleged, and probably with truth, to be a posthumous son of Nārāyan Rāo on the one side, and Raghunāth or Ragoba, who denied the child's claims, on the other. Ragoba invoked the aid of the Bombay government, promising the cession of Salsette and Bassein. When he failed to effect the cession, the Bombay people took possession of Salsette, and compelled Ragoba, who was in difficulties, to sign the treaty of Surat, acknowledging the rights of Bombay to both places. The local government was thus involved in a war with the Regency, in the course of which Colonel Keating won a battle at Arās (Adās, Arras) in the Kaira district of Gujarāt, at a heavy cost in casualties to his small force.

Treaties of Surat and Purandhar : convention of Wargāon. Meantime Francis and his colleagues had come into power. Disapproving strongly of the Bombay proceedings they sent peremptory orders to stop the war and recall Colonel Keating. They, with the concurrence of Hastings, dispatched an envoy (Col. Upton) who made with the Marāthās a disadvantageous compact, called the Treaty of Purandhar (1776). As it was never acted on,

¹ It is best to treat all the hostilities between 1775 and 1782 as a single war, the First Marāthā War. Some writers prefer to confine that name to the proceedings ending with the treaty of Surat. The Bombay government continued to display an insubordinate spirit even after it had acquired full knowledge of the new law, and strongly resented the autocratic attitude of the Governor-general and Council. Madras was equally averse to control, and often from less respectable motives.

its terms need not be recited. Four months later came a dispatch from the Directors approving of the treaty of Surat with Ragoba. In 1778 the Bombay government were emboldened by another dispatch from home to renew their alliance with Ragoba, who had gained successes, and to send an expedition towards Poona. It met with disaster, and was compelled to surrender. Colonel Camac, who was acting as the Civil Commissioner or political officer with the force, losing courage, concluded the disgraceful Convention of Wargāon (January 1779), which actually stipulated for giving British hostages as security for the restoration to the Marāthās of all acquisitions made since 1773, and for the surrender of Ragoba. He relieved the British from the disgrace of betraying him by taking refuge with Sindia and arranging terms with him. In due course the convention was repudiated by the Directors, and the officers concerned were dismissed. Hastings observed that the document 'almost made me sink with shame when I read it'.

Goddard's expedition. Hastings having recovered power, as explained above, felt bound to retrieve the disgrace and support the Bombay government to the best of his ability. He conceived the bold plan of dispatching a Bengal force right across India through hostile states and country then unknown, under the conduct at first of Colonel Leslie, and then of Colonel (General) Goddard. The expeditionary force of more than 6,000 sepoys under European officers, and encumbered, as was the fashion of those days, by a crowd of camp followers and traders numbering about 30,000,¹ being admirably led, reached Surat in safety. In February 1779 Goddard occupied Ahmadābād and made an alliance with the Gaikwār of Baroda, which continued unbroken through all subsequent troubles.

Capture of Gwālīor. His brilliant operation was supported by another admirably conducted expedition sent by Hastings into Central India. In August 1780 Major Popham most cleverly escalated the strong fortress of Gwālīor at night and took it without losing a man. Colonel Camac succeeded in surprising Sindia's camp and frightening him.

Treaty of Sālbāi. Towards the close of 1779 the Nizam had organized a coalition embracing all the Marāthā princes, except the Gaikwār, and including Haidar Ali of Mysore, in the hopes of destroying the growing English power. The principal Marāthā army was defeated, and the Rājā of Nāgpur was bought off. Haidar Ali was threatened by the successful march of a Bengal force under Colonel Pearse by land through 700 miles of almost unexplored country, an exploit second only to Goddard's march to Surat. Ultimately, peace was arranged with the aid of Māhādājī Sindia, the ablest and most powerful of the Marāthā chiefs.²

¹ Rennell, *Memoir*^s, 1793, p. 236 n.

² The name (साहादजी in Nāgarī characters) should be spelt as in the text. Authors who call the chief Mādhō or Mādhava are in error.



GWALIOR FORT.

The treaty, signed at Sālbāi in Sindia's territory, secured Salsette for the English, gave Ragoba a pension, and in other respects mostly restored the old condition of affairs. Although the terms of peace as thus concisely stated may seem to be of small moment, the treaty of Sālbāi (1782) should be remembered as one of the landmarks in the history of India because it assured peace with the formidable power of the Marāthās for twenty years, and marked the ascendancy of the English as the controlling, although not yet the paramount government in India. The enemies of Hastings sneered at his 'frantic military exploits'. We may applaud unreservedly the energy, boldness, tenacity, and resource which enabled him to grapple successfully with his hydra-headed enemies. He may be described with justice as the Indian Pitt, 'the Chatham of the East'.

1782, an 'annus mirabilis'. The year 1782, it may be noted, was remarkable for many other important events in various parts of the world, namely, the resignation of Lord North, who had been in power as Prime Minister of England since 1770; the repulse of the Franco-Spanish main attack on Gibraltar; a great naval victory gained by Rodney in the West Indies; the death of Haidar Ali; and the establishment of Grattan's Parliament in Ireland. It was truly an *annus mirabilis*, a year of wonders. In 1779 the French fleet had become for a short time superior to the British. Rodney's victory gave Britain again the command of the sea on which the retention of India depends.

Māhādājī Sindia. A few words must be devoted to Māhādājī Sindia, the chief through whom the treaty of Sālbāi was negotiated. He was the illegitimate son of Rānoji Patēl, a Marāthā of humble origin who had started life as slipper-bearer to the Pēshwā, but rose in the world, as happened in those times. Māhādājī was present at the battle of Panīpat and was one of the few Marāthās of note who escaped with his life, although permanently lamed by a severe wound. He succeeded to his father's *jāgīrs*, and soon became the most prominent of the Marāthā chiefs. In those days the glory of the Pēshwā had been obscured, and real power was shared mostly by four territorial chiefs, namely, Sindia of Gwālior, Holkar of Indore, the Gaikwār of Baroda, and the Rājā of Nāgpur. When Shāh Ālam, the titular emperor, quitted British protection in 1771 and attained his desire of re-entering Delhi, Sindia furnished his escort and in practice became his jailor. The military ability displayed in 1780 and 1781 by the commanders whom Hastings had selected convinced Māhādājī that it was safer to treat with the British than to fight them. Accordingly he came to an understanding with Hastings, who was in urgent need of peace with the Marāthās. Even without their hostility his enemies were almost more than he could manage, and his financial embarrassment was extreme. The result of the friendly understanding was the treaty of Sālbāi, signed at the village of that name in Sindia's territory. Māhādājī conducted the negotiations in two capacities, as plenipotentiary empowered by the Pēshwā and as guarantor for the due

execution of the compact. The transaction greatly enhanced his influence, so that his power grew rapidly. He trained infantry in the European fashion under foreign officers and by their help became for a few years the arbiter of Hindostan. Hastings has been criticized for his indifference to the aggrandizement of Sindia, but the fact was that he could not afford to quarrel with the Marāthā chief.

Count de Boigne. The most celebrated of the foreign generals employed by Sindia was Count de Boigne, whose remarkable career may conveniently receive a passing notice in this place. Monsieur de Boigne, after service



COUNT DE BOIGNE.

armies, made his way to India in 1778 at the age of twenty-seven and obtained a commission as ensign in a Madras infantry regiment. While so employed he narrowly escaped from being involved in Baillie's disaster in 1780. Quitting the British army, he tried various ways of making his fortune, and finally settled down to Sindia's service. He served his master well and loyally, and was the principal instrument in establishing Māhādājī's temporary lordship over Hindostan. In 1796, after his principal's death, de Boigne left India, and retired to his native place, Chambéry in Savoy. In the course of his Indian adventures he had accumulated without dis-

honour immense wealth, much of which he expended on charitable institutions and municipal improvements in his birthplace. The rulers of France and Savoy loaded him with well-deserved titles and distinctions. In 1830 he died in his eightieth year. Count de Boigne was the worthiest of the many European free-lances or military adventurers who swarmed at Indian courts in the latter half of the eighteenth and the earlier years of the nineteenth century.

Two contested incidents. Before entering upon the history of the Second Mysore War and describing the heroic exertions of Hastings and Sir Eyre Coote to save the Carnatic from the fury of Haidar Ali and his son and to counteract the corrupt incompetence of the Madras local government, it will be advisable to discuss with some fullness of detail two hotly contested incidents in the career of Hastings. The incidents are his treatment of Rājā Chait Singh of Benares and his extraction of a large sum, supposed to

have been about 76 lakhs of rupees, from the coffers of the Bēgams of Oudh. Both affairs were the outcome of the pressing difficulties, political and financial, which beset the Governor-general during the terrible years from 1778 to 1782. No fair judgement can be passed upon his actions unless the existence of those difficulties be constantly present to the mind of the reader of his story.

. **Rājā Chait Singh.** The action of the Governor-general on which the 1st article of impeachment was based was as follows :

When the war with France broke out in 1778 and the British power was in imminent danger, the Governor-general-in-Council required from Rājā Chait Singh, the ruler of Benares and adjoining districts, a special war contribution of five lakhs of rupees (then more than £50,000). An equal sum was exacted in each of the two succeeding years, 1779 and 1780, being fifteen lakhs, or over £150,000 in all. The Rājā naturally disliked such demands, and in 1780 so delayed remittances that the government found difficulty in paying Colonel Camac's detachment. The Rājā also failed to place 1,000 horsemen at the disposal of the authorities for the defence of Bihār, a province adjoining his territory, as demanded by Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief. Hastings suspected that the Rājā was planning revolt, and was well assured that he had plenty of both men and money. He regarded Chait Singh's delay in making payment of the special contribution in 1780 and his neglect to furnish horsemen in the same year as acts of contumacy and disloyalty, holding that the Rājā, as a zemindar or large landholder, under the sovereignty of the Company, was bound to give ready support to his superior in time of stress, in accordance with well-established usage. In his *Narrative* Hastings frankly states that 'he considered Chait Sing as culpable in a very high degree towards our state, and his punishment . . . as an example which justice and policy required. . . . In a word, I had determined to make him pay largely for his pardon, or to exact a severe vengeance for his past delinquency.' In pursuit of that resolve Hastings *intended* to levy a fine of 40 or 50 lakhs, and communicated his intention to his colleague, Mr. Wheeler. No demand for such fine was ever actually made, and nobody except Mr. Wheeler knew of the Governor-general's intention. Hastings went to Benares to execute his plans, repelled the humble advances made by the Rājā, and ordered his arrest, to which Chait Singh submitted quietly. A tumult arose, in the course of which a number of officers and sepoy were killed. Hastings was obliged to fly to the fortress of Chunar. After considerable fighting Chait Singh was defeated and compelled to take refuge among the Marāthās. He was deposed and a relative was installed in his place. The army seized the funds taken in his fort as prize-money, so that none of the money reached the Treasury. The new Rājā was assessed to land revenue at a sum nearly double that paid by Chait Singh, and was deprived of the power to coin money, as well as of

civil and criminal jurisdiction over Benares city, and of criminal jurisdiction in the whole of his country.¹

The main issue. For those proceedings Hastings was impeached on the allegation of Pitt that his conduct was 'cruel, unjust, and oppressive'. The main issue taken was the status of Rājā Chait Singh. Was he an independent sovereign prince or a mere zemindar? It was conclusively established that he was only a zemindar, not an independent prince, although allowed the exceptional privilege of coining money. His possession of civil and criminal jurisdiction proved nothing, because under the Muhammadan governments all large zemindars exercised such jurisdiction. The sovereignty of the Benares province undoubtedly had been vested in the Company from 1775. It is also certain that Chait Singh was an illegitimate son of his predecessor, and that his succession was due to the personal initiative of Hastings.

Criticism. Concerning the justice and propriety of the action taken by Hastings my opinion is that the grave necessities of the situation justified the demand of exceptional war subsidies from a subordinate ruler in the position of Rājā Chait Singh; that he could have afforded to pay them without undue strain; that he could have supplied and ought to have furnished the 1,000 horsemen finally demanded; and that Hastings was injudicious and imprudent in arresting the Rājā, whom he treated with improper harshness. The proposed fine of 40 or 50 lakhs was excessive. All legitimate objects apparently could have been attained without violence. No praise can be too great for the energy and resource shown by Hastings in dealing with the outbreak produced by the arrest of the Rājā. Probably the excessive severity practised and intended by Hastings was partly due to his personal resentment against the Rājā for having sought to curry favour with the hostile members of council while they were in power. The errors of Hastings in the business, whatever they may have been, did not deserve impeachment, and his acquittal on the Benares charge by a large majority of the Lords was right.

Affair of the Bēgams of Oudh. The next case for consideration is that of the exaction of about 76 lakhs of rupees from the Bēgams of Oudh, the mother and grandmother of the Nawāb-Vizier, Āsafu-d daula, and the employment of severities to compel the eunuchs in charge of the treasure to disgorge.

Abstract of the facts. The Company always had had a heavy bill pending against the Nawāb-Vizier for arrears of subsidy, due for the maintenance of the troops who secured his dominions against external aggression in the midst of wars. The Nawāb, Āsafu-d daula, was a wretched, worthless creature, wholly incapable of governing and surrounded by gangs of greedy adventurers, Indian and European. In 1781 the arrears were particularly

¹ Benares occupied a special position as the head-quarters of Hinduism and the resort of princes and people of all ranks from every part of India, so that the proper administration of the city was a matter of more than local concern.

heavy, and the requirements of the Marāthā, Benares, and Carnatic wars had exhausted the Company's treasury. After the suppression of Rājā Chait Singh, Hastings met the Nawāb at Chunar and concluded a treaty or arrangement by which it was hoped that the Nawāb's difficulties might be adjusted and the Company's necessities satisfied. Hastings undertook to clear the European adventurers out of Oudh and to relieve the Nawāb of a portion of the military charges. The Nawāb not only agreed but expressed a strong desire to resume the *jāgīrs*, or grants of lands made to the Bēgams and other persons, and to recover his father's treasure which the Bēgams had been allowed to retain in 1775, with the sanction of the majority in council hostile to Hastings. In 1781 the Governor-general held that the complicity of the Bēgams in Chait Singh's revolt was fully established and warranted the cancellation of the arrangement made in 1775 by which the ladies had been allowed to retain the treasure subject to a payment in satisfaction of all demands amounting to 30 lakhs (also stated as 50). When the Nawāb was required actually to resume the *jāgīrs* and recover the treasure he naturally hesitated to take proceedings against such near relatives, and the Resident, Mr. Middleton, failed to enforce compliance. Hastings, being determined to get the money from the 'old women' who, as he observed, 'had very nigh effected our destruction', wrote severe reproofs to Middleton for his remissness. The screw was then applied vigorously. The Bēgams' palace at Fyzabad was occupied by troops, and the ladies with their attendants, although not personally mishandled, were put to much inconvenience. Their two confidential eunuchs in charge of the treasure were placed on short commons, lightly ironed, and perhaps beaten. The Resident certainly handed them over to the Nawāb to do what he pleased with them. By those measures, which any Hindu or Muhammadan government would have regarded as normal, the money was obtained and the debt to the Company was cleared off. During the operations Hastings, who was in Calcutta, was not personally cognizant of the details of the severities employed. How far he would have sanctioned them if asked does not appear. It is beyond doubt that no grave personal injury was inflicted on the eunuchs, who lived rich and prosperous for years afterwards. During the impeachment the Bēgams were among the numerous persons who sent in unsolicited and obviously sincere testimonials in favour of Hastings while the trial was in progress.

Comment. If the urgent necessities of the time be remembered Hastings may be considered to have been justified in cancelling the arrangement sanctioned by his hostile colleagues in 1775, and in putting a certain amount of pressure on the Bēgams to make them disgorge. The severities used by his agents without his immediate personal knowledge, while not legitimate according to European standards of conduct, were thoroughly in accordance with Indian practice, and would have been regarded by Indian opinion as mild measures. The Bēgams themselves bore no

malice for their rough treatment. Critics should remember that until quite recent days, and within my own experience, it was a point of honour in India not to pay money until coercion had been applied. Landholders with the cash tied up in their waistbands would submit to be beaten in order to satisfy the public opinion of their fellows before they would pay out the land revenue admittedly due. Hastings was familiar with such practices and must have had them at the back of his mind when he abstained from asking questions about the exact degree of coercion applied to the people at Fyzabad. The business, which formed the subject of the second charge at the impeachment, was ludicrously exaggerated by the prosecutors and made an excuse for much raving rhetoric. The Lords had the good sense to acquit Hastings on the charge by a majority of 23 to 6.

Second Mysore War. The way has now been cleared for the study of the last and most strenuous campaign conducted under the general direction of Hastings—the Second Mysore War, fought primarily for the defence of the Carnatic against Haidar Ali and his son Tippoo (Tipū), but involving various subsidiary military operations and political transactions. The war lasted from July 1780 to March 1784.

Capture of the French settlements. France having united her forces with those of the revolted American colonies, war between France and England was declared in 1778. Early intimation of the event was received by the Governor-general through the overland route, which had been opened for a short time, as already mentioned. The French settlements were promptly attacked, and Pondicherry fell after a gallant resistance. The little French station of Mahé on the Malabar coast was taken in the same month, and, after a short occupation, was dismantled. It was useful to Haidar Ali as a port through which he received supplies, so that the British attack upon the place annoyed him. Sir Thomas Rumbold, the governor of Madras, opposed the operation for that reason, but was overruled by Sir Eyre Coote, who felt bound to carry out the orders of the home government.

Hostile confederacy. The current histories generally state that the formation in 1779 of a confederacy against the English by the Nizam, including both the Marāthās and Mysore, was due to the Nizam's resentment at the annexation of the Guntūr District in the northern Sarkārs. That resentment was a factor in the Nizam's policy, but the Rumbold papers show that his displeasure had been aroused at an earlier date by the support given to his enemy Ragoba by the Bombay government, and by a project which Hastings had planned for an alliance with the Marāthā Rājā of Nāgpur. In 1780 Hastings, by giving up Guntūr, secured the neutrality of the Nizam, who was offended by Haidar Ali's intrigues at Delhi.¹

¹ For the Rumbold papers see Marshman, *History of India*, vol. i (ed. 1869), Appendix; and Miss Rumbold's book, *A Vindication . . . of Sir*

The Madras government. The Madras government under Sir Thomas Rumbold in 1779 repeatedly sent warnings to Bengal that an attack by Haidar Ali was to be feared and that the local resources were insufficient to meet it. But in January 1780 Hastings wrote that 'I am convinced from Hyder's conduct and disposition that he will never molest us while we preserve a good understanding with him'. When Sir Thomas Rumbold was quitting India in bad health at the beginning of April 1780 he had come round to the same opinion and expressed a belief that peace would be maintained. Both Hastings and Rumbold were honestly mistaken. Although the Madras government was torn by internal dissensions and saturated with corruption, there is excellent reason for believing that the charges of personal corruption against Sir Thomas Rumbold were unfounded. The weakness and other defects of the local administration consequent on the rotten system of 'double government', which still recognized the worthless Nawāb as the sovereign of the Carnatic, poisoned the whole policy of Madras and prevented the elaboration of adequate measures for defence. Thornton observes that at that time the moral atmosphere of Madras 'was pestilential: corruption revelled unrestrained. . . . It is not wonderful that where public spirit and public decency were alike extinct, the government should have been neither wise nor strong.' The Nawāb was wholly in the hands of money-lenders, whose baneful influence dominated the Madras council.

Invasion by Haidar Ali. In June 1780 Haidar Ali moved from Seringapatam his capital, and descended on the Carnatic plain with a force of 70,000 or 80,000 men, including a body of four hundred Europeans under Lally junior. He plundered Porto Novo as well as Conjeeveram, distant less than fifty miles from the capital, and committed horrid cruelties on a systematic plan. The inhabitants, notwithstanding his savagery, seem to have preferred Haidar Ali to their own Nawāb, and furnished the invader with information which was refused to the British defenders of Muhammad Ali.

The country was stripped so bare that the most necessary supplies for even a small army were almost unprocureable. The force under the command of Sir Hector Munro, numbering only about 8,000 men, was continually hampered by lack of money, food, and transport. The commander-in-chief, then fifty-four years of age, was no longer the man he had been at Buxar. Indeed, his conduct amounted almost to imbecility, so that Marshman denounces him as 'the dastardly Munro'.

Fortunately, Haidar Ali was left to fight his battles alone. The Marāthās gave him no support. The Marāthā chiefs in Orissa were bought over by Hastings, who was clever enough to persuade them to allow the passage through their territory of a *Thomas Rumbold* (London, Longmans, 1868). Rumbold went to Europe on urgent medical advice.

reinforcement under Colonel Pearse which marched from Bengal by land.

Disaster of Colonel Baillie. On September 10, 1780, an appalling and apparently wholly unnecessary disaster befell the British army. Colonel Baillie, who was marching with 2,813 men from Guntūr, subsequently raised to 3,720 by a reinforcement, in order to join Munro, who had 5,209, was overwhelmed by Haidar Ali's son Tippoo near Conjeeveram, although the commander-in-chief was only about two miles distant. Munro's excuses for his failure to succour Baillie were feeble and unconvincing, and Baillie's leadership was marred by errors. The detachment when surrounded fought so gallantly that out of eighty-six British officers engaged only sixteen surrendered unwounded. Baillie and all the survivors who were taken prisoners suffered unspeakable ill treatment. The painful details have been recorded by several of the victims.

Action of Hastings. A special dispatch vessel brought the ill news to Bengal. The spirit of Hastings rose nobly to the occasion. Forsaking all other plans he resolved to hasten peace with the Marāthās and to send every man and every rupee he could collect to save the Carnatic. Within three weeks Sir Eyre Coote was dispatched by sea with fifteen lakhs of rupees, about four hundred Europeans and some gunners, a thousand men in all, while the detachment under Pearse marched by land. The corrupt and incompetent governor of Madras, a person named Whitehill, was suspended, and every possible measure was taken to repair past mismanagement. Space fails to narrate in detail the incidents of the melancholy war which followed. Its unpleasant story is redeemed by acts of heroism which may be read in the pages of Wilks.

Battle of Porto Novo. After several months of ineffectual operations Haidar Ali was brought to bay at Porto Novo on July 1, 1781, and decisively defeated by Coote, with a loss estimated at 10,000 killed and wounded. The casualties on the British side were only 306. It is curious to find that on this occasion Sir Hector Munro, who served under Coote, was praised for 'conduct equally spirited and active', a 'strange contrast with his behaviour in the matter of Baillie's disaster. General Stuart, who afterwards displayed utter incompetence as commander-in-chief, also was commended for highly meritorious service.

Other less decisive successes were gained by Coote at Pollilore and Sholinghur.

Lord Macartney. Lord Macartney, a nobleman of considerable distinction, who had been sent out from England in the hope that he might reform Madras, took charge of the local government just before the battle of Porto Novo. He strongly disapproved of the Marāthā war, and was so eager for peace that he sent a most improper letter to the Marāthā chiefs, offering to guarantee any treaty that might be arranged by the Governor-general, and

promising the restoration of Gujarāt, Salsette, and Bassein.¹ It is astounding that a subordinate administration should have dared to issue such a document. The blunder, which did not stand alone, necessarily produced strained relations between the governments of Bengal and Madras, and the southern presidency continued to pay the penalty for official friction in high places.

Admiral de Suffren. In the course of 1782 the hopes of Haidar Ali were raised by the appearance of a powerful French squadron under the command of Admiral de Suffren (Suffrein), an able officer. Five actions were fought between him and Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, resulting in much damage to both combatants without decisive result. The interruption of sea-borne supplies caused a distressing famine at Madras and a large mortality. The French admiral was accompanied by Bussy, then 'gouty, worn out, and querulous', and consequently quite useless.

Failure and death of Haidar Ali. In December Haidar Ali died at the age of sixty.² Coote had been obliged by ill health to return to Calcutta, and General Stuart, his successor, lost the opportunity presented by the passing of the ruler of Mysore.

Haidar Ali knew before he died that he had failed. Whenever he had met Coote in the field he had been beaten; the hopes of French aid had come to naught; the Marāthās, according to their nature, had betrayed him, and even meditated an attack upon him from the north; while the Nāyars (Nairs) of Malabar were in revolt. 'Deeply reflecting on this unprosperous aspect of affairs,' he resolved to give up his attempt to hold the Carnatic, concentrating his attention on the western coast and the defence of Mysore. In August 1782 the Bombay government had dispatched Colonel Humberston (Mackenzie) to operate in Malabar. After the rains Haidar Ali sent Tippoo to defend his western provinces. While he was thus engaged his father died. Ingenious arrangements were made to conceal the fact of Haidar's decease until Tippoo had secured the succession.

Not long before his death Haidar Ali had a talk with his minister Pūrnīa (Poonna), whom he addressed in this remarkable language :

'I have committed a great error; I have purchased a draught of spirits at the price of a lakh of pagodas; I shall pay dearly for my arrogance :

¹ The fact is recorded without comment by Mill (iv. 157), who seems to have been unconscious of the enormity of Lord Macartney's offence. On the other hand, the interference of Calcutta sometimes was practised in an irritating way.

² Wilks gives the date of his death as December 7 (reprint, ii. 33). Robson (p. 153) gives it as November 9. The concealment of the event for a time evidently caused doubts concerning the exact date. Thornton, Forrest, and a crowd of other authors state erroneously either that Haidar Ali died at the age of eighty or at a very advanced age. It is certain that he was only sixty, having been born in 1722.

³ Wilks explains the meaning of the exact terms used. A lakh of pagodas was worth £40,000.

between the English and me there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but not sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Muhammad Ali, the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Braithwaites and Baillies will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea, and I must be first weary of a war in which I can gain nothing by fighting.'

He concluded by lamenting how he had been deceived by the Marāthās and disappointed by the French. Colonel Braithwaite, when encamped with about 2,000 men in the Tanjore territory, had been surrounded by a superior force under Tippoo and suffered the fate of Baillie, early in 1782.



HAIDAR ALI.

Sir Eyre Coote died in 1783, a few months after the decease of his antagonist.

Character of Haidar Ali. Haidar Ali in the south and Ranjit Singh in the north were the ablest of the fierce adventurers who rose to power during the turmoil of the eighteenth century. Both were illiterate and absolutely unscrupulous. Haidar Ali had no religion, no morals, and no compassion. He relied on savage terrorism and strict personal supervision of every act of government. 'No person of respectability', it was said, 'ever left his house with the expectation of returning safe to it,' and the highest officers in his service were liable to brutal floggings.¹ He spoke five languages fluently and ordered his affairs with regularity and

¹ On one occasion he flogged his son Tippoo severely in public. Compare Akbar's more private buffeting of Prince Salim.

swift dispatch. Like Akbar, he remedied his lack of formal education by a memory of extraordinary power. He could go through complicated arithmetical calculations with accuracy equal and quickness superior to that of an expert accountant. He was skilled in the necessary art of appreciating character, and may be said to have justly earned his success in those wild times by the superiority of his personal endowments as compared with those of his equally wicked but less able rivals. No Indian politician in those days pretended to have any principles. Each one of them fought for his own hand with undisguised selfishness.

End of Carnatic war ; peace of Versailles. Before proceeding to glance for a moment at the subsidiary operations in Malabar, it will be well to dispose of the war in the Carnatic. Unhappy dissensions between Lord Macartney, the Company's governor of Madras, and General Stuart, a ' King's officer ', holding a commission directly from the Crown, paralysed the operations in Madras territory and imperilled the safety of the army. A force besieging Cuddalore, where French and Mysorean troops had taken refuge, was even in danger of being lost when news arrived in June 1783 that peace between France and England had been signed at Versailles.¹ The combatants in India made no attempt to carry on unofficial hostilities. All military operations ceased on July 2, which, accordingly, is the date of the close of the Second Mysore War, so far as the Carnatic was concerned.

Defence of Mangalore. Tippoo not being a party to the Versailles compact, the war in Malabar continued. The Bombay authorities appointed General Matthews to the supreme command. The incidents of the contest included the taking of Bednūr (Bednore) by Colonel Macleod and its recapture by Tippoo, as well as many other interesting happenings deserving of notice if space permitted. The most notable event was Colonel Campbell's gallant defence of Mangalore, ' a common country fort of the fourth or fifth order ', which held out until reduced by famine. General Macleod's failure to relieve the place may be reckoned as the most scandalous occurrence of the campaign, which was marked by more than one scandal. Campbell's defence, which was at least equal to Clive's famous performance at Arcot, had not the good fortune to receive equally brilliant literary applause and is rarely remembered or mentioned.

Treaty of Mangalore. Although Tippoo had gained considerable successes, his resources were much exhausted by long continued war,² and his capital was threatened by Colonel Fullarton, who

¹ Sometimes, as by Gardiner, called the Treaty of Paris.

² The exhaustion of the resources of Haidar Ali and Tippoo is explained by the general remarks of Mr. Verelst contained in a letter to the Directors dated March 28, 1768, which throw much light on the growth of British dominion in India. The writer dilates on ' the general indigence of the Mogul empire ', and proceeds :

' The natural consequence of these circumstances has been, that the different powers find their finances narrow, and their treasures unequal to

had occupied Coimbatore with 13,000 men, and had devised a well-planned campaign. A strong, courageous government at Madras might have dictated an advantageous treaty. Unfortunately, Lord Macartney, who desired peace almost at any price, allowed himself to be manœuvred into the attitude of a suppliant. The advance of Colonel Fullarton was stopped, and envoys were sent to the camp of Tippoo, where they were treated with almost incredible insolence, to which they tamely submitted. At last, when Tippoo realized the danger of being attacked by both the British and Marāthās, and feared that the patience even of the long-suffering Lord Macartney might be exhausted, he graciously signed the treaty of Mangalore on March 11, 1784. The document provided for mutual restitution of conquests and the liberation of the surviving prisoners in the hands of the Sultan. Tippoo gave up 180 officers, 900 European soldiers, and 1,600 sepoys, 2,680 in all. But the abject governor of Madras had not spirit enough to insist on a complete jail delivery, and some miserable victims were left in the tyrant's hands to suffer a sad fate later.

Hastings, while loathing the disgraceful compact, and resenting the insults which attended its execution, lacked the cordial support of the ministry in England, and was not in a position to refuse ratification. 'What a man is this Lord Macartney !' he exclaimed ; 'I yet believe that, in spite of the peace, he will effect the loss of the Carnatic.'¹

Thus ended in dishonour the Second Mysore War, including the Carnatic War terminated in July 1783, and the Malabar operations closed in March 1784. Such a peace carried within it the seeds of a new war, which duly followed in the days of Lord Cornwallis. The Madras government, disobeying express instructions to negotiate on the basis of the treaty of Sālbaī, omitted to make any reference

the maintenance of a respectable army, or the prosecution of a war of any duration. Whenever, therefore, they are urged by ambition or necessity to enter on any expedition, they assemble new levies for the purpose with the most unreflecting precipitancy ; they risk every thing on one campaign, because they seldom have resources for a second, and come to an engagement at all events, because the consequences of a defeat are less terrible than those which must ensue from the desertion, or sedition of an ill-paid and disaffected army. As their troops are chiefly raw men and aliens, they are without attachment to their general, or confidence in each other ; a variety of subordinate commanders destroys all subordination and authority ; and the certainty of beggary and starving, from the common accidents of war, throws a damp on the most ardent bravery.

These circumstances, I apprehend, gentlemen, have been very principal sources of our repeated victories over these immense Asiatic armies, which have fled before a handful of your troops. . . . A second, and no less powerful for the security of our situation, is the discordancy of the principles, views, and interests of the neighbouring powers. . . . The majority of the present princes of Hindostan have no natural right to the countries they possess' (*A View*, App., p. 101).

¹ Gleig, iii. 186.

to that document. Hastings had much trouble to persuade Sindia and the other Marāthā leaders that he was not responsible for the erroneous form given to the Mangalore compact by the perverse government of Madras.

Retirement of Hastings. The work of Hastings in India substantially closed when he gave unwilling assent to the humiliating treaty of Mangalore. The Court of Proprietors, or general meeting of the shareholders in the East India Company, gave him almost unanimous support, but Pitt, the Prime Minister, had become hostile, and towards the close of 1784 intimated his disapproval of several features in the policy of Hastings. The position of the Governor-general was much affected by the clash of parliamentary parties. In those days Indian affairs were the battleground of the party leaders to a degree never known before or since. It is impossible in this place to go into details of the parliamentary conflicts which ultimately led to the impeachment proceedings. Two India Bills prepared by Fox, the rival and opponent of Pitt, were defeated in 1783, much to the satisfaction of Hastings. But he equally disliked Pitt's bill, which became law in 1784, and clearly perceived that his resignation was desired. The general knowledge that his withdrawal from the Indian stage was imminent seriously weakened his authority both in the Calcutta council and at Madras. Under such conditions he could not desire to remain in office. He therefore resigned, and on February 1, 1785, made over charge to his colleague, Mr. John Macpherson, who was second in council.

Hastings in retirement. The life of Warren Hastings was prolonged after his retirement from India for thirty-three years until 1818, when he passed away at the age of eighty-five in peace with honour. He never again took an active part in public affairs, save as the victim of the long-drawn agony of the impeachment. When he went home he had every reason to believe that he would receive the rewards justly due for his eminent services to India and his country. The malice of Philip Francis, the frenzied zeal of Burke, and the cold hostility of Pitt not only robbed him of his reward, but consumed his moderate fortune, and subjected him to the fiercest ordeal of inquisition ever endured by any statesman.

Impeachment. The responsibility for his prosecution rests solely upon Pitt, whose decision still causes legitimate astonishment, even when viewed in the light of the words of his colleague Dundas contained in a letter dated March 21, 1787, addressed to Lord Cornwallis:

‘The only unpleasant circumstance is the impeachment of Mr. Hastings. Mr. Pitt and I have got great credit from the undeviating fairness and candour with which we have proceeded in it, but the proceeding is not pleasant to many of our friends; and of course from that and other circumstances, not pleasing to us; but the truth is, when we examined the various articles of charges against him with his defences, they were so strong, and the defences so perfectly unsupported, it was impossible

not to concur; and some of the charges will unquestionably go to the House of Lords.¹

That statement is open to much criticism, but the story of the impeachment belongs to the domain of biography and parliamentary polemics rather than to the history of India. It is sufficient to chronicle the bare facts that the trial began on February 13, 1788, and ended on April 23, 1795, with a verdict of acquittal; that sixteen questions were put to the twenty-nine lords who voted; that the acquittal was unanimous in two cases, including the principal charges of corruption; and that the minority in favour of conviction on the other charges ranged from two to six. The Court of Proprietors wished to give Hastings a pension of £5,000 and to pay his costs to the extent of £71,080, but Pitt and Dundas vetoed the proposed grants. The Directors managed to give him an allowance sufficient to permit of his living at Daylesford, an estate of 650 acres, as a benevolent country gentleman in decent comfort until the end. Throughout those long years he maintained an attitude of dignified serenity, and when his time came died like a gentleman. The Horatian motto, *Mens aequa in arduis*, inscribed under one of the best known of his many portraits, indicates exactly his bearing in the face of adversity.

Character of Warren Hastings. Probably no person equipped with tolerably accurate knowledge of the facts could now be found to deny that the impeachment of Hastings was undeserved. His few errors, so far as they were real, were those of a statesman exposed to imminent peril and beset by embarrassments so complex that fallible human judgement was bound to err occasionally. Can any statesman be named who never made a mistake, or perpetrated a job under pressure? If Hastings deserved impeachment, how many potentates and prime ministers would be entitled to impunity? Hastings should be judged by the standard applicable to sovereigns or prime ministers. It is impossible to contest the truth of the observation of Lord Cornwallis that he was 'unjustly and cruelly persecuted'. The foulness of the abuse heaped upon him by Burke and the other orators for the prosecution would be incredible were it not recorded to their everlasting shame.² The violence of Burke's language was so

¹ Ross, *Correspondence of Marquis Cornwallis*², vol. i, p. 293. The process of impeachment, which had many defects as a mode of trial, is obsolete and not likely to be revived. After the trial of Hastings it was used only once when Dundas (Lord Melville) was the accused person. He, too, was acquitted, in 1806. In an impeachment the House of Commons prosecutes through the agency of managers, and the House of Lords finds a verdict after the manner of a jury. Each peer votes separately, giving his finding on his honour. For criticism of the statement by Dundas and the reasons for the apparent weakness of the defences see Forrest, *Selections*, p. xv. Macaulay gives a brilliant description of the impressive scene at the opening of the trial.

² For an anthology of Burke's flowers of speech see *The History of the Trial of Warren Hastings, Esq.*, part v, pp. 151-4 (London, 1796).

disgusting that on one occasion it drew down the grave censure of the House of Commons.

James Mill, who had devoted many pages to unsparing criticism of the acts and policy of Hastings, felt himself constrained when quitting the subject to pen a partial recantation and bear emphatic testimony to the rare gifts of the man whom he had treated so ill. It is true that the praise is qualified by the absurdly false statement that Hastings 'had no genius, any more than Clive, for schemes of policy including large views of the past, and large anticipations of the future'. The exact contrary is the truth. Anybody who studies the letters and minutes written by Hastings cannot fail to recognize the largeness of his mind and the breadth of his views. The somewhat unwilling eulogy pronounced by Mill includes the following propositions which any of the rulers of India might be glad to have inscribed upon his tomb.

'It is necessary, for the satisfaction of my own mind, and to save me from the fear of having given a more unfavourable conception than I intended of his character and conduct, to impress upon the reader the obligation of considering two things. The first is, that Mr. Hastings was placed in difficulties, and acted upon by temptations, such as few public men have been called upon to

overcome : and of this the preceding history affords abundant evidence. The second is, that no man, probably, who ever had a great share in the government of the world, had his public conduct so completely explored and laid open to view. . . . It is my firm conviction, that if we had the same advantage with respect to other men, who have been as much engaged in the conduct of public affairs, and could view their conduct as completely naked, and stripped of all its disguises, few of them would be found, whose character would present a higher claim to indulgence than his. In point of ability, he is beyond all question the most eminent of the chief rulers whom the Company have ever employed, nor is there any one of them, who would not have succumbed under the difficulties, which, if he did not overcome, he at any rate sustained. . . . He was the first, or among the first, of the servants of the Company, who attempted to acquire any language of the natives, and who set on foot those liberal inquiries



WARREN HASTINGS

(in old age).

into the language and literature of the Hindus,¹ which have led to the satisfactory knowledge of the present day. He had the great art of a ruler, which consists in attaching to the Governor those who are governed ; his administration assuredly was popular, both with his countrymen and the natives in Bengal.' ²

It is not easy to recognize as the same man the tyrannical oppressor depicted in such lurid colours by Burke, Sheridan, and Macaulay. 'We may', as Wilson remarks in a note, 'look now with wonder, not unmixed with contempt, upon the almost insane virulence with which he was assailed, and think of him in no other character than that of the ablest of the able men who have given to Great Britain her Indian Empire.'

Warren Hastings should not be treated as a man lucky enough to escape conviction in court and qualified for the indulgence of superior persons. He is entitled to warm appreciation of his uncommon powers, and to the affectionate admiration of Europeans and Indians alike. As a young man he emerged unscathed from temptations to which his contemporaries succumbed. As a mature man of forty he took charge of Bengal with absolutely unsullied hands. Throughout his official life he laboured unceasingly for the public good. Whatever judgement modern critics may pass upon the propriety of certain acts of policy, nobody who knows the facts can deny that Hastings gave his best to the service both of England and of India.

His industry was almost superhuman, his resolution inflexible, his patience abounding, his courage imperturbable, and his dignity unfailing. Throughout the long years of the impeachment torture he bore with stoic equanimity the buffets inflicted by lesser men, and at last towards the close of his long life attained general recognition of his merits.

In private life, as a contemporary truly said, 'all who knew him loved him, and they who knew him most loved him best'.³ His generosity was inexhaustible and often overstepped the bounds of prudence. It is impossible to read the letters to his 'beloved Marian' who shared his joys and sorrows for so many years, or those addressed to intimate friends without feeling the charm as well as admiring the ability of the writer.

Hastings in his old age was indeed the Happy Warrior,

Who, if he rise to station of command,
Rises by open means ; and there will stand
On honourable terms, or else retire,
And in himself possess his own desire. . . .

¹ Add 'and Muhammadans'.

² The admitted popularity of Hastings among the 'natives of Bengal' is in itself a conclusive answer to the accusations of oppression. The oppressed do not love their tyrants.

³ The extensive, although still very incomplete, publication of the private correspondence of Hastings produces the same effect on students of his life. 'Mr. Hastings's tastes were essentially domestic,' as a correspondent writes in Gleig, iii. 533.

Whose powers shed round him in the common strife,
 Or mild concerns of ordinary life,
 A constant influence, a peculiar grace. . . .
 He who, though thus endued as with a sense
 And faculty for storm and turbulence,
 Is yet a Soul whose master bias leans
 To home-felt pleasures and to gentle scenes. . . .
 Whom neither shape of danger can dismay,
 Nor thought of tender happiness betray. . . .
 This is the Happy Warrior ; this is He
 Whom every Man in arms should wish to be.

Pitt's India Act. The Bills prepared by Fox having been rejected by the Lords,

'like other ministers, Pitt found himself compelled to introduce and defend when in office measures which he had denounced when in opposition. The chief ground of attack on Fox's Bill was its wholesale transfer of patronage from the Company to nominees of the Crown. Pitt steered clear of this rock of offence. He also avoided the appearance of radically altering the constitution of the Company. But his measure was based on the same substantial principle as that of his predecessor and rival, the principle of placing the Company in direct and permanent subordination to a body representing the British Government.

The Act of 1784 begins by establishing a board of six commissioners, who were formally styled the "Commissioners for the Affairs of India", but were popularly known as the "Board of Control".

The Board met for a time and Pitt took part in its deliberations, but it soon ceased to assemble, and its power was exercised by a single member, the President. In modern times a similar fate has befallen the Board of Trade.¹

The Board was given power 'from time to time, to check, superintend, and control all acts, operations, and concerns which in any wise relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the territories and possessions of the said United Company in the East Indies'. At the same time a Committee of Secrecy was constituted, consisting of three Directors of the Company, through whom all important communications from the Board were to be sent. The remaining twenty-one Directors were excluded from any share of political power, and the Court of Proprietors, whose independence had offended ministers, was restricted from interfering with the decisions of the Board.

'The control of the Governor-general and Council over the minor presidencies was enlarged, and was declared to extend to "all such points as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war or peace,

¹ At first a Secretary of State or the senior commissioner present was the President *ex officio*, and without extra salary. Dundas usually presided. 'The system was changed in 1793, when the presidentship was made a separate appointment with a salary.' Dundas continued to retain the office until 1801 (Malcolm). He was created Viscount Melville in 1802.

or to the application of the revenues or forces of such presidencies in time of war '.

An attempt to stay the inevitable development of British dominion in India was made by the emphatic declaration that 'to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation', and by the formal positive enactment that

'it should not be lawful for the Governor-general and his council, without the express authority and consent of the Court of Directors, or of the secret committee, to declare war, or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war, against any of the country princes or States in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possession of any country prince or State, except where hostilities had actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities, against the British nation in India, or against some of the princes or States who were dependent thereon, or whose territories were guaranteed by any existing treaty.'¹

The Act contains many other provisions, but those cited are the most important. Nearly at the same time Acts passed at various dates remedied the worst defects of the Regulating Act of 1773, defining the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, giving the Governor-general power to overrule his council, and introducing other adminis-

trative changes which need not be detailed.

Patronage remained in the hands of the Directors, who retained the power even of recalling a Governor-general. When they exercised that power in the case of Lord Ellenborough Queen Victoria was much annoyed.

The modern Secretary of State for India represents the President of the Board of Control, and his Council, which has a Political Committee of its own, takes the place occupied by the secret committee of the Court of Directors. The 'double government'

¹ The quotations are partly from Mill and partly from Ilbert. The latter author notes that 'almost the whole' of Pitt's India Act (24 Geo. III. sess. 2, c. 25) 'has been repealed, but many of its provisions were re-enacted in the subsequent Acts of 1793, 1813, and 1833'.

of Crown and Company set up by Pitt's Act subsisted with little material change until 1858. The machinery was cumbrous and dilatory in working, but no government cared to undertake the task of eliminating the Company from the administrative mechanism until the shock of the Mutiny forced the hand of ministers.

Sir John Macpherson. Mr. (Sir John) Macpherson, the senior member of council, who took the place of Hastings pending the appointment of a permanent successor, had a bad record. Originally a ship's purser, he had been employed as a secret agent for the Nawāb of the Carnatic, whose affairs were a mass of corruption. He got into the service of the Company by backstairs influence, was deservedly, although irregularly, dismissed by Lord Pigot, governor of Madras; was reinstated by the Directors, and sent out to replace Barwell on the Bengal council. During his administration, which lasted for twenty months, Māhādājī Sindia, who had obtained the government of the provinces of Agra and Delhi with complete control of the titular emperor, and the imperial army,¹ had the audacity to demand payment of *chauth* for the British provinces. It need hardly be said that the impudent request met with a peremptory refusal. Macpherson does not seem to have been responsible for the scandalous action of Dundas, President of the Board of Control, who insisted on paying off the alleged debts of the Nawāb of the Carnatic amounting to about five millions sterling without examination. The action of the President, although not taken for the sake of personal gain, was essentially corrupt, being dictated by a desire to retain the parliamentary influence wielded by Mr. Paul Benfield and other dishonest usurers who had secured control of the Nawāb's finances. The same motive induced the minister to cancel the assignment of the Carnatic revenues to the Company, which had been arranged by Lord Macartney.² That nobleman resigned his office as governor of Madras when his principal measure was reversed. Negotiations for his appointment as Governor-general came to nothing, and Lord Cornwallis was appointed.

Sir John Macpherson effected some financial economies, chiefly by the reduction of salaries, but deserves no commendation. His successor, Lord Cornwallis, a thoroughly honest man, would neither believe a word he wrote, nor touch the corrupt jobs which he recommended. His government is described as 'a system of the dirtiest jobbing', and the man himself is justly held up to

¹ As a matter of form the Pēshwā was appointed *Vakil-i mullak*, or 'Vicerent of the Empire', and Sindia was styled his deputy. The nominal emperor, of course, had to do as he was told. His name, however, still was respected to a certain extent, and his grants gave a pleasing appearance of legality to lawless proceedings. European writers of the period usually call the Pādshāh 'the King'.

² The alleged jobs of Hastings were trifles compared with the doings of Dundas, his accuser.

scorn as 'weak and false to a degree, and he certainly was the most contemptible and the most condemned governor that ever pretended to govern'.¹

Sir John Malcolm, while giving full credit to Hastings for his 'personal integrity' and the 'active energy of a great statesman', directed to the saving of the interests of his country in India from ruin, is constrained to admit that 'the system of government over which he presided was corrupt and full of abuses'.² Hastings did all that man could do in the circumstances to effect an improvement, and actually succeeded to no small extent. But the system was too strong to be overthrown by a mere servant of the Company. The retirement of Sir John Macpherson, who belonged to the old unreformed school, marks the close of an evil period in Bengal. The Carnatic had to endure even worse government for some years longer.

CHRONOLOGY

Hastings Governor-general; the Supreme Court	1774
Cession of Benares province to the Company; treaty of Surat; first Marāthā war began; execution of Nandkumār	1775
Treaty of Purandhar; death of Col. Monson	1776
War with France; occupation of French settlements	1778
Convention of Wargāon (Jan.); Nizam's confederacy	1779
Capture of Gwālior; invasion of Carnatic by Haidar Ali; Baillic's disaster	1780
Battle of Porto Novo; affair of Chait Singh	1781
Affair of the Bēgams of Oudh; Treaty of Sālībāi; Braithwaite's disaster; Admiral de Suffren; death of Haidar Ali; (<i>European events</i>)—Resignation of Lord North, prime minister; relief of Gibraltar; Admiral Rodney's victory; Grattan's Parliament in Ireland)	1782
Surrender of Mangalore to Tippoo; peace of Versailles	1783
Ascendancy of Māhādājī Sindia; treaty of Mangalore; Pitt's India Act	1784
Resignation of Hastings; Sir J. Macpherson acting Governor- general	1785
Impeachment trial began	1788
Acquittal of Hastings	1795
Death of Hastings	1818

AUTHORITIES

FORREST, G. W. [Sir], *Selections from the State Papers of Governors-general, Warren Hastings*, 2 vols. (Oxford, Blackwell; and London, Constable, 1910) may be given the first place. Besides the general histories,

¹ *Cornwallis Correspondence*, (1859), ed. Ross², i. 383, 454. Thornton is much too favourable to Macpherson.

² *The Political History of India*, 1826, vol. i, p. 35. The author's explanation of the causes which brought about the abuses is too long to quote, but deserves study.

the following special works, among others, have been used. ANONYMOUS, *A History of the Trial of Warren Hastings, Esq.* (London, Debrett, 1796), gives an excellent and well-documented account of the impeachment and connected proceedings. The biographical works are numerous. The most accurate is GRIER, SYDNEY C., *The Letters of Warren Hastings to his Wife* (London and Edinburgh, Blackwood, 1905), a volume which contains much more than its title indicates. The leading *Life* still is that by GLEIG, G. R., 3 vols. (London, Bentley, 1841). Many smaller biographies exist, written by Sir ALFRED LYALL and other authors. I am inclined to think that the best is that by TROTTER, LIONEL, in *Everyman's Library* (Dent, 1910), which is superior to the volume by the same author in the *Rulers of India* series. All the biographies, except Sydney Grier's, contain mistakes. *A Vindication of Warren Hastings* by HASTINGS, G. W. (Frowde, 1909); and *The Private Life of Warren Hastings* by LAWSON, Sir CHARLES, (Swan, Sonnenschein, London, 1905), are useful, but not quite free from errors. V. A. SMITH, annotated edition of Macaulay's essay (Clarendon Press, 1911). Many other books and a multitude of pamphlets might be named. A huge quantity of unpublished MSS. about Hastings exists, and it is almost hopeless to look for a really satisfactory biography of him. The material is overwhelming in mass, and controversy is endless.

Everything about 'Nuncomar' will be found in STEPHEN, Sir JAMES, *The Story of Nuncomar and the Impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey*, 2 vols. (Macmillan, 1905), on one side; and in BEVERIDGE, H., *Maharaja Nuncomar* (Calcutta, Thacker, Spink, 1886), on the other.

The latter work, a revised reprint of articles in the *Calcutta Review*, although learned and painstaking, seems to me to be thoroughly wrong-headed. It is based on the assumption that Hastings conspired with Impey to murder 'Nuncomar' because the death of the Mahārāja was of advantage to Hastings. It would be as reasonable to assume that the Governor-general poisoned Colonel Monson, whose death was still more opportune for him. When the *jury* convicted 'Nuncomar', the Chief Justice was bound to pass sentence. The proposition that Hastings and Impey joined in a conspiracy to murder, which was rejected by the law officers and by Parliament, is an atrocious calumny, inconsistent with the characters of both the men accused. The title 'Hastings' Confession' to chapter viii of Mr. Beveridge's big book is a most unfair *petitio principii*. No confession ever was made. Most of the points discussed in the book are irrelevant, and later works supply fuller information on some of them.

For all Marāthā affairs GRANT DUFF is the leading authority. I possess and have used two biographies of Nānā Farnavis, one by MACDONALD, A., Captain, Bombay N.I., Bombay, 1851; and the other by BRIGGS, JOHN, *An Autobiographical Memoir, &c.*, reprinted from the *J. R. A. S.*, vol. ii, part i, London, 1829. Count de Boigne's life is narrated sufficiently by GRANT DUFF, and more fully by RAYMOND, G. M., *Mémoire*², &c. (Chambéry, 1830). WILKS, MARK, *Historical Sketches of the South of India, &c.*, is the principal guide for the Mysore war. Some other books are cited in the notes, and many more might be named. For the Board of Control see 'The India Board (1784-1858)', by WILLIAM FOSTER, C.I.E., in *Trans. R. Hist. Soc.*, read in November 1916.

CHAPTER 5

Lord Cornwallis; reforms; the third Mysore war; the 'permanent settlement'; Sir John Shore, a man of peace.

Lord Cornwallis. Charles, second Earl Cornwallis, was in his forty-eighth year when, in 1786, he accepted unwillingly and from a sense of duty the office of Governor-general. A soldier by profession, he had seen much active service. It was his misfortune that in October 1781 he was in command of the force which was compelled to surrender at Yorktown on the American coast, because the French fleet under de Grasse had secured for the moment command of the sea. Although the surrender ended the American war and assured the independence of the United States, the disaster, for which Cornwallis was not blamed personally, did not prevent his appointment to India. It was, as Marshman observes, 'the singular caprice of circumstances that the man who had lost America was sent out to govern India, and the man who had saved India was subjected to a prosecution for high crimes and misdemeanours'.¹

It is refreshing for the historian to escape from the turbid politics of the time of Hastings and Macpherson and to pass into the more wholesome atmosphere of the Cornwallis régime. The new Governor-General, a member of the aristocratic oligarchy which then governed England, was raised by his peerage above the jealousies which must ever beset the path of a man promoted from the ranks of an official service and set to rule over his fellows. Hastings never could wholly overcome the disadvantages of his position, either as regards the Directors and ministry at home or his colleagues and subordinates in India. He was forced to make compromises

¹ ' *An Historic Meeting.*

Yesterday members of the American Mission met the British War Cabinet and the Heads of the Departments most intimately concerned in the war at No. 10 Downing-street. The meeting was essentially a business meeting to consider how the United States could best work with us and with the other Allies for the single end we have in view. But the dullest imagination must be stirred by the gathering of the representatives of the two great English-speaking peoples for such a purpose upon such a scene. Until a century and a half ago they were one people with a common inheritance of blood and of language, of political and religious thought, of institutions, habits, character, and traditions coming down to them through countless generations. Then the claim of the colonists to self-government divided them from the Mother Country, and just because they were of the same family the kinsmen stubbornly fought their quarrel out. It was in the room and at the table where the decisions which made the severance inevitable were taken, and where the treaty of peace with the new Republic was signed, that their representatives took counsel together yesterday against the enemy of the polity and of the civilization they have developed' (*The Times*, November 21, 1917).

and opportunist arrangements, and even occasionally to perpetrate jobs, in order to secure his continuance in office and control over the instruments which he had to use. The personal rank and reputation of Cornwallis freed him from such necessities. He could afford to defy even the Prince Regent, when he sought to effect a scandalous job, and he enjoyed the full confidence of the ministry, so that his authority in every department of government was uncontested. He was invested with military control as commander-in-chief. He obtained powers to overrule for adequate reasons the majority of his council.

The want of that authority had been the most serious embarrassment of Hastings. The other most glaring faults in the Regulating Act had been remedied by earlier legislation. Cornwallis was not a genius, but his lack of imagination and intellectual brilliancy was compensated by the strength of his character and his unflinching moral courage. No man ever presumed to question his integrity. His mistakes and failures do not affect the high respect due to his essentially noble nature and almost invariably straightforward conduct.

Reform of civil service. The first three years of his lordship's term of office were mainly occupied in the reform of abuses, the eradication of corruption, and the provision of adequate salaries for the civil service. He was resolutely opposed to the old-fashioned commercial view of the Directors, who liked to see small salaries shown in the accounts, while they were indifferent to the largeness of the unofficial perquisites appropriated by their servants. Cornwallis, soon after his arrival, estimated the takings of the Resident of Benares at £40,000 a year. Such monstrous gains, of course, were stopped. The Resident was given the adequate but not then excessive salary of 5,000 rupees a month. Under the influence of the new system the Civil Service of India developed into the honourable body which it has continued to be ever since. Cornwallis was served by several admirable officials, among whom John Shore and Jonathan Duncan stand out pre-eminent. The administrative changes and reforms will be discussed more fully later.



LORD CORNWALLIS.

Peace sought ; war found. Lord Cornwallis came out to India as a man of peace, bound by Act of Parliament and his own convictions to refrain from conquests and alliances, except in defence of British possessions or those of an ally. Before he went home he had broken the power of the principal potentate in the far south and had taken half of his dominions. Like more than one of his successors he came seeking peace and found war. The self-denying ordinance enacted by Parliament could not be strictly observed ; and even Cornwallis, who disliked trickery, was driven on at least one occasion to evade the Act by a subterfuge. The various Indian states, or 'country powers', as contemporary writers called them, were not stable kingdoms with settled boundaries, capable of entering into a permanent system of polity. Nearly all the kingdoms were of recent origin founded by adventurers, each of whom fought for his own hand, and schemed incessantly to outwit and subdue his neighbours. The policy of the Marāthās, in its essence predatory, could not be reconciled with general order. Nānā Farnavīs, the Pēshwā's powerful minister in those times, aimed at restoring the supremacy of his people. Tippoo in the far south, an arrogant fanatical tyrant, apparently not quite sane, and filled with bitter hatred of the English intruders, never relaxed his efforts to drive them out. No fixed authority could be found anywhere, and the British rulers of Bengal, as the strongest military and naval power, found themselves irresistibly constrained to acknowledge the duties imposed by the possession of strength, and to accept the position of 'umpires', not only in Hindostan or northern India, as in Verelst's time, but of the whole country, even down to Travancore and Coorg in the extremity of the peninsula. When the war with Tippoo began in 1790, only thirty-three years had elapsed since Plassey.

Causes of the Mysore war. In 1786 the Marāthās, meaning the Pēshwā acting under the advice of Nānā Farnavīs, Sindia, and Holkar, combined with the Nizam for the purpose of despoiling Tippoo, and in the following year forced him to cede a district and pay thirty lakhs of rupees. In 1788 Lord Cornwallis succeeded in obtaining Guntūr in the northern Sarkārs from the Nizām, who in return asked for troops under the provisions of the treaty of 1768. Lord Cornwallis, hampered by the Act of Parliament and anxious to avoid an open breach with Tippoo, adopted, as Grant Duff observes, 'a line of conduct more objectionable than an avowed defensive alliance'. He addressed a letter to the Nizam promising that if the English should at any future time obtain possession of the Carnatic Bālāghāt or uplands they would then fulfil their obligations to both the Nizam and the Marāthās. When the letter was written the territory in question was included in the Mysore state. The Governor-general further promised to send the battalions on demand, on condition that they should not be employed against the allies of the Company, including specifically the Marāthās. Tippoo's name was not included among the allies.

Cornwallis thus evaded the Act by framing a treaty in the form of a letter. Tippoo heard of the evasion, and his anger at it was one of the causes of the war which followed. In any case he had intended to fight the English, and if possible, destroy their power.

Invasion of Travancore. The immediate cause of the war was Tippoo's attack on Travancore, a state in alliance with and under the protection of the Company. It is needless to go into the special reasons which induced the Sultan to attack Travancore at that moment, as he proceeded to do. On December 29, 1789, he assailed the 'lines of Travancore', a rampart covering thirty miles of the northern frontier of the state, and suffered a repulse owing to a sudden panic among his troops. 'The plain country was a scene of merciless devastation, the inhabitants were hunted and sent in immense numbers to the usual fate of captivity and death.' Lord Cornwallis treated that attack as an act of war against the Company, and, ignoring the effects of his letter to the Nizam in July, wrote :

'That mad barbarian Tippoo has forced us into a war with him by attacking without any just provocation our ally the Raja of Travancore, whose territories it is not only our interest to defend, but we are specifically bound to do it by the late treaty of peace.'

Triple alliance. Orders were sent to the government of Madras to regard the invasion of Travancore as equivalent to a declaration of war against the Company, to collect military stores and transport, and to suspend all commercial expenditure. The provincial government, then under the control of two brothers named Holland, of whom one, John, was governor, deliberately disobeyed the peremptory orders of the Governor-general in every particular. The rascals soon found that they had a master. John Holland fled to Europe, and his brother, Edward John, who succeeded him as acting governor, was suspended from office. Subsequently, both of the Hollonds went to America and disappeared. The Governor-general, being now at war in defence of an ally, felt himself at liberty to conclude a 'tripartite treaty' or 'triple alliance' with the Nizam and the Marāthās against Tippoo.

The first two campaigns. General Medows, in command of the Company's forces, occupied Dindigul and other places, while troops from Bombay took possession of Malabar. Seasonal and transport difficulties prevented decisive operations.

In December 1790 Lord Cornwallis in person assumed command. After a siege he captured Bangalore, which he made his base. Hampered by appalling difficulties in the way of supplies and transport he struggled on and inflicted a severe defeat on the Sultan at Arikera (Arrakerri), only nine miles from Seringapatam, the capital. The victory proved fruitless. At the moment when success seemed assured Cornwallis was obliged by fear of starvation to destroy his siege train and retire on Bangalore.¹ Just then

¹ Full details of the sufferings of the army are given by Wilks. The Bombay force had to abandon a small hospital with 18 patients.

a Marāthā force arrived with ample supplies. If they had come a few days earlier the war might have been ended triumphantly. Lord Cornwallis bought the further aid or neutrality of the mercenary Marāthās with funds provided by seizing the Company's silver on its way to China. In those days modern financial facilities did not exist. There was no paper money, no funded debt, and no machinery of extensive credit. Each campaign had to be financed by chests full of coin, and the amazingly cumbrous arrangements for transport and supply were of a mediaeval character.¹

Treaty of Seringapatam. Two campaigns having failed, Lord Cornwallis resolved to finish the business in 1792. With the help of an army from Bombay he approached Seringapatam in February, and convinced Tippoo that resistance was hopeless. Preliminary terms then arranged were converted on March 16 into the definite treaty of Seringapatam, which required the cession of half of the Sultan's dominions, the payment of 330 lakhs of rupees, the release of all prisoners, and the surrender of two of Tippoo's sons as hostages.

The Sultan was furious when he learned that the Governor-general insisted on the cession of Coorg, which did not come clearly within the precise language of the preliminary terms accepted. Lord Cornwallis could not possibly abandon to the rage of the Sultan the gallant little principality, which had already suffered unspeakable cruelties at Tippoo's hands; but he should not have exposed himself by the use of loose language to even the suspicion of breaking faith. Tippoo had paid a large part of the indemnity and sent in his sons before he realized that he must lose Coorg.²

Territorial adjustments. The territorial adjustments, intended to give shares of equal value to the three allies, may be described in the words of Wilks:

'The selections of ceded territory brought the Mahrattas to the river Toombuddra [Tungabhadra], their frontier in 1779; restored to Nizam Ali his possessions north of that river, and the province of Kurpa [Cuddapah] to the south, which had been lost about the same period. The English obtained Malabar and Coorg; the province of Dindigul [now in the north of the Madura District], which had jutted inconveniently into their southern provinces, and Baramahal [now the NE. portion of the Salem District], an iron boundary for Coromandel, which placed her frontier fortress of Rayacota [Rāyakottai, now in Salem District] on the table-land of Mysoor to the east, as the undisputed cession of Coorg secured a similar advantage to the west.'

¹ The needs of Lord Cornwallis in 1792 were supplied by a huge supplementary army of Banjāras ('Brinjaries', 'Lumbanies'), or professional nomad grain-carriers and dealers, numbering not less than 400,000. Wilks gives a curious account of them. Now that their ancient occupation has gone they have been mostly merged in the general population and become a mere caste. See Yule and Burnell, *Glossary*, s. v. Brinjarry.

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The districts left to Tippoo were 'rugged and unproductive' in comparison with those of which he was deprived. Coorg was maintained as a protected state under its Rājā, and so remained until 1834, when the misconduct of its ruler made annexation necessary. The annexations under the treaty of Seringapatam largely extended the area of the Madras and Bombay presidencies.

Criticism. Lord Cornwallis is sometimes criticized for his failure to deal in a more drastic fashion with an implacable enemy. Subsequent events proved that the complete overthrow of Tippoo in 1792 would have saved another war;¹ but at the time the Governor-general believed that he had done enough to secure a lasting peace. Annexation of the whole of Mysore would have displeased both the Nizam and the Marāthās, offended public and official opinion at home, and contravened the policy of the Act of 1784. The partial annexation effected was approved by the ministry, and the Governor-general was promoted to the rank of Marquess. Tippoo compelled his subjects to pay most of the indemnity,² and at once began preparations for the next war.

Land policy. The most momentous and most hotly debated measure carried through by Lord Cornwallis was the Permanent Settlement of Bengal, Bihār, the Benares Province, and part of Orissa.³ Comparatively few readers of this book can have had practical, inside knowledge of the nature and working of the Indian systems of land tenure and finance, which differ widely from those prevalent in Europe and other parts of the world. Explanation at some length of elementary facts familiar to experts is therefore indispensable for the majority of students who do not possess the experience gained by Collectors and Settlement Officers.

India always has been a country mainly agricultural, and for that reason the proper treatment of the problems connected with the land is the primary duty of an Indian government, so far as internal administration is concerned. Good policy concerning the land means contentment and peace; bad policy means discontent and disturbance. Indian finance always has depended on the land policy, because from time immemorial the right of the government, whatever its form might be, to a large share of the gross produce of the land has been admitted by everybody, and that share has been the principal source of the income of the state. Even now, when new sources of revenue have been developed by the action of modern conditions, the 'land revenue' constitutes about from 38 to 40 per cent. of the income of the government of

¹ General Medows would have preferred to dethrone Tippoo and restore the country to its Hindu rulers, the policy adopted later by Lord Wellesley (*Cornwallis Corr.*, ii. 78).

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India. In earlier days its percentage was considerably higher; amounting to 75 per cent. or more of the gross receipts.

The share of the state. The legitimate government share of the gross produce according to the best legal authorities was one-fourth, but Akbar demanded one-third generally, and one-half in Kashmir. Theoretical limitations did not count for much. In practice, nearly every ruler, Hindu or Musalmān, took all he could get, and often the principle was avowed that the cultivating occupier, the 'ryot' (*raiyyat*), should be left no more than a bare subsistence and seed grain, in order that he might not wax fat and kick. Very often so much was not left. Then the cultivators were forced to desert their lands, which lay waste, a prey to wild beasts. The temptation to kill the goose which laid the eggs proved irresistible in many cases. Even the early 'settlements' made by British officers frequently erred on the side of over-assessment, with disastrous results. The financial and economic benefits of moderate assessment are now universally recognized in British India, but the practical difficulties in the way of attaining the golden mean are immense. In Bengal of the eighteenth century the information accessible was so crude that a decently fair assessment was impossible. The Benares province was more fortunate, because it was a comparatively small area and was assessed by Jonathan Duncan, the best revenue officer of the period.

Modes of collection. The government share of the produce might be collected in kind, either by actual division and weighing of the crop, or by various methods of appraisement or estimating. It might also be valued and collected in cash, the system preferred by Akbar, and now universally adopted in British territory. The ancient tradition, it should be clearly understood, allowed no place for an economic, competitive landlord's rent. According to theory, the whole produce should be shared between the State (*sarkār*) and the peasant ('ryot'). Akbar encouraged direct payments by each peasant ('ryotwār settlement'), which, as Sir Thomas Munro rightly insisted, was 'the old system of the country'. But in practice that arrangement often proved to be unworkable, and the services of a middleman under one name or another, zemindar, or what not, had to be called in. His remuneration was in the nature of a commission on the collections. Akbar sanctioned the payment of such commission, where necessary, at the rate of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.¹ That allowance to middlemen easily passes into landlord's rent, and, as a matter of fact, is the origin of the landlord's rent now levied in Bengal and most parts of India. Ancient Indian law recognized no freeholders, except in Malabar, and certain other regions in the peninsula.² The prevailing

¹ The best definition of the position of an early Bengal zemindar is that in Harington's *Analysis*, reproduced in Seton-Karr, *Lord Cornwallis* (Rulers of India), p. 34. It deserves careful study. The Cornwallis zemindar is defined, *ibid.*, p. 36.

² Munro found documentary evidence of private property in land in

opinion certainly was that the ultimate property in land vested in the State, and that opinion still is ordinarily held and acted on in the Native or Protected States of northern India. The corollary to that proposition is that the State or government could do what it pleased with tenures, subject only to vague customary rights, more or less recognized, but never defined, and never enforceable by law. Powerful people also needed to be careful, for fear of throwing land out of cultivation. Established 'ryots' were understood to have a prescriptive right to retain their fields so long as they paid at customary rates their 'land revenue', or government share of the produce, which in the old days was indistinguishable from rent. The British creation of 'proprietary right' in northern India has brought in a third party, the landlord or *zamindar*, who collects rents from the 'ryots' or peasants, and pays 'land revenue' as a share of the rent, not of the produce. The modern settlement officer values rents, not crops. If there is no actual rent, as in the case where a 'proprietor' cultivates his own land, a hypothetical rent is calculated, and 'rent-rates' are worked out for the whole cultivated area. In the eighteenth century no such refinements were possible. Rough assessments were usually made on the basis of previous collections, or, sometimes, as by Duncan in Benares, on estimates framed by hereditary skilled officers called *kānūngōs* ('canoongoes'). At other times the assessments were made in a still rougher fashion by putting up the 'land revenue' of a tract to auction. In that case the contractor was called a 'farmer', and the highest bidder got the contract. He then had to raise the sum agreed on as he best could from the middlemen and peasants under him. Warren Hastings was obliged to resort to the farming system as a makeshift for his hurried quinquennial 'settlement' of 1772-7. It is an evil system, intolerable except as a makeshift.

Questions of person and time. In the time of Lord Cornwallis everybody was agreed that the 'settlement' contract should be made with the established middlemen or *zamindars*, whose position had become hereditary, as usual in India.

The question of term remained open. Most native governments made rough 'annual settlements'. Akbar had preferred longer terms, and, actually, the Bengal 'settlement' made by his finance minister, Rājā Todar Mall, lasted for seventy-six years.

Chaos in Bengal. In the eighteenth century everything fell into confusion. In Bengal the village communities, which still held rural society together in Upper India, dissolved, and the *kānūngōs* ceased to maintain their records properly. Individual *zamindars*, originally mere collecting removable middlemen, developed into hereditary potentates, each controlling a huge extent of country. The Mogul government always had been in N. Kanara going back for a thousand years (Gleig's *Life*², i. 347). The 'other regions' alluded to are—from Sunda [in Mysore] to the Wynaad [now included in the Malabar District], the Carnatic, Tanjore, and Madura (*ibid.*, ii. 125).

the habit of allowing local landholders and middlemen, whatever their designation might be, to exercise practically despotic authority over the peasantry. The officials did not worry much about the details of administration, so long as the revenue came in sufficiently well to satisfy the persons in power, whoever or wherever they might be. Nobody's position or rights could be exactly defined in legal, precise terms. Lord Cornwallis suddenly introduced his 'permanent settlement' into the chaos thus sketched, and effected a revolution, without fully intending it. He was firmly persuaded that he had conferred a boon on the country which he did so much to ruin; and when he had departed his successors continued to pretend that all was well, being unwilling to admit failure. No official blundering could ruin altogether a fertile region like Bengal, filled with an industrious population.

Meaning of 'settlement'. The term 'settlement' so often used in the foregoing observations has in India a technical meaning, which needs definition. The term is a translation of the Persian word *bandobast*. In the time of Lord Cornwallis revenue records being written in Persian, the technical terms used mostly came from that language, which included many Arabic words. The vocabulary of official Persian differed little from that of modern 'High Urdū'. The comprehensive term *bandobast* or 'settlement' covered all the operations incidental to the assessment of the land revenue or government share of the produce. The survey which had been a necessary preliminary in Akbar's time, as it is now, had dropped out of use in all provinces. The main factors in a 'settlement' were the persons with whom the contract should be made, the amount of money demanded, the modes of collection, the penalties for default, and the term for which the arrangement should hold good.

Policy of the home authorities. The home authorities had been much disturbed by the reports concerning the vacillating policy pursued in Indian revenue matters, and were extremely anxious to secure a permanent revenue assessed on fixed principles. They were not keen about obtaining an increase of the annual amount. The farming system was condemned definitely, and all parties were agreed that the 'settlement' should be made with the recognized zemindars. Nobody advocated a survey or very detailed investigation of the assessable resources of the country, which settlement officers are accustomed to call the 'assets'.

Question of term. The term for which the settlement should be made was the principal topic debated. So far back as January 1776 Francis had written an able minute advocating a permanent, unchangeable assessment.¹ In a dispatch of 1786, the year in which Cornwallis came out, the Directors expressed their preference for a permanent settlement, never again to be revised. The Governor-general seems to have made up his mind from the first that such a measure must be passed. It is certain that in 1789 he had come to a fixed resolve on the matter, which could not be

¹ Ascoli, p. 34.

shaken by any argument. He succeeded in convincing the Prime Minister and the President of the Board of Control that he was right. The two statesmen shut themselves up in a country house for ten days to study the question and decided to support the opinion of the Governor-general. Accordingly the Permanent Settlement for Bengal, Bihār, and Orissa (i. e. Midnapur) was proclaimed in 1793, and for the Benares Province two years later. Shore urged with all his force the obvious common-sense view that the measure was premature and that an irrevocable step should not be taken on information which everybody knew to be extremely imperfect concerning a huge country largely waste and still suffering from the effects of the famine of 1770. He argued that ordinary prudence required that the agreements should be taken for ten years only, an arrangement which would allow time for inquiry and consideration.

Arguments of Cornwallis. Cornwallis replied to the effect that there had been plenty of inquiry, that the information was sufficient, that the government would be no wiser ten years hence, and that nothing save absolute permanence would stimulate the progress and improvement of the country. He cherished an idle dream that he would be able to create a class of landholders, like the best kind of English county magnates, who, under the magic influence of ownership and permanent assessment, would 'make the country flourish, and secure happiness to the body of inhabitants'. Being 'persuaded that nothing could be so ruinous to the public interest as that the land should be retained as the property of Government', he was further 'convinced that, failing the claim of right of the zemindars, it would be necessary for the public good to grant a right of property in the soil to them, or to persons of other descriptions.' He proceeds to say :

'I may safely assert that one-third of the Company's territory in Hindostan is now a jungle inhabited only by wild beasts. Will a ten years' lease induce any proprietor to clear away that jungle, and encourage the ryots to come and cultivate his lands, when at the end of that lease he must either submit to be taxed *ad libitum* for the newly cultivated lands, or lose all hope of deriving any benefit from his labour, for which perhaps by that time he will hardly be repaid ?

I must own that it is clear to my mind that a much more advantageous tenure will be necessary to incite the inhabitants of this country to make those exertions which can alone effect any substantial improvement.

The habit which the zemindars have fallen into of subsisting by annual expedients has originated, not in any constitutional imperfection in the people themselves, but by the fluctuating measures of Government ; and I cannot therefore admit that a period of ten years will be considered by the generality of people as a term nearly equal in estimate to perpetuity.

By the prudent landholders it will not, whatever it may be by proprietors of a contrary description. It would be unwise, therefore, to deny the former the benefit of a permanent system, because the mismanagement of the latter will not allow them to derive the same advantage from it.

It is for the interest of the State that the landed property should fall into the hands of the most frugal and thrifty class of people, who will improve

their lands and protect the ryots, and thereby promote the general prosperity of the country.

If there are men who will not follow this line of conduct when an opportunity is afforded them by the enactment [sic] of good laws, it surely is not inconsistent with justice, policy, or humanity to say that the sooner their bad management obliges them to part with their property to the more industrious, the better for the State.

It is immaterial to Government what individual possesses the land, provided he cultivates it, protects the ryots, and pays the public revenue.

The short-sighted policy of having recourse to annual expedients can only be corrected by allowing those who adopt it to suffer the consequences of it, leaving to them at the same time the power of obviating them by pursuing the opposite line of conduct.'

Criticism. Such feeble reasoning, while plausible enough on paper to deceive able English ministers ignorant of Indian conditions, was so utterly unrelated to the realities that it hardly deserves the trouble of refutation. It may, however, be well to observe that the grant or declaration of a heritable, transferable right of property in the soil as a boon bestowed on the zemindars ignored the ancient rights of multitudes of under-proprietors of various kinds as well as the customary tenant-right or hold on the soil at fair customary rates enjoyed by the ryots; that no serious attempt was made to secure respect for such rights and customary possession; that the words 'his lands' applied to a vast zemindāri were false in fact and implied an agrarian revolution; that great zemindars were not in the habit of spending capital on land reclamation or improvement; that such operations actually were effected bit by bit on a small scale by individual ryots; that no shadow of reason existed for believing that the transferees of properties would 'improve the lands and protect the ryots' better than the old zemindars had done; that, as a matter of fact, the new men were much worse than the old; and that the policy avowed in the concluding paragraphs of the extract was heartless and cruel. Much more might be said, but so much is enough.

Cruelty of the sale law. A tremendous change in usage and practice was introduced by the Permanent Settlement legislation through the enforcement of the sale of zemindāris by auction as the sole penalty for default. Previous rulers had been accustomed to imprison, flog, torture, or even kill defaulters; but whatever pain was inflicted fell upon individuals, without impairing the position of the defaulter's family, or inflicting loss of the vague rights recognized as existing. The notion that a big zemindar's interest in a whole barony or county was liable to be sold up and lost for ever because his agent had been a day late in paying the government revenue was wholly new to the Indian mind, which found extreme difficulty in grasping the terrible reality of the novel situation. Lord Cornwallis abhorred all forms of personal

¹ Mill's very much longer denunciation of the Cornwallis legislation is not open to hostile criticism to any material extent.

coercion, and in his anxiety to relieve landholders from corporal indignities subjected them to evils far worse. The rigid punctuality of payment required by the law could not be fully enforced. Large balances accrued in spite of the cruelty of the sale law, especially during the period of about fifteen years following the proclamation of the permanent settlement. Innumerable proofs of the mischief done might be cited, but it will suffice to quote the testimony of the Collector of Midnapur in 1802, who wrote that the zemindars

'all say that such a harsh and oppressive system was never before resorted to in this country ; that the custom of imprisoning landholders for arrears of revenue was, in comparison, mild and indulgent to them ; that, though it was no doubt the intention of government to confer an important benefit on them by abolishing the custom, it has been found by melancholy experience that the system of sales and attachments, which has been substituted for it, has in the course of a very few years reduced most of the great zemindars in Bengal to distress and beggary, and produced a greater change in the landed property of Bengal than has, perhaps, ever happened in the same space of time, in any age or country, by the mere effect of internal regulations.'

That indictment of the policy of Lord Cornwallis is literally true. The great landholders more or less completely ruined included the Rājās of Dīnājpur, Rājshāhi, Bishanpur, Nadiyā (Nuddea), Cossijurah, and many others.¹

The auction purchasers. Nor were the persons substituted any better as landlords than their predecessors had been. On the contrary, as already stated, they were much worse, because the ill-understood foreign sale law afforded endless opportunities for trickery and chicanery to rogues who mastered the formalities of the collector's office, suborned the underlings, and often acquired valuable properties for a trifle. In many cases the purchasers were agents, attorneys, or bailiffs of the zemindars, and purchases were constantly effected in the names of persons other than the real buyers. The purchasers, far from showing an inclination to become 'prudent trustees of the public interests', were selfish, greedy speculators, indifferent to everything except their own immediate pecuniary interest, and bitterly hostile to the holders of all subordinate rights. Very often they resided in Calcutta or some other city, never going near the estates which they were expected to improve. In the years 1871-4, when I served as Assistant Collector in the permanently settled districts of the Benares province, I examined many old records and heard endless stories of the iniquities of the auction-purchasers, although in that province the evil never attained the magnitude which it reached in Bengal. The effect on the peace of the country-side was then disastrous and probably is still felt. A family which has lost its legal rights by an auction sale always regards the transaction as unjust, and usually becomes a centre of agrarian disturbance, frequently resulting in murder.

So far as the hoped for creation of a landed aristocracy of a

¹ *Fifth Report*, in Ascoli, pp. 214, 223.

progressive character from among either the old zemindars or the new men was concerned the permanent settlement was a ghastly failure. The pecuniary benefit was reaped chiefly by rogues.

Neglect of subordinate rights. In respect of the under-proprietors and peasants or 'ryots' of various classes, who possessed well-recognized, although ill-defined customary rights, while owing equally well-recognized and ill-defined duties, the result of the obstinate idealism of Lord Cornwallis was equally disastrous. The government contented itself with expressing pious aspirations in the wordy preambles to Regulations and in making fine promises of future legislation which were never fulfilled. The first serious attempt to grasp the problem of tenant-right was made by Act X of 1859, which unhappily proceeded on lines not in accordance with custom, and was on the whole a failure. Subsequent attempts to solve the problem do not seem to have met with much greater success, but I am not qualified by experience in the Lower Provinces to express a decided opinion on that point.

'No rent' combinations. Another evil result of the sentimental obstinacy of Lord Cornwallis was the demoralization of the tenantry, who often adopted a 'no rent' policy, and made it impossible for the landholder to fulfil his obligations. A man who could not collect his rents could not pay his land revenue. Lord Cornwallis was perversely wedded to the notion that all disputes concerning the land could be easily settled by referring the parties to the civil courts established by him. The break-down of those courts will be noticed presently.

Distrain ; the Fifth Report. In 1799 an attempt to relieve the embarrassment of the zemindars was made by giving them the power of distraint, as copied from English law. The newly acquired power, which was unsuitable to the country, was tyrannically abused. The famous *Fifth Report* of the Select Committee of the House of Commons, presented in 1812, and drafted by the Senior Clerk of the Board of Control, gives a comprehensive and distressing view of the evils wrought by the permanent settlement, coloured to a considerable extent by the desire of the committee to prove that the country, notwithstanding 'certain imperfections' in the 'system of internal government in the Bengal provinces', yet 'exhibited in every part of it, improvement on a general view, advancing with accelerated progress in latter times.'

Advantages of delay. If the settlement had been made for ten years only as Shore advised, or even for a longer term, the defects inevitable in a rough and ready measure designed and executed by officers very imperfectly informed concerning essential facts could have been noted and cured by suitable remedies. The rights of subordinate holders and ryots might have been properly secured, the old landholding families might have been preserved, the villanies attendant on auction sales could have been stopped, and grave financial loss would have been avoided.

Lack of local knowledge. The permanent settlement had yet

one more injurious result. The land revenue being fixed for ever and its payment on the whole secured by a mechanical recourse to the process of sale, no motive remained to induce officials to study minutely rural tenures and conditions. The *kānūngōs* (canoongoes), the authorized hereditary custodians of knowledge concerning the land, were abolished, and the village accountants (*patwāris*) were declared to be merely private servants of the zemindars. No local collecting establishment was required. The extensive establishment of *tahsildārs* and subordinate officials at the disposal of the Collector of a District in temporarily settled provinces does not exist in Bengal, where the Magistrate and Collector is, so to speak, deprived of eyes and ears. He is constrained to rely for local investigations almost entirely on the police, an unsatisfactory agency. Considerable tracts of Bengal had the good fortune to escape the wide net of the permanent settlement for various reasons which cannot be explained here. Such tracts have been surveyed, examined, and assessed by skilled settlement officers in modern times and the knowledge thus acquired has thrown much light on rustic economy. But in the province taken as a whole it is extremely difficult for officials to gain that accurate information concerning the land which is the ordinary equipment of a competent officer in other provinces. Under the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 power was taken to make a survey and prepare a record of rights even in permanently settled tracts. Such operations have taken place in north Bihār and certain other Districts. In so far as they have been completed they remove the reproach of official ignorance concerning those areas.

Financial loss. The financial loss caused by the permanent settlement is enormous, and cannot be less than 300 lakhs, or 30 millions of rupees a year, a burden which the rest of India has to bear.¹ Apologists for the measure may urge that the apparent loss has been made up by the increase of cultivation due to the permanency of the assessment. Several years ago when lecturing at Oxford I came to the conclusion and taught my pupils that the large increase in cultivation which has taken place cannot be justly ascribed to the Permanent Settlement legislation. Mr. Ascoli, an expert revenue officer serving in Bengal, independently has formed the same opinion.² Probably few disinterested and

¹ The figure is put considerably higher in *I. G.* (1908, vol. vii, p. 301, s. v. Bengal).

² 'There is little doubt that the extension of cultivation subsequent to 1793 was due entirely to natural causes, such as the normal increase of population. . . . There is nothing in the contemporary accounts, nor in the subsequent history of zemindāri management, to show that the extension of cultivation was in any way due to the efforts of the proprietors, or to suggest that similar results would not have been obtained under a different form of settlement. . . . The Permanent Settlement in itself had no immediate effect on the state of cultivation' (*Early Revenue History of Bengal*, 1917, p. 80). 'We have only to guard the Ryots from oppression, and they will create the revenue for us' (Sir T. Munro in Gleig's *Life*², i. 174).

well-informed persons outside of Bengal could now be found to applaud the wisdom of the Permanent Settlement. Right or wrong, it has become irrevocable. The author of this book has no doubt that it was wrong.

Districts. 'The division of the province into districts is the backbone of the whole system of reforms. The Supervisors, the Provincial Councils, and the earlier Collectors had exercised their doubtful authority over a series of fiscal divisions, *parganas*, *zemindāries*, &c. . . . The new districts were territorial units . . . reduced to twenty-three in number' in 1787. 'The process of rendering the districts more compact continued . . . but the system evolved by Shore . . . has formed the basis of all subsequent administration.'¹

Judicial reforms. The judicial reforms, civil and criminal, were based on the district arrangement, and, although much modified in detail by later legislation, served as the foundation of the existing system, and were an improvement on the tentative institutions of Hastings. A civil court under a European judge was constituted for every district, and a gradation of appeal courts was established. Collectors were divested of judicial functions, and almost all disputes were referred to the civil courts. European judges were sent on circuit to perform the functions now performed by Sessions Judges, and the grosser faults of the Muhammadan criminal law were abolished, but that law, slightly modified, still supplied the place of a penal code, and supplied it very ill. The Judge of each district (*zillah*) had also the powers of a magistrate and the control of the police, who were officered by Indian *darogas*, each in charge of a police circle (*thāna*) about twenty miles square. The *daroga* received a salary of only twenty-five rupees a month, plus ten rupees for every dacoit or brigand convicted, and a commission on stolen property recovered. Murders, robberies, and other enormities were extremely numerous, and the *darogas* were a terror to the well-disposed rather than to the evil doers. The introduction of a more efficient police administration had to wait until the years 1859-62, when the High Courts were founded, the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure enacted, and the police was organized on the model of the Royal Irish Constabulary.

Radical error of Lord Cornwallis. Lord Cornwallis had an extraordinary distrust of all 'native' or Indian officials.

¹ Ascoli, p. 39. 'The unit of administration in British India is the district, corresponding roughly with the Sarkār of the Mogul system. In British India 258 districts exist. . . . Many of the native or protected states, as for example the Nizam's dominions or Hyderabad state, follow the British system and make use of the district as the unit of administration.

Each such district is ordinarily a considerable area, as large as a good-sized English county, and supporting a population of 1,000,000 more or less. In the Madras presidency the districts are exceptionally large. . . . The average area of a district is about 4,430 square miles, and the average population is about 931,000' (*The Oxford Survey of the British Empire*, 1914, vol. ii, p. 249). The districts in the time of Lord Cornwallis were large and unwieldy.

‘I conceive’, he wrote, that all regulations for the reform of that [criminal] department would be useless and nugatory, whilst the execution of them depends upon any native whatever,’

and went on to insist that all judicial proceedings should be at least supervised by Europeans. His plan for paying liberal salaries applied only to the European service.¹ Such entire exclusion of all indigenous agency from any responsible position was, as Marshman justly observes,

‘the great and radical error of Lord Cornwallis. . . . Under the impolitic system established in 1793, the prospects of legitimate and honourable ambition were altogether closed against the natives of the country.’

Space fails to enter into particulars of the working of the judicial system, but there can be no doubt that it broke down utterly on both the civil and criminal sides to such a degree that for many years justice was almost denied. The courts were far too few, were hampered by technicalities,² and clogged with arrears. In 1795 the Civil Court of Burdwan was more than 30,000 cases in arrear. Much information on the subject is contained in the *Fifth Report*. Magisterial powers were restored to Collectors in 1835. Cornwallis believed firmly, as many people now do, in the theoretical merits of the complete separation of executive from judicial functions. Practical men, who know the strength of the Indian tradition which looks to one officer, the Hākīm, or person who can give orders (*hukm*), as the representative of the government, do not believe that the villagers are gainers by the multiplication of departments and the sub-division of authority. But the subject is too large for discussion in this place. The student, however, should note that the theories of Cornwallis failed to stand the test of practice.

The ‘country powers’. Cornwallis did his best to avoid entanglements with the ‘country powers’. He had, however, the spirit to tell Māhādājī Sindia in peremptory language that he must keep his hands off Oudh. Both that province and the Carnatic continued to be scandalously misgoverned. Neither Nawāb took the slightest practical notice of the abundant excellent advice tendered by the Governor-General.

¹ Sir Thomas Munro understood the subject far better and entertained the most liberal views on it.

² The Cornwallis Code drawn up by Mr. George Barlow, afterwards Governor-general, was an extended and spoiled edition of Impey’s short code, which was much more practical and sensible. ‘It would have been better to have curtailed nine-tenths of the regulations—to have confined appeals within narrower limits, and to have made the zillah [district] judges absolute’ (Munro in Gleig’s *Life*, i. 420). It is hardly necessary to point out that now the great majority of judicial officers on the civil side are of Indian birth, that thousands of their countrymen exercise criminal powers, and that some of the most efficient High Court judges are Indians. The general level of judicial integrity has been raised to an extent which would have seemed incredible to Lord Cornwallis, but not to Sir Thomas Munro, who fully understood the possibilities of improvement. Munro, perhaps, was the wisest of all Anglo-Indian statesmen.

Ghulām Kādir. Māhādājī was in a critical position in 1787 owing to attacks by Rohilla chiefs. In the year following (1788) a ruffian named Ghulām Kādir, son of Zābita Khān Rohilla, seized Delhi and plundered the palace. In the course of his proceedings he even flogged the princesses and brutally blinded the titular emperor, Shāh Ālam, in order to force the disclosure of supposed hidden treasure. When Sindia recovered Delhi Ghulām Kādir paid the penalty of his ill deeds by a death of torture.

Later career of Sindia. Sindia had established his power with the aid of M. de Boigne, the foreign officer already mentioned, who ultimately commanded three brigades of eight battalions each, with the needful complement of artillery and cavalry. The old Marāthā style of warfare was abandoned, and Sindia relied on regular troops, equipped much in the same way as those of the Company, and comprising both Rājputs and Musalmāns. M. de Boigne defeated Ismāil Beg, a Muhammadan chief, at Pātan in Rājputāna in 1790; the Rājput allies of that chief at Mīrthā (Mairta, Merta) in the year following; and Holkar's army under a Frenchman named Dudrenec at Lakherī (Lukhairee) in 1792.¹

Sindia then (1792) went down to Poona and took part in the solemn investiture of the Pēshwā as titular *Vakil-i Mulk*, or Vicegerent of the Empire, which dignity had been conferred by the Pādshāh some years earlier. Māhādājī died in 1794. Grant Duff describes him as

‘a man of great political sagacity, and of considerable genius; of deep artifice, restless ambition, and of implacable revenge.... His countenance was expressive of good sense and good humour; but his complexion was dark, his person inclining to corpulency, and he limped from the effects of his wound at Pauniput. His habits were simple, his manners kind and frank, but sometimes blustering and coarse.’

He left no male issue, and was succeeded by his grand-nephew, Daulat Rāo, a boy of thirteen, whom he had intended to adopt.

The intrigues of the Marāthā courts during the time of Lord Cornwallis are too complex for narration in this work. The curious will find full details in Grant Duff's *History*.

Renewal of Charter. When the Regulating Act of 1773 was enacted the Charter of the East India Company had been confirmed for twenty years. As the time for renewal drew near a brisk discussion on the subject arose in England, and an agitation was started by merchants and manufacturers in favour of the opening of the trade. Lord Cornwallis was strongly opposed to substantial change, and saw dreadful visions of India filled by ‘desperate speculators’, if the Company's privileges should be abolished. The authorities also strongly objected to the importation of schoolmasters or missionaries. In short, all the old notions and prejudices still swayed official minds, and Parliament was easily persuaded to follow the guidance of the ministers, without examining

¹ For an account of these battles from the Rājput point of view see Tod, *Personal Narrative*, chap. xxviii, xxix (popular ed., vol. i).

their arguments too closely. In the end the charter was renewed for twenty years without material modification. The only concession made to the general public was the trivial allowance to private traders of 3,000 tons of cargo space yearly under conditions unacceptable to merchants.



MAHADAJI SINDIA.

The Revolutionary War. The execution of Louis XVI of France in January 1793 resulted in the beginning of the Revolutionary War between France and England, which lasted almost without interruption until the battle of Waterloo in 1815. Lord Cornwallis, who had determined to retire from India, went down to Madras in order to superintend the reduction of the French settlements, but found that the work had been done before his arrival. He sailed for home from Madras in October.

Character of Lord Cornwallis. The personal character of

Lord Cornwallis deservedly secured him universal respect during his lifetime, and his memory is still justly held in honour. The errors of policy which marked his Indian career were committed from the purest of motives and with the best intentions. The extent of those errors did not become apparent until long after he had disappeared from the scene, and both the government at home and the authorities in India were unwilling to admit the failure of much of his work. He continued to be employed in high office, and, as we shall see, was even sent out to India again. His incessant war against corruption and jobbery in every form was his especial glory. His reorganization of the Covenanted Civil Service and his establishment of the District or *zillah* as the unit of administration were enduring reforms for which he deserves full credit. He was a capable military commander, and knew how to control his subordinates. He was free from personal animosity, and always anxious to promote the most competent officials. His correspondence gives a pleasing picture of a thoroughly honest, hard-working, public-spirited ruler, exempt from avarice,¹ and actuated by an imperative sense of duty.

Sir John Shore. Lord Cornwallis maintained for sound reasons still valid the opinion that no servant of the Company ever should be appointed Governor-general. Unfortunately his esteem for his friend Sir John Shore induced him to make an exception to his rule and to recommend Sir John as his successor. The King and ministry concurring, Shore was appointed and took over charge in August 1793. Although his administration lasted for four and a half years, its history may be dismissed briefly. Sir John, notwithstanding his exemplary personal character and sincere piety, was one of the worst of the few really incompetent Governors-general. He had the candour to acknowledge his incompetence in a private letter dated March 9, 1796, when he wrote :

‘ The fact is this that the duties of my situation are too much, I fear, for my abilities. . . . Often have I wished that Lord Cornwallis were at the head of the Administration here, and that I were his coadjutor, as formerly ; all would then have been easy to him and to me ’ (*Life*, i. 363).

Like Galba, Shore might be described as *capax imperii, nisi imperasset*, ‘ fit to bear rule, had he never ruled ’ ; an admirable subordinate, but not big enough to stand the test of exercising supreme power.

Battle of Khardā. Shore, paralysed by a slavish obedience to the words of the Act of Parliament of 1784 and by unworthy fear of the Marāthās, broke faith with the Nizam, when that prince was threatened by the robber state. The Governor-general wrapped up his reasons for refusing to obey the call of honour in sophistical phrases, equivalent substantially to a declaration that it would not pay to keep faith.² He therefore allowed a powerful

¹ Both he and General Medows refused to take their shares of the Seringapatam prize-money.

² The words of the treaty did not definitely bind the government of

Marāthā combination, including the Pēshwā, Sindia, Holkar, and all the other leaders, to overwhelm the Nizam at the battle of Khardā in 1795.¹ The battle itself was nothing, the fighting being contemptible, but it was enough to reduce the Nizam to a state of vassalage and to exalt the dangerous Marāthā power to a pinnacle of arrogance. The war of 1795 was the last occasion on which 'the chiefs of the Mahratta nation assembled under the authority of their Pēshwā'. In all subsequent transactions each chief acted independently.

Marāthā troubles. The aggrandizement of the Marāthās was stayed by unexpected events, not by the foresight of the Governor-general. Mādho Rāo Nārāyan, the young Pēshwā, weary of the galling tutelage of Nānā Farnavis, the 'Indian Machiavelli', committed suicide. That tragedy threw all Marāthā affairs into disorder and resulted in three years of obscure, confused intrigue. Nānā Farnavis spent part of the time in prison. Towards the close of 1796 Bājī Rāo II, a son of Ragoba, and the bitter enemy of the minister, was recognized as Pēshwā, but trouble continued long afterwards.

The rebellion of the Nizam's son induced the ruler of the Deccan to recall the British battalions which he had dismissed. That recall checked the development of French influence which had threatened to become supreme. The Nizam was well served by a French officer named Raymond, who organized regular troops and fought against countrymen of his commanding similar forces on the Marāthā side at the battle of Khardā.

Mutinous combination of officers. Lord Cornwallis and the President of the Board of Control had discussed plans for amalgamating the king's troops with the Company's army, which came to nothing. The amalgamation, a most proper and necessary measure, was deferred until after the Mutiny. Cornwallis, however, had succeeded in reducing the excessive perquisites of officers in the military as well as in the civil departments, thereby causing deep discontent. Towards the close of 1795 the officers formed a dangerous mutinous combination, threatening even to seize both the Governor-general and the commander-in-chief and to take possession of the government. They demanded double *batta* or field allowances, promotion by strict seniority, and other personal privileges incompatible with good administration. Clive had suppressed a similar combination in a fortnight. Shore weakly gave in and granted even more than was demanded. When the news of his abject surrender reached England in December 1796

India to render the assistance asked for, but, as Wilson points out, the Nizam had been led to expect protection and had earned it by his cession of Guntūr.

¹ Khardā is now in the Ahmadnagar District, Bombay. For some reason not apparent all the history books call the place Kardla or Kurdla. Two battalions of female sepoys, each 1,000 strong, kept by the Nizam to guard his palace and ladies, took part in the battle, and behaved no worse than the rest of his army (Blacker, p. 213 n.).

the Directors at once decided to recall him. Dundas, the President of the Board of Control, made matters worse by yielding still more concessions, merely because the mutinous officers controlled an influential committee in London. Lord Cornwallis, who had been invited to return to India, refused to have anything to do with such cowardly transactions; and in the end Lord Mornington was appointed Governor-general.

Oudh affairs. Once and once only did Sir John display any spirit. Āsafu-d daula, the debauched ruler of Oudh, died in 1797,



SIR JOHN SHORE.

after nominating as his successor a youth named Vizier (Vazīr) Ālī, also known as Mīrzā Ālī, whom he recognized as his son. Shore somewhat hastily sanctioned the succession. Within four months he was satisfied that the young man was the offspring of a menial servant and totally unfit to rule as Nawāb-Vizier. The Governor-general went down to Lucknow, reversed his previous decision, and installed Sa'ādāt Ālī Khān, a brother of the late Nawāb. The new ruler paid the price of his elevation by signing a fresh treaty, which among other provisions ceded the important strategic position of Allahabad at the confluence of the Jumna with the Ganges. Some disturbance occurred which at one time threatened the life of Sir John Shore, who behaved with cou-

rage and discretion. His ordinary cowardice as Governor-general was political, not physical.

In the following year (1799) Vizier Ālī revenged his downfall by murdering Mr. Cherry, the Resident at Lucknow, and several other European gentlemen. The murderer fled, was surrendered by the Rājā of Jaipur, and ended his days at Calcutta in rigorous confinement.

Dr. Laurence, an intimate friend of Edmund Burke, who had died in 1797, threatened Shore with impeachment on account of his action, but did not proceed with the prosecution. Sir John Shore was created a peer as Baron Teignmouth. After his retirement he lost interest in India, and devoted his time chiefly to the concerns of the British and Foreign Bible Society and cognate institutions.

Ahalyā Bāi. Although it is impossible in this work to treat in detail the history of the various Marāthā states, I cannot refrain

from commemorating the virtues of a lady who died in 1795, while Sir John Shore was Governor-general, after she had directed with success for thirty years the affairs of the Holkar dynasty and the administration of the Indore state. In 1765 Ahalyā Bāī, widow of Malhār Holkar and then in the thirtieth year of her age, was the sole representative of her late husband's dynasty. With the consent of the subordinate chiefs and the loyal co-operation of Tukajī Holkar, the commander-in-chief, who was not related to the reigning family, she ruled the state until her death in such a manner that she gained for herself unbounded veneration and for her subjects the blessings of righteous government. The historian, weary of the selfish wickedness of nearly all the Indian princes of the eighteenth century, finds agreeable relief in dwelling for a moment on the picture of Ahalyā Bāī as drawn by the skilful pen of Sir John Malcolm, who delineated her character after careful investigation of the facts. It would be a pleasure to transcribe the whole of his long and fascinating account, but room can be found only for a few extracts :

'The success of Ahalyā Bāī in the internal administration of her dominions was altogether wonderful. . . . The undisturbed internal tranquillity of the country was even more remarkable than its exemption from foreign attack. . . . Indore, which she had raised from a village to a wealthy city,¹ was always regarded by her with particular consideration. . . . The fond object of her life was to promote the prosperity of all around her. . . . She has become, by general suffrage, the model of good government in Malwa. . . . Her munificence was not limited to her own territories. . . . The beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the fish of the river shared in her compassion. . . . She died at the age of sixty, worn out with care and fatigue. . . . She could read and understand the Purānas, or sacred books, which were her favourite study. . . . It is not common with the Hindus . . . to confine females, or to compel them to wear veils. The Mahrattas of rank (even the Brahmins) have, with few exceptions, rejected the custom [of seclusion], which is not prescribed by any of their religious institutions. Ahalyā Bāī therefore offended no prejudice, when she took upon herself the direct management of affairs, and sat every day for a considerable period, in open Durbar, transacting business. . . . The facts that have been stated of Ahalyā Bāī rest on grounds that admit of no scepticism. It is, however, an extraordinary picture—a female without vanity, a bigot without intolerance . . . her name is sainted, and she is styled an Avatar, or incarnation of the Divinity. In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears, within her limited sphere, to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed.'²

Such a noble eulogy by a foreigner honours the writer as well as the lady.

¹ Indore city or Indūr is in 22° 43' N. and 75° 54' E. The original village was not founded until 1715. The city, which is growing steadily, covers an area of about five square miles, and in 1901 had a population of 86,886, excluding the people attached to the Residency. The place is now one of the largest trade centres in Central India, and the chief collecting and distributing centre for Southern Mālwa (*I. G.* (1908), s. v.).

² *A Memoir of Central India* (1832), vol. i, pp. 157–95.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Cornwallis Governor-general	1786
Internal reforms	1786-90
Reverses of Māhādājī Sindia	1787
Ghulām Kādir ; cession of Guntūr	1788
Third Mysore war began ; battle of Pātan	1790
Battle of Mirthā (Mairta, Merta)	1791
Treaty of Seringapatam ; battle of Lakheri	1792
Revolutionary war began ; permanent settlement of Bengal, &c. ; renewal of charter of E. I. Co.	1793
Death of Māhādājī Sindia	1794
Sir John Shore Governor-general ; battle of Khardā ; suicide of Mādhō Nārāyan Rāo, Pēshwā ; permanent settlement of Benares ; Cape of Good Hope taken from the Dutch ; death of Ahalyā Bāi	1795
Bājī Rāo II, Pēshwā	1796
Sa'adat Ali Khān, Nawāb of Oudh ; departure of Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth)	1798

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The special works used include *Correspondence of Charles, First Marquis Cornwallis*, ed. Ross,³ 3 vols. (Murray, 1859) ; SETON-KARR, W. S., *The Marquis Cornwallis* (Rulers of India, 1898) ; *Memoir of the Life and Correspondence of John, Lord Teignmouth*, by his son, SHORE, C. J., LORD TEIGNMOUTH, 2 vols. (London, 1843) ; MALCOLM, Sir J., *The Political History of India*, 2 vols. (Murray, 1826) ; ASCOLI, F. D., *Early Revenue History of Bengal and the Fifth Report, 1812* (Clarendon Press, 1917). The Bengal section of the text of the *Fifth Report* is most conveniently read in Mr. Ascoli's little book, which is excellent. The *Report* was officially published in full, with appendices and glossary, folio, 1812. It deals with Madras as well as Bengal. There is also an official 8vo edition of the whole text only, bearing the same date. Higginbotham, Madras, published a good edition of the complete work, arranged in two volumes, in 1883. An earlier reprint by the same firm appeared in 1866. Archdeacon Firminger has brought out an annotated edition in three volumes (Cambray, Calcutta).

CHAPTER 6

Lord Wellesley ; the fourth and last Mysore war ; annexations ; treaty of Bassein and the second Marāthā war ; policy and achievement.

Lord Wellesley (Mornington). Richard, Baron Wellesley in the peerage of Great Britain and Earl of Mornington in the peerage of Ireland, took over charge of the office of Governor-general in May 1798. With the exception of Lord Curzon of Kedleston no Governor-general has come out so well informed concerning all the problems of Indian government as the Marquess Wellesley was. It is convenient to designate him from the first by his late and more familiar title. Wellesley, a ripe and accomplished scholar, had been for several years a member of the Board of Control and had devoted special attention to the acquisition of knowledge

of Indian politics. When he took his seat at Calcutta he did not feel himself to be a novice surrounded by experts. His imperious temper and confidence in his own judgement were justified in no

SIR ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

small measure by the depth and accuracy of his knowledge. At the time of his accession to power he was almost thirty-eight years of age with his powerful faculties at their best. The Indian climate suited his constitution, so that he was able to perform an

enormous amount of hard work without injury to his health. After leaving India he became Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at a critical time in the course of the Peninsular War and twice served as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland.

In almost everything he contrasted sharply with his predecessors, Lord Cornwallis and Sir John Shore, resembling them only in spotless integrity and unselfish public spirit. His temperament and ideas were closely akin to those of Warren Hastings. His views were large and comprehensive, imperialistic in modern phraseology; and, like Lord Dalhousie, he believed thoroughly in the superiority of British over any native Indian government. That conviction enabled him to make annexations right and left without any qualms of conscience. Every annexation appeared to him to be an undoubted and unqualified public benefit. The times and circumstances being such as they were, it is true that all the territories absorbed into British India benefited immediately by the change. If there were any countervailing disadvantages they were slow to appear. The Governor-general was fortunate in being well served by his brothers Arthur, afterwards the Duke of Wellington, and Henry, who became Lord Cowley and ambassador in Paris. Many brilliant officers, Elphinstone, Malcolm, and others, who were trained under Wellesley, proved themselves well fitted to undertake at an early age the heavy responsibilities thrust upon them by the rapid growth of the British power in India.

Effects of Shore's policy. Malcolm justly observes that

'a period of six years' peace, instead of having added to the strength or improved the security of the British dominions in India, had placed them in a situation of comparative danger. Though the British strength was not lessened, the power and resources of the other states had increased. The confidence and attachment of our allies were much shaken, if not destroyed; and the presumption and hostile disposition of the principal native powers in India too clearly showed that it was to a principle of weakness or of selfish policy, and not of moderation, that they ascribed the course which had been pursued by the British government.'

It was proved from the events of Shore's administration

'that no ground of political advantage could be abandoned without being instantly occupied by an enemy; and that to resign influence, was not merely to resign power, but to allow that power to pass into hands hostile to the British government'.


The enemies alluded to were Tippoo and the Marāthās especially. The self-denying ordinance of the Act of 1784 and subsequent legislation which sought to tie the hands of the Governor-general, although honestly intended, was founded on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Indian situation. Instead of securing peace it ensured war. Nevertheless, in spite of the experience of the results of the brief period of pacifist inaction under the guidance of Shore, the experiment was tried once more by Lord Cornwallis in his second term of office, and by his successor, Sir George Barlow, with consequences far more disastrous than those which had followed Shore's desertion of the Nizam. We

shall see presently what an amount of needless misery was caused to millions of innocent people by the pusillanimous policy of non-interference.

The action and inaction of Sir John Shore had given Tippoo time to regain his strength and mature his hostile designs; had permitted a French party, supported by powerful contingents under French commanders, to become paramount at the courts of both Daulat Rāo Sindia and the Nizām; had encouraged the Bhonsla Rājā of Berār to plan a scheme of resistance against British predominance; had abandoned the Carnatic to anarchy and desolation; and, after all, had left the finances of the Company in a state of exhaustion.

The dominant fact. The newly arrived Governor-general, well qualified by previous study to understand the situation as a whole, took a comprehensive view of all the perils confronting his government and country. The modern reader when studying the records of Wellesley's imperious orders, of his wars and annexations, is apt to lose sight of the dominant fact that Great Britain was then engaged in the deadly struggle of the Revolutionary War, in which, as now (1917) in the Great War, everything was at stake. The political action of Warren Hastings had been dominated similarly by the dangerous position of his country between 1778 and 1783, while fighting France, America, and

a host of other enemies. Wellesley, by reason of his rank, family connexions, official experience in Europe, and a mind trained to deal with matters of high politics, was in a position better than that of Hastings for grasping the relation between Indian politics and the wider issues of the Revolutionary War.¹ In 1798, when Wellesley assumed charge of the government of India, Napoleon, then known as General Bonaparte, had led an expedition into Egypt, and avowedly cherished designs for the conquest of India.



NAPOLÉON.

¹ Thorn gives a good exposition of the real, although not obvious connexion between Indian and European politics at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 'It had long been a maxim of French policy that the superiority of England could only be effectually reduced by the capture of her eastern possessions.' The Germans have pursued the policy of Napoleon by their attacks on Egypt, the 'neck of the British empire'.

Those designs were shattered by Nelson's splendid naval victory on August 1 at the battle of the Nile or Aboukir Bay; but the spectre of French ambition in the East long continued to trouble the repose of statesmen in London and Calcutta. Consequently, Wellesley's policy of subsidiary alliances and annexations, directed to the immediate purpose of making the British the supreme power in India, was largely determined by his resolve to exclude for ever all possibility of French competition. The policy pursued did not rest only upon the local Indian situation. India, whether she liked it or not, had been drawn into the vortex of European politics. Tippoo, the Nizam, and the Marāthās, each sought to gain French support, but all were too ignorant of European geography, history, and current affairs, to understand in the least degree what France could or could not do. The papers found after the death of Tippoo prove that that 'mad barbarian', as Cornwallis scornfully called him, was totally incapable of realizing the forces of the European world with which he blindly ventured to meddle. Bonaparte, who was equally ignorant of Indian conditions, seems really to have believed that valuable aid might be expected from Tippoo, and so contributed to the speedy ruin of that headstrong prince, to whom he had addressed a letter written in Cairo.

The Nizam disarmed. Wellesley, while recognizing the dangers of Tippoo's hostility, resolved to deal first with the Nizam, who had been estranged by Shore's desertion in 1795, and had endeavoured to strengthen himself by allowing M. J. Raymond to organize for him a powerful body of regular troops, similar to those commanded by M. de Boigne and his successors for Sindia. The Governor-general succeeded in persuading or compelling the Nizam to accept a revised form of subsidiary alliance, and to consent to the disbandment of the troops under French command. The accomplishment of Wellesley's plan was made easier by the death of Raymond, whose successor did not command equal influence. By means of clever diplomacy, combined with a skillfully planned military demonstration, the force organized by Raymond was disarmed and disbanded. Malcolm, who was one of the chief actors in the proceedings, relates how

'in a few hours, a corps, whose numbers amounted to fourteen thousand men, and who had in their possession a train of artillery, and an arsenal filled with every description of military stores, was completely disarmed, without one life having been lost'.

That bold stroke instantly reduced the Nizam to complete dependence on the Company, and removed him from the list of powers whose enmity should be feared, or whose amity should be sought. In those days the Sikh kingdom had not yet become formidable to India, and the only powers needing serious consideration were Tippoo and the Marāthās. The leading Marāthā chiefs were Sindia, Holkar, and the Bhonslā Rājā of Berār. The Peshwā, Bājī Rāo, although nominally the head of all the Marāthās, enjoyed little substantial authority.

Declaration of war with Tippoo. Tippoo, after his defeat by Lord Cornwallis in 1792, had given many proofs of his inveterate hostility. The incident which immediately caused war was the publication in June 1798 of a proclamation by Monsieur Malartic, Governor-general of the Isle of France or Mauritius and Réunion, welcoming the proposals of Tippoo for an offensive and defensive alliance with France, and calling for volunteers to serve under the Sultan of Mysore for the purpose of expelling the English from India. The response to the call was insignificant, but the proceedings left no doubt as to the intentions of Tippoo. Wellesley, having carefully verified the authenticity of the document, called on him for explanations. His replies being evasive and contemptuous, the Governor-general, who had made effective preparations, declared war on February 22, 1799. The reasons for that action and for overruling the timid counsels of the government of Madras were recorded in an elaborate minute. At that time the second Lord Clive was governor of the southern presidency.


The war. The war was conducted with such lightning rapidity that few words are needed to describe its brief course. A Bombay force defeated a much larger body of the enemy on the Coorg frontier on March 6, 1799.¹ The main Carnatic army of about 37,000 men under General George Harris crossed the frontier on March 5; defeated Tippoo at Malavelli, twenty-eight miles east of the town of Mysore, on March 27; and stormed Seringapatam on May 4. The campaign was all over in two months. Tippoo, while fighting gallantly in a gateway, was shot through the head by a soldier. His body, extracted with difficulty from a heap of corpses, next day received honourable burial by the side of his father. The troops plundered the town. Their excesses were sternly repressed by the Governor-general's brother, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, who reported in his terribly laconic style:

'I came in to take the command on the morning of the 5th, and by the greatest exertion, by hanging, flogging, &c., &c., in the course of that day restored order among the troops, and I hope I have gained the confidence of the people.'

He gained it with absolute completeness. The prearranged plan of campaign had been carried out accurately in every particular, and the whole kingdom lay at the mercy of the conqueror.

Decay of Seringapatam. Bowring, writing in 1893, states that 'the old fortress of Seringapatam remains in much the same state as it was left in after the siege nearly a hundred years ago. The formidable fortifications have stoutly withstood the ravages of time, while the breach made in the curtain is still visible from the opposite bank of the river, where two cannons fixed in the ground denote the spot on which the English batteries were erected. Inside is shown the gateway on the northern face where Tipu fell in his death-struggle. The whole island is now insalubrious. A few wretched houses only remain where once was a great capital, and the ancient temple of Vishnu looks down, as if in mockery, on the ruins of the

¹ General Stuart's dispatch (*Wellesley Despatches*, pp. 115, 116). Lord Wellesley gives the date as the 8th (*ibid.*, p. 107).



SERINGAPATAM IN 1792.

palace of the Muhammadan usurper. Part of this building has been demolished, and the rest turned into a sandal-wood store.²

The *Imperial Gazetteer* published in 1908 records some improvement in the decayed town.

Character of Tipoo. Tipoo, who was about fifty years of age at the time of his death, was a strange man, full of whims and caprices. He devised a new calendar, a new scale of weights and measures, a fantastic coinage, and so forth. He suffered from the delusion that he knew everything and was the wisest of men.¹ He worked hard at the business of administration and wrote instructions on all subjects, civil and military, with his own hand in Persian. He spoke fluently Persian, Kanarese, and Urdu. He left behind him two collections of letters, and possessed a valuable library, which was removed to Calcutta. His fierce Muslim bigotry did not prevent him from having recourse to Brahman prayers in time of danger, or even from making gifts to Hindu temples. He treated his enemies and prisoners with the most ferocious cruelty, of which innumerable painful details are on record, but was not more harsh than his neighbours to peaceful ryots in his own territories, which seem to have been well cultivated. He was personally brave, while too ignorant and conceited to merit praise as a general. His devotion to the faith induced the local Muhammadans to overlook his crimes and to regard him as a martyr of Islām. The tolerant British government permitted inscriptions in that sense to be inscribed on his tomb. The mausoleum, in which he and his father lie, is a handsome building, with ebony and ivory doors, the gift of Lord Dalhousie.

Wellesley's Mysore policy. Lord Wellesley's intention had been to cripple permanently rather than to destroy utterly the power of Tipoo. The absolutely complete success of the operations of General Harris and the death of the Sultan were a surprise to



TIPPOO SULTAN.

¹ 'A restless spirit of innovation, and a wish to have everything originate from himself, was the predominant feature of his character' (Sir T. Munro in Gleig's *Life*², i. 233).

the Governor-general, who was obliged to reconsider the problem of the disposal of Mysore. Wellesley explained in a dispatch addressed to the Directors that the Company and the allied Nizam enjoyed the 'free and uncontroled right of conquest', while the Marāṭhās, having taken no share in the war, had 'forfeited every pretension to share in the advantages of the peace'. He therefore felt at liberty to secure the objects originally contemplated, namely, a reasonable indemnification for the expense incurred and adequate guarantees of safety for the future. The Governor-general was of opinion that the simple plan of dividing the conquests equally between the Company and the Nizam, who had given some help, would unduly aggrandize that Prince, while giving offence to other powers. He was convinced that no member of Haider Ali's family possibly could prove an efficient and friendly ruler. After reviewing all conceivable alternatives, he came to the decision that the wisest course would be for the Company and the Nizam to take the districts which best suited each party and to make over the residue to a prince of the Hindu royal family which had been dispossessed by Haider Ali. The prince selected for restoration as Rājā being a child five years of age, the whole of Mysore, except the districts assigned to the Nizam, practically became British territory. The exception was only temporary, because in the following year (1800) the Nizam surrendered his acquisitions in order to settle the Company's claims for the payment of the subsidiary force. A leading principle of Wellesley's policy was to secure territory the revenues of which should suffice to pay for the subsidiary force of each state concerned. He objected strongly to the old practice of having unpaid and unsecured bills for subsidiary payments continually the subject of negotiation. All the Indian states of that time were careless about finance, and almost always in arrear.

In pursuance of that policy the Company annexed Kanara, thereby obtaining the whole of the south-western coast, Malabar having been already annexed. Some other territory was also taken, and Seringapatam was retained in British control. The region assigned to the Nizam lay to the north-east. The State or Rāj of Mysore was thus reduced to the compact triangular inland block which it is still. The territory left to the Rājā, after the Nizam's surrender of his share, was completely surrounded by the British dominions and cut off from access to the sea.

Administration. The administration of the territory reserved for the child Rājā was entrusted to Pūrnia or Pūrnaiya (Poornea), the capable Brahman minister who had served Tippoo to the end. The arrangements were embodied in the supplementary treaty of Seringapatam, which included the usual articles providing for the payment of a subsidiary force, prohibiting political relations with other states, and excluding Europeans from employment. Articles 4 and 5 went far beyond the standard model by giving the Governor-general power to introduce regulations for the better internal government of the country, or even, if he should think

proper, to bring the state under the direct management of the servants of the Company.

Although the independence of Mysore was avowedly destroyed by orders clothed in the form of a treaty, the mistake of introducing a British code of regulations was not committed. Pūrnīa was allowed to manage his business in his own fashion. He had the good sense to employ irregular cavalry as his military force, an arrangement which suited the habits of the people. Every office, civil and military, was filled by natives of the country. The system thus started worked admirably while it was supervised in succession by Arthur Wellesley and Colonel Close. The precedent might have been followed with advantage in other cases.

Later history of Mysore. Pūrnīa retained the executive power until December 1811, when the Rājā was allowed to undertake the administration. He lapsed into evil ways, so that in 1831 Lord William Bentinck was compelled unwillingly to act on the article of the treaty authorizing the assumption of the direct administration by the Company. For fifty years after that date Mysore was well governed by British Residents, working through native agency. Sir Mark Cubbon held the office for twenty-seven years. In 1881 Lord Ripon felt himself warranted in once more restoring the royal family to power. The experiment has been justified by success, and Mysore now ranks as one of the best administered of the Protected States. Indeed, it might, perhaps, claim with justice to be the best, but possibly such a claim, if made, would be disputed.¹

The relatives and principal officers of Tippoo were treated by Lord Wellesley with humanity and liberality. The members of the Sultan's family were interned at Vellore, an arrangement which proved to be undesirable.

Subsidiary campaigns. The Governor-general's eminent brother, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, better known as the Duke of Wellington, enjoyed his first independent command when entrusted with the task of hunting down a Marāthā adventurer named Dhoondia Waugh (Dhūndia Wahag), who aspired to found a new dynasty.


A second series of supplementary operations took place in the difficult Malabar country, and was conducted by Colonel Wellesley with characteristic ability. The story of that forgotten minor campaign, while interesting to read in detail, is not susceptible of useful condensation.

Piracy in Malabar. Measures were taken to check piracy on the Malabar coast. Grant Duff, who gives the history of the pirate

¹ For details see Rice, *Mysore Gazetteer*² (1897). The author of this work can vouch for the excellent administration of the Archaeological Department established in 1908. The wise policy of employing natives of the country, as initiated in 1799, has secured a supply of capable officials. The position of the state in the midst of British territory leaves the local government free to attend solely to internal affairs. The chief now has the rank of Mahārāja. A representative assembly exists.

chiefs, observes that 'it is no slight stigma on the British Indian administration that this system of piracy was not finally suppressed until the year 1812'. In that year the Marāthā chief of Sāwant-wārī, the pirate nest situated to the north of Goa, was compelled to give up all his vessels of war and to cede the port of Vengurla, now included in the Ratnagiri District.

The Mysore policy was approved by the ministry, and honours and rewards were conferred upon the principal personages concerned



in the conquest. The campaign was popular and applauded in Great Britain where many families had to deplore the cruelties inflicted by Tippoo on his prisoners.

Wellesley's 'forward policy'. Wellesley's 'forward policy' and his firm conviction that the extension of direct British rule was an unquestionable benefit to any region annexed led him to seize every opportunity for increasing the Company's dominions. His efforts to prove that his proceedings were in strict conformity with Pitt's India Act and subsequent legislation renewing the prohibition against ambitious designs are not convincing. In

truth, he had unlimited reliance on his own judgement and little regard for the distant authority of his superiors in England. After the first enthusiasm over the conquest of Mysore and the destruction of Tippoo had worn off the general tendency of Wellesley's policy was distrusted by both the ministry and the Directors of the Company. The latter body especially displayed distinctly hostile sentiments and on several occasions passed irritating orders which gave the Governor-general just cause for complaint.

Annexations. He effected four annexations in addition to Mysore by taking over the administration of the Carnatic, the Tanjore Rāj, the Nawābī of Surat, and a large portion of Oudh. Those proceedings demand brief notice. It is impossible to go into minute examination of the complicated facts of each case.

A disputed succession gave an opportunity for the absorption of the small Marāthā principality of Tanjore founded by Sivājī's father, Shāhājī, a century and a half earlier. In October 1799 the Rājā was persuaded to resign the administration to the Company and accept the position of a pensioned nobleman. The pension lapsed in 1855 owing to the failure of heirs. Tanjore is now an ordinary District of the Madras Presidency.

In the same year, 1799, similar arrangements were carried out concerning Surat, on the occasion of the death of the local Nawāb. Subsequent cessions made under the provisions of treaties with the Marāthās, coupled with the absorption by lapse of the Māndoi state, resulted in the formation of the Surat District of the Bombay Presidency as now constituted.

The Carnatic. The reasons for the annexation of the Carnatic are set forth in the Governor-general's declaration dated July 27, 1801. The papers seized at Seringapatam having proved that both Nawāb Muhammad Ali, who had died in 1795, and his son and successor, Umdat-ul Umrā, who died in July 1801, had corresponded secretly with Tippoo, Lord Wellesley announced that they had 'placed themselves in the condition of public enemies to the British Government in India'. He held accordingly that the family had forfeited its title to retain the rank of a ruling dynasty. After much negotiation he selected Prince Azamu-d daula,¹ a grandson of Muhammad Ali, as titular Nawāb, and took over the administration of the country. Whatever opinion may be formed concerning the validity of the reasoning based upon the Seringapatam papers, it was absolutely necessary to terminate the disastrous system of 'double government', and to give the much oppressed inhabitants of the country a decent administration. The sufferings of the people in the Carnatic had been far more severe and much more prolonged than those of the Bengālīs during the interval between the battle of Plassey and the appointment of Warren Hastings as governor. The action of the Governor-general was approved by the home authorities. The nobleman who

¹ Beale spells the name عظیم, 'Azam,' not 'Azim' (عظیم) as in most books.

now represents the Nawāb's family is known as the Prince of Arcot. The greater part of the existing Presidency of Madras consists of the annexations effected by Wellesley.

Oudh. Wellesley's action in depriving the Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh of a large part of his territory undoubtedly was high-handed and open to criticism both as regards the substance of the transaction and the manner of its execution. Wellesley explained his Oudh policy in a dispatch addressed to the Secret Committee of the Directors dated November 28, 1799. The gist of the matter is contained in the following passage :

'The affairs of Oude have occupied a considerable share of my attention. No probability existing that Zemān Shāh [the Afghan chief] ¹ will be able in the course of the present season to renew his hostile attempts against Hindostan, and a conjuncture so favourable coinciding with our successes in Mysore, the most eligible opportunity seemed to be opened for carrying into execution such a reform of the Nabob Vizier's military establishments as would secure us from all future danger on the frontier of Oude, and should enable me to introduce a variety of necessary improvements in the government of that country. With this view it was my intention to establish a considerable augmentation of our troops in Oude without delay, and to induce the Vizier to disband, under certain regulations, a proportional part of his own useless and dangerous force.'

That passage clearly shows that the Governor-general felt himself at liberty to do what he thought fit in Oudh, and to regard the formal consent of the Nawāb to the proposed measures as a mere matter of ceremony. The Nawāb tried to evade compulsion by offering or threatening to abdicate, but soon withdrew that proposal, on which he had no intention of acting. Negotiations proceeded until Wellesley lost patience, and in February 1800 administered a scathing rebuke expressed in language deliberately discourteous, to the Nawāb, whom he accused of threatening abdication 'with the sole view of defeating by delay the long meditated measure of a reform of your military establishment'. That, of course, actually was the motive of the Nawāb, who loathed all ideas of reform, and was simply writhing helplessly in the grasp of irresistible power. The Governor-general informed the Nawāb that his conduct was regarded as 'unequivocally hostile', and warned him that his perseverance in a 'fatal and imprudent' course would involve extremely disagreeable consequences.

In the end (January 1801) the Nawāb was forced to yield an unwilling assent to commands which he could not resist. He was required to go through the form of signing a treaty providing for the cession of the districts now constituting the Gorakhpur and Rohilkhand Divisions, besides certain territories between the Ganges and the Jumna, generally called the Doāb, in order

¹ Zamān Shāh, or Shāh Zamān, grandson of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī or Durrānī, had advanced as far as Lahore in 1796, but never came farther into India. He was blinded and imprisoned a few years later, and was still alive in 1812. Wellesley was inclined to make the most of the supposed danger of an invasion by Zamān Shāh.

to provide permanently for the cost of so many Company's troops as the Governor-general should be pleased to employ in Oudh or on the frontier of that province. The territories thus annexed, which comprise some of the most favoured regions in India, were long known as the Ceded Districts. They now form part of the Province of Agra.

Oudh thus became, like Mysore, a compact province of moderate size completely enclosed by British territory and absolutely impotent for military purposes. The Nawāb-Vizier, although he resented the transaction, gained considerable personal advantages. He was secured permanently from attack by the Marāthās or anybody else ; was relieved from all pecuniary obligations to the Company ; and was left free from any effective restraint on his vicious habits. The scandalous and shameless misgovernment of the country continued unabated without the slightest improvement until 1856 when the authorities in England insisted on annexation. Every Governor-general had lectured every ruler of Oudh to the same effect concerning the duty of reform without producing the slightest improvement. Sleeman's well-known book, *A Journey through the Kingdom of Oudh, in 1849-1850*, gives an appalling and perfectly trustworthy picture of the horrors consequent on the selfish tyranny of debauched and negligent sovereigns.¹

Subsidiary alliances. Oudh continued to afford a conspicuous illustration of the evils inherent in the system of subsidiary alliances, whether the troops provided for defence by the paramount powers were paid for by cash subsidies or by assignments of territory. Wellesley was right in preferring the system of payment by territorial cession, which eliminated many occasions for irritating discussions. But whatever mode of payment was adopted, the fundamental objection remained that

'the native Prince being guaranteed in the possession of his dominions, but deprived of so many of the essential attributes of sovereignty, sinks in his own esteem, and loses that stimulus to good government, which is supplied by the fear of rebellion and deposition. He becomes a *roi fainéant*, a sensualist, an extortionate miser, or a careless and lax ruler, which is equivalent in the East to an anarchist. The higher classes, coerced by external ascendancy, in turn lose their self-respect, and degenerate like their master ; the people groan under a complicated oppression which is irremediable. Thus, in spite of the Resident's counsels and attempts to secure good government, the back of the State, so to speak, is broken ; the spirit of indigenous political life has departed : the native community tends to dissolution ; and annexation is eventually the inevitable remedy for its helplessness and chronic disorders.'

That description by Sidney Owen, echoing the opinions of Sir Thomas Munro, applies exactly to Oudh at any date until the

¹ In 1819 the reigning Nawāb-Vizier offended Muslim opinion by assuming the style of king. Similar action by Tippoo, although disapproved, did not hinder him from attaining the reputation of a martyr, when he redeemed the error by a soldier's death. No ruler of Oudh ever aspired to the crown of martyrdom.

annexation in 1856, and equally well to most of the states which were compelled to accept subsidiary alliances at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The conditions at present existing, when the rulers of the Protected States are bound to their king-emperor both by ties of genuine loyalty and by intelligent policy, are so radically different that an effort is needed to understand and appreciate the attitude of Wellesley on the one side or that of his critics on the other. The system of subsidiary alliances was a temporary expedient, serviceable in a transitional period, but long since obsolete. Substantial, although not formal annexation, as in the case of Mysore, accompanied by the rule of a capable indigenous minister, and unaccompanied by the uncongenial introduction of British law and courts too elaborate to serve their purpose, was an alternative by far preferable and infinitely more advantageous to the inhabitants.

But in Lord Wellesley's time the system of subsidiary alliances seemed to follow the line of least resistance. It was considered convenient to pretend that a country like Oudh still was an independent state, and to go through the farce of expressing the orders of the Governor-general in the form of a treaty between the 'high contracting parties'. Sir Arthur Wellesley never shared his brother's predilection for subsidiary alliances,¹ and it may be suspected that the wise arrangements effected in Mysore were sanctioned in pursuance of his advice.

The Regulations in the Ceded Districts. When the Ceded Districts were taken over in 1801 the Wellesleys arranged an informal system of administration, deviating where necessary from the Regulations of the Lower Provinces, so that the people might grow accustomed to British ideas and methods. In later years, as when the Panjāb was annexed in 1849, such a system, technically called 'non-regulation', was often applied with success. But when Wellesley resigned his arrangements were reversed, and in 1803 the country was subjected to the operation of the entire Bengal Regulations, except that the permanent settlement was not introduced (*J. U. P. H. S.*, 1918, pp. 91, 107). The establishment of civil courts after the Bengal pattern in territories taken over directly from the lawless government of Oudh gave occasion to much roguery, and largely neutralized the satisfaction given by the reign of peace and order.

Henry Wellesley. Lord Wellesley's appointment of his brother Henry as lieutenant-governor of the newly acquired Ceded Districts gave deep offence to the Directors, who held that the Civil Service had a right to the post and that their own patronage was infringed. Although Henry Wellesley was competent for the duties entrusted

¹ His reason, among others, for objecting to the system was that 'as soon as such an alliance has been formed, it has invariably been discovered that the whole strength of the tributary government consisted in the aid afforded by its powerful ally, or rather protector' (*Wellington Despatches*, p. 476). Munro held the same opinions, and in 1817 regarded the system as already obsolete (Gleig, *Life*², vol. ii, 6-10).

to him, his near relationship to the Governor-general naturally gave occasion for accusations of nepotism against Lord Wellesley who resented them fiercely. He could easily have found a suitable member of the Civil Service for the appointment, and his action produced much unnecessary friction with the Directors. Their subsequent action in recalling Lord Wellesley was largely influenced by their displeasure at the promotion given to his brother in an irregular manner. His habitually contemptuous attitude towards the Directors was a deplorable mistake.

Action in Egypt, &c. The measures taken by Lord Wellesley in co-operation with the British ministry to combat the world-wide ambition of Napoleon were not confined to Indian soil. An expedition planned by the Governor-general for the conquest of the Dutch settlements in Java was diverted by the Home Government to Egypt, where a sepoy force under General Baird, who had led the assault on Seringapatam, was landed early in 1801. The Indian contingent, which included some British troops, endured considerable hardships with credit, but had no fighting to do, in consequence of the previous defeat of the French. Indian troops did not again take part in European and Egyptian affairs until 1878, when Lord Beaconsfield summoned a force from India to Malta as a support to his anti-Russian diplomacy. The brilliant performances of the Indian contingent sent to France in 1914 at a critical time in the Great War are fresh in the memory of all readers. If Wellesley could have got his way both Ceylon and the French islands of Bourbon and Mauritius in the Indian Ocean would have been brought under the rule of the Company, but his designs to effect those objects were frustrated.¹ An embassy to Persia under Captain (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm in 1801 attained considerable political and commercial results, and was regarded by the Governor-general as a complete success. Since that time the government of India has always taken an active interest in maintaining control over the Persian Gulf. The necessities of the gigantic conflict still (1917) in progress have carried Indian arms far beyond Baghdad, and no man can predict the ultimate fate of Persia and Mesopotamia.

The French possessions. The peace of Amiens in 1802 having provided for the restoration of the French possessions in

¹ The ports of Ceylon, which had been occupied by the Dutch for 138 years, were taken from them by troops from Madras in 1796, and remained under the authority of the governor of Madras until 1798, when Ceylon was declared a colony under the Crown, and the Honourable Frederick North was appointed governor. For the disgraceful story of the war with Kandy in 1803-4 see chapter xix of Thornton's *History*. On March 2, 1815, the king of the inland kingdom of Kandy was dethroned for good reasons and the whole island passed under the sovereignty of King George III. The administration is controlled by the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The government of India is not concerned with the affairs of the island. The conquest of the French islands was deferred until the time of Lord Minto I in 1809 and 1810.

India, the government of France, which attached high importance to their recovery, dispatched a fleet to take possession. Wellesley, who foresaw that the truce could not last, boldly ordered Lord Clive, the governor of Madras, to withhold the surrender of Pondicherry and the other southern settlements pending further instructions. The French commander, not caring to attack, sailed back to Mauritius, and the prescience of the Governor-general was justified by the speedy renewal of the war. Wellesley showed equal promptness and resolution by his occupation of Portuguese Goa and Danish Serampore. He never forgot the interdependence of India and the other parts of the British empire.

The Civil Service. The operation of Wellesley's capacious mind was not wholly confined to the direction of wars and high matters of foreign policy. He paid careful attention to the indispensable subject of finance, although his numerous wars did not permit of much economy. While he did not show any keen interest in education or other administrative departments devoted directly to the improvement of the condition of the natives of the country, he entertained the most comprehensive and statesmanlike views concerning the necessity for bestowing on the European administrators the best possible general and professional education. He seems to have believed that when the Company should be served by British officers of high character, and equipped with all the general and special knowledge required for the efficient performance of their duties, all desirable improvements in the country would follow. Present day conditions require much more, but Wellesley's stately sketch of the ideal training for members of the Indian Civil Service was drawn on sound lines and still merits respectful consideration. Some extracts from his long minute on the subject will repay the reader's attention.

'The civil servants of the East India Company . . . can no longer be considered as the agents of a commercial concern. They are, in fact, the ministers and officers of a powerful sovereign ; they must now be viewed in that capacity, with reference not to their nominal but to their real occupations. They are required to discharge the functions of magistrates, judges, ambassadors, and governors of provinces. . . . Their duties are those of statesmen in every other part of the world. . . . Their education should be founded in a general knowledge of those branches of literature and science which form the basis of the education of persons destined to similar occupations in Europe. To this foundation should be added an intimate acquaintance with the history, languages, customs, and manners of the people of India, with the Mahometan and Hindoo codes of law and religion, and with the political and commercial interests of Great Britain in Asia.'

The Governor-general goes on to recommend study of the Regulations of the Indian government and of the British constitution.

'The early discipline of the service should be calculated to counteract the defects of the climate and the vices of the people, and to form a natural barrier against habitual indolence, dissipation, and licentious indulgence.'

'To remedy the existing evils, the Governor-general proposed to establish a College in Calcutta, for the reception of writers for the three presi-

dencies, who were there, for a limited period, to be subjected to the restraints of academic discipline, and trained in such studies as might fit them for their future duties. These were to be pursued under the superintendence of two clergymen, chaplains in the Company's service; for the native languages moonshees were to be provided.'

Wellesley was so eager to see his College at work that he started it without waiting for sanction, and was much mortified when the project was vetoed by the Directors, who substituted a much more modest scheme for teaching Indian languages at the head-quarters of each presidency.

A few years later, in 1809, the East India College at Haileybury near Hertford was founded. It continued for nearly half a century to give a training arranged approximately on the lines of Wellesley's plan, but carried out in England instead of at Calcutta.

Change in political relations with the Marāthās. The reduction of the Nizam to a condition of absolute dependence on the British power, resulting from the treaties of 1798 and 1800, with the simultaneous destruction of Tippoo, produced, as Malcolm observes, 'a complete alteration of our political relations with the Mahratta states'. When the government of India became bound to defend the territories of the Nizam as it would its own, and the Mysore state had practically become a British possession, the government of India virtually succeeded to all the local and political relations which had existed between the Marāthās on the one part and the Hyderabad and Mysore States on the other. The policy of non-interference in Marāthā affairs had ceased to be practicable, because the Marāthā chiefs always had claims outstanding against both Hyderabad and Mysore for the realization of *chauth* and on other accounts, while they could not subsist their own troops except by the plunder of neighbours. A predatory life was the essence of the existence of a Marāthā government. The only possible alternatives open to the Governor-general were either the abandonment of all conquests, or measures such as would induce the Marāthā governments to acquiesce in a state of general peace and tranquillity. The former alternative, although contemplated by the Directors, would have involved gross breaches of faith and would have consigned enormous territories to anarchy and misery. Lord Wellesley was not the man to entertain for a moment designs so pusillanimous and dishonourable. He was forced therefore to consider means by which he might hope to convert the Marāthās into peaceable neighbours, while leaving their domestic institutions unchanged.

Wellesley sought alliance with the Pēshwā. The prospect of success in that endeavour was not promising. Marāthā institutions and ideas were fundamentally incompatible with the *Pax Britannica* which Wellesley sought to impose on India. He probably realized that obvious fact, although he felt bound to make an effort in the hope of inducing the Marāthā chiefs to accept his postulate of a peaceful India. He proposed to effect his purpose through the Pēshwā, whom he desired and professed to treat

as the actual ruler and head of all the Marāthās. His immediate aim, accordingly, was to persuade the Pēshwā, Bājī Rāo, to accept a treaty of subsidiary alliance on lines resembling those of the treaty with the Nizam. The Governor-general pursued that object with the utmost pertinacity, and apparently was not fully conscious that he was asking the Pēshwā and all the Marāthā chiefs to renounce their independence and sink into the position of mere dependants on the British power. Lord Wellesley was disposed to overrate the authority of the Pēshwā, and to give too little



NĀNĀ FARNAVIS.

weight to the fact that Sindia and the other leading chiefs of that time paid little regard to the wishes or commands of their nominal head.

Dominance of Mahādājī and Daulat Rāo Sindia. After the execution of the treaty of Sālbaī in 1782 the chiefs of the family of Sindia had been allowed to do as they pleased without interference from the Calcutta government. Warren Hastings had been too glad to obtain the help of Mahādājī in concluding the then indispensable peace to throw any obstacles in the way of his aggrandizement. Lord Cornwallis and Sir John Shore had pursued a policy of strict non-interference on principle. The result was that Mahādājī Sindia became the most powerful prince in India, and that when he died in February 1794 his power was trans-

mitted to his successor, Daulat Rāo, with whom Lord Wellesley had to deal.

Marāthā anarchy. After Lord Wellesley had assumed charge in May 1798 Marāthā internal politics presented a scene of terrible confusion, vividly pictured in Grant Duff's pages. That author, writing of the year 1799, describes a state of absolute anarchy in the Pēshwā's territory, where the Pēshwā, Sindia, the Bāis, or ladies of his family, the Rājā of Kolhāpur, and other parties, were all fighting one with the other. The flame spread into Hindostan, where Jaswant Rāo Holkar, a son of Tukājī, and a ferocious, drunken savage, now became prominent as a leader of banditti.

Death and character of Nānā Farnavis. The death of Nānā

Farnavis, who had been for thirty-eight years, since the death of Pēshwā Mādho Rāo in 1772, the leading Marāthā politician, occurred in March 1800. 'With him', the Resident observed, 'has departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Mahratta government.' His death, however, was welcome to the treacherous Pēshwā, Bājī Rāo II, who had long sought the ruin of the great minister. Grant Duff held that the Nānā 'was certainly a great statesman', notwithstanding a conspicuous lack of personal courage, and his rather unscrupulous ambition. In difficult times he tried to do his best for his master and country. He is described as having been in private life 'a man of strict veracity, humane, frugal, and charitable'. Most of his rivals were such scoundrels that the historian's praise of the Nānā's virtues is a pleasant surprise.

Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

The worst scoundrel of those evil days was Daulat Rāo Sindia's father-in-law and minister, the 'execrable' Sarji Rāo Ghātkē (Shirzee Rao Ghatgay), who took a fiendish pleasure in devising new and horrible modes of execution and in plundering defenceless citizens whom he subjected to atrocious tortures. He lived longer than he deserved until 1809, when a Marāthā chief 'transfixed him with his spear, and thus rid the world of a being, than whom few worse have ever disgraced humanity'.



BĀJĪ RĀO PESHWĀ.

Bājī Rāo II, Pēshwā. Bājī Rāo, the Pēshwā, vied with Sarji Rāo in cruelty, and could sit on a balcony watching with delight the torture of an enemy dragged about at the foot of an elephant. One of his ruling passions, we are told, was 'implacable revenge', and he was so much the slave of that ignoble passion that he was incapable of taking broad and statesmanlike views of any political question. His main object always was to destroy and plunder somebody whom he disliked. He was the personification of treachery, and withal an arrant coward.

Battle of Poona, October 25, 1802. At last, on October 25, 1802, the turmoil in the Marāthā country was brought to a crisis by the battle of Poona, in which Jaswant Rāo Holkar inflicted a decisive defeat on the forces of Daulat Rāo Sindia and the Pēshwā.

Bājī Rāo fled with about 7,000 followers as soon as the result of the battle was known, and at once intimated his willingness to accept the subsidiary treaty pressed upon him by the Governor-general. The Pēshwā ultimately proceeded to Bassein, where he arrived early in December.

Amrit Rāo set up by Holkar. Jaswant Rāo Holkar, whose object was to persuade Bājī Rāo to return, at first pretended to use his victory with great moderation. But when he saw that the Pēshwā had no intention of coming back Holkar set up Amrit Rāo—brother by adoption of Bājī Rāo—as Pēshwā, and plundered Poona with the utmost cruelty. Several men died under the tortures they underwent.

Terms of the Treaty of Bassein. Colonel Close, the British Resident at Poona, proceeded to Bassein, where, on the last day of the year 1802, he concluded with Bājī Rāo the celebrated treaty known by the name of the place of signature. The compact purported to be a general defensive alliance, for the reciprocal protection of the territories of the Company, the Pēshwā, and their respective allies. The Pēshwā bound himself to pay 26 lakhs a year for a subsidiary force of not less than six battalions to be stationed within his dominions; to exclude from his service all Europeans of a nation hostile to the English; to relinquish all claims on Surat; to recognize the engagements between the Gaikwār and the British; to abstain from hostilities or negotiations with other states, unless in consultation with the British Government; and to accept the arbitration of that government in disputes with the Nizam or the Gaikwār.

Restoration of Bājī Rāo. Thus 'the Pēshwā sacrificed his independence as the price of protection'; no other course being open to him. He was wholly unable to stand alone, and had to choose between the Company, Holkar, or Sindia as his protector. The evil which at the moment seemed to him to be the least was chosen. He never intended to abide by the terms of the treaty, if by any means he could evade compliance.

The restoration of Bājī Rāo was accomplished by General Arthur Wellesley with his accustomed promptitude and ability. By making forced marches at extraordinary speed he saved Poona from destruction and installed the Pēshwā. Holkar's candidate, Amrit Rāo, who felt no desire to resist, was content to retire to Benares with a pension.

War. Meantime Sindia and the Rājā of Berār were concerting plans to defeat the Governor-general's policy. Neither prince could contemplate the voluntary acceptance of a subsidiary alliance involving the loss of independence. Holkar declined to join in the combination, preferring to retire to Mālwa in order to look after his own interests. Sindia and the Rājā declined to remove their troops from the Nizam's frontier, where they occupied a threatening position, and Sindia informed the Resident that the question of peace or war could not be decided until after consultation with the Rājā. The withdrawal of the Resident from the camp of the allies on August 3, 1803, served as a declaration of war.

Lord Wellesley too sanguine. Lord Wellesley undoubtedly was or professed to be too sanguine in hoping that he could induce all the Marāthā chiefs to surrender everything which made life worth living in their eyes, and to accept his invitations, which so closely resembled those of the spider to the fly. The critics of the Governor-general both in England and in India were not slow to perceive that his policy necessarily involved the outbreak of a general Marāthā war, which actually began when the Resident withdrew from the camp of Sindia and the Rājā of Berār in August 1803. The truth is that a contest between the British and the Marāthās for the sovereignty of India had to be fought out, and that no treaty could long delay the inevitable trial of strength. Wellesley would have finished the business if he had been allowed to do so, but his recall postponed the final settlement until 1818.

Theatres of war. The war involved five sets of operations, namely, three major campaigns, that in the Deccan, a second against Sindia, and a third against Holkar, with two subsidiary campaigns in Bundēlkhand and Orissa. It is needless to describe in detail the minor operations, which were successful, and resulted in a notable improvement of the British military position. The conquest of Bundēlkhand secured the southern frontier of Hindostan or Upper India, while the annexation of Cuttack (Katak) joined the territories of Bengal and Madras.¹

The Deccan campaign. The Deccan campaign was entrusted to the capable hands of Arthur Wellesley, who was armed with full powers, political as well as military. He began by occupying Ahmadnagar, and securing the most important strategical position in the country, the pass connecting the Nizam's dominions with the Marāthā territory of Khāndēsh, and traversing the range of mountains variously known by the names of Ajantā, Sahyādri, or Indrayādri. The army was divided into two corps, each of about 5,000 men, one under Colonel Stevenson, and the other under Arthur Wellesley. The arrangements for effecting a junction proved impracticable, and Wellesley was obliged, or believed himself obliged, to give battle while Stevenson was still about eight miles distant.²

Battle of Assaye. Wellesley, with less than 5,000 men, boldly attacked the Marāthā army, from seven to ten times superior in numbers, at Assaye, close to the north-western frontier of the Nizam's dominions. The fight, which was desperate, resulted in a complete victory for the Company's troops on September 23, 1803. After the battle Wellesley found it expedient to offer Sindia a suspension of hostilities in the Deccan, and proceeded to deal with the Rhonsla Rājā of Berār and Nāgpur.

Treaty of Dēogāon. The army of that chief, under the command of his brother, Venkājī, was decisively defeated at Argāon (Argaum) in the Akola District of Berār on November 29. The

¹ For full particulars see Thorn, chapters vii, viii.

² Munro, even after receiving General Wellesley's explanation, held that it would have been wiser to defer attack (Gleig, *Life*³, i. 385).

strong fortress of Gāwīlgarh was stormed on December 15, and two days later the war with Berār was closed by the treaty of Dēogāon, drawn nearly on the same lines as the treaty of Bassein. The document also arranged for the cession of Cuttack.

Battle of Delhi. The hostilities with Sindia in northern India had equally brilliant results. General Lake, who was in command of about 10,000 men, operating in Hindostan, won a series of splendid victories. He began by an 'extraordinary feat', the capture by assault of Aligarh, a strong fortress situated between Agra and Delhi, and then proceeded to defeat Louis Bourquin, the French general who had succeeded Perron in the command of Sindia's regular troops, at a hard-fought battle near Delhi. The British force, outnumbered by four to one, had to face the fire of a hundred guns, many of large calibre. The losses of the victors necessarily were heavy.¹


'I really do think', Lake wrote, 'the business was one of the most gallant actions possible; such a fire of cannon has seldom been seen, if ever, against which our men marched up within one hundred yards without taking a firelock from their shoulders, when they gave one volley, charged instantly, and drove the enemy. . . . I do not think there could have been a more glorious day.'

The poor old blind emperor, Shāh Ālam, was set on his throne again, and made as comfortable as he could be with suitable allowances. He counted no longer in politics. Agra, 'the key of Hindostan', was surrendered by the enemy.²

Treaty of Surjī Arjungāon. A little later Sindia's remaining forces were utterly defeated at Laswārī in the Alwar state. The battle was even more severe and bloody than that of Assaye. The war was ended by the treaty of Surjī Arjungāon on December 30. Sindia accepted a subsidiary alliance of the usual kind and surrendered much territory. Thus the power of both Sindia and Berar had been overthrown within less than five months. Lord Wellesley rejoiced especially over the destruction of Sindia's regular troops commanded by French officers, which had threatened to endanger the British supremacy in Hindostan.

¹ Sindia's strength lay chiefly in his artillery. The 'regular' infantry under French command lacked steadiness as a rule, but at Laswārī fought with extraordinary valour. Its discipline, its arms, and uniform clothing, I regard merely as the means of dressing it out for the sacrifice' (Munro in Gleig's *Life*², i, 392). Munro was right, as usual. Perron had retired from Sindia's service and passed through the British lines by permission. The only full account of Perron's career is in Compton's valuable work. For the true position of the Delhi battle-field see Jones, App. iii, and E. D. MacLagan in *J. P. H. S.*, vol. iii, pp. 127-41. The 76th Regiment (now 2nd Batt. Duke of Wellington's) did wonders at Delhi and elsewhere.

² A wonderful piece of ordnance, known as the 'great gun of Agra', was taken. It was a casting in brass or some similar alloy, 14 feet 2 inches long, with a calibre or bore 23 inches in diameter. It weighed 96,600 pounds and could fire a shot weighing 1,500 pounds. When General Lake tried to remove it to Calcutta, it sank in the Jumna. Subsequently, Lord William Bentinck caused it to be blown up and sold as old metal.



GATEWAY, GAWILGARH.

War with Holkar. Holkar, who had remained aloof, now determined to fight on his own account, and deliberately preferred extravagant demands which forced Lord Wellesley to begin a fresh war. The British plan of campaign was skilfully designed to press the Marāthā chief from every direction, Lake operating in Hindostan, while Arthur Wellesley was to advance from the Deccan, and Colonel Murray from Gujarāt. Lake went into quarters at Cawnpore for the rainy season, instructing Colonel William Monson to keep Holkar in check with three battalions of sepoy and a considerable body of cavalry. Murray was desired to advance from Gujarāt in support. Both commanders failed to carry out their instructions and mismanaged their business.¹ General Wellesley observed that they were afraid of Holkar and 'fled from him in different directions'. Monson, who according to the same caustic critic 'advanced without reason and retreated in the same manner', committed many military errors. His force suffered an overwhelming disaster in the Mukund Dara (Muckundra) Pass in Rājputāna, thirty miles to the south of Kotah. The remnants reached Agra in utter disorder on August 31, 1804.


Defence of Delhi. The destruction of Monson's detachment gave fresh courage to all the enemies of the Company and prompted the Jāt Rājā of Bhurt pore (Bharatpur) to renounce alliance with the British and to support Holkar in an attack on Delhi. Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony and Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, notwithstanding the dilapidation of the walls, maintained the defence for nine days, and compelled the assailants to retreat.

Battle of Deeg. On November 13, 1804, Holkar was defeated with heavy loss at the battle of Deeg (Dīg) and in the following month the formidable fortress of Deeg was captured with a hundred guns.

Siege of Bhurt pore. So far all had gone well in the war, except for the mishap due to Monson's and Murray's blundering, and a minor reverse in Bundēlkhand, but the tide of success was turned by Lake's failure before the walls of Bhurt pore (Bharatpur) early in 1805. General Lake, misled by his success at Aligarh and Deeg, disregarded prudent advice, and ignoring his lack of an adequate siege train and of the services of skilled engineers² insisted on making four assaults on the fortress, which was eight miles in circumference and defended by a strong garrison. All the assaults failed, the losses amounting to more than 3,000 men. The repeated failures disturbed the minds of people throughout India, but the Rājā of Bhurt pore had had enough of war and its exhausting

¹ Jones (p. 61) points out that the orders given by Wellesley to Murray were 'perplexing'. Monson's instructions from Lake also were not precise. It is right to add that Monson was an extremely gallant officer, who had led the storming party at Aligarh, and did good service even after his disaster.

² Blacker (p. 237) points out that at that time and for many years afterwards the Indian government did not attach sufficient importance to the engineering branch of the service.



expense. He returned to his allegiance and promised to pay an indemnity of twenty lakhs (2 millions) of rupees.

Recall of Lord Wellesley. The authorities in England, who had not at any time cordially supported the aggressive policy of Lord Wellesley, seized the opportunity presented by the receipt of the news of Monson's disaster and the outbreak of the fresh war with Holkar, and decided to recall their ambitious Governor-general, hoping 'to bring back things to the state the legislature had prescribed in 1793'. Attempts were made to impeach the Marquess, but were not pressed. Pitt, as usual, had recourse to



BHURTPORE FORT.

Lord Cornwallis, whom he regarded as an infallible cure for all Indian ills.

Policy and achievement of Wellesley. The Marquess Wellesley undoubtedly is entitled to a place in the front rank of the Governors-general by the side of Warren Hastings, the Marquess of Hastings, and Lord Dalhousie. Some authors would award him the first place, but in my judgement that honour belongs to Warren Hastings. Lord Wellesley, like Lords Lytton and Dufferin in later times, looked upon the affairs of India as seen by a British nobleman and politician from a Foreign Office point of view. He was a statesman, rather than an administrator, concerned chiefly with matters of high policy, and little inclined to examine closely the details of departmental administration. His policy was

directed to two main objects. The first was the elevation of the British government to the position of paramount power in India ; or to use his stately words, 'to establishing a comprehensive system of alliance and political relation over every region of Hindustan and the Deccan'. The second object was the full utilization of Indian strength so that it might play a proper part in resistance to the menace of Napoleon's world-wide ambition, which avowedly aimed at the overthrow of the British power in the whole of India. All the most important acts of Wellesley—such as the destruction of Tippoo, the treaty of Bassein, the Marāthā wars, and the series of annexations—were directed to the attainment of those two purposes, which were inseparably connected. The India of those days was bound to come under the domination of either France or England. It was impossible for her to withstand Napoleonic ambition unless when shielded by the might of England. Wellesley, as already observed, seized every opportunity for effecting annexations, because he believed sincerely that every such operation was a clear benefit to the people inhabiting the annexed territory. When replying to an address from the citizens of Calcutta, he formulated his policy distinctly in these words :



MARQUESS WELLESLEY.

'My public duty is discharged to the satisfaction of my conscience by the prosperous establishment of a system of policy which promises to improve the general condition of the people of India, and to unite the principal native states in the bond of peace, under the protection of the British power.'¹

He did much to accomplish that grand design, and would have accomplished it wholly but for his recall.

His vision was clear and comprehensive. He saw what he wanted so distinctly, and showed resolution so inflexible in the execution of his well-laid plans, that he never failed in consequence of lack of personal foresight, although he was often baulked by the reluctance of the home authorities to accord their support,

¹ Marshman describes Lord Wellesley as 'the Akbar of the Company's dynasty'.

and occasionally, but not often, embarrassed by the failure of a trusted subordinate. He chose his agents, civil and military, with sagacity, and trusted them without reserve.

Calcutta owes to him many much needed improvements and the dignified Government House, erroneously supposed to be modelled on the mansion of Lord Curzon's ancestor at Kedleston. Lord Wellesley was familiar with the ancient literature of Greece and Rome, as well as with that of modern Europe. He possessed an intimate knowledge of Dante's noble poem. His style, whether in speech or writing, echoed the eloquence of Demosthenes and Cicero, with a tendency to excessive formality and magniloquence. He loved pomp and ceremony to such a degree that his taste for display sometimes invited ridicule and attracted hostile criticism. But his weaknesses as a public man were nothing when compared with his merits, which were fully recognized by a later generation of Directors, the year before his death. The Company then bestowed the rare honour of erecting his statue in his lifetime, and, knowing that his means were rather straitened, presented him with £20,000. When he was Governor-general he had spent with profusion and had scorned to take even sums of the nature of prize money to which he was entitled.

On September 26, 1842, Wellesley died at the age of eighty-two. In accordance with his express wish he was buried at Eton, close to the renowned school of which he retained a loving memory, and to which he had sent his two sons.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Mornington (Wellesley) Governor-general (May); Ceylon declared a Crown colony	1798
Fourth and last Mysore war; capture of Seringapatam; annexation of Tanjore and Surat	1799
Death of Nānā Farnavis; union of Ireland with Great Britain	1800
Annexation of the Carnatic and of the Ceded Districts of Oudh; expedition to Egypt	1801
Peace of Amiens; battle of Poona; treaty of Bassein	1802
Renewal of war with France; second Marāthā war; capture of Aligarh; battles of Delhi, Assaye, Laswāri, and Argāon; treaty of Deogāon and cession of Cuttack; treaty of Surji Arjungāon	1803
War with Holkar; defeat of Monson; battle and capture of Deeg	1804
Failure of siege of Bhurtpore; recall of Lord Wellesley	1805

(For exact details of the dates of Lord Lake's campaigns see Jones, App. ii.)

Mysore Wars

FIRST, 1767-9; ended by treaty dictated by Haider Ali under the walls of Madras.

SECOND, 1780-4; Warren Hastings Governor-general; ended by treaty of Mangalore, based on mutual restoration of conquests.

THIRD, 1790-2; ended by peace dictated by Lord Cornwallis under the walls of Seringapatam; Tippoo being deprived of half of his kingdom.

FOURTH AND LAST, MARCH-MAY, 1799; Lord Wellesley Governor-general; ended by the death of Tippoo, partition of his dominions, and restoration of the Hindu Rājā in a portion of them.

The primary authorities are the *Selections of Despatches, &c.*, ed. by SIDNEY J. OWEN, namely, those of the Marquess Wellesley, 1877 ; and those of the Duke of Wellington, 1880 ; both published at the Clarendon Press, Oxford, and skilfully edited. The earlier volume contains a good survey of Wellesley's administration. The *Political History* by Sir J. MALCOLM continues to be useful. WILKS deals fully with the Mysore war, and GRANT DUFF relates all Marāthā affairs in ample detail. The *Lectures* by Major H. HELSHAM JONES, R.E., delivered at the school of Military Engineering, Chatham, in 1881, which give an admirable professional account of the campaigns of Lord Lake against the Marāthās, 1804 [read '1803']-6, probably are difficult to procure. The *Memoir of the Life and Military Services of Viscount Lake* by Col. HUGH PEARSE (Blackwood, 1908) is more readable and accessible. The authoritative contemporary account is the *Memoir of the War in India conducted by General Lord Lake and Major-General Sir Arthur Wellesley, &c.*, by Major W. THORN, quarto, London, 1818, with maps and battle-plans. The author shared in Lake's campaigns and kept a diary. The work gives full military details for each theatre of the war. The *Marquess Wellesley* by W. H. HUTTON (*Rulers of India*, 1897) is well written and based on special research. *Haidar Ali and Tipū Sultan* by L. B. BOWRING is good (same series, 1893). The revised edition of the *Mysore Gazetteer* (Westminster, Constable, 2 vols., 1897) is an excellent compilation, full of accurate information, the work of Mr. B. LEWIS RICE. G. B. MALLESON in *Final French Struggles in India* (new ed., London, Allen, 1884) gives a detailed account of the expedition to Egypt, and certain other matters of interest. H. COMPTON, in *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan, from 1784 to 1803* (Unwin, 1892), fulfils the promise of the title. It is a sound work on an ample scale.

CHAPTER 7

Reaction ; peace at any price policy of Lord Cornwallis in his second administration and of Sir George Barlow ; Lord Minto's strong foreign and cautious internal policy.

Reasons for recall of Wellesley. The dislike in England to Wellesley's policy was not confined to official circles. The body of the Court of Proprietors or shareholders in the East India Company was still more actively hostile. It is necessary to remember that in 1805 the Company continued to be a commercial organization, in almost exclusive possession of the overseas trade with India as well as China, and expected to make a good percentage of profit. The shareholders thought more of the 'investment', or provision of goods for export, than of empire. Although the extension of British dominion was certain to pay in the end, the immediate results of annexation were increase of debt, an empty treasury, diversion of funds from the 'investment', and consequent risks to the dividend. Such considerations induced a large majority of the stockholders to condemn Wellesley and clamour for his recall.

Lord Cornwallis a wreck. Malcolm observes that

‘no one can be surprised that the choice of Lord Cornwallis as the successor to Lord Wellesley met with almost universal approbation in England at such a moment; and to those acquainted with that venerable nobleman’s character, it will be a subject of still less surprise that his accumulated years and infirmities did not render him insensible to such a call’.

He was no longer the man who fifteen years earlier had sprung to arms in order to defend distant Travancore. He had come to regard almost the worst peace as better than the best war, and was willing to listen to the pleasant words of admirers who hailed him as the saviour of India. In truth, he was a wreck, unable to save anybody. He took over charge on July 30, went up country by river, and died at Glāzīpur on October 5. He was insensible for some days before his decease, and had not been really fit for business from the time he landed. The state of his health forbids harsh judgement on the motives of his conduct, which in itself was both dishonourable and mischievous. Sindia had allowed the Resident’s camp to be plundered, and had even dared to detain Mr. Jenkins the Resident. The Governor-general at first insisted on the release of his representative, but on reconsideration declared that the demand was ‘a mere point of honour’, not to be pressed if it should be the only obstacle to an arrangement with the Marāthā prince. To such disgraceful pusillanimity had the victor of Seringapatam sunk in his old age.

Reversal of policy. As long as he could hold a pen he busied himself reversing the whole of his predecessor’s policy and renouncing so far as possible all his gains, for the sake of a peace that was no peace. He decided to abandon Gwālior and Gohud to Sindia, to make the Junna the British frontier, to desert Jaipur and the other Rājput states, and to give the Marāthā bandits a free hand. He descended even to the baseness of anticipating with satisfaction that

‘Sindia’s endeavours to wrest those territories [in Rājputāna] from the hands of the Rajahs of Macherry and Bhurtrapore may be expected to lay the foundation of interminable contests, which will afford ample and permanent employment to Sindia’;

forgetting or refusing to see that the ‘employment’ of the plunderer would be paid for by the agonies of millions of helpless peasants. Lake’s passionate remonstrances on the breach of faith, and the ‘deep injury to the honour and reputation of the English nation’, which such sentiments involved could not stay the drivelling infatuation of the Governor-general.

Sir George Barlow. When Cornwallis passed away his place was taken by the senior member of council, Sir George Barlow, who once again proved that a capable departmental official could make an exceedingly bad head of the Government. Sir George Barlow has been justly described as ‘the meanest of the Governors-general’. His narrowness of view was made the more dangerous by the extreme personal dislike which he inspired. He showed himself even more zealous than the deceased Marquess had been

in carrying out the behests of the ruling party at the India House so far as Hindostan or Upper India was concerned, and he broke faith so openly with Jaipur that the Directors felt constrained to regard his action as 'extremely questionable'. Sir George went so far as to bind the Government of British India not to make any engagement with the Rājput states for their protection against Marāthā oppression—a document described by Lord Hastings as 'the inexplicable treaty', which tied the hands of Lord Minto throughout his term of office, and hampered Lord Hastings until 1816. Lake's reiterated arguments produced no effect upon Barlow's obstinate mind. The commander-in-chief consequently resigned his political powers, and retired to Europe. He was created a Viscount and shortly afterwards died, in 1808.

Holkar. Before leaving India Lord Lake had pursued Jaswant Rāo Holkar by a series of wonderful forced marches, until that ferocious chief was driven to bay on the banks of the Bīās. Lake was then in a position to impose any terms he chose; but Barlow insisted on giving back to Holkar power and provinces, while assuring him of full liberty to harry and ravage the Rājput states as much as he pleased. Even the Rājā of Bundī, who had helped Colonel Monson in his extremity, was abandoned to the cruelty of the Marāthā hordes. It is a sad and shameful story, still worse when read in detail than when presented in abstract.

The Nizam. Sir George Barlow, when not frightened by his terror of a Marāthā war, was ready to admit 'the utter impracticability of applying' extreme principles of non-interference to the case of the Nizam. When the Governor-general discovered that that incompetent prince had been led into a conspiracy to dismiss Mīr Ālam, his able minister, and to subvert the alliance with the British Government, Barlow decided that acquiescence in those proceedings was impossible, because 'by such an event the very foundations of our power and ascendancy in the political scale in India would be subverted', and so on. Consequently he applied the necessary pressure and stopped the intrigue.

Treaty of Bassein. He was equally firm in resisting suggestions from England to modify the treaty of Bassein, and in adopting that attitude was consistent, because he had recorded his deliberate approval of the compact when it was made. He held that the connexions with the Pēshwā must be either maintained as they stood or abandoned altogether. The latter course was rejected as being likely to result in

'the subversion of the British power—in the prosecution of which the Mahrattas would possess the means almost uncontrolled of efficient co-operation with a French force'.

The war with Napoleon had still to go on for nine years, and the worst phases of it had not yet appeared.

Financial surplus. Sir George Barlow's cringing before Sindia and Holkar had the great merit in the eyes of the shareholders in the Company that during his brief period of rule he was able to convert the financial deficit into a surplus, and to leave a full

treasury to the credit of his unhonoured name. According to H. H. Wilson, 'the provision of the investment of goods for sale in England was, in fact, the mainspring of Sir G. Barlow's policy.'

Vellore mutiny. The only other event during Barlow's term of office which requires notice is the sepoy mutiny at Vellore in the Carnatic, wantonly produced by stupid orders of Sir John Cradock, the local commander-in-chief, issued with the sanction and approval of Lord William [Cavendish-]Bentinck, the governor.¹ The new regulations required the men to wear a novel pattern of turban, to train their beards in a particular way, and to abstain from putting sectarian marks on their foreheads. Anybody with a grain of sense could have foreseen that such folly would produce trouble. An outcry arose that the sepoys were all to be forcibly made Christians. Popular opinion in India, accustomed to violent 'conversions' to Islam under Muhammadan governments, is wont to regard Christianity rather as an impure mode of life, associated with the wearing of hats, the eating of beef and pork, the drinking of spirits, and the neglect of personal purity, than as a system of lofty theological doctrine. A man is a 'Kristān' who practises the objectionable habits thus indicated. The danger of the local situation was seriously inflamed by the presence at Vellore of Tippoo's family and some thousands of their dependants. At that place the sepoys suddenly broke out on July 10, 1806, seized the fort, and massacred two European companies, 113 strong, including 14 officers. Troops from Arcot took swift vengeance, and a series of courts martial followed. The whole business became the subject of acute controversy, some people thinking that the mutineers had been treated too harshly, while others clamoured for more executions. The complicity of Tippoo's sons was suspected rather than proved, but it is certain that the mutineers were in communication with the palace.² As a precaution the relatives of the late Sultan were removed to Calcutta. The childish regulations about the sepoys' dress and sectarian marks were more than enough to account for the tragedy, without seeking for any further explanation. The final orders were passed by Lord Minto, the new Governor-general, who halted at Madras on his way to Calcutta, and treated the cases in a spirit of sane moderation. After the expiry of some months the fears and distrust excited by the outbreak gradually died away. The Directors justly recalled both Lord William Bentinck and Sir John Cradock.

Lord Minto. When the news of the death of Lord Cornwallis

¹ Thornton, who had all the India Office records at hand, expressly states that 'the governor not only approved, but ordered the new turban to be adopted by a corps of fencibles under his own especial command'. Wilson agrees that both the governor and the commander-in-chief were blameable. 'Fencibles,' an obsolete term to denote troops raised only for home defence.

² Wilson observes that 'even with regard to the sons of Tippoo themselves, no proof could be elicited that they had been concerned in the conspiracy'.

reached London, Lord Minto, then President of the Board of Control, agreed with the Directors in supporting the confirmation of Sir George Barlow as Governor-general. The change of ministry consequent on Pitt's death upset those arrangements, and the new ministers suggested the Earl of Lauderdale as a candidate. The Directors strongly objected to his nomination. Lord Grenville, the Prime Minister, a warm admirer of Lord Wellesley, was equally opposed to the confirmation of Sir George Barlow. After much heated discussion all parties concurred in the nomination of Lord Minto, who accepted office with sincere reluctance.¹

The Governor-general elect had enjoyed considerable parliamentary and official experience. His warm personal friendship for Burke had coloured his early views on Indian subjects, so that, before his elevation to the peerage, he had been as Sir Gilbert Elliot one of the managers of the prosecution of Warren Hastings, and had also been entrusted with the conduct of the projected impeachment of Sir Elijah Impey, which never matured. Those events belonged to a distant past. Time had so far ripened Lord Minto's character and judgement that the Prime Minister, notwithstanding his own attachment to Lord Wellesley's policy, could cordially approve the proposed appointment. The Directors, on the other hand, expected the new Governor-general to follow the guidance of Cornwallis and Barlow rather than that of Wellesley. Being a cautious, canny, and yet genial Scotsman, he steered a middle course with a degree of success which has not always been sufficiently appreciated.

Malcolm observes with his accustomed good sense that 'the administration of Lord Minto differs essentially from that of every Governor-general who preceded him. It was impossible for a man possessed of such clear intellect, and so well acquainted with the whole science of government, to be long in India without being satisfied that the system of neutral policy which had been adopted could not be persevered in without the hazard of great and increasing danger to the state. His calm mind saw, at the same time, the advantage of reconciling the authorities in England to the measure[s] which he contemplated.

Hence, he ever preferred delay, where he thought that it was unaccompanied with danger, and referred to the administration at home, whom he urged, by every argument he could use, to sanction the course he deemed best suited to the public interests. But the desire to conciliate, and carry his superiors along with him, did not result from any dread of responsibility; for wherever the exigency of the case required a departure from this general rule, he was prompt and decided. . . . The government of Lord Minto had no result more important, than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home, of the utter impracticability of perseverance in that neutral policy they had desired to pursue. It was a progressive return to a course of action more suited to the extent, the character, and the condition of the British power; but when compelled to depart from the line prescribed, the measures adopted by this nobleman were so moderate,

¹ 'I accepted . . . a situation which, so far from seeking, I thought a week before no human persuasion could have led me to undertake' (*Lord Minto in India*, p. 5).

and the sentiments he recorded so just, that it was impossible to refuse assent to their expediency and wisdom. A gradual change was thus effected in the minds of his superiors in England, and this change tended in no slight degree to facilitate the attainment of the advantages which have accrued from the more active and brilliant administration of his successor. . . . The marked feature in this nobleman's character was moderation; but that was combined with firmness and capacity.²

I concur heartily with the verdict of Thornton that Lord Minto 'well deserves to be held in remembrance as one of the eminent statesmen of India'.

Unappreciated merit. The appreciation of Lord Minto's personal character and policy has been placed at the beginning rather than at the end of the narrative of his administration for special reasons. One of those reasons is that the scale of this book does not permit the insertion of an adequate account of his achievements, especially of his admirably planned and executed expeditions overseas. The story of the conquest of Java, one of the most splendid feats of British arms, coupled with that of the reduction of the French islands, would suffice to fill a considerable volume. The restoration of Java to the Dutch at the general peace of 1815 has almost blotted out the memory of the conquest. A concise summary of Lord Minto's proceedings in connexion with the expeditions above mentioned cannot give the reader a just idea of the resolution, skill, and moderation with which the operations were conducted. Many circumstances contributed to dim Lord Minto's fame.¹ The six years of his administration coincided with the most critical period of the Napoleonic war, during which public attention was concentrated either on Wellington's glorious struggle in Spain and Portugal or on Napoleon's Russian adventure. Even the most brilliant successes in the eastern seas could not compete in interest with the events of the European drama. The distinction of Lord Minto's most masterly performance in the field of Indian politics—his defiance of Ranjit Singh, coupled with the extension of the British frontier to the Sutlaj—was obscured by the complete success of the policy enforced and by the Mahārājā's loyal observance of his engagements until his death thirty years later. Undue depreciation of Lord Minto's eminent merits sometimes seems to have been due to the belief that within the limits of India he merely carried on the policy of Sir George Barlow. The extracts from Malcolm quoted above should dispel that illusion. He could not have done much more than he did without antagonizing the authorities at home, and causing a Marāthā war, which he could not prosecute at the same time as the expeditions abroad. The moderate man always incurs the risk of censure from violent partisans. Lord Minto also had the misfortune to provoke the hostility of the powerful missionary societies and their numerous supporters, who roundly denounced the Governor-General as the enemy of Christianity because he had dared to restrain the exuberance of indiscreet theologians.

¹ 'Lord Minto's administration has never been sufficiently appreciated' (Marshman, *Abridgement* (1873), p. 306).

Lord Minto, who was then fifty-six years of age, took his seat in Calcutta on July 31, 1807. Sir George Barlow quietly resumed his place in council, which he continued to retain for several months until he was appointed governor of Madras, where, as will appear presently, he again failed as a ruler of men.

Foreign policy. 'The most brilliant chapter in Lord Minto's Indian government is that of his foreign policy. . . . Every fresh gain of France in Europe was followed by a corresponding loss in Asia. It was the glory of Lord Minto's administration that, whereas at its commencement dread of a French invasion of India haunted the imagination of statesmen, at its close France had lost all her acquisitions eastward of the Cape. The isles of Bourbon and of France, the Moluccas, and Java, had been added to the colonial possessions of Great Britain, the fleets of France were swept from the Indian seas, and England was without a rival in the Eastern hemisphere.'

The Governor-general himself, when writing from Java in 1811, informed the Secretary of State for War that 'the British nation has neither an enemy nor a rival left from the Cape of Good Hope to Cape Horn'. Those results were attained by well devised naval and military operations.

Diplomacy. Lord Minto also took much pains, but with less success, to curb by diplomacy the world-wide intrigues of Napoleon. It is unlikely that the autocrat of the French ever seriously contemplated an actual invasion of India, nor does such an operation appear to have been feasible. But he certainly did his best to stir up all the Asiatic nations within his reach against England. He sent a mission to Persia in 1808, which was countered by one dispatched from India by the Governor-general as well as by a royal embassy from England. An unseemly conflict arose between the rival British missions, and Lord Minto, so far as I can judge the merits of a tangled story, failed to display his usual discretion. It is not worth while to examine in detail forgotten quarrels. The royal ambassador obtained a treaty which the Governor-general was obliged to accept with a bad grace. Malcolm, who paid two visits to Persia under Lord Minto's direction, effected nothing except the collection of materials for his excellent *History of Persia*.



LORD MINTO.

Elphinstone's embassy to Kābul in the same year never got farther than Peshāwar. Shāh Shuj'ā, to whom the mission was accredited, soon afterwards was expelled from his kingdom, so that no direct political results were obtained. The envoy devoted much of his time to investigation through agents and by all means at his command of the conditions existing in Afghanistan, then a completely unknown country. He embodied the results of his researches in a book of great value, entitled *An Account of the Kingdom of Caubul, &c.*, which was published in 1815, and still counts as an authority.

Ranjit Singh. Diplomacy, supported by the threatened advance of an army, effectually stayed the triumphant progress of Mahārājā Ranjit Singh, the able Sikh leader, whose ambition menaced the security of the British provinces of Upper India. Ranjit Singh, who was only twelve years old when his father died, was suspected of having murdered his mother, who certainly disappeared and was not heard of again. At the age of nineteen he acquired possession of Lahore with the title of Rājā from Shāh Zamān or Zamān Shāh, the Afghan ruler, in 1799. Three years later, in 1802, he made himself master of Amritsar, the Sikh holy city, and thus became a formidable chieftain. Continuing to extend his power in the Panjāb proper, he desired to annex the Sikh territories south of the Sutlaj, which had been 'a sort of no-man's land' between the Marāthās and the Sikhs, and had been reduced to a waste. Much of the country was inhabited only by wild beasts. In 1806 Ranjit Singh, at the invitation of his uncle, a notable of Jīnd, crossed the Sutlaj with a large force and occupied Lūdiāna.

Two years later the Cis-Sutlaj chiefs repented of having called in a person so powerful as the Mahārājā to take a side in their quarrels, and appealed to the Governor-general for protection.

Lord Minto dispatched as his envoy to the Sikh court Charles Metcalfe, then only twenty-four years of age. After much negotiation a treaty was signed at Amritsar on April 25, 1809, establishing 'perpetual amity' between the contracting parties.

The brief operative clauses were these :

'The British government will have no concern with the territories and subjects of the Raja to the northward of the river Sutlej.

The Raja will never maintain in the territory which he occupies on the left bank of the river Sutlej more troops than are necessary for the internal duties of that territory, nor commit or suffer any encroachments on the possessions or rights of the Chiefs in its vicinity.'

Thus the British frontier was advanced from the Jumna to the Sutlaj by a Governor-general who was supposed to refrain from all extensions of territory. Lūdiāna became the frontier cantonment.

Central India. Early in his administration Lord Minto had been obliged to secure peace in Bundēlkhand to the south of the Jumna by the capture from local chiefs of the fortresses of Ajaigarh and Kālanjar. He also made a military demonstration to warn off Amīr Khān, the Pathān leader of banditti, from invading Nāgpur, but drew back when confronted with the prospect of

a Marāthā war. The Marāthās, with their Pathān and Pindāri associates, continued to oppress Central India and Rājputāna, which were in a state 'truly deplorable'.¹

'People do not scruple to assert', as the Resident at Delhi reported, 'that they have a right to the protection of the British government. They say that . . . the British government now occupies the place of the great protecting power, and is the natural guardian of the peaceable and weak; but, owing to its refusal to use its influence for their protection, the peaceful and weak states are continually exposed to oppressions and cruelties of robbers and plunderers, the most licentious and abandoned of mankind.'

Lord Minto never felt himself at liberty to interfere effectually to stop those horrors. He could not have done so without committing himself to a general Marāthā war, and the strength of India was absorbed by the expeditions overseas. Jaswant Rāo Holkar became insane from the effects of intemperance and died in 1811. The British government had little intercourse with Indore for several years.

Travancore rebellion. The strangest event during Lord Minto's term of office was the mad rebellion in Travancore organized by the Dīwān or minister, Velu Tampi. The country had been shockingly misgoverned, and constant disputes had existed between the minister and the Resident concerning the administration and the arrears of payment for the subsidiary force. In December 1808 the minister, who felt much aggrieved at certain measures taken by the Resident, made a furious attack on the house of that officer, who barely escaped with his life. Velu Tampi then issued a violent proclamation calling on the inhabitants to defend caste and the Hindu religion, which elicited an eager response from the Nāyars. 'The whole country rose like one man. Their religious susceptibilities were touched, which in a conservative country like Travancore is like smoking in a powder magazine.' An officer and about thirty European soldiers of H.M. 12th Regiment were foully murdered, an incident which induced Thornton to echo an opinion that 'in turpitude and moral degradation' the people of the state 'transcend every nation upon the face of the earth'. That severe judgement is not justified by the later history of the state, which is now, and has been for many years, exceptionally well administered.² The rebellion, of course, never had any chance of success and was soon suppressed. The minister committed suicide and his brother was deservedly hanged for his active share in the murder of the soldiers.

Mutiny of Madras officers. An event much more dangerous was the mutiny of the officers of the Madras army, occasioned immediately by the stoppage of certain perquisites on tent contracts enforced by Sir George Barlow in compliance with peremptory orders of the Directors. The ill feeling was embittered by the

¹ For details see Tod.

² The country and people of Travancore are the most interesting in all India on many accounts.

injudicious action of the governor and other authorities. In 1809 the conspiracy, which had extended to many stations, collapsed, and most of the officers returned to their duty. 'Lord Minto, on learning the nature and extent of the disaffection, had proceeded without delay to Madras; but the crisis had passed before he arrived.' The punishments inflicted were few. Sir Samuel Auchmuty or Ahmuty, a competent officer, was appointed the local commander-in-chief. The affair destroyed Sir George Barlow's chances of again becoming Governor-general.



The French islands. The resolve of the British ministry to attempt the capture of the French islands in the Indian Ocean was prompted not only by the desire to inflict a heavy blow on the hostile power of France but by the necessity of stopping the devastations of the privateers which issued from the island harbours. The losses caused by privateering during Lord Wellesley's time were estimated at from two to three millions sterling; and in 1809, six 'Indiamen', or large vessels belonging to the Company, were captured. Lord Minto co-operated actively with the home authorities in planning and executing the difficult operations necessary, which proved thoroughly successful, in spite of some intermediate mishaps.

The island of Rodriguez was taken in 1809; Bourbon, or

Réunion, and Mauritius, or the Isle of France, after considerable fighting, capitulated in 1810. At the general peace Bourbon was restored to France; Mauritius being retained as a Crown colony, with Rodriguez and certain minor dependencies. The principal industry is sugar-planting, which has been developed by the aid of Indian coolies. The Indians resident number about a quarter of a million. The population is dense, the institutions and language being mainly French. The islands have suffered much from epidemics and hurricanes. A small garrison occupies Mauritius.¹

Java expedition. The attack on the Dutch settlements in the Spice Islands or Moluccas, and in Java, then under French control, was a formidable business, which required careful organization, and hearty co-operation between the forces of the Crown and those of the Company. The Spice Islands, including Amboyna, notorious for the massacre of 1623, were occupied quickly in 1810, although not without some lively fighting. Batavia, the capital of Dutch Java, had been strongly fortified under French direction, because Napoleon attached high importance to its retention. Fort Cornelis, six miles from the town, was believed to be impregnable. But it had to yield. The storm may be described in the words of Lord Minto, who was present.

‘August 28 [1811]. The enemy’s impregnable works were stormed at daybreak on August 26, a new day in our military calendar. The place was most formidable in strength, and it really seems miraculous that mortal men could live in such a fire of round, grape, shells, and musketry long enough to pass deep trenches defended by pointed palissades inclining from the inner edge of the ditch outwards, force their way into redoubt after redoubt, till they were in possession of all the numerous works, which extend at least a mile. . . . The slaughter was dreadful, both during the attack and in the pursuit. . . . We have upwards of 5,000 prisoners, including all the Europeans left alive. . . . There never was such a rout.’

The storming troops were led by General (Colonel) Gillespie; the supreme direction was in the hands of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, commander-in-chief of the Madras army.

Lord Minto is sometimes alleged to have accompanied the expedition ‘as a volunteer’. That is incorrect; he went as Governor-general in order that being on the spot he might be able to settle at once and with authority ‘many important points regarding our future relations with the Dutch and with the native states in Java’, and also secure harmonious working with the admirals. With the help of Mr. (Sir Stamford) Raffles admirable arrangements were made, and if the colony had been retained it would now be a possession of the highest value. But at the general peace the island was restored to the Dutch, who still retain it. The abuses which disfigured the administration in Lord Minto’s time have been mostly remedied.

¹ The names of the islands have been changed repeatedly. In some of the older documents they are called collectively the Mascarene islands.

Charter legislation, 1813. The legislation of 1813 for the renewal of the Company's charter was preceded by the exhaustive inquiries of a Select Committee of the House of Commons, culminating in the *Fifth Report*, sufficiently noticed in an earlier chapter. The debates in Parliament were prolonged and interesting. Napoleon having closed the continental ports, British merchants insisted on the opening of the Indian trade. The concession was granted, subject to certain limitations. The Company still retained an interest in Indian commerce, but only as one competitor among many, and made little or no profit, although the captains of the magnificent 'Indiamen' acquired ample fortunes. For the purposes of government the Company continued until 1858 to be merely a 'fifth wheel in the coach' of the administrative machinery. Parliament, being unwilling to raise the thorny question of patronage of Indian appointments, declined to adopt Lord Grenville's suggestions that the Crown should assume the direct administration and that the Civil Service should be recruited by a limited competition between nominees of the public schools. The Company preserved for twenty years longer its exclusive rights in the China trade, of which tea was the principal item.

The question of the admission of missionaries was hotly debated. Their admission under licence was allowed. Provision was made for the spiritual needs of the European population by the appointment of a bishop of Calcutta and three archdeacons paid from Indian revenues. A grant for public education was made for the first time, a lakh of rupees, then worth more than £10,000, being

'set apart and applied to the revival and improvement of literature and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India'.

Improved arrangements for the training of the civil and military servants of the Company were sanctioned. Subject to the above provisions and many others, the charter was renewed for twenty years.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Cornwallis Governor-general for second time (July 31–Oct. 5)	1805
Sir G. Barlow Governor-general	1805
Vellore mutiny	1806
Lord Minto Governor-general	1807
Missions to Persia and Kābul	1808
Travancore rebellion	1808–9
Treaty of Amritsar with Ranjit Singh ; mutiny of Madras officers	1809
Capture of French islands	1809–10
Conquest of the Moluccas	1810
Conquest of Java	1811
Pindāri raid on Mirzāpur ; <i>Fifth Report</i>	1812
Renewal of charter of E. I. Co. ; retirement of Lord Minto	1813

AUTHORITIES

MALCOLM'S *Political History*, THORNTON, and H. H. WILSON'S continuation of Mill are useful for the whole period. Vol. iii of *Cornwallis Correspondence*, ed. Ross, gives some documents.

The leading authorities for Lord Minto are his *Life and Letters*, 1751-1806, 3 vols., 1874; and *Lord Minto in India*, 1880, both well edited by his grand-niece the COUNTESS OF MINTO. *Ranjit Singh*, by LEPEL GRIFFIN (1898, in 'Rulers of India'), is excellent. The separate work on the Java expedition is the *Memoir of the Conquest of Java* by Major W. THORN, 4to, London, 1815, with maps, plans, and plates. A full account of the local rebellion will be found in AIYA, *Travancore State Manual*, Trivandrum, 1906, vol. i.

For the charter legislation see ILBERT, *The Government of India*, and App. x of vol. vii of H. H. WILSON (continuation of Mill—vol. i of Wilson's *History of British India*, ed. 1858).

CHAPTER 8

The Marquess of Hastings; Nepalese, Pindāri, and Marāthā wars; establishment of British supremacy in 1818.

The Marquess of Hastings. Francis Rawdon-Hastings, Baron Rawdon in the peerage of Great Britain, and Earl of Moira in the peerage of Ireland, represented two of the most ancient noble families in England, those of Rawdon and Hastings. The Rawdons settled in Ireland in the seventeenth century and became Earls of Moira. Francis Lord Moira in early life had spent nearly eight years in America as an officer during the War of Independence, and afterwards had seen some military service in Europe, but for the greater part of his life had attained little distinction. He was notorious for profuse, generous extravagance, resulting in dissipation of a noble fortune, and was on terms of the closest and most expensive intimacy with the Prince Regent, afterwards King George IV, whose friendship was not an honour. Lord Moira having rendered the prince certain special political services in 1812, was nominated by him in 1813 as successor to Lord Minto, and was accepted by the Directors. He was then nearly fifty-nine years of age, and apparently much too old for a term of arduous Indian exile. His record gave no indication that he would prove himself worthy to be ranked with the greatest of the Governors-general, and that, notwithstanding his advanced age, he would be strong enough to bear the heavy burden of civil government combined with supreme military command for nine and a quarter years. The length of his administration was surpassed only by that of Warren Hastings. He never went to the hills, and never failed to be at his desk at four o'clock in the morning. Early in 1817, as a reward for his conduct of the Nepalese war, he was created Marquess of Hastings in the peerage of Great Britain.

It will be convenient to designate him from the beginning by that title.

Seven quarrels pending. The seeds of the wars which were the main business of the early years of the administration of Lord Hastings had been sown by the enforcement of the timid non-intervention policy prescribed by the home authorities, carried out whole-heartedly by Lord Cornwallis and Sir George Barlow, and only slightly modified by Lord Minto. During the government of that nobleman the seeds had begun to germinate, so that his successor, on assuming office, found 'seven different quarrels likely to demand the decision of arms' awaiting his orders.

Nepalese aggressions.

The most urgent of the seven quarrels was that with the hillmen called Gürkhas, who had overthrown the ancient dynasties of the Nepāl Valley in 1768, and had subsequently created a large state possessing considerable military force, which extended over the whole hill region of the lower Himalayas from the Sutlaj on the west to the frontier of Bhutan on the east. The cession of the Gorakhpur territory by the Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh in 1801 had brought the British districts into contact with the Gürkha possessions in the Tarāi or strip of lowland lying under the hills.

The Gürkhas displayed an aggressive, hostile spirit and constantly made inroads across the ill-defined frontier. Lord Minto was obliged to take notice of daring invasions in the Būtwal region to the north of what is now the Bastī District and in another region called Sheorāj farther to the east. The tracts wrongfully seized by the Nepalese were reoccupied by Company's troops without open opposition. A fresh aggression in May 1814, when the Nepalese without provocation attacked three police stations in Būtwal, killing eighteen policemen, brought on war.

War with Nepāl, 1814-16. Lord Hastings, who from the beginning was his own commander-in-chief, at once proved his strategical genius. He devised an admirable plan of campaign designed to attack the enemy at four distinct points on a frontier of about six hundred miles, and supplemented his military dispositions by negotiations with various hill chiefs. If the Governor-



MARQUESS OF HASTINGS.

general's instructions had been obeyed prompt success certainly would have attended the army, which was amply sufficient in numbers and equipment. But, unfortunately, four out of five generals employed displayed extraordinary incompetence in different fashions, so that the early operations failed, and all India was excited by news of defeats suffered by the Company's forces. General Gillespie, who had won a high reputation by the storm of Fort Cornelis in Java, lost his own life and uselessly



A NEPALESE STOCKADE.

sacrificed many men by making a rash frontal attack on a strong wooden stockade, in direct violation of the commander-in-chief's orders. Gillespie, unaccustomed to mountain warfare, followed the tactics customary in the Indian plains, and paid the penalty. During the progress of the operations the Company's troops gained experience of the novel conditions, and learned how to make stockades for their own protection. Three other commanders wasted their efforts from sheer imbecility. The failures were partly compensated for by successes in Kumāon and on the upper Sutlaj. Colonels Nicholls and Gardner occupied Almora

in Kumāon, thus driving a wedge into the Gürkha territory, and General (Sir David) Ochterlony, who had defended Delhi against Holkar, operated from Lūdiāna with such skill that in May 1815 he compelled the brave Gürkha leader, Amar Singh, to surrender the fort of Malāon.

Treaty of Sagauli. A treaty was then signed, but at the last moment the government of Nepāl refused ratification, and hostilities were resumed. Sir David Ochterlony, advancing in February 1816 in strong force and with reasonable precautions, was soon in a position to threaten the capital, so that the enemy consented to ratify the treaty in its original form. That document, the treaty of Sagauli (Segowlee), signed in March 1816, provided for the cession by the Nepalese of Garhwāl and Kumāon to the west of the Kālī river, the surrender of most of the Tarāi,¹ withdrawal from Sikkim, and the acceptance of a British Resident at Kathmāndu, the capital. The clause requiring the admission of a Resident was more distasteful to the enemy than the loss of territory.

Advantages gained. The terms, although by no means harsh to the Nepalese, secured extremely important advantages to the British government and the people of India. The Kumaun (Kumāon) province, now organized as the Kumaun Division, comprising the Nainī Tāl, Almora, and Garhwāl Districts, has proved to be an acquisition of the highest value. The temperate climate, being suitable to European constitutions, has favoured the growth of large 'hill-stations', where a considerable population of pure Europeans and persons of mixed descent can settle permanently and rear families. Nainī Tāl, the summer capital of the government of the United Provinces, and Almora, are the principal of such settlements in Kumaun. The prosperity of the country has increased enormously since the annexation, which was warmly welcomed by the inhabitants. The Gürkha rule had been oppressive. The rapid growth of the revenue has materially helped the finances of India and the informal 'non-regulation' system of administration, which was wisely adopted, suits the peculiarities of the hillmen.

The Dehra Dūn District, including the hill station of Mussoorie subsequently formed, was also annexed.

The existing Simla District is made up of sundry patches of territory, some of which were obtained in 1815-16, and some at various later dates by amicable arrangements with hill chiefs. The first residence, a thatched wooden cottage, erected in 1819, was gradually followed by others. In 1827 Lord Amherst, then Governor-general, spent the summer at Simla, which in course of time developed into what it now is, the official capital of India for a large part of the year. A considerable tract ceded by the Nepalese was made over to the Rājā of Sikkim.

Peace unbroken. The peace concluded more than a century ago with Nepāl has never been broken. The kingdom, indeed,

¹ The Tarāi boundary was modified more than once later, and the frontier was defined by masonry pillars.

far from being hostile, may be regarded justly as one of the pillars of the Indian empire. During the Mutiny of 1857-9 Sir Jung Bahādur, then the Minister responsible for the government, rendered valuable assistance, which was suitably recognized by territorial concessions and in other ways. Almost immediately after the Nepalese war Gürkha soldiers began to enter the Company's army. An elaborate system of recruiting was developed subsequently by friendly agreement between the two governments, under which the Gürkha regiments have become one of the most efficient and trustworthy elements in the Indian army. Their services in many fields, and notably in France and elsewhere during the Great War, are more or less familiar to everybody. Gürkhas also enlist as military police and are highly esteemed in that capacity.

Internal independence of Nepāl. The government of the kingdom, while unswerving in its friendly attitude, is jealous of its independence, which it has managed to retain intact. The Resident does not attempt to interfere in the internal administration, and has to submit to considerable restriction on his movements. Most of the hill territory has not been visited by any European, and British subjects even of Indian birth are rarely admitted to the interior.

'The political status of Nepāl is somewhat difficult to define. It may be said to stand intermediate between Afghānistān and the Native States of India. The point of resemblance to Afghānistān is in the complete freedom which Nepāl enjoys in the management of its internal affairs, while in both countries foreign relations are controlled by the Indian Government. The analogy to the Native States is that, by treaty, Nepāl is obliged to receive a British Resident at Kātmāndu, and cannot take Europeans into service without the sanction of the Indian Government' (*I. G.*, 1908).

The situation is further complicated by the fact that Nepāl recognizes the nominal suzerainty of China as the result of ancient events. The acknowledgement takes, or recently took, the form of the dispatch every five years of a mission carrying presents to the Chinese Court. Possibly the establishment of the Chinese Republic may modify the practice.

Interest of Nepāl. The country is of exceptional interest for many reasons, and exploration would yield many valuable results to science, historical and physical; but the increase of knowledge gained by insisting on free access to the interior could not be purchased save at an excessive price. The existence of Nepalese Buddhism and an enormous Buddhist literature of a peculiar character was revealed by Mr. Brian H. Hodgson, who resided at Kātmāndu from 1820 to 1844, and conducted extensive researches which have placed a vast mass of material at the disposal of the learned. Nepāl offers special advantages for the study of the interaction of Buddhism and Brahmanical Hinduism as living religions and social systems.

Anarchy and robbers. The awful anarchy in Rājputāna

and Central India resulting from the refusal of the British government to assert itself as the paramount power waged unchecked, or almost unchecked, from 1805 to the close of Lord Minto's administration. Lord Minto undoubtedly would have been compelled to take strong action if he had remained in office. The outrages were the work of three distinct though closely related organizations—the Marāthās, the Pathāns, and the Pindāris.¹ The Marāthā chiefs, of whom Sindia, Holkar, and the Bhonsla of Nāgpur and Berār were the most prominent, each possessed considerable territories more or less defined in extent, which they used as a base from which to make predatory raids. Sir George Barlow gave them his licence to harry Rājputāna as much as they pleased, and they did not fail to make full use of their opportunities. The Marāthā armies were no longer recruited mainly from the Deccan, but included Muhammadans and Hindus of various classes and from diverse countries. The Pathān bands of Musalmān freebooters had at first no definite territory, and were content to plunder wherever they could find an opening, and to lend their swords to any chief who would provide pay and booty.

'The Pindarries, who had arisen, like masses of putrefaction in animal matter, out of the corruption of weak and expiring states, had fortunately none of those bonds of union which unite men in adversity. They had neither the tie of religious nor of national feeling. They were men of all lands and all religions. They had been brought together less by despair than by deeming the life of a plunderer, in the actual state of India, as one of small hazard, but great indulgence. . . . The Pindarries, when they came to a rich country, had neither the means nor inclination, like the Tartars, to whom also they have been compared, to settle and repose. Like swarms of locusts, acting from instinct, they destroyed and wasted whatever province they visited. Their chiefs had, from grants or usurpation, obtained small territorial possessions; but the revenues of their land were never equal to the maintenance of one-tenth part of their numbers, and they could, therefore, only be supported by plunder.'

They are supposed to have numbered 20,000 or 30,000 about the beginning of the nineteenth century; but all calculation of their numerical strength is fallacious, and, as Munro pointed out, contemporary reports showed a strong tendency to exaggerate their numbers. They were 'so amalgamated with the whole of the loose part of the military population of India, that it had become a system, not a particular force, that was to be subdued'.

They made their forays in bodies often numbering each two or three thousand horsemen under the command of a chosen leader, carrying neither tents nor baggage. They rode forty or fifty miles a day straight for their destination.

'They then divided, and made a clean sweep of all the cattle and property they could find: committing at the same time the most horrid atrocities, and destroying what they could not carry away. . . . The Pindarries who first settled in Central India may be said to have been introduced by the

¹ The word Pindārī or Pindāra seems to be Marāthī and to mean 'consumers of *pinda*', a fermented drink.

Mahrattas. Ghazee u Deen, a person who served under the first Bajerow [Bāji Rāo I, A. D. 1720-40], died when employed with a detachment at Oojain.¹

Subsequently the Pindārīs usually were loosely attached to the armies of either Sindia or Holkar.

‘Condemned from their origin to be the very scavengers of Mahrattas, their habits and character took, from the first, a shape suited to the work they had to perform. . . . All appear to have shared in the ignorance, the meanness, the rapacity, and unfeeling cruelty, by which they were, as a body, distinguished.’¹

In the time of Lord Hastings the three chief leaders were Chītū (Cheetoo), Wāsil Muhammad, and Karīm Khān. Chītū was a Mewātī, and professed allegiance to Daulat Rāo Sindia.

Pindārī atrocities. It is impossible to find space for a full description of the devastation wrought and the cruelties practised by the various classes of plunderers, but a few brief quotations from contemporary authors are indispensable in order to enable the reader to realize in an imperfect degree the horrors of those terrible years.

James Tod during his memorable term of service in Rājputāna from 1812 to 1823 enjoyed and used ample opportunities of witnessing the havoc wrought by the banditti of all classes and of watching the rapid reparation effected largely by his own exertions after the destruction of the robber hordes.

Describing Mewār as it was about A.D. 1817, he writes :

‘Expression might be racked for phrases which could adequately delineate the miseries all classes had endured. . . . The capital will serve as a specimen of the country. Oodipoor [Udaipur], which formerly reckoned fifty thousand houses within the walls, had not now three thousand houses occupied, the rest were in ruin, the rafters being taken for firewood. The realization of the spring harvest of 1818, from the entire fiscal land, was about £4,000 ! . . . Such was the chaos from which order was to be evoked . . . On the same day, and within eight months subsequent to the signature of the treaty, above three hundred towns and villages were *simultaneously* re-inhabited, and the land, which for many years had been a stranger to the plough-share, was broken up. . . . The chief commercial mart, Bhilwara, which showed not a vestige of humanity, rapidly rose from ruin, and in a few months contained twelve hundred houses, half of which were occupied by foreign merchants.’

A Marāthā chief named Ambājī extracted two millions sterling from Mewār in the course of eight years.²

‘The cruelties they [the Pindārīs] perpetrated were beyond belief . . . every one whose appearance indicated the probability of his possessing money was immediately put to the most horrid torture, till he either pointed out his hoard, or died under the infliction. Nothing was safe from the pursuit of Pindaree lust or avarice ; it was their common practice to burn and destroy what could not be carried away ; and, in the wantonness

¹ The quotations are from chap. x of Malcolm, *A Memoir of Central India*², 1832.

² *Annals of Mewār*, chap. xvii.

of barbarity, to ravish and murder women and children, under the eyes of their husbands and parents . . .

A favourite mode of compulsion with them was to put hot ashes into a bag, which they tied over the mouth and nostrils of their victim, whom they then thumped on the back till he inhaled the ashes. The effect on the lungs of the sufferer was such that few long survived the operation. Another common mode was to throw the victim on his back, and place a plank or beam across his chest, on which two people pressed with their whole weight.¹

Malcolm observes that

'the women of almost all the Mahomedan Pindarries dressed like Hindus, and worshipped Hindu deities. From accompanying their husbands in most of their excursions they became hardy and masculine : they were usually mounted on small horses or camels, and were more dreaded by the villagers than the men, whom they exceeded in cruelty and rapacity.'²

Raids on British territory. The Pindāris began to raid the Company's territory in 1812, when they harried Mirzapur and South Bihār. But for a long time both the home authorities and the members of council in Calcutta hesitated to take the necessary measures for the extermination of the plague. A fierce incursion early in 1816 into the northern Sarkārs settled the question. That region had enjoyed unbroken peace for half a century. In twelve days the brigands plundered 339 villages, 182 persons were cruelly killed, 505 severely wounded, and 3,603 subjected to different kinds of torture. Many women destroyed themselves in order to escape dishonour. But it is needless to pursue farther the tale of horror. Even the Directors were roused by the news, and in September they authorized the necessary measures of repression. Before that dispatch had been received, Lord Hastings, with his usual fearlessness, had made up his mind to act, sanction or no sanction, and to act effectively.

Diplomacy. The Governor-general understood fully the intimate nature of the relations between the powerful Marāthā chiefs and the plundering hordes of Pathāns and Pindāris. He laid his plans with a distinct consciousness that the operations directed primarily against the Pindārī lairs in the Narbadā Valley might develop, as they actually did, into a general Marāthā war ; and resolved that his preparations should be on a scale adequate for the final settlement of the problem. He supplemented his military arrangements by diplomacy, and succeeded in negotiating a subsidiary treaty with the regent of the Bhonsla's territory, known as Āpā Sāhib. The Rājā of Jaipur asked for protection, and Lord Hastings was willing to execute a treaty, but the Rājā drew back, and in the end was the last of the Rājput princes to come to terms with the British government. The Muhammadan Nawāb of Bhopāl signed a treaty, and proved to be a staunch and faithful ally. Since 1844 the state usually has been ruled by ladies. Sikandar Bēgam rendered signal services to the government of India in 1857. During the course of 1817 alliances were

¹ H. T. Prinsep, *History*, i. 39.

² *Central India*², ii. 177.

arranged with Udaipur (Mewār), Jodhpur (Mārwar), and Zālim Singh, the Regent of Kotah.¹ Bājī Rāo continued his usual game of perfidious intrigue, but had to sign a compact supplementary to the treaty of Basscin. Besides consenting to the outlawry of his guilty favourite Trimbakjī, who had foully murdered the Gaikwār's Brahman envoy, with the privity of the Pēshwā, Bājī Rāo was obliged to renounce his headship of the Marāthā confederacy, and to cede the Konkan province on the Bombay coast, with certain other territory and strongholds. Both the Pēshwā and Apā Sahib, who had become the Bhonsla ruler of Nāgpur by the murder of a rival, conspired incessantly to defeat the plans of the Governor-general. Negotiations with Sindia, Holkar, and Amīr Khān, the leader of the Pathān banditti, also were undertaken.

The army. Lord Hastings, while neglecting no diplomatic precaution, relied chiefly on his military preparations, conceived on a comprehensive scale and designed with true strategical genius. With a view to an energetic campaign during the cold season of 1817-18 he mobilized a great army of about 120,000 men with 300 guns. The European troops included in that total numbered about 13,000, namely 8,500 infantry, more than 2,000 cavalry, and the rest gunners. The entire force was divided into two armies, namely the Northern or Army of Hindostan, under the personal command of the Governor-general and commander-in-chief; and the Southern or Deccan Army, commanded by Sir Thomas Hislop, whose principal lieutenant was Sir John Malcolm. Both Sir Thomas Hislop and Sir John Malcolm were invested with extensive political powers.

Strategy. The plan of the operations, the most extensive ever conducted in India before or since, may be described as a vast encircling movement.

* The Pindārīs were to be rooted out of their haunts which lay in Mālwa, somewhat to the east of Ujjain, north of the Narbadā and between Bhopāl and the dominions of Sindia and Holkar; to accomplish this it had been decided to surround them on all sides—on the north and east from Bengal, on the south from the Deccan, and on the west from Gujarāt—and to keep the native states in check. An extended movement, therefore, was about to be made inwards, from the circumference of a great circle, whose centre was somewhere near Handiā [in the Allahabad District], and whose diameter was nearly 700 miles in length; the enormous distances which separated the different bases of operations, the absence of rapid means of inter-communication, and the necessity of simultaneous action, all contributed to render the task which had been undertaken an exceedingly difficult one.'

Sindia isolated. Lord Hastings reached Cawnpore by the river route in September 1817, and at the end of October advanced to the Sind river in Bundēlkhand.² Sir Thomas Hislop took up his

¹ The strange story of that 'consummate politician', Zālim Singh, the blind Regent, who ruled Kotah for sixty years, should be read in Tod's lively narrative.

² The Sind river rises in the Tonk state, flows through Central India and Bundēlkhand, and falls into the Jumna.

central position near Handiā in November. It is hardly necessary to state explicitly that the Pēshwā, Sindia, and all other Marāṭhā chiefs were hostile, and prepared to violate any engagements into which they had been constrained to enter. Sindia was isolated by clever strategical movements and effectually neutralized during the war, much against his inclination.

Cholera. The operations suffered a check in November from a violent outbreak of cholera in the camp of Lord Hastings, which lasted in a virulent form for ten days, causing much mortality and many desertions. The epidemic, first observed in the delta of the Ganges at the beginning of the rainy season of 1817, killed two hundred people a day in Calcutta for some time in September, and gradually crept up country, attacking the crowded camp of Lord Hastings with exceptional severity. The whole encampment was a hospital, and about one-tenth of its occupants perished, including many personal servants of the Governor-general and his historian. The disease abated when the camp moved to healthier ground, but the epidemic spread over a large part of the world, and, with fluctuations, lasted for twenty years.

Popular belief sometimes erroneously represents the epidemic of 1817 as the first appearance of cholera in India. The disease, however, had been observed as early as the seventeenth century, and had been extremely fatal to Colonel Pearse's detachment when marching to Madras in 1781.

End of the Pindāris. By the end of 1817 the primary object of the campaign had been almost accomplished, the Pindāris having been driven out of Mālwa and across the Chambal. A month later, towards the close of January 1818, all the organized bands of Pindāris had been annihilated, and the time had come for inducing the remnants to settle down to a quiet life. Karīm Khān surrendered and was granted the estate of Ganēshpur, then in the Gorakhpur, and now in the Bastī District, where his descendants still reside. Wāsil Muhammad, who had taken refuge with Sindia, and was surrendered by that prince, committed suicide while in captivity. Chītū (Cheetoo), the most formidable of the three conspicuous leaders, was hunted with unremitting vigour until he was driven into a jungle near Asirgarh, where a tiger devoured him. Thus the Pindāris were finally disposed of. Amīr Khān, the Pathān chief, was made happy by the grant of the principality or Nawābī of Tonk.

Battle of Kirkee. The Pēshwā, who, as already observed, had been hostile throughout, assembled a large force near Poona. Mr. Elphinstone, the Resident, and Colonel Burr, commanding the troops, found it necessary to retire to Kirkee (Khadkī), four miles to the north-west of the city. Bājī Rāo then burnt the Residency, and on November 5, 1817, attacked with about 26,000 men the force under Colonel Burr, which did not exceed 2,800. The attack lasted from four in the afternoon until dark, when the Pēshwā retired after suffering heavy losses. Reinforcements arrived and the British reoccupied Poona.

Battles of Sitābaldī and Nāgpur. Āpā Sahib Bhonsla presently followed the Pēshwā's example by assailing Mr. Jenkins, the Resident at Nāgpur, who had only about 1,400 men at his disposal, comprised in two weak regiments of Madras infantry, three squadrons of Bengal cavalry, and the European gunners of four six-pounders. That small force took up its position on the ridge known as Sitābaldī, consisting of two eminences connected by a narrow neck. Āpā Sahib's army of about 18,000 men, including 4,000 Arabs, and supported by thirty-six guns, attacked on the night of November 26. The fight continued the next day. The assailants were on the point of overwhelming the weary garrison, when Captain Fitzgerald made two brilliant charges with his tiny force of cavalry and converted defeat into victory. The gallant defenders had more than a quarter of their number killed or wounded during the action which lasted for eighteen hours. A few days later reinforcements arrived and Āpā Sahib surrendered. His troops, refusing to acknowledge defeat, fought another battle close to the city of Nāgpur on December 16, which resulted in their total rout with the loss of their camp, elephants, and guns.

Deposition of the Bhonsla. The Governor-general rightly decided on the deposition of the faithless Āpā Sahib, and the annexation of his dominions lying to the north of the Narbadā, which became known as the Sāgar (Saugor) and Narbadā Territories.

Battle of Mahīdpur. The operations against Holkar were conducted by Sir Thomas Hislop with the aid of Sir John Malcolm. Attempts at negotiations failed, and the murder of Tulsi Bāi, the Regent, by the soldiers under the command of a Pathān named Ghafūr Khān on the morning of December 20, made a fight inevitable. On the same day the British commander forded the Sīprā river, to the north of Ujjain, and carried the enemy's position at the point of the bayonet. Holkar's guns, which were well served, inflicted heavy losses, 174 killed and 606 wounded, on the victorious army. The loss of the enemy was estimated at 3,000. The battle is described by the military historian as having been 'the only general action of primary order in India since 1804'. Holkar attempted no further resistance and signed the required treaty on January 6, 1818.

Battle of Ashtī. The Pēshwā's army, which had been hotly pursued and was under the command of Bāpū Gokhale (Gokla), a brave officer, was forced to give battle on February 20, 1818, at Ashtī or Ashta, now in the Sholāpur District, Bombay. The action, fought solely by cavalry on both sides, resulted in a complete victory for the Company's troops gained with extremely slight loss. The Marāthā general was killed, the Pēshwā became a fugitive, and the titular Rājā of Sātārā, the representative of Sivājī, was captured.

End of the war ; Koregāon. The fights above described in outline—at Kirkee, Sitābaldī, Nāgpur, Mahīdpur, and Ashtī—decided the war, but considerable subsidiary operations remained, which were accomplished in due course. The fortress of Asīrgarh did not capitulate until April 1819, after standing a short siege. The

wonderful defence of Koregāon (Koregaum) for eleven hours on January 1, 1818, by Captain Staunton, with 500 Bombay native infantry, 250 irregular cavalry, and two six-pounders served by twenty-four European gunners from Madras, against the whole army of the Pēshwā, numbering more than 20,000, merits a passing notice. The little garrison suffered 276 casualties. The action, called the 'Indian Thermopylae' by Tod, is commemorated by a stone obelisk at the village. Except at Mahīdpur, where the European element in the army of the commander-in-chief was considerable, the actions in the fourth Marāthā war were won almost exclusively by native Indian troops under the command of trusted British officers. No soldiers could have done better than the men who defended Kirkee, Sītābaldī, and Koregāon.

Surrender of the Pēshwā. Bājī Rāo, finding resistance or even escape hopeless, had surrendered on June 3, 1818, to Sir John Malcolm, who entered into wholly unnecessary negotiations, and granted him the excessive annuity of eight lakhs (800,000) of rupees a year. The Governor-general, knowing that the fugitive must have surrendered at discretion and that he was not in a position to argue about terms, disapproved of Malcolm's action, but felt bound to confirm it officially. The question concerning the propriety of Malcolm's proceedings evoked much difference of opinion. Personally I agree with Grant Duff and Lord Hastings in holding that Sir John allowed his feelings of compassion for fallen greatness to overbear his judgement. Bājī Rāo, a perjured, vicious coward, possessed no personal claim whatever to the absurdly generous treatment which he received. The office of Pēshwā having been extinguished, Bājī Rāo was allowed to reside at Bithūr, a sacred place near Cawnpore, where he lived for many years. His adopted son, known as Nānā Sahib, gained an infamous immortality in the Mutiny.


Political settlement. The political settlement resulting from the war was planned by Lord Hastings on broad lines, as his strategy had been, and in a comprehensive spirit which took count of all the conditions of the complex problem. He desired a permanent, not merely a temporary settlement, which should secure general peace under the avowed paramount control of the British government, with the minimum of interference in the internal affairs of states allowed to retain their autonomy. No native state within India proper could any longer claim absolute independence.

Paramount power established. Prinsep, writing in 1824 or 1825, observes

'that the universal extension of the British influence has been attended with advantage to the people of India is a proposition not likely to be combated at the present day. The different state of Malwa, and of all provinces recently brought within its range, as viewed now that the system has had five years trial, compared with the condition of the same countries in 1817-18, establishes the fact incontestably. . . . But we may be allowed to observe, that such a result could not have been produced by the simple extirpation of the Plindarees, and suppression of the predatory system ;

without the general controlling government established at the same time, the relief must have been temporary, and the effect would before this have disappeared.'

Rājput states and Mālwa. The same judicious and well-informed author shows the necessity for a certain amount of control over the Rājput states and of interference in their affairs.



COLONEL TOD AND HIS JAIN PUNDIT.

'Independently of quarrels and wars prosecuted from motives of ambition or avarice, there were hereditary feuds and jealousies between the different tribes of Rajpoots, the Kychuhas [Kachhiwahas], for instance, and the Rhatōrs, both these again, and the Chouhans, which must for ever have prevented their living together in harmony without a general sense of the necessity of submitting to the behest of a controlling power.'

The same reasoning applied to Mālwa. The problem of each state was separately examined, discussed, and decided with the aid of a group of exceptionally able officers, including Metcalfe,

Malcolm, Elphinstone, Tod, and many others. The sympathetic labours of Tod in Rājputāna are recorded for all time in his immortal *Annals*. The decisions were embodied in a long series of treaties, beginning with Kotah and ending with Jaipur or Ambār. Full details will be found in the special treatises cited at the end of this chapter.

Marāthā states. Among the greater Marāthā chiefs, Sindia and Holkar were fortunate enough to retain considerable kingdoms and to be allowed a large measure of independence. Holkar was further lucky in securing the services of a competent minister named Tantia Jōg. The foundations put down by Lord Hastings were well and truly laid. The present representatives of all the dynasties embraced in the comprehensive system devised by the Governor-general are faithful supporters of the paramount power, yielding willing homage to the person of their King-Emperor, and, as a rule, administering their dominions, whether small or large, with sufficient regard to equity.

Abolition of the Pēshwā. The Governor-general, after very mature consideration of the question, decided

‘in favour of the total expulsion of Bajee Rao from the Dukhun, the perpetual exclusion of his family from any share of influence or dominion, and the annihilation of the Pēshiwa’s name and authority for ever’.

He felt that those stern measures were warranted by the uniformly insidious conduct of Bājī Rāo, who had violated all engagements and placed himself at the head of the confederation against the British power, choosing the moment for treacherous defection which seemed to him the most critical. No less penalty would have sufficed as ‘a warning example to the sovereigns of India, and an awful lesson on the consequences of incurring the full measure of our just indignation’. The measure adopted was unexpected, and the intended lesson was learnt by all concerned.

Sātārā. A concession was made to Marāthā opinion by the reservation of a small area around Sātārā in the Western Ghāts as a separate semi-independent principality for the descendant of Sivājī captured at Ashtī. The experiment was not a success. The principality was suppressed in 1848 by Lord Dalhousie and now forms a District of the Bombay Presidency. Grant Duff, who was placed by Lord Hastings in charge of the Rājā, collected the materials for his invaluable *History of the Mahrattas* while employed at Sātārā.

The Bhonsla. The perfidy and crimes of Āpā Sahib Bhonsla fully justified his deposition and the annexation of the Sāgar and Narbadā Territories. A new Rājā was set up in the regions south of the river under British control. In 1853 Lord Dalhousie applied the doctrine of lapse and annexed the whole of the Bhonsla dominions, which, with certain additions, now constitute the Central Provinces, Nāgpur being the official capital. Care should be taken not to confound the Central Provinces with Central India, a group of Native or Protected States, roughly corresponding with the ancient Mālwā, and including the dominions of Sindia and

Holkar.¹ The Agent to the Governor-general resides at Indore, Holkar's capital.

An elastic 'non-regulation' system of administration was judiciously applied to the Sāgar and Narbadā Territories, which are familiar to all readers of Sleeman's fascinating *Rambles and Recollections*.

Conclusion. This chapter may be fitly closed by quoting the passage with which Prinsep concludes his 'Political Review', published in 1825 :

'The struggle which has thus ended in the universal establishment of the British influence is particularly important and worthy of attention, as it promises to be the last we shall ever have to maintain with the native powers of India. Henceforward this epoch will be referred to as that whence each of the existing states will date the commencement of its peaceable settlement, and the consolidation of its relations with the controlling power. The dark age of trouble and violence, which so long spread its malign influence over the fertile regions of Central India, has thus ceased from this time ; and a new era has commenced, we trust, with brighter prospects—an era of peace, prosperity, and wealth at least, if not of political liberty and high moral improvement.'

The validity of the prediction that no further struggle with the native powers of India need occur is not affected by Lord Ellenborough's momentary and probably unnecessary fights with Sindia's army in 1843 ; nor by the annexations of Sind and the Panjāb, provinces lying outside the limits of India proper and in 1825 really independent.

Since Prinsep wrote, some progress in the evolution of 'political liberty' has been effected, and not a few signs of 'high moral improvement' may be noted by a sympathetic observer.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Hastings (Earl of Moira) Governor-general	(Oct.) 1813
War with Nepāl	1814-16
Treaty of Sagauli (Segowlee)	1816
Pindāri and Marāthā war	1817-19
Battles of Kirkee, Sitābaldī, Nāgpur, and Mahīdpur	1817
Defence of Koregāon ; battle of Ashti ; political settlement	1818
Capitulation of Asīrgarh	1819

The three Marāthā Wars

FIRST, 1775-82 : Warren Hastings Governor-general ; Convention of Wargāon, 1778 ; capture of Gwālior, 1780 ; treaty of Sālbaī, 1782.


SECOND, 1803-5 : Lord Wellesley Governor-general ; capture of Aligarh ; battles of Delhi, Assaye, Laswāri, Argāon, and Deeg ; treaties of Deogāon and Surjī Arjūngāon ; siege of Bhurtpore.

THIRD, 1817-19 : Lord Hastings Governor-general ; battles of Kirkee, Sitābaldī, Nāgpur, Mahīdpur, and Ashti ; defence of Koregāon ; capitulation of Asīrgarh ; abolition of the Pēshwā ; ended by general political settlement and about twenty treaties.

(The brief conflict with Sindia's army in 1843 is not counted as a Marāthā war.)

¹ The term Central India was officially applied at first to Mālwa alone, but is now used so as to include the states in the Bundēlkhand and Baghēlkhand Political Agencies.

THE FAMILY OF THE SEVEN PESHWĀS



AUTHORITIES

The two leading contemporary printed authoritative works on the wars of the Marquess of Hastings are (1) *Memoir of the Operations of the British Army in India during the Mahratta War of 1817, 1818, and 1819*, by Lt.-Col. VALENTINE BLACKER, Q.M.G. of the army of the Deccan, quarto, London, 1821, which gives full professional details ; and (2) *History of the Political and Military Transactions in India during the Administration of the Marquess of Hastings, 1813-1823*, by HENRY T. PRINSEP, B.C.S., Assistant Secretary to the Governor-general, 2 vols., 8vo, London, 1825 ; based on an earlier quarto work published in 1820. The book ends with a political and financial review.

The Marquess of Hastings, K. G., by Major ROSS-OF-BLADENSBURG (Rulers of India, 1893), is a well-written and lucid summary of the whole history. WILSON devotes the entire third volume of his *History* (vol. 8 of Mill and continuation) to the administration of the Marquess, which is treated at considerable length in several histories by other authors, MALCOLM, MARSHMAN, THORNTON, &c. The *Private Journal* of the Marquess, edited by his daughter, the Marchioness of Bute, 2 vols., London, 1858, and a *Summary* published by the Marquess himself in 1824 give further particulars.

BOOK VIII

THE RULE OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY FROM 1819 TO 1858

CHAPTER 1

The Marquess of Hastings continued ; reconstruction and internal reforms ; Mr. Adam and the press ; Lord Amherst ; the first Burmese War.

Abominable Marāthā system. The admiration felt and expressed by many Hindus for Sivāji may be explained easily and justified partially by many reasons, notwithstanding his glaring crimes of violence and treachery. Bājī Rāo and the other Marāthā chiefs at the close of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century are not entitled to either respect or esteem. With the solitary exception of one woman, Ahalyā Bāī, they rarely possessed any discernible virtues, while they were all stained by perfidy, cruelty, rapacity, and most of the other vices. The abominable system of government which they administered was incapable of effecting any benefit to or improvement of mankind in any direction.

‘The contempt of all morality, in their political arrangements, was with the Mahrattas avowed and shameless.’

The constitution of their government and army was

‘more calculated to destroy, than to create an empire. . . . The Mahrattas, from their feeling and policy as well as from those habits of predatory warfare on which the whole construction of their government was founded, were the natural enemies of the British power. There could be no lasting peace between states whose object and principles of government were always in collision.’¹

In short, the Marāthās were robbers by profession, whose activities could not be endured by decent neighbours. They were openly leagued with all the ruffians who came to the front in a time of disorder, and the suppression of their lawless rule was the first duty of that government which, in spite of itself, had become the controlling power in India.

The complete and final overthrow of the Marāthā domination in 1818 should not excite the slightest feeling of regret or sympathy in the breast of any person, Indian or European. Nobody who possesses even a slight acquaintance with the facts of history can doubt that the utter destruction of the Marāthā capacity for evil

¹ The proposition applies to the case of the Central Empires against the world in 1918.

and the substitution of orderly government were necessary and of incalculable benefit to India.¹

The merit of Lord Hastings. It is the peculiar merit of Lord Hastings that he realized both the necessity and the benefit. His comprehensive mind provided with ample sufficiency the means needed to ensure the indispensable preliminary destruction of a wholly evil system,² and worked out with equal grasp of realities the measures best calculated for the construction of a new and lasting fabric. His work lives after him. The existing pleasant relations between the surviving Marāthā states and the government of India stand on the foundations well and truly laid by the Marquess of Hastings. The ill faith of the Pēshwā and the Bhonsla met its just reward. Sindia and Holkar, who could not reasonably have complained if they too had been condemned to heavy penalties, were wisely left in a position where they were able to reap immense advantages immediately. Holkar's revenue rose in a few years from a pitiful sum of barely four lakhs to thirty-five lakhs a year. Sindia soon found himself the master of a profitable kingdom. He ceded Ajmēr, the strategical key to Rājputāna, receiving other districts in exchange, so that on the whole he did not lose territory, and had every reason to be satisfied with the treatment he received. Everywhere towns and villages sprang up from their ashes, and the returning ryot soon created revenue for the prince in amounts immeasurably exceeding the precarious gains of predatory raids.

Variety of transactions. Even during the progress of the wars which chiefly occupied the earlier years of his administration, Lord Hastings engaged, to use Wilson's words, in

a variety of transactions . . . , which, although of minor moment, involved objects of considerable magnitude, arising from the determination to preserve the tranquillity of India undisturbed; from the necessity still existing of shielding maritime commerce from piratical depredations;

¹ It may be well to support the propositions in the text as based on Malcolm's writings by the equally competent testimony of Sir Thomas Munro:

'The Mahratta Government, from its foundation, has been one of the most destructive that ever existed in India. It never relinquished the predatory spirit of its founder, Sewajee. That spirit grew with its power; and when its empire extended from the Ganges to the Caverry, this nation was little better than a horde of imperial thieves. All other Hindoo states took a pride in the improvement of the country, and in the construction of pagodas, tanks, canals, and other public works. The Mahrattas have done nothing of this kind; their work has been chiefly desolation. They did not seek their revenue in the improvement of the country, but in the exactions of the established *chout* from their neighbours, and in predatory incursions to levy more' (Gleig, *Life*², ii. 14).

Those propositions are absolutely true without qualification.

² 'Nothing is so expensive as war carried on with inadequate means. It entails all the expense without the advantages of war' (Sir Thomas Munro in Gleig, *Life*², ii. 371).

from the duty of providing for British as well as Indian interests in the eastern seas ;

and from treaty relations with the Native States.

Suppression of piracy. The annexation of the Pēshwā's territory involved the adjustment of relations with the Konkan districts lying between the Western Ghāts and the sea. The pirate chiefs, who had been incompletely chastised in 1812, were thoroughly subjected in 1820, and required to cede the remainder of the coast between Kolhāpur and Goa. The measures adopted 'extinguished all vestiges of the piratical practices for which this part of the coast of India had been infamous, since the days of Roman commerce'.

Effective operations against the pirates of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf were also carried out.

Affairs of Cutch. The Rāo of Cutch (Kacchh), the peninsula lying to the north of Kāthiawār, and separated from the mainland by the 'Runn' (Ran), formerly an arm of the sea, had been caught in the wide sweep of the net of treaties. He soon grew tired of control, and early in 1819 began hostilities. A small force of Company's troops, aided by the nobles of the state, who were opposed to the Rāo, captured Bhūj, the capital. The Rāo surrendered, and was deposed by Lord Hastings. An infant prince was appointed in his place, and the administration was conducted by a regency under the control of the Resident until 1834. The proceedings alarmed the Amcers of Sind, and war with them was averted only by the forbearance of the Governor-general under provocation.

Earthquakes. Although the country of Cutch has suffered much from famine, pestilence, and earthquakes, it is now tolerably prosperous, and is governed on modern lines. The practice of female infanticide, once terribly prevalent, has been materially checked, if not suppressed. Shortly after the capture of Bhūj the principality endured a series of earthquake shocks, about a hundred in number, which lasted from June 16 to November 23, 1819. A large portion of the Western Runn subsided, including the small town of Sindri, which disappeared under the waters. In some places the land appears to have risen. The changes of level due to earth movements in Cutch, the Runn, and the neighbouring Indian desert have transformed the face of the country during historical times.

Sir Bartle Frere observes :

'From the frontiers of Sirhind to Jeysulmere, the Thurr [Thar, or Indian Desert] contains frequent traces of ancient watercourses which once flowed where no stream now flows even in the heaviest rains ; and ruins of ancient towns and villages, which have for ages been utterly deserted, prove that the country in former days was more populous, and contained more water and cultivation than at present.

Further south similar indications are very frequent, though owing to the want of permanent buildings in the Thurr itself they are more frequently met with in the plain country east and west of it. Thus the plain

between Hyderabad and Oomercote [‘Umarkōt, Amercote] presents everywhere indications of having been thickly populated as far back as the Bhuddist period, and well irrigated by canals from the Indus, which no longer carry water in consequence of a slight change in the relative levels of the Indus and the plain to be irrigated.’¹

Students of the movements of Alexander the Great and other events in ancient story must bear such facts in mind.

Singapore. The ministers in London had never taken much interest in the conquest of Java, or cordially supported the far-seeing policy of Lord Minto and Sir Stamford Raffles. When the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815 freed Holland from French domination and restored the independence of the country, the Cabinet was glad to get rid of Java and hand it back to the Dutch unconditionally. No pains were taken either to maintain the engagements made by the British with the Javanese chiefs or to secure the interests of British commerce in the Archipelago. The Dutch were alleged to have allowed themselves to be

‘actuated by a spirit of ambition, by views of boundless aggrandizement and rapacity, and by a desire to obtain the power of monopolizing the commerce of the eastern archipelago’.

They were credited with the will to resume their traditional exclusive policy, which had led to the massacre of Amboyna two centuries earlier.

Lord Hastings, wiser than his masters in Europe, saw the necessity of securing a safe trade route with China and the Far East. He approved the proposition of Raffles to acquire the island of Singapore at the extremity of the Malay Peninsula, which was occupied accordingly in 1819, much to the annoyance of the Dutch. The foresight of the Governor-general and his enthusiastic lieutenant has been justified abundantly. The island wilderness of 1819, tenanted by a handful of poor Malay fisher-folk, is now the noble colony of Singapore, with a population of 309,185 in 1911. The city, with its capacious harbour situated in a position dominating the Straits of Malacca, the principal gate to the Far East, and strongly fortified, is ‘the port of call for practically all the shipping of the eastern world’. Before the Great War, 11,000 vessels, with a tonnage of about fifteen million tons, passed in and out of the port each year. ‘A stupendous revenue’ is raised from tin mining and opium, and the population includes an astonishing variety of races and nationalities, among whom eight different classes of industrious Chinese are the most prominent.

The occupation of Singapore by Lord Hastings was a service to the empire hardly second to his unification of India and the consolidation of the British authority in that country. Now that Japan and the United States are in alliance with Great Britain (1918) it is needless to dilate upon the strategical importance and commercial value of Singapore.

¹ ‘Notes on the Runn of Cutch and neighbouring region,’ p. 193 of reprint dated 1870 from ? *Geographical Journal*. See also Raverty, ‘The Mihrān of Sind’ (*J. A. S. B.*, 1892, vol. lxi, part i, pp. 456–66).

A few years after the occupation of the port the difficulties with the Dutch were settled by friendly agreement—the British government giving up its settlements in Sumatra in exchange for the Dutch settlements in India.

Singapore is the leading element in the Straits Settlement Colony, which has received many extensions since the time of Lord Hastings. A competent writer affirms that

‘a complete history of that extension and growth, and the devious ways by which they have been brought about, would make a fascinating tale and a long one’.


The ancient port of Malacca, which seemed to have closed its honourable career, has been revived by the development of the rubber industry. Penang, too, which had superseded Malacca for a time, is now prosperous, although far inferior to Singapore. The whole colony is extraordinarily progressive, with infinite possibilities. But it is now administered, like Ceylon, under the control of the Colonial Office, and its development does not directly concern the history of India.¹

Various occurrences. The dealings of the Governor-general with the protected states other than those of Rājputāna and Mālwa were ordinarily marked by discretion and forbearance. But his encouraging the Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh to assume the royal title in defiance of the shadowy authority of the Pādshāh of Delhi was generally regarded as a mistake. The Nizam refused to take the same liberty. In 1816 the people of Cuttack (Katak) in Orissa were driven to rebellion by over-assessment, undue enhancement of the salt tax, and the chicanery of Bengālī underlings, who defrauded the ignorant inhabitants. When the necessary military operations took place, the insurgents submitted promptly in reliance on a promise that their grievances would be remedied. The promise was faithfully redeemed by the reduction of the excessive taxation and the establishment of a sympathetic administration under a special commissioner. The province has never been disturbed again.

The titular emperor. Lord Hastings stopped the presentation of *nazars* (*nuzurs*), or formal presents offered to a superior, which it had been the practice for

the head of the government to tender to the titular emperor. He rightly held ‘such a public testimony of dependence and subservience’ to be irreconcilable with any rational system of policy when the paramount authority of the British government had been openly proclaimed and established. With strange incon-

¹ The island was finally taken over from India and the Crown Colony organized in 1867.



Murshidābād half-rupee.

sistency the Company's coinage was allowed to bear the name and titles of Shāh Ālam until 1835, when Act XVII prescribed a new coinage with European devices.¹

Bareilly outbreak. Nearly at the same time as the Cuttack insurrection a dangerous outbreak occurred at Bareilly in Rohilkhand, the immediate provocation being the imposition of a small municipal tax. Other grievances also came into play, and a Muhammadan Mufti having taken the lead the usual cry of 'religion in danger' was raised. An inoffensive young English gentleman was murdered, and the insurgents fought the troops with such fury that they lost more than three hundred killed. The casualties among the troops were twenty-one killed and sixty-two wounded. The incident deserves notice because it is a good illustration of the way in which the unexpected happens in India, and of the facility with which an ordinary complaint against the administration can be used to excite a fanatical outburst of religious enthusiasm. The reader may remember that in Lord Minto's time the differences between the Hindu minister and the British Resident in Travancore were similarly utilized as the foundation for a war of religion.

The lesson of Hathrās. In the next year (1817) Dayarām, a zemindar in the Aligarh District, who had shown a contumacious spirit, refused to dismantle his fortress at Hathrās. Lord Hastings, who was then preparing for the Pindārī war, took measures which left nothing to chance and soon rendered the fort untenable by means of an incessant shower of bombs from forty-two mortars. The Governor-general, who was his own commander-in-chief, had satisfied himself at an early date that considerations of false economy had unduly limited the use of artillery, and had caused failures at Bhurtpore and elsewhere. He was resolved not to repeat the error. The lesson taught by the speedy fall of Hathrās did not need repetition.

Public works, education, and finance. The Marquess resumed the much-needed improvements in Calcutta, which had been suspended since the departure of Lord Wellesley. He also repaired an ancient canal, and thus secured a good water supply for Delhi. Generally, throughout the country, he paid attention to roads and bridges, a subject neglected by previous administrations. He was steadfastly opposed to the ignoble policy of keeping the natives of the country in ignorance, which had strenuous supporters at the India House.

'This Government', he boldly declared, 'never will be influenced by the erroneous position that to spread information among men is to render them less tractable and less submissive to authority. . . . It would be treason to British sentiment to imagine that it ever could be the principle of this

¹ See Thurston, *History of the Coinage of the E. I. Co.* (Madras, 1890); and J. M. C. Johnston, 'Coinage of the East India Company' (*Num. Chron.*, 1903, p. 71, Pl. III). In 1827 Lord Amherst permitted the gentlemen of his suite to present 'nuzzurs', but did not himself tender any.

Government to perpetuate ignorance in order to secure paltry and dishonest advantages over the blindness of the multitude.'

Those liberal sentiments, far in advance of the ideas current at the time, were translated into action. Both the Marquess and Lady Hastings established schools, to which they made generous contributions from their own purse, and the Governor-general accepted the office of patron of a college founded by Bengālī gentlemen. His action in regard to the press will be noticed more conveniently in connexion with the administration of Mr. Adam.

Finance, notwithstanding the long-continued wars on a large scale, was managed so well that government bonds, which stood at 12 per cent. discount in 1813, rose to 14 per cent. premium ten years later.

Reforms begun. The publication in 1812 of the *Fifth Report*, discussed in an earlier chapter of this work, and the elaborate debates on the renewal of the charter in 1813 reopened all the problems of Indian administration, which demanded still further reconsideration in consequence of the upheaval caused by the destruction of the Marāthā power in 1818. Efforts were made in all the older British possessions to reform the abuses in the judicial system, civil and criminal; and some progress was made in reversing the mistaken policy of Lord Cornwallis, which excluded men of Indian birth from all responsible or decently paid office. Lord Hastings was keenly alive to the necessity of reform; and several of his lieutenants entertained the most sensible and enlightened opinions.

In Bengal official opinion opposed extensive change in the judicial arrangements, but something was done to remedy abuses by increasing the number of courts and enhancing the powers of Indian officials. At the instance of the directors a determined attempt was made in Madras to revive the old system of *panchāyats*, or native juries of neighbours, for the settlement of disputes, which produced little result owing to the unwillingness of the people to serve.

The rigorous separation between the judicial and revenue services on which Lord Cornwallis had laid so much stress was abolished, and the offices of collector and district magistrate were combined in every presidency at various dates, in some cases after the departure of Lord Hastings. Generally speaking the employment of natives of the country in positions of considerable authority was slowly extended. As new territory was acquired the absurdity of introducing a complicated code of English laws among communities wholly unprepared to receive it began to be recognized, and the necessity for a simpler, more elastic form of administration was acknowledged. The 'non-regulation' system for the government of newly acquired or backward territory was developed in the time of Lord Amherst, but its application had begun during the term of office of Lord Hastings. We have seen how Cuttack was quieted at once the moment that a reasonable system for the management of rude people was introduced by a special commissioner.

Settlement problems. The complex problem of land 'settlement' in every province came under review. In the territories now known as the Province of Agra an extremely elaborate system of survey and assessment was enacted by Regulation VII of 1822, which failed because it was too elaborate to work in practice. Ten years after the departure of Lord Hastings, Regulation IX of 1833 laid the foundation of the modern system of 'settlement' in Upper India.

The proposal to make 'permanent settlements' the general rule in all provinces was often mooted, and at times was on the point of being decreed. It was not finally negatived until 1883. 'Settlements' are now most commonly sanctioned for periods of either thirty or twenty years.

Munro's 'ryotwar settlement'. The name of Sir Thomas Munro—a man equally distinguished as a soldier and an administrator—who was perhaps the wisest of the many brilliant officers who served Lord Hastings,¹ is specially associated with the 'ryotwar settlement' of the greater part of the Madras Presidency, which he is often alleged erroneously to have 'introduced' during his service in various capacities before 1820 and as Governor of Madras from 1820 to 1827.

Writing in 1825 he warmly repudiated the charge of having invented or introduced 'the Rayetwar system, which, though the old system of the country, is by some strange misapprehension regarded in England as a new one'. He proceeded to explain that official opinion had been unduly biased by familiarity with the Bengal zemindārī system, which was unknown in Madras, except in the Northern Sarkārs (Circars).

'The greater part of our [Madras] territories have been acquired from Native Princes who did not employ Zemindars, and who collected the revenue, as we now do, from the Rayets, by means of Tishildars, receiving a monthly salary, and appointed and dismissed at pleasure. Most of our provinces have in ancient times been surveyed and assessed; but as the accounts have in general been altered or lost, we make a new survey and assessment, in order that we may know the resources of the country; and in order that every Rayet may know the exact amount of his assessment, and thus be protected against any extra demand. . . . It is our business to let the distribution of property remain as we find it, and not attempt to force it into larger masses upon any theoretical notion of convenience or improvement. There are many Rayets who have not more than four or five acres; there are some who have four or five thousand. Between these extremes, there are great numbers who have from one [hundred] to five hundred.'²

¹ Canning declared that 'Europe never produced a more accomplished statesman, nor India, fertile as it was in heroes, a more skillful soldier'. In 1824 Munro stated that 'I have introduced no new system either in the revenue or the judicial department. . . . I have never wished to introduce any new system of revenue, but I wish in all cases to have no renters, but to collect directly from the occupants or owners, whether they are small or great. Renters are no necessary part of any revenue system' (Gleig, *op. cit.*, ii. 205).

² Gleig, *Life*², ii, 268.

The system. 'The basis of this system is the division of the whole area into fields by a cadastral survey, each field being valued at a fixed rate per acre and the assessment settled thereon. A holding is one or more of such fields or of their recognized subdivisions. The registered occupant of each field deals directly with Government, and so long as he pays the assessment he is entitled to hold the land for ever and cannot be ejected by Government, though he himself may, in any year, increase or diminish his holding or entirely abandon it; should the land be required for a public purpose, it must be bought at 15 per cent. above its market value. Inheritance, transfer, mortgage, sale, and lease are without restriction; private improvements involve no addition, either present or future, to the assessment. Waste land may be taken up by any person, under the rules laid down, and once granted to a ryot it is his as long as he pleases.'¹

Munro, who laid down the general principle so contrary to the views of Lord Cornwallis, that 'no theoretical improvement should make us abandon what is supported by experience', was right in maintaining the *ryotwar* system of 'settlement'. But the assessments made in his time and for long afterwards were far too high, and the Madras practice of collection was disfigured by cruel severities, which he did something to modify. The modern system dates only from 1855, and differs from that of Munro's time in several important particulars, notably in the ryot's absolute freedom to relinquish his land, and in the full protection given to private improvements. The assessments have been largely reduced, and the penalty of imprisonment for default is no longer enforced. The Madras system as now worked seems to be excellent, but I have not any personal experience of its operation.

Bombay system. The Bombay system has a general resemblance to that of Madras,

'but the actual holdings are to a large extent grouped into small "survey numbers" with practically immutable boundaries, which are solidly and carefully marked out upon the ground; and in Bombay this fact constitutes so characteristic a feature of the revenue system that the occupant who holds a survey number on the condition of paying the revenue assessed on it is said to hold on the "survey tenure".'²



SIR THOMAS MUNRO.

¹ I. G. (1908), xvi. 318.

² I. G. (1907), iv. 209.

The early assessments in Bombay, as in Madras and most other provinces, were too heavy and caused much distress. The reformed system dates from 1847.¹

In the Agra Province, comprising the Ceded and Conquered Districts, with certain other territory, the 'settlement' contract ordinarily was made with groups of zemindars forming a brotherhood or community in each village, through their headmen, the lands of a 'village' being the unit of assessment. The system, as already mentioned, rests upon Regulations VII of 1822 and IX of 1833, as largely modified by subsequent legislation and orders.

Resignation of Lord Hastings. The closing years of the brilliant administration of Lord Hastings were darkened for him personally by the censure passed by the home authorities on his indiscreet indulgence to the banking house of Palmer and Co., which had acquired an undue and corrupt control over the Nizam's government, similar to that exercised by Paul Benfield over the Nawāb of the Carnatic in an earlier generation. The Governor-general permitted himself to be influenced by the fact that one of the partners was married to a ward of his, a young lady whom Lord Hastings regarded as a daughter. The Governor-general, who left India poorer than when he came out, was absolutely cleared of any corrupt motive, but was so distressed by the strictures on his indiscretion that he sent home his resignation in 1821. He made over charge on January 1, 1823, to Mr. John Adam, the senior member of council,² after nine and a quarter years of unremitting labour. The directors passed cordial votes of thanks, and granted him at different times sums amounting to £80,000. In 1824 he became Governor of Malta, and on November 28, 1826, he died at sea off Naples.

Mr. Adam. The administration of Mr. Adam for seven months until he was relieved by Lord Amherst in August 1823, is remembered only for his expulsion from India of Mr. James Silk Buckingham, the able editor of the *Calcutta Journal*, who offended the authorities by the freedom of his criticisms on official persons and doings. The incident offers a convenient opportunity for reviewing briefly the history of journalism in India from the days of Warren Hastings to the present time.³

History of the Indian press. The first Indian newspaper printed in English was Hickey's *Bengal Gazette*, which began its stormy course in January 1780 and was suppressed early in 1782. The editor spent a long time in jail on account of the libels he published on Mrs. Hastings and various people. Hickey's paper was succeeded by the *Indian Gazette* and several other journals.

¹ *I. G.* (1908), viii. 294.

² Thornton calls him 'second member', the Governor-general being the first.

³ The principal, although not the sole authority, is Malcolm's essay entitled 'Free Press' in *Political History*, vol. ii, 1826. Heber observes that Mr. Adam was 'one of the most popular men in India', both with his countrymen and with Indians. Hickey's name is sometimes spelt Hicky.

Lord Cornwallis found it necessary in 1791 to order the deportation of another editor. The right of the Governor-general to inflict that penalty having been affirmed after a long discussion by the unanimous judgement of the Supreme Court, the editor in question was actually deported in 1794.

Five years later, in 1799, a censorship was instituted and approved by the directors. In Lord Wellesley's time, when French privateers were active and the free publication of shipping news was observed to guide them in their depredations, severe restrictions on the newspapers were enforced as being necessary for the public safety. Lord Minto, influenced by the same reasons, maintained a vigilant control over the press, and formulated a revised code of regulations for the censorship in 1813.

Lord Hastings, in 1817, while recognizing the necessity for supervision, preferred to exercise it through rules prohibiting the discussion of certain matters; and therefore abolished the censorship. The Marquess had no objection to fair, honest criticism, believing, as he said, that

'it is salutary for supreme authority, even when its intentions are most pure, to look to the control of public scrutiny; while conscious of rectitude, that authority can lose nothing of its strength by its exposure to general comment'.

His rules were directed against the abuse of liberty.

Mr. James Silk Buckingham, the editor of the *Calcutta Journal*, founded by him in 1818, took full advantage of the liberal opinions of Lord Hastings, and commented boldly on public measures. He also indulged in sarcastic comments on high officials. Mr. Adam, who did not agree with Lord Hastings on the subject, and was irritated by Buckingham's articles, required every printer of a newspaper to take out a licence. When that measure failed to muzzle the editor of the *Calcutta Journal*, Mr. Adam deported him. That proceeding gave rise to acute controversy. Buckingham, on arrival in London, was compensated for his losses by a liberal subscription raised among his friends. Some years later he entered parliament as member for Sheffield, and afterwards obtained a pension of £200 a year from the East India Company. His adventurous life ended in 1855.¹ Lord William Bentinck (1828-35), while avowing the conviction that it is 'necessary for the public safety that the press in India should be kept under the most rigid control', allowed great freedom in practice.

His successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe, in September 1835, removed all restrictions, incurring thereby the wrath of the directors. From that date until 1878, when Lord Lytton's government imposed restrictions on vernacular papers, the Indian press continued to be free, unless for offences against the ordinary law. Lord Lytton's

¹ For the strange career of Buckingham, who was a voluminous author, see Higginbotham, *Men Whom India has Known*², 1874. His *Autobiography* (1855) unfortunately unfinished, and does not deal with the most interesting part of his life.

measure was repealed by his successor, Lord Ripon. The outbreak of atrocious political crime, much of which was traced directly to the instigation of newspaper articles, constrained the government of India to pass a restrictive Press Act in 1908 and a more stringent one in 1910.

During the agony of the nations in the Great War since 1914, paramount regard for the public safety has forced even the free democracies of England and America to endure restrictions on newspaper publication which would have been regarded as intolerable at any other time. No theories about natural liberty can be allowed to override the requirements of the defence of the realm.

Vernacular press. No independent Hindu or Muhammadan government in India ever made any use of the printing-press. Excluding the excessively rare publications issued by the early Jesuit presses on the western coast, and at a later date by missionaries in the south, the first vernacular work printed in India was Halhed's Bengālī grammar, issued in 1778. The earliest Bengālī weekly newspaper, the *Samachar Darpan*, appeared in 1818 at Serampore under the editorship of the famous missionary and historian, John Clark Marshman, with the cordial approval of the Marquess of Hastings. It is needless to dilate on the rapid modern development of the Indian newspaper press both in English and in various vernacular languages. The early papers written in English circulated only among the small European population. Their modern successors have access to a large Indian public.

Burmese war. The war with Burma, which lasted for almost two years, from March 1824 to February 1826, was the principal event of Lord Amherst's short administration. The operations were originally purely defensive on the British side, the Governor-general's declaration of war having been forced by deliberate Burmese acts of aggression, and the avowal by the Burmese court of its intention to take both Chittagong and Calcutta.

Origin of the war. Bodoahprā, the ferocious king of Burma, who had a long and generally victorious reign of thirty-seven years, died in 1819, and was succeeded by his grandson Hpagyīdoā. The Burmese having conquered Arakan in 1784, multitudes of Arakanese refugees crossed into British territory, and constantly stirred up trouble by conflicts with the Burmese.

In 1813 the Burman troops occupied Manipur, and in 1821–2 Assam was annexed to the Burmese Empire. An incursion into Kāchār (Cachar) at the beginning of 1824 actually brought on a fight with the Company's troops. Some months earlier the Burmese had forcibly occupied an island (Shuparu, or Shapārī) on the Chittagong frontier well within British territory, and had killed some sepoys. In January 1824 the best Burmese general, known by his title of Mahā Bandūla, was sent in command of a considerable army with orders to expel the British from Bengal. The court of Ava, intoxicated by its numerous military successes against neighbours, believed its army to be invincible, and, in profound ignorance of all the facts, regarded the white foreigners

with ineffable contempt, Mahā Bandūla felt no doubts about the success of his proposed invasion of Bengal, and was provided with golden fetters for the Governor-general.

Missions to Burma. The Calcutta government had made persistent efforts to establish friendly relations with the Burmese court. Lt.-Col. Symes had been sent on a mission by Sir John Shore as early as 1795. He was sent again in 1802.¹ Captain Canning followed him in 1803 and once more in 1811-12. All the missions were unsuccessful, and the envoys were invariably subjected to studied insult. The king intrigued with the Pēshwā in 1817. Lord Hastings ignored the provocations offered by the government of Ava, having his hands more than full with the affairs of India. But the attack on British territory and the projected invasion of Bengal early in 1824 could not be ignored, and necessarily led to war.

Lord Amherst's policy. Lord Amherst's government aimed primarily at turning the Burmese out of Assam, Manipur, and Kāchār. The Governor-general at first did not intend to invade Arakan or Burma through the difficult mountain country—his purpose was to secure the Bengal frontier. Without going into the details of the operations by land, which included some failures, it may suffice to say that all the primary objectives of the war had been attained by June 1825, when Manipur was occupied by the Company's troops. The Burmese had evacuated Kāchār and been driven from Assam earlier in that year. Those successes were brought about indirectly by the British attack on Rangoon and the Irrawaddy (Irāwadī) valley, which became the principal theatre of the war. Mahā Bandūla was recalled to meet the invasion from the sea, and the Company's forces had thus a comparatively easy task in clearing the enemy out of Assam and the other hill states on the north-eastern frontier of Bengal.

An attempted invasion of Arakan by land failed, owing to terrible sickness among the troops.

Barrackpore mutiny. The preparations for that unlucky expedition in October 1824 led to a painful incident, the mutiny of the 47th Native Infantry and a few other troops stationed at Barrackpore, the Governor-general's country seat on the Hooghly fifteen miles above Calcutta. The sepoys, who dreaded the loss of caste if they should be sent by sea, also had a real material grievance owing to the impossibility of obtaining land transport, which had to be provided by the men themselves under the rules then in force. As usual the genuine grievance was made the occasion for raising the cry of religion in danger. The 47th, when paraded, refused to obey the orders to either march or ground arms and remained sullenly, although passively, defiant. A battery of European artillery, supported by two British regiments, then opened fire and killed many. Others were subsequently tried and

¹ Lt.-Col. Michael Symes, *Embassy to the Kingdom of Ava*, published in 1800, and reprinted with additions in Constable's Miscellany, 2 vols. duod., Edinburgh, 1831.

hanged, and the number of the regiment was removed from the Army List. The business was not well managed by the military authorities. The tragedy apparently might have been averted by judicious handling of the men, without sacrifice of indispensable discipline.

Origin of the Rangoon expedition. The expedition to Rangoon was undertaken on the advice of Captain Canning, who had been one of the envoys to Burma and was supposed to know the country. Lord Amherst was induced to believe that the occupation of the port would frighten the king into submission. The disappointment of that ill-founded expectation led to a costly war, involving much sacrifice of life and treasure. The expedition originally was not designed to advance into the interior, and in consequence no arrangements had been made for transport, which was supposed to be available locally if it should be needed. As a matter of fact, none was to be had.

The campaign. The fleet assembled at Port Cornwallis in the Andaman Islands carrying troops to the number of about 11,500 under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell; and Rangoon was occupied in May 1824 without serious resistance. The trouble began in the following month, when the rains broke, and the army of occupation suffered terribly from disease and putrid food. The town had been evacuated of its inhabitants, and, as the military secretary to the commander writes,

‘the plains, for many miles around us, were swept of their herds; the rivers were unprovided with one friendly canoe; the towns and villages were deserted, and every man beyond our posts [was] in arms against us’.


The weakened force of the invaders endured bravely the miseries of its situation, and fought many actions against the encircling multitudes of Burmese. The end of October, when the rains ceased, brought some relief in comfort, but the sudden change of temperature aggravated the sickness and mortality, which were greater in October than in any previous month. In November the health of the troops improved; reinforcements were received, and a fleet of boats was being built. Tenasserim and Pegu were occupied by detachments.

At the beginning of December the whole army from Arakan under the command of Mahā Bandūla was entrenched in its positions opposite the British force. On the 6th of that month he was defeated and compelled to retire to Donabew (Danabyu), about sixty miles above Rangoon. The Burmese general entrenched himself in his new position with remarkable skill, constructing a formidable stockade more than a mile long, and composed of huge teak beams ‘from fifteen to seventeen feet high, driven firmly into the earth, and placed as closely as possible to each other’, supported in the rear by brick ramparts and provided with many guns of poor quality.

The first attack on the stockade was repulsed. On April 2, 1825, a lucky accident gave the British force possession of the place. A rocket having killed Mahā Bandūla, the whole garrison fled or

dispersed during the night, abandoning everything, including a welcome store of grain. The enemy also evacuated the important town of Prome which was occupied on April 4, and used as a comfortable and healthy cantonment for the expeditionary force during the rainy season.

When operations were resumed early in December, the British troops, after fighting several actions with success, quickly reached



BANDŪLA'S ARMED OBSERVATION POST.

Yandabo, only four marches from the capital, on February 22, 1826. Two days later the Burmese government accepted the terms imposed by the victors.

Treaty of Yandabo. The treaty of Yandabo provided for the payment of a crore of rupees, or one million pounds sterling; as well as for the cession of Assam, Arakan, and the coast of Tenasserim, including the portion of the province of Martaban lying east of the Salween river. The king of Burma further agreed to abstain from all interference in Kāchār (Cachar), Jaintia, and Manipur. A quarter of the indemnity was paid at once, and a

second quarter towards the end of the year, whereupon the British evacuated Rangoon. The Burmese retained Pegu, including Rangoon, until the next war. A commercial treaty of an unsatisfactory kind was arranged subsequently, and the appointment of a resident British envoy was accepted. But until 1830 no such officer was appointed. From that date Colonel Burney held the appointment for seven years, discharging his difficult duties with tact and success.¹ King Hpagyidoo sank into a state of melancholy, and had to be kept in strict seclusion. He was deposed quietly by his brother in 1837, and allowed to end his days in peace as a prisoner, well treated.

The Burmese version. The Burmese official account of the war, as recorded in the *Royal Chronicle*, deserves quotation :

'In the years 1186 and 1187 [of the Burmese era], the *Kulu pyu*, or white strangers of the west, fastened a quarrel upon the Lord of the Golden Palace. They landed at Rangoon, took that place and Prome, and were permitted to advance as far as Yandaboo; for the King, from motives of piety and regard to life, made no preparation whatever to oppose them. The strangers had spent vast sums of money in their enterprise, so that by the time they reached Yandaboo their resources were exhausted, and they were in great distress. They then petitioned the King, who in his clemency and generosity, sent them large sums of money to pay their expenses back and ordered them out of the country.'²

Criticism. The errors in the planning and execution of the operations against the Burmese caused much needless waste of life and treasure.³ The actual fighting was nearly all done by the European troops, the commander of the expedition, Sir Archibald Campbell, having little confidence in the native army. The Madras regiments showed fortitude under privation, but, according to Lord William Bentinck, 'entirely failed' in attacks when employed without European support. Notwithstanding the valour of the soldiers, the Rangoon expedition probably would have been a failure but for the help sent by Sir Thomas Munro, the competent Governor of Madras. Lord Amherst was not qualified either by natural ability or by training to direct a war and Sir Archibald Campbell's strategy was open to criticism.

The Burmese soldier fought well, considering that, as Playfair observes, he 'fought under conditions which rendered victory impossible'. The army was composed mainly of untrained

¹ Burney, a Malay and Pāli scholar, published works on his special subjects.

² Lawrie, p. 60. The passage is of interest as indicating the value of official documents in many cases when the means of checking their statements do not exist.

³ Munro wrote in April 1826 :

'There has been no want of energy or decision at any time in attacking the enemy; but there has certainly been a great want of many of the arrangements and combinations by which the movements of an army are facilitated, and its success rendered more certain.' Munro proceeds to recognize the difficulties, and to give Lord Amherst credit for persevering (Gleig, op. cit., ii. 279).

peasants, badly armed. The home-made gunpowder was defective, and the artillery consisted of 'mostly old ship-guns of diverse calibre, and some of them two hundred or more years old'. The expeditionary force, if it had been properly directed and equipped, should have made short work of the resistance. The Burmese displayed extraordinary skill in the construction of stockades, superior even to those of the Nepalese. A competent writer declares that 'the position and defences at Donoobew, as a field-work, would have done credit to the most scientific engineer'.

Fall of Bhurtpore. The mishaps during the earlier stages of the Burmese war excited feelings of unrest throughout India, as similar failures in the first Nepalese campaign had done in the time of Lord Hastings. Durjan Sāl, cousin of the child Rājā of Bhurtpore, who had been enthroned with the approval of Sir David Ochterlony, the Resident at Delhi, ventured to dispute the succession to the principality and proclaimed himself as Rājā. The Resident at once moved troops to enforce the decision of the agent of the supreme government; but Lord Amherst, then anxious about the ill success in Burma, denounced his action as premature, and passed censorious comments which provoked the resignation of the veteran, who was replaced by Sir Charles Metcalfe. Sir David Ochterlony, who was old and in bad health, died a few months later. Sir Charles Metcalfe soon succeeded in persuading the Governor-general that the paramount power could not allow itself to be flouted by a petty princeling. The fortress was besieged by Lord Combermere, the commander-in-chief, with an adequate force and a suitable train of heavy artillery. The fortifications were breached in January 1826 by the explosion of a huge mine, and the failures of Lord Lake twenty years earlier were amply avenged. The glory of the achievement was dimmed by the excessive rapacity for prize-money displayed by Lord Combermere.¹

Resignation of Lord Amherst. No other political event during the administration of Lord Amherst calls for notice. The Governor-general resigned owing to domestic reasons, and quitted India in March 1828, making over charge to Mr. Bayley, the senior member of council. Lord Amherst was not intellectually fit for his high office, and ought not to have been appointed. Parliament, with its accustomed generosity, pardoned his errors, and awarded him cordial thanks for the final success of the operations against Burma and Bhurtpore.

Steamships. The Burmese war offered the first opportunity for the employment of steamships in war in the Indian seas. A small vessel named the *Diana* rendered valuable service at Rangoon.² A little later, in April 1827, Sir Thomas Munro and

¹ Wilson gives full particulars of the siege, with a reference to Capt. Creighton's *Narrative of the Siege and Capture of Bhurtpore* (4to London, 1830), which is in the India Office Library. For the rapacity see Metcalfe's opinion in Marshman, ii. 409.

² Lord William Bentinck observed that 'if five powerful steamers had

a vast crowd of all classes assembled on the Madras beach 'to see the *Enterprise* steam-vessel manœuvre for the gratification of the public'. The incident serves as a reminder of the extreme rapidity with which scientific invention had advanced within the space of a hundred years. The moralist, unhappily, cannot discern a corresponding advance in human nature.

CHRONOLOGY

First Bengālī newspaper	1818
Deposition of Rāo of Cutch ; earthquakes ; occupation of Singapore ; Nawāb-Vizier of Oudh takes the title of king	1819
Sir Thomas Munro Governor of Madras	1820-7
Regulation VII	1822
Departure of Lord Hastings ; Mr. Adam acting Governor-general ; deportation of Mr. Buckingham ; Lord Amherst Governor-general	1823
War with Burma	1824-6
Barrackpore mutiny	1824
Fall of Bhurtpore ; treaty of Yandabo	1826
Resignation of Lord Amherst ; Mr. Bayley acting Governor-general	1828

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For the Burmese War : PHAYRE, *History of Burma* (1883), chap. 21, the clearest chronicle ; Major SNODGRASS, *Narrative of the Burmese War* (London, Murray, 1827), a short and unpretentious contemporary military account ; Colonel W. E. B. LAURIE, *Our Burmese Wars* (London, Allen, 1880), Part I, a diffuse work ; and correspondence of Sir T. MUNRO in GLEIG, *Life* ², vol. ii. The life of Sir Thomas Munro has been also written by Bradshaw (R. I., 1894), and by Arbuthnot, 1881. I have used Gleig. No critical military history of the war seems to exist.¹ *The Narrative of a Journey, &c.*, by REGINALD HEBER, Bishop of Calcutta from 1823 to 1826, was published soon after his death in the latter year, and has gone through several editions. It contains many interesting observations on the India of Lord Amherst's time.

then been at our command to bring up in quick succession all necessary reinforcements and supplies, the war would probably have terminated in a few months, and many millions of treasure, many thousands of lives, and extraordinary misery and sickness would have been spared' (Boulger, *Lord William Bentinck* (in R. I.), p. 199).


¹ Professor Ramsay Muir observes that 'there is probably no part of the history of British India upon which less material is easily available than the first Burmese war. No documented life of Lord Amherst has been published, and the printed documents on the war are very inadequate.'

CHAPTER 2

Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck; reforms; relations with native states; abolition of suttee; suppression of thuggee; renewal of charter; Sir Charles Metcalfe.

Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck. The second son of the third Duke of Portland was William, known by the courtesy title of Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck, and commonly called Lord William Bentinck. He had been Governor of Madras at an

unusually early age, and, having been recalled on account of the Vellore mutiny, had been variously employed since that event. He never admitted the justice of his recall, and made no secret of his intense desire for compensation by appointment as Governor-general. He even went so far as to violate propriety by applying for the office when the Marquess of Hastings resigned. On that occasion Lord Amherst was preferred, but in 1827 the directors consented to gratify Lord William Bentinck's ambition and appointed him. He did not actually take over charge until July 1828; Mr. Butterworth Bayley having acted meantime as Governor-general. Nothing specially worthy of record occurred during his tenure of power, but some of the reforms which distinguished the term of office of Lord William Bentinck were prepared by the Bayley administration. The new Governor-general was almost fifty-four years of age when he entered upon his duties as ruler of India.



LORD WILLIAM CAVENDISH-BENTINCK.

After his return from India in 1835 he declined the offer of a peerage, preferring to share in active political life as a member of the House of Commons.¹ In 1837 he was elected as a Liberal

¹ The younger sons of a British peer are commoners in law and eligible to sit in the House of Commons. The eldest son of a peer is accorded by courtesy the use of the second territorial title held by his father. The younger sons of a Duke are called Lord without any territorial title.

member for the city of Glasgow. He died on June 17, 1839, in the sixty-fifth year of his age.

Diverse opinions. While the dictum of the poet that

‘peace hath her victories
No less than those of war’

may pass unchallenged as a statement of fact, it is unquestionable that the glories of the successful warrior arouse interest to a degree with which the legislation of the domestic reformer cannot pretend to compete. The administration of Lord William Bentinck for almost seven years from July 1828 to March 1835, with nothing to show which can be described as a victory of war, has to its credit many achievements justly entitled to be called victories of peace, and important enough to earn for their author a high place among the rulers of India. Two of those achievements—the abolition of suttee and the suppression of thuggee—may even be styled ‘renowned’, and so justify the revised and more familiar reading of Milton’s lines. The almost exclusively peaceful career of Lord William Bentinck in India has given occasion for strangely divergent appreciations of the merits and demerits of his work; ranging from the vitriolic denunciation of Thornton, through the guarded commendation of Wilson, and the almost unqualified praise of Marshman, to the exuberant eulogy of Macaulay, his colleague and brother Whig. Thornton, constrained to admit that one act of the Governor-general, the abolition of suttee, will be ‘held in eternal honour’, can find nothing else deserving of approval in the history of seven years, and concludes his inadequate record of the facts by the surprising observations:

‘The best and brightest of his deeds has been reserved to close the history of Lord William Bentinck’s administration. It remains only to state that he quitted India in May 1835, having held the office of Governor-general somewhat longer than the ordinary period; but having done less for the interest of India and for his own reputation than any who had occupied his place since the commencement of the nineteenth century, with the single exception of Sir George Barlow.’

A few lines above that passage we find the remarkable allegation that

‘but for the indulgence of similar extravagance in a variety of ways, the administration of Lord William Bentinck would appear almost a blank, and were all record of it obliterated posterity would scarcely observe the deficiency, while it is certain they would have little reason to regret it’.

Wilson held that

‘a dispassionate retrospect of the results of his government will assign to Lord William Bentinck an honourable place amongst the statesmen who have been intrusted with the delegated sovereignty over the British Empire in the East’.

Marshman, with greater warmth, affirms that

‘his administration marks the most memorable period of improvement between the days of Lord Cornwallis and Lord Dalhousie, and forms a salient point in the history of Indian reform . . . with the intuition of

a great mind, he discovered the weak points of our system of administration, which was becoming effete under the withering influence of routine, and the remedies he applied went to the root of the disease. He infused new blood into our institutions, and started them upon a new career of vigour and efficiency . . . the impulse of his genius, which became the mainspring of a long succession of improvements.'

The climax of eulogy is attained in the inscription composed by Macaulay :

'This statue is erected to William Cavendish-Bentinck, who during seven years ruled India with eminent prudence, integrity, and benevolence; who, placed at the head of a great empire, never laid aside the simplicity and moderation of a private citizen; who infused into Oriental despotism the spirit of British freedom; who never forgot that the end of government is the welfare of the governed; who abolished cruel rites, who effaced humiliating distinctions; who allowed liberty to the expression of public opinion; whose constant study it was to elevate the moral and intellectual character of the Government committed to his charge;—this monument was erected by men who, differing from each other in race, in manners, in language, and in religion, cherish, with equal veneration and gratitude, the memory of his wise, upright, and paternal administration.'

The doings of a man whose character could evoke judgements so contradictory as those cited merit narration and consideration.

Financial economies. The undoubted unpopularity of Lord William Bentinck with the members of the European services, civil and military, was primarily due to the strictness with which he enforced financial economies at the beginning of his administration. The directors, frightened by the heavy cost of the Burmese War, insisted on retrenchment, and issued peremptory orders to withdraw the 'half-batta', or field allowances still enjoyed by officers of their army. Lord William Bentinck, who simply carried out the orders from home, was not in any way responsible for them, although the angry sufferers vented their indignation upon him. The allowances of the Civil Service, which could better bear pruning, were also diminished.

Confidential reports. The Governor-general further irritated that service by his suspicious attitude and inquisitorial proceedings, described by Thornton in these bitter words :

'Under pretence of improving the character of the civil service and providing for the advancement of merit, he sought to establish a system of universal espionage, better suited to the bureau of the holy office of the Inquisition than to the closet of a statesman anxious to be regarded as the representative of all that was liberal. Every superior officer, court, and board, was required to make periodical reports on the character and conduct of every covenanted servant employed in a subordinate capacity. Like most of his lordship's projects, this plan met neither with approbation nor success, and it was soon abolished.'

Flogging in native army. In 1833 Lord William Bentinck followed the example of Lord Cornwallis and the Marquess of Hastings by taking on himself the office of commander-in-chief. In that capacity he issued two important orders affecting the native army—one giving the sepoy enhanced rates of pay after

long service, and the other abolishing the punishment of flogging. Both measures were good in themselves, but the fatal objection to the second one was that flogging was retained as a penalty for the European king's troops. Thus an 'odious distinction', as Sleeman observes, was created, subjecting the white man, the member and support of the ruling race, to a grave personal indignity from which his dark-skinned comrade in arms was exempt. No consideration could justify such a distinction, and the order on the subject must be counted as one of the errors of Lord William Bentinck, which in large measure explains and justifies his unpopularity with the European services.¹ Subsequently, early in the administration of Sir Henry Hardinge, courts-martial were again empowered to inflict corporal punishment not exceeding fifty lashes on soldiers of the native army, but the power has been exercised very rarely.

In the whole British army the penalty of flogging in time of peace was prohibited in April 1868, by an amendment of the Mutiny Act. It was completely abolished by the Army Act of 1881.

Relations with Native States. The action of Lord William Bentinck's government in its dealings with the Native or Protected States and with tribal chiefs cannot be unreservedly commended, although the blame for the vacillating and contradictory policy pursued may be held to rest upon the authorities in England more than upon the Governor-general. The directors, under the delusion that everything had been settled by Lord Hastings, quickly relapsed into their old timidity, and repeatedly forbade any sort of interference with Rājās and chiefs. Lord William Bentinck, who set great store upon obedience to his instructions, came out steeped in the notion that the paramount power could afford to allow disorder in the Native States. Hard facts convinced him in course of time and against his will that a certain amount of interference was unavoidable, and constrained him in the end to interpose with more force than would have been needed at an earlier stage of the troubles induced by the dereliction of duty on the part of the paramount power.

An admirable review of the situation in each state, filled with copious details, may be found in Book III, chapter viii of Wilson's *History*, which proves conclusively the wide extent of the evil wrought by a timorous, selfish policy aiming at a return to the ignoble ideal of Sir George Barlow. In Oudh the reforming minister, Hakīm Mehdi, was deserted by the British government, and driven from the kingdom.² The Nizam's dominions were permitted to fall into disorder; support to the infant Holkar was refused, with a like result; and dangerous quarrels were allowed to develop in

¹ An interesting discussion of the subject will be found in Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections*, chap. 76, ed. V. A. Smith, Oxford University Press, 1915. That book, published in 1844, was written some years earlier. The remarks on flogging were printed in a pamphlet dated 1841.

See article on 'Hakīm Mehdi' by Prof. S. B. Smith in *J. U. P. H. S.*, i. 168-84.

Gwālior. The Gaikwār assumed an attitude of open hostility. The Rājput States were almost encouraged to engage in civil war; the improvements in Udaipur were checked, and the prosperity of the state created by Tod and his fellow labourers rapidly declined; at Jaipur, the policy of the Governor-general,

'after exhibiting the extremes of interference and of abstinence from interference, terminated in a catastrophe which was wholly unprecedented, and which was followed by a still closer and more authoritative connexion'.

The 'catastrophe' alluded to was the furious attack made on the British officers stationed at the local court in June 1835, shortly after the departure of Lord William Bentinck, but due to his vacillating policy. The Resident was severely wounded, and Mr. Blake, his assistant, was killed.¹ The crime was traced to Jota Rām, the ex-minister, and a knot of Jain bankers, who supported his cause in the tortuous politics of the state.

The subject might be developed at length, but what has been said suffices to show that the policy of Lord William Bentinck is not entitled to indiscriminate eulogy, and that his failure to act upon the principles of Wellesley and the Marquess of Hastings produced its inevitable effects.²

Mysore. At times his action in regard to the Protected States was vigorous enough. In 1831 the misgovernment of the Rājā of Mysore provoked a rebellion, which induced the Governor-general to proceed under a clause in the treaty of 1799, and to place the state under British administration. That arrangement lasted for fifty years until 1881, when Lord Ripon felt justified in effecting the 'rendition of Mysore' to a young Mahārājā, who had been carefully trained. Happily the experiment proved successful; the Mahārājā did his duty, and the state is still admirably administered.

Small annexations. Three small annexations were effected, two on the north-eastern frontier, and one in the extreme south. The Jaintiā Parganas to the north-east of Sylhet were annexed in 1835, because the Rājā refused to surrender men who had kidnapped British subjects and sacrificed them to the goddess Kālī.

When the Rājā of the neighbouring territory of Kāchār (Cachar) died in 1830, his dominions lapsed to the British government under the provisions of a treaty made a few years before, and without opposition from the inhabitants. The country is now prosperous and well cultivated, producing valuable crops of rice and tea.

Coorg. The annexation of Coorg (Kodagu) in 1834 was forced

¹ See Sleeman, *Rambles*, ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, pp. 503, 504.

² Sir Henry Durand "often said—and it was an opinion shared by many thinking natives—that the surest way of extinguishing native states was to abstain from all interference in their affairs. I see that a late writer in the *Quarterly Review* quotes a remark to the same effect made by the well-known Minister, Sir Madava Rao; "If left to themselves they will wipe themselves out"' (editor's note in Durand, *The First Afghan War* (1879), p. xxii).

on the government by the outrageous conduct of Vīra Rājā, who practised the most bloodthirsty tyranny. He cherished intense animosity against the English, in spite of the fact that they had rescued his country from the savage cruelty of Haidar Ali and Tippoo; he closed his frontiers, permitting nobody to leave, and admitting nobody who declined to declare himself an enemy of the English; he murdered all his male relatives and many of the female, often with his own hands. After his surrender seventeen bodies, dug up from a pit in the jungle, comprised the remains of the Rājā's aunt, the child of his sister, and the brother of her husband, with others. His adherents contrived a plot to seize Bangalore and overthrow the Company's government. All endeavours to bring the furious chief to reason having failed, troops in four columns were sent into his country. After a few days, and some considerable fighting, they occupied Mercāra the capital,¹ and the Rājā surrendered. No male relative having survived, and it being obviously useless to set up a stranger as Rājā, the country was annexed and administered in subordination to Mysore. The little province is now governed by a commissioner, under the supervision of the resident at Bangalore (Mysore), and the government of India. For some years after 1865 coffee-planting was profitable, but the industry has since declined. Rice is the main ordinary crop.

Coorg is a strange land, inhabited by queer tribes. Their religion is the worship of ancestors and demons, slightly tinged with a Hindu colouring introduced by domiciled Brahmans. The absence of true Hindu feeling is shown by the fact that the brown monkey is eaten and regarded as a great delicacy.

The Rājā and his family. The criminal Rājā was treated with excessive lenity. He was deported first to Vellore and then to Benares, and in 1852 was granted by Lord Dalhousie leave to visit England with his favourite daughter, then ten years old. He died in London about 1863. The curious and tragic sequel to the family history is told briefly in the foot-note.² It is often asserted that Vīra Rājā must have been insane, but that explanation of his ferocity does not seem to be tenable. His father, Linga Rājā, was nearly as bad, and governed on the

¹ Madhukaira of Wilson. The correct form is said to be Medukeri, meaning 'clean town' (*I. G.*).

² The princess having been brought up as a Christian by her father's desire, was baptized by the name of Victoria in 1852, the Queen being her godmother. The royal favour encouraged the Rājā to claim seven lakhs of rupees from the East India Company, but he lost his suit after litigation lasting several years. In 1860 the princess married Col. John Campbell (Madras Army), dying in 1864. Their daughter, according to Lady Constance Russell (*N. & Qu.*, Nov., 1919, p. 296), married Captain H. G. Yardley in 1882. According to *I. G.* (1908, s. v. Coorg), as followed in my first edition, the marriage was unhappy and the daughter disappeared with her father. Col. Campbell's son told me that his father vanished from the Oriental Club. Lady Constance substitutes 'his lodging in Jermyn Street . . . carrying a small hand-bag', supposed to contain his wife's jewels, which also disappeared. The Rājā was buried in Kensal Green Cemetery.

same principles. Vīra Rājendra, the elder brother of Linga, who was equally ferocious, appears to have been really a maniac at times.

Anti-Russian policy. The ill-conceived policy, which brought about the first Afghan war and the annexation of Sind a few years later, was initiated by the Home Government in Lord William Bentinck's time. It was founded on an excessive fear of a Russian advance towards India by way of Herat and Kandahār. Negotiations with the Ameers of Sind were opened, nominally to secure commercial privileges on the waters of the Indus, then unexplored by Europeans, but in reality mainly directed to political objects. The Ameers, much against their will, were constrained to sign commercial treaties, stipulating among other things that the parties would 'never look with a covetous eye on the possessions of each other'. In 1830-1 Lieutenant Alexander Burnes, acting under the instructions of Lord Ellenborough, then President of the Board of Control, was sent up the Indus with a present of English horses for Mahārājā Ranjit Singh, who received his visitor with marked distinction. Later in the same year the Governor-general paid a highly ceremonial visit to the Mahārājā at Rūpar (Roopur) on the Sutlaj. The meeting resulted in 'a treaty of perpetual friendship with the great Sikh ruler, who agreed in his turn to encourage trade along the Sutlej and upper Indus, and to respect the territories of the Sind Amīrs'.¹ Shāh Shujā, the Afghan prince who lived in exile at Lūdiānā, the British frontier station, then made an attempt to recover the throne of Afghanistan from Dōst Muhammad, his rival in possession. Shāh Shujā, notwithstanding the help given by Ranjit Singh and the benevolent neutrality of the government of India, suffered a total defeat, and was obliged to return to Lūdiānā.

Malay peninsula. Lord William Bentinck took much pains to make himself personally acquainted with the local conditions of the immense territories under his government, and travelled almost continually. In 1829 he visited Malacca and the neighbouring settlements, where he effected certain administrative changes. The connexion of the settlements with Bengal lasted, as already noted, until 1867. The Governor-general appreciated the importance of Singapore, which was made the capital, instead of Penang, in 1830.

Steam navigation. He was a man of his age, with a mind open to the ideas of reform then in the air, and was ready to recognize the developments of applied science. The subject of communication by means of steamships especially interested him. The earliest steamship plying regularly in Great Britain had appeared on the Clyde in 1812; and, as has been seen, a small vessel of the kind did valuable service at Rangoon in 1824. Lord William Bentinck quickly saw the importance of utilizing the novel form of navigation both on the Indian rivers and for the abridgement of

¹ Trotter, *Lord Auckland*, p. 41; but the text is not quoted.

the voyage between England and India. The Court of Directors willingly supported his arrangements for the creation of a steam fleet on the Ganges, but his efforts to improve the communications with England by a steam service to Suez did not command equal enthusiasm at the India House, and the new service was allowed to drop. The regular communication between Europe and India via Suez was deferred until 1843, when it was undertaken by the then newly formed Peninsular and Oriental Company, which still flourishes.¹ Lord William Bentinck did not attempt to introduce railways into India. That innovation was left for Lord Dalhousie in 1848. The earliest railway in Great Britain had been opened in 1825 on a small scale.

Finance. The all-important subject of finance received its due share of attention from Lord William Bentinck, who took well-considered steps to increase the revenue, especially that from the opium monopoly, as well as to reduce the expenditure. The reductions in the military budget were, perhaps, excessive; but on the whole the financial administration was successful, and transformed the deficit into a surplus.

N. W. P. 'settlements'. The 'settlements' in the North-Western Provinces, now called the Province of Agra, made under Regulation IX of 1833, already mentioned, increased the revenue at the same time as they provided a record of rights and an assessment generally fair, although sometimes rather heavy. The largest share of the credit for the successful working of the Regulation is due to Mr. Robert Merttins Bird, who was appointed in 1832 member of the newly constituted Board of Revenue at Allahabad. He was aided by a staff of highly qualified settlement officers, whose reports are still a mine of information.²

'Resumption'. A considerable increase in the land revenue of the permanently settled provinces was obtained by the 'resumption' and assessment of a large number of estates which had been alleged to be revenue free.* The process, which continued after Lord William Bentinck's time to 1850, is the main explanation of the increase in the land revenue of Bengal from 286 lakhs in 1790-1 to 323 lakhs in 1903-4.

Extension of employment of Indians. The financial reforms and economies effected by Lord William Bentinck were intimately connected with his personal policy concerning the larger employment of the cheaper Indian element in the judicial and executive administration of the country. He had the courage to reverse boldly the erroneous policy of Lord Cornwallis and to act decisively on the principles laid down by Sir Thomas Munro and Sir Charles

¹ The Company, originally established for the service of the ports in the 'Peninsula', meaning Spain and Portugal, obtained the right to extend its operations to India under royal charter granted in 1840.

² Probably the author is now (1918) the only person living who has read all those old *Reports*. He had to go through them when preparing the *Settlement Officer's Manual for the N. W. P.*, published at Allahabad in 1881.

Metcalfe. He followed generally the lines prescribed by Metcalfe in the following passage :

' Native functionaries in the first instance in all departments. European superintendents, uniting the local powers of judicature, police, and revenue in all their branches through the districts over which they preside. Commissioners over them, and a Board over them, communicating with and subject to the immediate control of the Government.'

In pursuance of the new policy a Board of Revenue was constituted at Allahabad ; Commissioners of Revenue and Circuit were appointed ; certain classes of judicial work were entrusted to collectors ; the office of district magistrate was combined with that of collector ; the cumbrous and useless provincial courts were abolished ; Indian officers were entrusted with responsible judicial and executive duties, decently paid ; in especial, the functionaries now known as subordinate judges were appointed ; and, in short, the administration was organized very much in the form which it still (1918) retains. Madras, however, never adopted the institution of commissioners. Lord William Bentinck, filled with the spirit which carried the British Parliamentary Reform Act of 1832, was the first of the modern Governors-general ; and, in spite of the errors noted in the early part of this chapter, deserves credit for the clear vision which enabled him to construct for the first time a really workable, efficient framework of administration, offering to the natives of the country reasonable opportunities for the exercise of their abilities, and capable of the expansion still in progress.

Indian army. Lord William Bentinck held sensible views about the Native or Indian Army, which had deteriorated rapidly in value after 1818. The Madras sepoys, who had done such splendid service in earlier days, were inefficient in Burma and Coorg, while the Bengal Army was being slowly ruined by the excessive indulgence of caste prejudices, the retention of worn-out officers, European and Indian, and general slackness of discipline. The Governor-general in a minute recorded on March 13, 1835, and first published by Mr. Boulger, rightly declared ' the Indian army to be the least efficient and the most expensive in the world '. The general soundness of his opinions on army matters was proved by the events of 1857, and by many incidents which occurred prior to the outbreak of the mutiny in that year.

Abolition of suttee. The most famous of Lord William's actions, the abolition of suttee, was the result of a resolve certainly formed very early in his term of office, and probably almost decided on before he quitted England. The proposal ' to wash out this foul stain upon British rule ' had been often discussed by his predecessors and private persons in a half-hearted fashion without result, because the government dreaded the reproach of interference with Hindu religion and was nervous about possible resentment among the sepoys of the native army. Lord William Bentinck displayed no undue haste in his preparations for the overdue reform. He secured the unanimous approval of the judges of the

highest criminal court, and a decided preponderance of opinion in his favour from army officers, high police officials, important civil administrators, and many notable private individuals, among whom Rāmmohan Rāi is the best known to fame. The Governor-general's inquiries satisfied him that no substantial danger of popular excitement or of disaffection in the army was to be feared. He then carried Regulation XVII of 1829, which settled the controversy for ever. The Regulation applied directly to the Bengal presidency only, that is to say, to all British India except the Madras and Bombay presidencies; but was quickly followed by similar enactments in those territories; the Bombay law taking a different form for special reasons. The burning or burying alive of widows was declared illegal and punishable by the criminal courts as 'culpable homicide', equivalent to 'manslaughter' in English law. When violence or compulsion should be used, or the freewill of the victim should be interfered with by the administration of drugs, the offence might be treated as murder and punished with death. The Regulation was upheld by the Privy Council in 1832, when the appeal of certain influential Bengālis was dismissed. No popular excitement was aroused, nor was the loyalty of the native army affected by the measure. The reasoning of the Governor-general's minute was justified in all points by experience, and his action, as Thornton candidly allows, deserves 'eternal honour'.

The principle. The decision of Lord William Bentinck affirmed the important principle that a civilized legislature might lawfully and rightly forbid acts which violate the universal rules of morality and the ordinary feelings of humanity, even when such acts have, as suttee had, the sanction of immemorial custom, Brahmanical tradition, and, to a certain extent, of ancient scriptures deemed sacred. Although it may be, and presumably is true that no section of Hindu opinion would now venture openly to demand the repeal of the legislation of 1829 and the authorization of suttee, the feeling in favour of the rite probably is not extinct. A case occurred in Bihār as late as 1905, and sporadic cases during the nineteenth century in various localities are on record. We may, however, believe that the sentiment which favoured the atrocity is no longer general, and is dying out. If that belief be correct, the legislation of Lord William Bentinck may claim credit for having effected a definite improvement in Hinduism. Other cases might be cited to show that contact with a foreign civilization and a different code of ethics has been instrumental in developing a neo-Hinduism more humane than the old.¹

¹ 'The term Suttee, or Satī, is strictly applicable to the person, not the rite; meaning "a pure and virtuous woman"; and designates the wife who completes a life of uninterrupted conjugal devotedness by the act of *Saha-gamana*, accompanying her husband's corpse. It has come in common usage to denote the act' (H. H. Wilson). For details of the horrors of the practice see J. Peggs, *India's Cries to British Humanity*, &c., 2nd ed., London, Seely, 1830; 3rd ed. 1832. That book, based mainly on official documents, deals also with infanticide, slavery, the cruelties connected

History of suttee. It is almost certain that the practice of voluntary self-immolation by a widow is a refinement on the earlier and more savage custom of sacrificing widows and slave girls at the master's sepulchre without asking their consent. That custom was prevalent among many of the tribes in Central and Western Asia, and even in Eastern Europe, who may be called Scythians in a general way, and there can be little doubt that the suttee rite was brought into India by early immigrants over the north-western passes. The Greek authors state that it was practised in the half-foreign city of Taxila along with other startling customs, and that it also prevailed among the Kathaioi, who dwelt on the banks of the Rāvi. A custom that was notorious and well established in the Panjāb in the fourth century B. C. must have been introduced much earlier. The high antiquity of suttee, therefore, must be admitted, and it is also true that the practice is commended in some ancient scriptures of recognized authority. The rite was never universal, either in all parts of India, or among all castes and classes, nor was it ever regarded as obligatory on all widows. The voluntary self-immolation of a widow was ordinarily treated as a special act of devotion and an exceptional honour to her family. But the sacrifice was often, and especially in the case of princes, compulsory, so that scores or hundreds of women might be, and actually were, burnt at the funeral of a single Rājā, with or without their consent. The most wholesale burnings on record were those perpetrated from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century at the obsequies of the Telugu Rāyas of Vijayanagar.¹

Between the years 1815 and 1828 suttees were extremely numerous in Bengal, and especially in the districts around Calcutta. The worst year was 1818, when 839 burnings were recorded for the whole of the Bengal presidency, including Rohilkhand, of which 544 occurred in the Calcutta division. In 1828 the corresponding numbers were 463 and 309. The evil, therefore, existed on a large scale, and called urgently for remedy.²

The practice had been often locally prohibited both by Hindu princes and by European officers. It was forbidden in the Peshwā's personal domains and in the Tanjore Marāthā principality. Early with the pilgrimage to Jagannāth, the scandals of the pilgrim tax, and other evils of unreformed Hinduism previous to 1830.

¹ Nuniz states that 'when a captain dies, however many wives he has, they all burn themselves; and when the king dies, they do the same'. Sometimes the sacrifice was accomplished by burial alive. The same author credits the King or Rāya with 500 wives, 'and all of these burn themselves at his death'. The earlier traveller, Nicolo Conti, was informed that the King had 12,000 wives, of whom 2,000 or 3,000 were selected 'on condition that at his death they should voluntarily burn themselves with him, which is considered to be a great honour for them' (Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire* (1900), pp. 84, 370, 391). A cinder mound near Nimbāpuram, north-east of Vijayanagar, marks the scene of those appalling holocausts (Longhurst, *Ilampī Ruins*, Madras, 1917, p. 41).

² The figures give the suttees officially reported. Many unreported cases must have occurred.

in the sixteenth century Albuquerque forbade it at Goa ; and at different times individual British officers had ventured to prohibit it in their respective jurisdictions. But a general law was needed in order to effect appreciable reform.

The Regulation, as confirmed by later enactments, has been generally effective, and its provisions have been adopted substantially by many of the Protected States. Modern cases of suttee in British provinces are rare.

Thuggee. The government of Lord William Bentinck has to its credit the suppression of a second semi-religious atrocity, the organized secret system of murder called Thuggee, which was practised by both Muhammadans and Hindus with the supposed sanction of the Hindu goddess, variously named Kālī, Dēvī, Durgā, or Bhawānī. The initiated regarded their victims as sacrifices pleasing to that deity, on whose protection they relied with unquestioning faith. They never felt the slightest compunction or remorse for their crimes, however horrible, believing themselves to be predestined to their mode of gaining a living, as their victims were to death. The system probably attained its highest development in the early years of the nineteenth century, during which thousands of travellers must have been slaughtered annually. One man confessed to having been concerned in the murder of 719 persons.

The Thugs, or cheats, as the word means,¹ formed a secret society, extending over the whole of India, except the Konkan on the western coast. They used among themselves a secret code of words and signs intelligible to initiated Thugs everywhere. Initiation was effected by an impressive ceremonial, including the consumption of *gur* or raw sugar in a sacramental manner. The organization was complete, each man having his special duty, whether as strangler, gravedigger, scout, or other. The gangs varied greatly in strength, the largest recorded having numbered 360 men. In every part of the country they enjoyed protection and aid from many chiefs, landholders, and merchants, ostensibly respectable. Such persons were sometimes actually members of the secret society. Thugs occasionally obtained employment in the service of European gentlemen, and performed their duties to the satisfaction of their employers, taking leave now and then to go secretly on an expedition.

The Thugs, favoured by the insecure state of the roads and the lack of efficient police, travelled in gangs large or small, usually unarmed, and appearing to be pilgrims, ascetics, or other harmless wayfarers. By means of ingenious tricks and false pretences they secured the confidence of their intended victims, who were murdered at a place appointed where the graves had been dug in advance. Such burying places were extremely numerous. Sleeman published a map showing 274 of them in the small province of Oudh, about half the size of Ireland, and was horrified to learn that one such

¹ The Hindi word is *thag*, pronounced with a hard aspirated *t*. The verb *thag-lānā* or *thag-lenā* means 'to cheat'. *Thak* is the Marāthī form.

cemetery was within a march of his court house at Narsinghpur in the Sāgar and Narbadā territories, now included in the Central Provinces. Murder was usually, but not invariably, effected by strangulation with a handkerchief or scarf used as a noose, which experience showed to be the safest method. The gangs, although on rare occasions detected and broken up in some particular locality by the action of a chief or magistrate, had little to fear, and enjoyed almost complete impunity. The ordinary peasants and watchmen frequently were in league with them and shared their bloodstained gains; while, as noted above, they always had the support of powerful protectors. The moral feeling of the people had sunk so low that there were no signs of general reprehension of the cold-blooded crimes committed by the Thugs. They were accepted as part of the established order of things; and, until the secrets of the organization were given away by approvers, it was usually impossible to obtain evidence against even the most notorious Thugs.

History of Thuggee. The secret society of Thugs undoubtedly was extremely ancient. The members believed that its operations are represented in the sculptures at Ellora, executed in the eighth century, and they may have been right. They also believed that the so called ' saint ' Nizāmu-d dīn Auliya of Delhi in the fourteenth century was a member of their order, and that he thus obtained the wealth at his disposal, and not otherwise satisfactorily accounted for. The earliest definite mention of the Thugs in literature is in the chronicle of Jalālu-d dīn Pīrōz Khiljī, Sultan of Delhi, at the close of the thirteenth century, when a thousand were brought before him. He refused to execute them, merely deporting them to Bengal, where probably they introduced the practice of river thuggee, common in that province until lately, and possibly not wholly extinct. Tradition credits Akbar with having executed 500 Thugs in the Etāwah District (now in U.P.); and the French traveller, de Thevenot, has recorded an accurate description of their proceedings in the days of Aurangzēb. Fryer describes the execution of fifteen stranglers at Surat by order of Aurangzēb.¹ English magistrates in the south became aware of the crimes of the Thugs after the capture of Seringapatam in 1799, when many sepoys mysteriously disappeared. The earliest accounts of the system in the English language were printed in 1816 and 1820. Individual officers occasionally succeeded in arresting and punishing a few of the murderers; but the system remained unbroken until 1829, when Feringhia, the approver, saved his life by betraying all the secrets of the society to Sleeman and his colleagues. Systematic inquiries based on the testimony of numerous approvers, and conclusively confirmed by the exhumation of bodies and in a hundred other ways, enabled the officers placed on special duty to hunt down the gangs, and break up the society. Probably the chain of Thug tradition has been severed, and the crime in its old form may be regarded as extinct. But in India it is never safe to

¹ *A New Account*, ed. Crooke (Hakluyt Soc.), i. 244.

assume that an institution many centuries old is absolutely dead. Cognate crimes, especially the poisoning of travellers by *datūra*, are still common, and I have tried or investigated many cases of the kind.¹ Some of the *datūra* poisoners appear to be descendants of Thug families. The murder trade, like everything else in India, was hereditary. 'Thuggee Sleeman,' otherwise known as Sir William Sleeman, K.C.B., took the most prominent part in destroying the Thug organization. He was aided by many competent colleagues, and supported cordially by Lord William Bentinck, who passed a series of special Acts to regulate the proceedings of

the officers selected to crush the gangs. During the years 1831-7, 3,266 Thugs were disposed of in one way or another; 412 out of that number being hanged, and 483 admitted as approvers. The approvers and their descendants were detained for many years in a special institution at Jubbulpore (Jabalpur).

Renewal of the Charter, 1833. As the time for the renewal of the charter of the East India Company in 1833 approached, all parties concerned made preparations for the inevitable discussion and contest. The directors, when they appointed Lord William Bentinck to be a reforming Governor-general, were thinking of the advantage they would gain in the coming



SIR WILLIAM SLEEMAN.

debates by their ability to produce a good budget of reforms. A parliamentary select committee, appointed in 1829, submitted in 1832 a voluminous report on things Indian; and outside of official circles, merchants and manufacturers agitated for the abolition of the monopoly of the China trade, for the legalization of land-owning by Europeans in India, and other changes desired.

Neither the ministry nor Parliament was yet prepared to take over the direct administration, so that little serious opposition was offered to the renewal of the charter for the customary period of twenty years. The Company was unable to resist the demand for the opening of the China trade. Thus the Company of merchants founded in the days of Queen Elizabeth lost the last vestige of

¹ The *Datūra* genus of plants is common in India. The white and purple species are alike used by thieves to stupefy victims, but the white is considered the most efficient (Balfour).

its commercial character and became merely an agency, performing its duties, as declared by the Charter Act, 'in trust for His Majesty, his heirs and successors, for the service of the Government of India.' The fleet of 'Indiamen' was dispersed. Complicated financial arrangements provided for the liquidation of the Company's commercial assets and the payment of a fixed dividend for forty years. The directors succeeded in retaining the right to recall governors and military commanders, a prerogative on which they set a high value.

Changes in India. The government of India was empowered to legislate by passing formal Acts, not merely informal Regulations, for the whole of India. The title of the head of the government was changed from 'Governor-general of Bengal in Council' to 'Governor-general of India in Council'. The power of legislation was withdrawn from Madras and Bombay, but had to be restored later. Europeans were allowed to acquire and hold land in India, practically without restriction. That enactment was specially designed to benefit the growing industry of indigo planting, but it also permitted the formation by enterprising speculators of admirably managed estates in undeveloped regions. In the Gorakhpur and Basti districts of the United Provinces, being part of the territory ceded by Oudh in 1801, many such estates were created by the clearance of forest on a large scale. Those properties, with which I am familiar in detail, are models of estate administration. The new liberty did not produce such good results in the indigo planting regions, where grave abuses grew up, which resulted in serious trouble in 1859 and 1860.¹

The Council of the Governor-general was reinforced by a fourth member, the Law or Legal Member, empowered to act as member of council only at meetings for the purpose of making laws and regulations. Macaulay was the first law member. The investigations initiated by him resulted many years later in the Penal Code and the Codes of Criminal and Civil Procedure.

A new presidency at Agra was sanctioned, but that provision never came into operation, because the Upper Provinces were almost immediately placed under a Lieutenant-governor instead of a Governor-in-Council by an amending Act.

Bar of race, &c., removed. Probably the most important provision in the Act was sec. 87, which laid down the principle that

'no native of the said territories, nor any natural-born subject of His Majesty resident therein, shall, by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment under the Company'.

The language then used is even more emphatic than that of the similar paragraph in Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858, which is :

¹ See the drama, 'Nil Darpan', or the 'Indigo Planting Mirror', of which an English translation was published in Calcutta in 1861. It is not pleasant reading.

'And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to office in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.'

The promises implied in those solemn declarations by the Sovereign and Parliament have been redeemed gradually and cautiously; too slowly to satisfy impatient reformers. At the moment of writing (1918) gentlemen of Indian birth share in all the highest executive and judicial offices, excepting only the posts of Governor-general, lieutenant-governor, chief commissioner, or ruler of a province under any other designation. Further extension of the application of the principle is under consideration (1918).

Higher education. The subject of education was connected intimately with the reforms prescribed by the Charter Act. The provisions for the employment of natives of India in high offices could not be carried into effect until Indians possessed of adequate educational equipment should be available in sufficient numbers. The work of administration in a British government must necessarily be conducted in the English language, and the old-fashioned Hindu and Muslim modes of instruction clearly could not provide candidates suitable for responsible appointments. That consideration alone was enough to determine that the higher education must be imparted chiefly through the English language.

Macaulay, who was appointed President of the Board or General Committee of Education, at once became the leader of the Anglicists, in opposition to the Orientalist conservatives, who championed the claims of Arabic and Sanskrit. His able although somewhat one-sided minutes induced the Governor-general in Council, just before the retirement of Lord William Bentinck on March 20, to issue the Resolution dated March 7, 1835, stating that

'the great object of the British Government ought to be the promotion of European literature and science among the natives of India, and that the funds appropriated to education would be best employed in English education alone'.

The word 'alone' went too far; and subsequent legislation and orders redressed the error by providing due encouragement for the vernacular tongues and classical languages of the East.

The controversy of 1835 is dead, and nothing would be gained by rekindling its ashes. Everybody may accept the judgement of Mr. Boulger that

'the momentous decision to make the English language the official and literary language of the Peninsula represents the salient feature of his [Lord William Bentinck's] administration, and makes his Governor-generalship stand out as a landmark in Indian history'.

The missionaries, under the guidance of the Rev. Dr. Alexander Duff, gave the government of India valuable aid in promoting the cause of sound education.

Lord William Bentinck, in the same month of March 1835, which saw the issue of the Resolution on education, crowned his work

by the foundation of the Calcutta Medical College, which proved an eminent success in spite of the croakings of wisacres who confidently predicted its failure.

'Contact with a dead body', they argued, 'had for twenty centuries been considered a mortal pollution by the Hindoos, and it was traditionally affirmed that native prejudices were invincible. But these anticipations, when brought to the test of actual practice, proved, as usual, to be the phantasms of a morbid imagination. Natives of high caste were found to resort freely to the dissecting room, and to handle the scalpel with as much indifference as European students. In the first year they assisted in dissecting sixty subjects, and the feeling of ardour with which they entered on these studies, and the aptitude for acquiring knowledge which they exhibited created a universal feeling of surprise.'

Those observations, recorded by Marshman in 1867, now seem strangely out of date. It is needless to dilate on the eminent scientific attainments of modern physicians and surgeons of Indian birth.¹

Sir Charles Metcalfe. Sir Charles Metcalfe, who had accepted the office of Lieutenant-governor of the North-Western Provinces, and had also been nominated provisional Governor-general, had hardly taken charge of his up-country appointment when he was summoned to Calcutta in order to relieve Lord William Bentinck, who wished to go home. Sir Charles Metcalfe continued to be head of the government for almost twelve months, and would have been confirmed had he not given mortal offence to the directors by his abolition of the restrictions on the press. His action in that business has been sufficiently discussed in connexion with the administration of Mr. Adam. Metcalfe, smarting under the censure of the India House, resigned the service and retired to England. Subsequently he was appointed Governor of Jamaica, and then Governor-general of Canada, being raised to the peerage. He died in 1846. He may be justly reckoned as the most eminent of the many illustrious Anglo-Indian officials, whose names fill so large a place in history from the time of Lord Wellesley to that of Lord William Bentinck.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck Governor-general (July) ; financial economies	1828
Abolition of suttee by Regulation XVII	1829
Suppression of thuggee	1829-37
Annexation of Kāchār (Cachar) ; Singapore made capital of Malay Peninsula Settlements	1830
Deposition of Rājā of Mysore ; journey of Burnes up the Indus ; meeting at Rūpar with Ranjit Singh	1831
British Reform Act	1832
Regulation IX (N. W. P. 'settlements') ; renewal of charter ; numerous reforms ; abolition of flogging in the native army	1833
Annexation of Coorg	1834

¹ In 1908 twenty-two medical schools existed in India (*I. G.*).

Annexation of Jaintiā Parganas ; education Resolution ; foundation of Medical College, Calcutta ; retirement (March 20) of Lord William Bentinck ; Sir Charles Metcalfe Governor-general ; attack (June) on Resident of Jaipur	1835
Death of Lord William Bentinck	1839

AUTHORITIES

The only separate Life of Lord William Bentinck is that by D. BOULGER (R. L., 1897) ; a good little book, containing important documents not previously published. The most useful of the general histories are those by H. H. WILSON and MARSHMAN. The works of Sir W. H. SLEEMAN are the primary authority on thuggee ; especially *Ramaseena* (Calcutta, 1836), a roughly compiled collection of documents, now rare, but accessible in several libraries ; and *Rambles and Recollections* (London, 1844 ; ed. 3 by V. A. SMITH (Oxford University Press, 1915). MEADOWS TAYLOR gives a fascinating account of the organization in *Confessions of a Thug* (1839 ; ed. C. W. STEWART, Oxford University Press, 1916), with a small but harmless admixture of fiction. R. V. RUSSELL and HĪRA LĀL present a lucid summary of Sleeman's works in *The Tribes and Castes of the Central Provinces of India*, vol. iv (Macmillan, 1916).

The Charter Act of 1833 may be best studied in ILBERT. RAMSAY MUIR also supplies a careful abstract. The most essential passages of MACAULAY'S *Minutes* are quoted by Boulger. His Minutes on education from 1835 to 1837 were collected by Woodrow (Calcutta, 1862). A copy is in the I. O. Library.

CHAPTER 3

Lord Auckland and Lord Ellenborough ; the First Afghan War ; annexation of Sind ; affairs of Gwālior ; abolition of slavery.

Lord Auckland. The directors' nomination of Lord Heytesbury, formerly ambassador to Russia, as successor to Lord William Bentinck was accepted by the Tory government of Sir Robert Peel, and the new Governor-general was actually sworn in. When Lord Melbourne's Whig government came into power, the ministry, declaring that Lord Heytesbury did not possess their confidence, revoked his appointment, and substituted Lord Auckland, a member of their own party. The precedent thus set was a bad one, as tending to engulf Indian affairs in the muddy waters of party politics. Lord Auckland, a respectable official peer, with hosts of personal friends, was regarded as a safe man, likely to conduct the administration of India on lines much the same as those of his peaceful predecessor. When appointed he was fifty-one years of age, and up to that time nobody seems to have suspected that he, being 'unstable as water', could not excel, or to have supposed it possible that he would drag the honour of England in the dirt and expose India to the most grievous military disaster and the most shameful humiliation she had ever suffered. When he had actually done those things, unscrupulous ministerial support and

disciplined party spirit conspired to hush up his misdoings, and even permitted him to become once more First Lord of the Admiralty. The 'dismal story' of the First Afghan War and the connected transactions with the Ameers, including the equally painful sequel of the unprincipled annexation of Sind by Lord Ellenborough and Sir Charles Napier, will be told as briefly as possible. Before that story is dealt with certain other transactions of less moment demand notice.

Early domestic reforms. Lord Auckland's early proceedings justified the hopes of those who had recommended his appointment. He developed his predecessor's plans for the promotion of education and the cultivation of medical science, with the proper amendment that government scholarships should not be confined to the pupils of colleges where English was taught. He also gave effect to the neglected instructions of the directors requiring the abolition of the pilgrims' tax, the cessation of all official control of temple endowments, and the prohibition of the complimentary attendance on duty of the Company's troops or civil officers at popular religious ceremonials. Preliminary steps were taken towards the creation of great works of irrigation. So far so good; and Lord Auckland, if he had not been drawn by scheming ministers in England and evil advisers in India into political intrigues and military adventures for which he had no capacity, might have spent his five years of office in the business of useful, quiet administration, and then retired with unsullied reputation. His deplorable weakness of character, which prevented him from devising any fixed policy of his own, and made him the tool of other men's ambition and craft, led him to commit a series of dishonourable actions foreign to his kindly nature, and to sanction a policy truly described as 'baleful, lawless, and blundering'.

Famine of 1837-8. In 1837-8, while the Governor-general was on tour, Northern India suffered from a severe famine, which is estimated to have caused the death of at least 800,000 people. Relief works were undertaken by the State, the succour of the infirm and helpless being left to private charity for the most part. The expenditure was considerable, amounting to 38 lakhs of rupees in 1838, but the results were unsatisfactory.

Native States. The death in 1837 of the King of Oudh, a worthless debauchee named Nasīru-d dīn Haider, resulted in a ridiculous attempt at rebellion, made by the Pādshāh Bēgam, or principal Queen-Dowager, which was promptly suppressed. The misgovernment of the kingdom continued as usual.¹

¹ Lord Auckland tried to force on the new king a revised treaty providing for an additional subsidiary force at heavy cost. The whole treaty was disallowed by the Directors, but the Governor-general, with lamentable lack of candour, failed to communicate that fact to the king, informing him only that the additional subsidiary force would not be demanded. The curious book, *The Private Life of an Eastern King*, by William Knighton, which passed through three editions in 1855 and 1856, gives many details of the disreputable court of Nasīru-d dīn Haider. The Oxford University

The Rājā of Sātāra in the Western Ghāts, who had been set up by Lord Hastings in 1819, engaged in a long-continued series of foolish treasonable intrigues with the Portuguese and other people. The Bombay government made every effort to convince the Rājā of his folly, and gave him opportunities for repentance ; but he refused to listen, and was necessarily deposed, his brother taking his place (1839).

The Nawāb of Karnūl (Kurnool) in the Madras presidency, a descendant of Aurangzēb's officer, Dāūd Khān, made an equally insane attempt to levy war, which resulted in his deposition and the annexation of his territory (1842) ; which subsequently, with certain additions, was formed into the existing Karnūl district.

A warning to Holkar was sufficient to bring about desirable reforms at Indore.

Palmerston's anti-Russian policy. The troubles of Lord Auckland originated in the anti-Russian policy of Lord Palmerston, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in London, who took alarm at dispatches from St. Petersburg giving information of alleged negotiations between the rival chiefs in Afghanistan and the Shah of Persia. The Foreign Secretary regarded with excessive anxiety the prospect of Persia acquiring Herat, and holding that city in dependence on Russia. Lord Palmerston seems to have neglected the sound advice to use large maps, afterwards given by Lord Salisbury, and to have made the assumptions, as Sir Henry Durand puts the matter,

' that Afghanistan was at the time our frontier ; that the capture of Herat by Persia involved imminent peril to the security and internal tranquillity of our Indian Empire ; and that Persia, in prosecuting the siege of that place had, acting in concert with Russia, entered upon a course of proceeding avowedly unfriendly, if not hostile to British interests, and at variance with the spirit and intent of the definitive [Persian] treaty.'

In reality Afghanistan was then separated from British India by the Panjāb, Bahāwalpur, Sind, and the Rājputāna desert, which, as the author quoted truly observes, constituted ' no bad frontier '. The exaggerated fears of diplomatists

' invested Herat with a fictitious importance wholly incommensurate with the strength of the place and its position in regard to Candahar and the Indus '.

Or, to express the facts in the simplest language, it did not matter to India whether Persia held Herat or not. But Lord Auckland had not the sense to see that truth, and was led away by ill-chosen and unwise advisers to break treaties only six years old ; to bully the weak ; to pursue a fantastic policy ; to persist in that policy when the reasons for it, such as they were, had ceased

Press is bringing out a new edition along with the companion work, *The Private Life of an Eastern Queen*. Mrs. Meer Hassan Ali, author of the valuable *Observations on the Mussulmans of India* (ed. Crooke, Oxford University Press, 1917), also lived at Lucknow in the reign of Nasiru-d dīn Haidar. Her book appeared in 1832.

to exist ; to violate the principles of strategy ; to throw away thousands of lives by entrusting them to incapable commanders ; and finally, at least to acquiesce silently in the garbling of the documents submitted for the information of Parliament.

The truth of all those propositions will now be established by a summary narrative. The proceedings of the Governor-general undoubtedly were prompted by Lord Palmerston and his colleague, Sir John Hobhouse, President of the Board of Control, who publicly assumed full responsibility for the war. The ministry was so deeply committed to the policy of which the war was the outcome that even the most objectionable acts of Lord Auckland escaped official censure. Advantage was taken of the storm of Ghaznī and certain other favourable events in the earlier stages of the operations to divert public attention, and to veil the tricks of a tortuous diplomacy behind a shining cloud of military glory. Outside of the Foreign Office and the Board of Control the policy of the Governor-general was condemned by the Duke of Wellington and everybody qualified to give a valuable opinion. The judgement of Anglo-Indian historians, too, seems to be substantially unanimous ; and it is unlikely that now anybody could be found who would be prepared to justify either the First Afghan War or the treatment of the Ameers of Sind by Lords Auckland and Ellenborough.

Government of Sind. In those days Sind was governed by various Balōchī chiefs belonging to the Tālpur family, and known consequently as the Tālpur Ameers (Amīrs or Mīrs). The family had split into three branches ; one of which, and the most important, had its capital at Hyderabad in Middle Sind. Another branch was established at Mirpur Khās on the western edge of the desert ; and the third branch administered Northern Sind from the town of Khairpur, east of the Indus. The Khairpur territory included the important commercial town of Shikārpur and the island fortress of Bukkur (Bakhar).


Government of Afghanistan. It is not necessary to plunge deeply into the tangled history of the various regions now grouped together by European writers under the name of Afghanistan. It may be sufficient to note that Ahmad Shāh Durrānī's grandson, Shāh Shujā, who had become King of Kābul for some years, was driven out of the country in 1809, and that after a time he settled at the British cantonment of Lūdiāna as a pensioned refugee. The Kābul territory had no established government for some years. In 1826 Dōst Muhammad Khān, an able member of the Bārakzai clan, made himself lord of Kābul and Ghaznī. The English called him the King of Kābul, and he was the actual ruler with whom Lord Auckland had to deal. He had assumed the title of Amīr in 1835, after defeating an attempt of Shāh Shujā to recover the throne lost many years before. Shāh Shujā then returned to his residence at Lūdiāna.

Political relations with Sind. British political relations with the Ameers of Sind began in 1809, when Lord Minto negotiated a treaty with three chiefs establishing ' eternal friendship between

the contracting parties', providing for the exchange of envoys, and prohibiting 'the establishment of the tribe of the French in Sindh'.

That treaty was confirmed in 1820, when Americans, in addition to the French, were excluded.

The expedition of Burnes up the Indus, arranged in the time of Lord William Bentinck (1830-1) by Lord Ellenborough, then



MAP OF SIND.

President of the Board of Control, resulted in the treaties of 1832. The engagement then made with the Hyderabad Ameers stipulated, among other things, that 'the two Contracting Powers bind themselves never to look with the eye of covetousness on the possessions of each other'; that Indian merchants and traders might travel on business over the rivers and roads of Sind, on three conditions, namely :

(1) that no person shall bring any description of military stores by the above river or roads :

(2) that no armed vessels or boats shall come by the said river :

(3) that no English merchants shall be allowed to settle in Sindh, but shall come as occasion requires, and having stopped to transact their business, shall return to India.'

The shorter treaty with the Khairpur Ameers was to the same effect.

Those treaties were in full force at the beginning of the Afghan War.

Political relations with Kābul. Lord Auckland entered upon the duties of his office in March 1836. Later in that year he received from the Secret Committee of the Directors a dispatch dated June 25, which recited the anxiety felt by the British Foreign Office concerning Russian advances towards Herat, and instructed the Governor-general to

'judge as to what steps it may be proper and desirable for you to take to watch more closely, than has hitherto been attempted, the progress of events in Afghanistan, and to counteract the progress of Russian influence in a quarter which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances, and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our own territory.

The mode of dealing with this very important question, whether by dispatching a confidential agent to Dost Muhammad of Kābul merely to watch the progress of events, or to enter into relations with this chief, either of a political, or merely, in the first instance, of a commercial character, we confide to your discretion, as well as the adoption of any other measures that may appear to you desirable in order to counteract Russian advances in that quarter, should you be satisfied from the information received from your own agents on the frontier, or hereafter from Mr. McNeill, on his arrival in Persia, that the time has arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan.

Such an interference would doubtless be requisite, either to prevent the extension of Persian dominion in that quarter, or to raise a timely barrier against the impending encroachments of Russian influence.'¹

That unhappy dispatch, the product of Lord Palmerston's fantastic fears, was the foundation of Lord Auckland's discreditable proceedings. It also bound the British ministry to support him in the exercise of his discretion, and to see him through the consequences of his acts.

Burnes was sent to Kābul, on pretence of negotiating a commercial treaty, but in reality to talk politics. Dōst Muhammad wanted Peshāwar, which Ranjit Singh had annexed. Lord Auckland, who was much afraid of the Mahārājā, would not hear of putting any pressure on him. Burnes consequently had nothing to offer to the Amcer, who then turned towards Russia, and showed civilities to an informal Russian agent who had come to his court. Burnes left Kābul in April 1838.

Tripartite treaty. In July the Governor-general executed a tripartite treaty with Ranjit Singh and 'His Majesty', the refugee Shāh Shujā. The instrument was directed to the restoration

¹ Not in Kaye. Quoted from Colvin, p. 87.

to the throne of Kābul of Shāh Shujā, who was expected to become a pliant instrument of Palmerstonian diplomacy ; and was alleged to be popular in his own country, an allegation hardly borne out by his history.¹

Army of the Indus. Lord Auckland at first did not intend to send an army, hoping that the Sikhs and Shāh Shujā's levies would effect his crooked purpose. But the Governor-general soon allowed himself to be drawn by his private advisers, John Colvin, Macnaghten, and others, into more ambitious schemes. He issued a verbose declaration on October 1, and gave orders to assemble the Army of the Indus for the invasion of the dominions of Dōst Muhammad, who had never injured the British government. The Persians had been obliged to withdraw from the siege of Herat in September, and the news of that event, received during October, deprived Lord Auckland's warlike preparations of their sole justification. But he was not to be stopped by such a trifle, and went on with his plan to dethrone Dōst Muhammad. The Bengal section of the army, 14,000 strong, assembled at Fīrōzpur in November. The Bombay contingent, under Sir John Keane, was landed in Sind. The two forces were to unite at Kandahār. In order not to offend Ranjit Singh the Bengal army was sent round through the Bolān Pass, and so had to traverse a distance of more than a thousand miles between Fīrōzpur and Kābul. The plan violated all the conditions of sound strategy, and was that of a lunatic rather than of a sane statesman.

Military operations. The operations of the Bombay contingent involved an open breach of the treaties of 1832. Lord Auckland, through his secretary, W. H. Macnaghten, cynically directed the resident at Hyderabad that

'while the present exigency lasts, you may apprise the Ameers, that the Article of the Treaty with them, prohibitory of using the Indus for the conveyance of military stores, must necessarily be suspended during the course of operations undertaken for the permanent establishment of security to all those who are parties to that Treaty'.

Shikārpur, Bukkur (Bakhar),² and other places in Sind were occupied with equal disregard of solemn engagements. Frivolous charges of breach of treaty and accusations of hostility were advanced against the Ameers, who were forced in February 1839 to sign a treaty, so-called, which destroyed their independence. A subsidiary force was imposed on them ; they were compelled to pay three lakhs of rupees a year for it ; and to admit the Company's rupees as legal currency. In many other respects the

¹ Masson, however, denied that the Shāh was 'unpopular with his Afghans' ; who resented the presence of the British Army, not that of the Shāh (*Narrative*, 1842, p. viii). Durand held that 'the irascible vanity of Burnes . . . impelled him to a line of conduct hasty and injudicious, and which, wanting in truth, composure, and dignity, exasperated the Ameer' (p. 46).

² Bukkur (Bakhar) is the island fortress in the Indus lying between Sukkur (Sakhar) and Rohri (Rūrhī).

chiefs were fleeced and treated unfairly, but it is needless to pursue further the unpleasant subject.

Both the Bengal and the Bombay forces managed to reach Kandahār after undergoing intense suffering from want of water and supplies. The miseries of the march through the sixty miles of the Bolān Pass were especially severe, and about 20,000 camels were lost. Shāh Shujā's public entry into Kandahār in April 1839 was a failure, as the public declined to attend.

Sir John Keane, who was now in supreme command, started for Kābul by the Ghaznī road. He had been told that Ghaznī would not resist, and in consequence had left behind his few heavy guns. He found, on the contrary, a formidable fortress, inaccessible by storm. His troops, with only two days' rations in hand, were in imminent danger of starvation, when the situation was saved by the daring of certain junior engineer officers, who undertook to blow open the Kābul gate of the stronghold.¹ The 'gambler's throw' succeeded, the fuse being fired by Lieutenant Henry Durand, of the Bengal Engineers, who afterwards became Sir Henry, and lieutenant-governor of the Panjāb. In the storm which followed the explosion the loss of the Afghans was heavy while that on the British side was small. The ministry in London, delighted at the undeserved success thus gained by their rash policy, showered honours and rewards upon Lord Auckland, Sir John Keane, and the political officers. The engineers received scant attention.

Occupation of Kābul. The unexpected fall of Ghaznī compelled Dōst Muhammad to quit his capital and escape northwards. The invaders occupied Kābul in August without opposition. It is said that Shāh Shujā's solemn entry was more like a 'funeral procession' than a triumph. Lord Auckland left 10,000 troops under General Cotton as an army of occupation, and General Nott was called up from Quetta to command at Kandahār. The other troops were sent back to India. The government was thenceforward conducted really by Sir William Macnaghten, the political officer, the Shāh being allowed little substantial power. His royalty was maintained solely by the British force. Lord Auckland, having placed his protégé on the throne, should have left him to keep it if he could. Dōst Muhammad surrendered in November 1840, and was sent down to Calcutta where he was well treated, and assigned a liberal allowance. Shortly afterwards General Cotton returned to India. Lord Auckland insisted on replacing him by General Elphinstone, who had been a good officer in his time, but was now growing old, and was an invalid. He was assured by his predecessor that he would 'have nothing to do here; all is peace'. Macnaghten, who was in charge of the political department, declared the general tranquillity to be 'perfectly miraculous', and officers were allowed to bring up their wives and families from India. In fact, all reasonable precautions were neglected, and many foolish things were done.

¹ Havelock (ii. 122) praises the tactical dispositions of Sir John Keane. His work includes good descriptions and many military documents.

Towards the close of 1840 the directors became alarmed at the dangerous military situation and the excessive cost of the prolonged occupation. They suggested 'the entire abandonment of the country, and a frank confession of complete failure'; but Lord Auckland insisted on going on with his mad scheme.

Disasters. I do not propose to repeat in its miserable details the remainder of the story, which may be read in a multitude of books. Revolts broke out in all directions. The presence of the infidel foreigners was detested by the Afghans, who had just cause of complaint by reason of the licentious conduct of Burnes and many of the soldiers. General Elphinstone proved to be imbecile, and everybody in a responsible position behaved with unexampled folly. The troops were withdrawn from the Bālā Hissār, or citadel, and encamped in an indefensible position on the plain, separated from their stores. The higher officials, civil and military, quarrelled. The rank and file, practically leaderless, lost discipline, and would not fight when called on. A few brilliant subordinates, Durand, Broadfoot, and others, types of the best class of British officers, were powerless to avert the ruin to which the madness of their seniors irresistibly dragged the whole force. In December 1841 the necessity for retirement to Jalālābād, where Sale occupied the fort with a small detachment, was obvious. By that time the isolated stores *dépôt* had been destroyed, and starvation could be avoided only by a decisive retreat, as recommended by Durand. But

'Elphinstone and his advisers thought otherwise. There was an unearthly faintness upon their hearts; and it was as though some great crime had caused the wrath of God to settle down upon the host, withering the hearts of its leaders, unnerving the right arms of England's soldiery, and leaving them no power to stand before their enemies.'

Maenaghten, who had himself incurred suspicion of bad faith, was entrapped on December 23 into an interview with Dōst Muhammad's son, Muhammad Akbar, and treacherously slain. His three companions, Trevor, Mackenzie, and Lawrence, were overpowered, disarmed, and taken prisoners.

'The escort, instead of charging to the rescue, fled to the cantonments, and left the envoy and his brave companions to their fate.

In the cantonments all was apathy, and indecision. Although within sight of the scene, no attempt was made to avenge the slaughtered envoy and to recover his body from a cowardly mob who bore off in triumph his mangled remains, to parade them in the city of Cabul.'

The final catastrophe. The general, disregarding the advice of Pottinger, renewed negotiations. A treaty was signed on January 1, 1842; the guns, muskets, and ordnance stores having been previously given up. Snow fell, and the Shāh offered the English ladies an asylum in his citadel. Pottinger once more urged the occupation of the Bālā Hissār. Elphinstone again refused, sending in merely the sick and wounded.

On January 6 the dispirited army, still numbering about 4,500 troops and 12,000 followers, encumbered by a train of doolies or



BALA HISSAR, KABUL.

litters bearing the women and children, started for Jalālābād. On the 8th only about 800 men of all arms emerged from the Khurd Kābul defiles. The women and children, the married men, and wounded officers on that day 'were transferred into Akbar's keeping'.

On the 11th only 200 were left.

'On January 13, Dr. Brydon, sorely wounded, and barely able from exhaustion to sit upon the emaciated beast that bore him, reached Jellalabad, and told that Elphinstone's army, guns, standards, honour, all being lost, was itself completely annihilated. Such was the consummation of a line of policy which from first to last held truth in derision, trod right under foot, and, acting on a remote scene, was enabled for a time unscrupulously to mislead the public mind.'

Having written the epitaph of the victims in those scathing words, Durand proceeds to give Macnaghten credit for high courage, which, however, 'cannot palliate moral delinquency'.

'Macnaghten was not single in his high courage. The bones of many a chivalrous soldier long bleached upon the barren mountains and deep defiles between Cabul and Jellalabad. But if any called for the avenging swords of their countrymen with peculiar emphasis it was those of the European horse artillery, who, calm and stern to the last in their discipline and daring valour, fought and fell heroically, the admiration of all who witnessed their conduct and survived to tell the tale.'

It is well to close the sad story on that heroic note.

Defence of Jalālābād. The steps taken by Lord Auckland to retrieve the disaster during the few weeks of power left to him were not effective. His nerves broke down, and he feared to sanction measures which would tie the hands of his successor, who was on the way out from England. The interest of this intermediate period of the war lies chiefly at Jalālābād, where Sale's garrison held out, awaiting the long delayed relief. The credit for the successful defence of the place rests with Captain George Broadfoot, the garrison engineer, rather than with Sir Robert Sale, who had accepted the advice of a council of war to surrender. After a prolonged debate Broadfoot's honourable and passionate pleading won over a majority of the senior officers to do their plain duty and hold out to the last. Once that question was settled in the right way, every man in the garrison worked and fought with a will; so that, even when a violent earthquake on February 19 shattered the defences, the damage was instantly repaired.¹

Meantime General Nott maintained his grip on Kandahār, and Captain Halkett Craigie at Khelāt-i-Ghilzai defied a host of enemies; but Colonel Palmer at Ghaznī was forced to surrender.

Lord Ellenborough's arrival and action. At the close of February the new Governor-general, Lord Ellenborough, who came out to relieve Lord Auckland in the ordinary course, took charge. General Pollock, a capable commander, effected the relief of

¹ Both Sale and Broadfoot were killed in the first Sikh War. The story of the debate, discreditable to both Sale and Macgregor, is narrated at length by Durand, and in Kaye's third edition.

Jalālābād on April 16, finding on his arrival that the garrison had already virtually raised the siege by means of a vigorous sortie.

Lord Ellenborough's first instructions had been sensible and well considered, although erring perhaps on the side of caution. But the news of the fall of Ghaznī and of a small reverse near Quetta shook his resolution, so that he issued orders for the immediate evacuation of all posts held in Afghanistan, showing little concern for the recovery of the prisoners, about a hundred and twenty in number, or for the vindication of the British name. Meantime Shāh Shujā had been murdered, and strong remonstrances from all quarters, both in England and in India, forced Lord Ellenborough to reconsider his decision. At last, on July 4, he wrote letters to Pollock and Nott, professing to maintain the orders for withdrawal, but permitting the two generals to act in concert, if Nott should 'decide upon adopting the line of retirement by Ghaznī and Kābul'. Thus the Governor-general shifted his own responsibility upon the military commanders, who accepted it eagerly, and promptly concerted the needful measures.

General Nott's advance. Nott, who had crushed armed resistance in the neighbourhood of Kandahār during May, started for Kābul on August 7, with 8,000 fine soldiers in high spirits and confident of victory. He found Ghaznī abandoned, and, before passing on, reduced the town and fortifications to ruins. After some fighting on the road he came into touch with Pollock on September 17.

General Pollock's advance. Pollock, taking all proper military precautions, had successfully forced the passes, and reached Kābul on September 15. A few of the English prisoners were then rescued. Some days later the judicious promise of liberal reward brought in the rest, who had been moved about from place to place during their captivity, and were in danger of being sold into Central Asia as slaves. They do not appear to have been subjected to personal violence or outrage, and might be considered fortunate to have been as well treated as they were. General Elphinstone had died while in the hands of the Afghans.

No difference of opinion was expressed as to the propriety of punishing in some way the guilty city of Kābul. Some officers recommended the destruction of the Bālā Hissār, but Pollock preferred to blow up the great covered bazaar, where Macnaghten's body had been exposed. Eight years later it was rebuilt by Dōst Muhammad. The city also suffered much from unauthorized burning and plundering.

Evacuation. Lord Ellenborough having rightly adhered to the policy of complete withdrawal from the Afghan 'hornets' nest', the army returned to India, and early in November encamped at Peshāwar. Another army of observation protected it from the possible hostility of the Sikhs, who could not be relied on since Ranjit Singh's death in 1839.

Proclamations. The Governor-general's proclamation, misdated October 1, but really written later, announced a complete

change of policy, and denounced the 'errors' of the previous administration in language which, however true, was unbecoming. That manifesto was followed in a few days by a ludicrous proclamation celebrating the recovery of the gates of Somnāth, said to have been carried off by Mahmūd of Ghaznī and afterwards preserved at his tomb. Lord Ellenborough had given stringent instructions to General Nott to be sure and bring back those 'sandalwood gates'.¹

The proclamation, a silly imitation of Napoleon's Pyramids manifesto, celebrated the return of the gates, 'which had so long been the memorial of the humiliation of the people of India, and had now become the proudest record of their national glory'.

Nobody cared a straw about the gates, which were conducted in solemn procession, amidst universal ridicule, as far as Agra, where they were stowed away in a lumber room of the fort. When examined by experts they proved to be made of pine, not sandalwood, and to bear an Arabic inscription of Sabuktigīn. They are clearly local Muhammadan work, executed at Ghaznī, and may or may not have been made to replace the sandalwood originals carried off by Sultan Mahmūd from Somnāth. The proclamations were followed by splendid reviews and other spectacles at Firōzpur a form of display which Lord Ellenborough loved too well.

Restoration of Dōst Muhammad. Dōst Muhammad was allowed to return to Afghanistan unconditionally, and to resume the throne from which he had been so needlessly displaced. He retained it for the remainder of his long life, dying in 1863 when nearly 80 years of age. The Governor-general was made an earl, and the various commanders who had carried out the measures of retribution were liberally honoured and rewarded. The vote of thanks to Lord Ellenborough was opposed in Parliament and not without reason. But the war had been a Whig war, instigated by Sir John Hobhouse and Lord Palmerston, and the party politicians were keen to hide away the disgrace, while making the most of the retribution. The crime of the first Afghan War was covered over by the ministry as far as possible, and has not always met with the stern reprobation from the historians of England which its enormity deserves.

Designs on Sind. The Afghan difficulty having been thus disposed of, and Lord Auckland's policy killed with the men who had tried to put it into effect, Lord Ellenborough turned his attention to Sind. He was eager to find a pretext for the annexation of that country, and it was not long before his search was rewarded. Lord Auckland had broken treaties with the Amceers of Sind in the most cynical fashion. Lord Ellenborough went farther, and deliberately provoked a war in order that he might annex the province.² So long as it remained independent the navigation of

¹ According to Burnes (*Travels*², ii. 150), Ranjit Singh, when negotiating with Shāh Shujā, had required him to obtain the gates.

² It is not worth while to examine the flimsy pretexts. 'Certainly', Thornton observes, 'the rights of princes were never assailed on such slender ground as these charges afforded.'

the Indus was liable to be blocked by hostile tribes. The desire to obtain control of the great waterway seems to have been the leading motive of the annexationists in the time of Lord Auckland as well as in that of Lord Ellenborough.

The Ameers, who were not strong enough to resist the exactions imposed upon them, had abstained from open hostility during the Afghan War, even when the army of occupation was destroyed.

Sir Charles Napier. In 1842 Lord Ellenborough removed Outram and the other officers of the Political Department which he hated and sent Sir Charles Napier to Sind vested with sole authority, civil and military, as representative of the Governor-general in all the territory on the lower Indus. Napier, who was bent on annexing the province, pursued a bullying policy, always assuming that the government of India was at liberty to do what it pleased, without the slightest regard to treaties.

At last his proceedings goaded the Balōchīs into making a tumultuous attack on the residence of Colonel Outram, who had been recalled to Sind as the British Commissioner (February 15, 1843). That outbreak gave the excuse which Napier desired, and of course made formal war inevitable.

The conquest. Two days later (February 17) Napier, with only about 2,800 men and 12 guns, routed an army of 22,000 at Miānī (Meeanee), a few miles from Hyderabad. The British loss, although considerable in proportion to the numbers engaged, was small in amount; that of the Sindians was believed to exceed 5,000, killed and wounded. In the following month another fight at Dabo on a similar scale had the same result. A proclamation was then issued announcing the conquest and annexation of the country, and, after some desultory fighting, the inevitable was accepted, and the Ameers were exiled. Sir Charles Napier felt no scruple in accepting £70,000 as his share of the prize-money; but the chivalrous Outram, although a man of small means, disapproving of his chief's policy, refused to accept the £3,000 which formed his share, and distributed the money among charitable institutions. Outram, a warm personal friend of Sir Charles, could not profess to think his conduct right. He wrote to him:

'I am sick of *policy*; I will not say yours is the *best*, but it is undoubtedly the shortest—that of the *sword*. Oh, how I wish you had drawn it in a better cause!'

Outram. Outram, 'the Bayard of India, *sans peur et sans reproche*',¹ went home and exerted himself manfully to plead the cause of the despoiled and exiled Ameers of Sind, urging that they 'never contemplated opposing our power, and were only driven to do so from desperation'. But it was too late. As Mr. Gladstone observed many years afterwards, 'the mischief of retaining was less than the mischief of abandoning' the new conquest.

¹ The compliment was paid by Sir Charles Napier at an earlier date, and is inscribed on Outram's tomb in Westminster Abbey (Trotter, *The Bayard of India*, 1909, in Everyman's Library).

Napier as governor. The province was retained, and Napier was appointed its first governor.¹ The directors, while formally condemning the policy which had resulted in annexation, took no steps to undo the transaction. Napier ruled his conquest well until 1847, as a strong, masterful, military despot, and when he returned to England was received with enthusiasm. Annexation has resulted in a great increase of material prosperity, and an elaborate irrigation system has been developed. The recall of Lord Ellenborough in 1844 by the directors was based, not on the injustice of the conquest of Sind, but on other reasons, which will be explained presently. In 1844 several regiments of Madras and Bengal troops, who were unwilling to serve in Sind without extra allowances, mutinied. The mutinies were dealt with by the military authorities in a feeble manner.

Gwālior affairs. Yet another fierce conflict marked the brief and stormy period of Lord Ellenborough's rule. The death early in 1843 of Jankaji Sindia, the adopted son of Daulat Rāo, threw the politics of Gwālior into confusion. The danger of the situation to British interests consisted in the fact that, while court factions were quarrelling, all real power had passed into the hands of the army, which was more than 40,000 strong, possessed of 200 guns, and thoroughly insubordinate. Such a force was a real peril to its neighbours, especially when, as the Governor-general observed, there was within three marches of the Sutlaj 'an army of 70,000 men [Sikhs], confident in its own strength, proud of its various successes against its neighbours, desirous of war and of plunder, and under no discipline or control'. Lord Ellenborough assembled a force under the command of Sir Hugh Gough, the commander-in-chief; and at Christmas time, 1843, crossed the river Chambal. That act was taken by the Gwālior troops as a declaration of war. The Governor-general and commander-in-chief, although partially prepared for battle, came so suddenly on the enemy that Lord Ellenborough was accompanied by ladies and was intending to breakfast quietly under the trees, when he was greeted by artillery fire. The hard-fought battle which ensued took place at Mahārājpur near Gwālior, with the usual result, but at the cost of heavy loss to the victorious British. Another victory was gained on the same day by a distinct corps under General Grey at a place called Paniār. Those two battles broke down all opposition. The Gwālior State lay at the disposal of Lord Ellenborough to do what he pleased with it. He wisely refrained from annexation, contenting himself with disbanding the dangerous army, and making reasonable arrangements for the better government of the State. Although the conflict might have been postponed, it is unlikely that it could have been avoided ultimately; and it was fortunate that, when the deadly struggle with the Sikhs began in 1846, the forces of

¹ Ali Murād of Khairpur, having supported the British, was allowed to retain territory, which is now the Khairpur State. The area is 6,050 square miles, and the State seems to be fairly prosperous. Sind is now attached to the Presidency of Bombay.

the Company had not to guard against the threat of the Gwālior army on their flank. The suppression of that army should not, I think, be reckoned among the sins of Lord Ellenborough. During the Mutiny the Gwālior Contingent, as the reorganized forces of the State were then called, mutinied, retook Cawnpore from General Windham, and exposed the British power to no small danger. The princes of the Sindia family have continued to be uniformly loyal; and the reigning Mahārāja has done notable service in the cause of civilization during the Great War.

Abolition of slavery. The most important measure of internal reform carried out in the time of Lord Ellenborough was the passing of a law (Act V, 1843) prohibiting the legal recognition of slavery in India. The law of India was thus brought into agreement with that of England. The enactment was the work of Lord Ellenborough's colleagues. The Indian legislature avoided all the difficulties about emancipation or compensation, which had attended the enfranchisement of the West Indian negroes, by simply refusing to recognize slavery as a legal status. The law on the subject is now included in the Penal Code.

Although Megasthenes, in the fourth century B.C., was led to believe that no slave existed in India, he was certainly misinformed. It is clear that in most parts of the country slavery in various forms existed from time immemorial. Even now the institution can hardly be said to be wholly extinct, although it has no legal sanction. Before 1843 there were many millions of slaves in India. Up to 1819 the revenue authorities in the Malabar District of Madras were accustomed to sell the slaves of a revenue defaulter in the same way as his other property. If space permitted innumerable proofs of the prevalence of slavery and the abuses inseparable from the institution might be adduced.¹ The public conscience, however, chiefly among Europeans, gradually began to feel qualms about the maintenance of slavery, and the Act of 1843 does not seem to have aroused opposition or caused any excitement.

Lotteries and police. The state lotteries in the presidency towns, the proceeds of which had been devoted to local improvements, were also suppressed; and the Bengal police administration was made somewhat more efficient by the appointment of deputy magistrates, and by improvements in the pay and promotion of police *dārōgas*.

Reasons for recall of Lord Ellenborough. The published correspondence of Queen Victoria throws light upon the reasons for the appointment and recall of Lord Ellenborough. The Queen, Sir Robert Peel, and the Duke of Wellington concurred in the opinion that Lord Ellenborough, in spite of his 'tendency to hasty decisions', was 'better qualified than any man in England

¹ Much painfully interesting information on the subject, derived chiefly from official documents, is collected in the work by Peggs, already cited, entitled *India's Cries to British Humanity*, Book V, 2nd ed., 1830; or 3rd ed., 1832. The Indian slave trade at various times and in many provinces was extensive.

for the office of Governor-general'. The directors, however, never liked him, and during his term of office he frequently complained of their constant hostility. That hostility was not without justification. The directors were offended and disgusted by the arrogant tone of his correspondence; by his gasconading proclamations; by his open contempt for the Civil Service; by his love of theatrical display; and by the aggressive bent of his policy.

The Queen, who always gave him her personal support, resented his recall; but, in my judgement, the directors acted wisely and in the interest of India by exercising the power which had been reserved to them at the last renewal of the charter.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Melbourne (Whig) Prime Minister : Dōst Muhammad Ameer of Kābul	1835
Lord Auckland Governor-general (March); Dispatch from Secret Committee about Afghan affairs and Herat (June 25)	1836
Accession of Queen Victoria (June); mission of Burnes to Kābul	1837
Famine in northern India	1837-8
Tripartite treaty (June); Lord Auckland's Declaration (Oct. 1)	1838
New treaty forced on Ameers of Sind (Feb.); death of Ranjit Singh (June); capture of Ghazni (July); occupation of Kābul (Aug.); deposition of Rājā of Sātārā	1839
Risings of Afghan tribes; surrender of Dōst Muhammad	1840
Murder of Burnes (Nov.); murder of Macnaghten (Dec.)	1841
General Elphinstone's treaty with Akbar Khān (Jan. 1); retirement began (Jan. 6); Dr. Brydon reached Jalālābād alone (Jan. 13); Lord Ellenborough Governor-general (Feb.); relief of Jalālābād; reoccupation of Kābul; restoration of Dōst Muhammad; annexation of Karnūl	1842
Battles of Miāni and Dabo; annexation of Sind; defeats of Gwālior army at Mahārājpur and Paniār; suppression of slavery (Act V) and of state lotteries	1843
Mutinies of Bengal and Madras regiments in Sind; recall of Lord Ellenborough; Sir Henry Hardinge Governor-general (July)	1844

AUTHORITIES

The leading authority is the *History of the War in Afghanistan*, by J. W. KAYE (publ. in 1851; 4th ed., 3 vols., Allen, 1878); it is so carefully documented that little material change was made in the later editions. Next in importance is *The First Afghan War and its Causes*, the unfinished work by Sir HENRY MARION DURAND (Longmans, 1879). Of the many books written by other persons who took part in the campaign, I have used chiefly [Sir] H. HAVELOCK, *Narrative of the War in Afghanistan* (2 vols., Colburn, 1840).¹ *The Earl of Auckland* (R. L., 1905) by L. J. TROTTER is an excellent summary. *John Russell Colvin* by Sir A. COLVIN (R. L., 1911), although not convincing as an *apologia*, gives certain additional facts. The controversy between Sir Charles Napier and Sir James Outram elicited many books and pamphlets. I have consulted OUTRAM,

¹ Havelock then approved of Lord Auckland's policy.

Rough Notes on the Campaign in Sind and Afghanistan in 1838-9 (Richardson, 1840), a publication regretted by the author; *The Conquest of Scinde* (Boone, 1845); and *History of General Sir Charles Napier's Administration of Scinde* (Chapman & Hall, 1851), both by Major-General Sir WILLIAM NAPIER. *The History of the Indian Administration of Lord Ellenborough* by Lord COLCHESTER (London, 1874) gives the Governor-general's letters to the Queen and Duke of Wellington without comment. THORNTON alone narrates fully the dealings with Native States. MARSHMAN lays stress on internal reforms. The blue book, *Correspondence relative to Sind*, 1838-43 (London, 1843), 516 pp., supplies the text of 475 documents. The first Afghan blue book of 1839 was garbled by the omission of important passages in the letters of Burnes. KAYE exposed the facts in 1851, and a revised blue book was issued in 1859. See Kaye, ed. 4, vol. i, pp. 202-4.

CHAPTER 4

Sir Henry (Lord) Hardinge; first Sikh War: treaties of Lahore; Lord Dalhousie; second Sikh War; second Burmese War; annexations; reforms.

Sir Henry (Lord) Hardinge. The British government, in sending Sir Henry Hardinge to rule India, sent one of England's noblest sons. At Vimiera, Albuera, Ligny, and countless other battles of the Peninsular and Waterloo campaigns he had proved his prowess as a soldier and his capacity as a general. He had been wounded four times, losing his left hand at Ligny, and had had five horses shot under him. In civil life he had served as a member of parliament for twenty years, and had held office as secretary for war and chief secretary for Ireland. Although, like Lord Hastings, he was fifty-nine years of age when he came out to India, the advance of years had not quenched the fire of his youth or impaired his capacity for high command. In July 1844 he relieved his flighty predecessor, who assured him that India was in a state of 'universal peace, the result of two years of victories'. In December 1845 the Sikhs crossed the Sutlaj, and so falsified the shortsighted optimism of Lord Ellenborough.

Internal administration. The new Governor-general, although obliged from the first to take precautions against the Sikh peril, was able for a year and a half to devote much of his attention to improvements in internal administration and to the suppression of cruel customs. He took preliminary steps towards planning the Indian railway system of the future; made progress in the designs for the Ganges Canal; supported education; and took measures for suppressing suttee and infanticide in the Native States.¹

¹ Among the Sikhs in the Panjāb the suttee murders were atrocious. Four ladies burned with Ranjit Singh; one, against her will, with Kharak Singh; two with Nao Nihāl Singh; 310 (10 wives and 300 unmarried ladies of his zenana) were sacrificed at the obsequies of Rājā Suchet Singh; in September 1845 four wives of Jawāhir Singh were forced on the pyre

Human sacrifices. He also sanctioned systematic arrangements for the extinction of the horrible practices of human sacrifice prevalent in the Hill Tracts of Orissa. The results obtained at first in the Orissan operations during Sir Henry Hardinge's time were poor, owing to defects in the agency employed, but in the years from 1847 to 1854 Lieut.-Col. (Major-General) John Campbell and other officers specially appointed succeeded in stamping out the atrocious customs. The purpose of the sacrifices usually was to increase the fertility of the soil by burying bits of the flesh of the victims in the fields. The cruel rites varied in different localities. Campbell describes one which may be taken as a sample :

'One of the most common ways of offering the sacrifice in Chinna Kinedy is to the effigy of an elephant rudely carved in wood, fixed on the top of a stout post, on which it is made to revolve. After the performance of the usual ceremonies, the wretched Meriah [consecrated victim] is fastened to the proboscis of the elephant, and amidst the shouts and yells of the excited Khonds, is rapidly whirled round, when, at a given signal by the officiating "Zani", or priest, the crowd rush in, seize the Meriah, and with their knives cut the flesh off the shrieking victim as long as life remains. He is then cut down, the skeleton burnt, and the horrid orgies are over. In several villages, I counted as many as fourteen effigies of elephants which had been used in former sacrifices.'

Between 1837 and 1854 no less than 1,506 Meriah victims were rescued.

The Khond people gradually became convinced that their fields produced crops as good as formerly, and that sickness was not more prevalent. Animals were substituted for human victims, and it is believed that the Meriah horrors have been finally suppressed.¹


Origin of the Sikh War. The main business, however, of Sir Henry, or to call him by his later title, Lord Hardinge, was the Sikh War, forced upon him by the arrogance of the army of the Khālsa.

Mahārāja Ranjit Singh, when stopped by Lord Minto in 1809 from pursuing his intended conquests to the south of the Sutlaj, was left free to do as he pleased to the north of the river.² 'By the year 1820 his power may be said to have been consolidated and absolute throughout the whole Panjāb proper from the Sutlej to the Indus.' The city and province of Peshāwar, wrested from the Afghans, became tributary to him in 1823; but the Sikhs never reduced the frontier to obedience, or extended their influence beyond the range of their forts. The possessions of the Mahārāja by the soldiery; and, after Sobrāon, the widow of Sardār Shān Singh burnt voluntarily. Sir Lepel Griffin in 1898 described that as being the last case in the Panjāb.

Infanticide was practised extensively in the Panjāb, Rājputāna, Mālwa, Cutch, Kāthiāwār, and elsewhere.

¹ But Sir W. Lee-Warner, writing in 1904 (*Life of Dalhousie*, p. 211), says: 'nor have cases of Meriah passed entirely out of the calendars of Indian crime.'

² He was allowed to retain certain lands south of the river which he had acquired earlier.



at the time of his death in 1839 at the age of fifty-nine included Kāngra and Kashmīr, as shown in the map.

Ranjit Singh, who had ruined his health by drink and debauchery, was struck with paralysis in 1834, and again in 1838, the year in which he met Lord Auckland. The general knowledge that his death must soon occur, and that he had no heir fit to succeed him, weakened his authority in his latter days, and prepared the way for the six years of misrule which ensued upon his decease. It is



MAHARAJA RANJIT SINGH.

needless to detail the crimes which stained the Panjāb during that evil time. The nature of the events is indicated sufficiently in Sir Lepel Griffin's summary :

'The six years which followed were a period of storm and anarchy, in which assassination was the rule, and the weak were ruthlessly trampled under foot. The legitimate line—Kharak Singh, the imbecile [and only son of Ranjit]; and his handsome, reckless, vicious son, Nao Nihāl Singh [a youth of eighteen]—was soon extinguished in blood. Then came the turn of the impostors : Mahārāja Sher Singh, a drunken debauchee [and pretended son of Ranjit], murdered together with his son by the fierce

Sindhanwalias ; and Dhulip [Dilip] Singh, the son of the dancing girl, whose end would have been as swift and bloody as the others, had not a propitious fortune and the collapse of the Sikh army allowed him a secure refuge in the unrequited generosity of the British Government.

As Ranjit Singh had sown, so was the harvest. The fathers had eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth were set on edge. The kingdom founded in violence, treachery, and blood did not long survive its founder. Created by the military and administrative genius of one man, it crumbled into powder when the spirit which gave it life was withdrawn ; and the inheritance of the Khālsa passed into the hands of the English, who will hold it against all comers, if only they rule with the justice, beneficence, and strength which alone make empires enduring.'

The early Sikh plundering bands had consisted almost wholly of irregular cavalry. Foot-soldiers were of little account, and artillery did not exist. Ranjit Singh transformed the army of the Sikh Khālsa, or military order, into an essentially infantry force, supported by powerful artillery, and moderately good cavalry. His principal officers were foreigners, mostly French or Italian, including Generals Ventura and Allard, who had served under Napoleon, and the ferocious Neapolitan, Avitabile. In 1845 the Sikh army comprised 88,662 men, of whom 53,756 were regular infantry. The guns of all sorts amounted to 484, besides 308 camel swivels.

In December 1845 the Khālsa, which had accepted as its nominal sovereign a child five years of age named Dhuleep (properly, Dalip) Singh, falsely alleged to be a son of Ranjit, compelled the Rānī, mother of the child, and her counsellors, Lāl Singh and Tēj Singh, to authorize the invasion of British territory by crossing the Sutlaj. The soldiers hoped to take the authorities unawares and to secure the plunder of Delhi. They numbered about 50,000 or 60,000.¹

Declaration of war. No ruler of India could refuse to accept such a challenge. The Governor-general issued his declaration of war on December 13, 1845, stating that

'the Sikh army has now, without a shadow of provocation, invaded the British territories.

The Governor-general must therefore take measures for effectually protecting the British provinces, for vindicating the authority of the British Government, and for punishing the violators of treaties and the disturbers of the public peace.

The Governor-general hereby declares the possessions of Muharaja Dhuleep Singh, on the left or British bank of the Sutlej, confiscated and annexed to the British territories.'

The war. The Governor-general in his anxiety to avoid war had incurred serious risk, against the advice of the commander-in-chief, by refraining from pushing large forces forward. The first action at Mudki (Moodkee) between Lūdiāna and Fīrōzpur

¹ Cunningham notes a tendency to overrate the numbers of the Sikh enemy. He also proves the reality of the erroneous belief held by the Khālsa soldiery that the English meditated an invasion of Sikh territory.

consequently was fought at a disadvantage and on the defensive, but resulted in the defeat of the Sikhs. Three days later the British army, having received reinforcements, attacked the invaders in their entrenchments at a village commonly called Ferozeshāh, about twelve miles from the Sutlaj.¹ The battle lasted for two days ; and, after a desperate struggle, in which the British army lost 2,415 killed and wounded, the Sikhs were driven from their entrenchments and compelled to retire. Five aides-de-camp of the Governor-general were killed, and four wounded. The situation of the British force was extremely critical on the night of December 21, when the troops had to bivouac on the ground won. Fighting was renewed at dawn, and ended in the retirement of the Sikhs. It is impossible within the limits of this work to discuss the interesting military details, which may be read in the excellent account recorded by the Governor-general's eldest son, who attended his father as an aide-de-camp.

The third battle, fought close to the Sutlaj at Aliwāl to the west of Lūdiāna, on January 28, 1846, ended in the driving of the Sikhs across the river, in which many were drowned. Every enemy gun, to the number of fifty-two, fell into the hands of the victors.²

Battle of Sobrāon. The final battle of the brief campaign was fought on February 10, 1846, in the Ferozepore (Fīrōzpur) District on the eastern bank of the river, facing the village of Sobrāon,³ on the opposite or Lahore bank. The Sikhs, numbering about 30,000, with seventy guns, occupied strong entrenchments, connected by a good bridge with the opposite bank, where their reserve was posted. The position involved obvious risk. The British force carried the works with the bayonet alone, and forced the Sikhs to retire on the bridge. The concluding act of the drama is vividly described by the Governor-general's son and heir, who was present :

'Compelled to retire, they gave way in such admirable order as to excite the admiration of the British soldiers. At last the fire slackened, and then ensued a scene which defies description. Pressed on all sides by our advancing infantry, the enemy were hemmed in in one confused mass at the head of the bridge, there to be shot down or hurled into the river below. Happening to be an eye-witness of what then occurred, I saw the bridge at that moment overcrowded with guns, horses, and soldiers of all arms, swaying to and fro, till at last with a crash it disappeared in the running waters, carrying with it those who had vainly hoped to reach the opposite shore. The river seemed alive with a struggling mass of men.

¹ The name really is Phīrūshahr (Phceerooshuhur), or 'Phīrū's town' (Cunningham, *Hist. of the Sikhs*², p. 301 n.). The *I. G.* spells Phārūshahr.

² Gough (p. 119) notes a curious incident after Aliwāl : 'By order of the Governor-general a royal salute was fired from the British camp, the bands raised the National Anthem. The Sikhs on the opposite bank, not to be outdone, followed suit with both ; and their bands were heard playing "God save the Queen".' Gough puts the number of guns captured as 67 ; the number in the text is as stated by Viscount Hardinge in his book.

³ Properly Subrāhān, the plural of Subrah, the name of a tribe inhabiting the village (*ibid.*, p. 320 n.).

The artillery, now brought down to the water's edge, completed the slaughter. Few escaped, none, it may be said, surrendered. The Sikhs met their fate with that resignation which distinguishes their race.¹

On the side of the conquerors

'the total number of killed amounted to 300, of wounded to 2,063. The lowest official estimate of the Sikh loss is 8,000.¹ The trophies of the victory comprised 67 pieces of artillery and 200 camel-swivels. Prince Waldemar [of Prussia] and his aides-de-camp were again present in the field. As true soldiers, they were not satisfied with being distant spectators, but were continually under fire.'

Rewards. Great anxiety had been felt in England when the news of the battles of Mudkī and Aliwāl arrived. The accounts of the tactics pursued seemed to indicate a certain amount of rashness on the part of Sir Hugh Gough, the gallant commander-in-chief; so that plans for placing the Governor-general in supreme military command had been considered. The announcement of the final victory at Sobraŋ, which closed the Sutlaj campaign by the destruction of the Sikh field army, dispelled all fears, and gave just cause for rejoicing. The war on the British side having been purely defensive, no regrets tempered the joy of victory. Peerages and other rewards were conferred on the Governor-general and commander-in-chief; and all ranks shared in the honours and bounties which were distributed freely, as was right, considering the critical nature of the contest with the bravest and steadiest enemy ever encountered in India by a British army.

Treaties of Lahore. The victory opened the way to Lahore, which was promptly occupied by the Governor-general. The Sikhs were not in a position to contest the terms imposed, which required the cession of all lands on the British side of the Sutlaj, as well as of the Jullundur (Jālandhar) Doāb, between that river and the Biās, the payment of half a million sterling, the cession of Kashmīr and Hazāra as the equivalent of a million, the surrender of many guns, and the limitation of the Sikh army to 20,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry.

The government was to continue in the hands of the young Mahārāja, with Lāl Singh as his minister, under the supervision of Sir Henry Lawrence, who was appointed Resident. A British force was to remain in occupation of Lahore until the close of the year, but not longer. The arrangement did not work, and before long the more friendly Sikh leaders requested that the occupation might be prolonged for eight years until the Mahārāja should come of age. An amended treaty accordingly was executed in December 1846. Sir Henry Lawrence remained as the real ruler, but nominally as the president of a council of regency. He gathered round him a cluster of brilliant colleagues as assistants, including his brother John, Herbert Edwardes, and many others well known to fame in later years. Sir Henry Lawrence's attempt to conduct the administration on more or less civilized lines was much disliked by the chiefs, and especially by the Queen Mother, who had to be

¹ Cunningham, as usual, was inclined to reduce the number.

deported. Meantime the Sikhs, who had managed to retain many guns, and still could muster a formidable force of fighting men, were preparing for a fresh conflict. It did not break out until after Lord Hardinge's departure.

Makeshift arrangements. Lord Hardinge's arrangements for the administration of the Panjāb obviously were open to criticism, and lacking in prospects of permanence. But at the time annexation was hardly possible, and the Governor-general rightly was determined to avoid a subsidiary alliance of the old, obsolete kind. Annexation was dangerous, because the small European force had been much weakened by the casualties of the campaign, and certain incidents had proved that full confidence could not be reposed in the sepoy army. Lord Hardinge hoped rather than believed that peace might be preserved because the Sikh military power had been so much weakened by the territorial cessions enforced and by the losses suffered by the Khālsa.¹ The valley of Kashmir, with the neighbouring dominions of several petty hill chiefs, was made over to Rājā Gulāb Singh, an upstart Dogra chieftain of Jummoo (Jumū), on payment of three-quarters of a million sterling. The modern Kashmir State was thus established. The British retained the Hazāra District, now (1918) included in the North-West Frontier Province.

A Muhammadan leader tried to prevent Gulāb Singh from taking possession of his new acquisitions, but was easily suppressed. The British force engaged in the operation was actually supported by a contingent of 17,000 Sikhs who had been fighting in the campaign just concluded.

All the political arrangements were made by Lord Hardinge on his own responsibility, without the advice of the council in Calcutta. He enjoyed the full confidence of the Home Government, which warmly supported him in all his acts.

Close of Lord Hardinge's administration. Lord Hardinge, in his anxiety to secure financial economy, somewhat hastily made considerable reductions in the army, which seriously embarrassed his successor. The old Duke of Wellington's blunt comment, 'I never could understand why he was in such a damned hurry,' was a just, if unconventional criticism.

In January 1848 Lord Hardinge made over charge to his successor, Lord Dalhousie, to whom he expressed the rash assurance that, so far as human foresight could predict, 'it would not be necessary to fire a gun in India for seven years to come.' The prediction, like many others of its kind, was quickly falsified.

Subsequent career of Lord Hardinge. Viscount Hardinge, after quitting India, continued to serve his queen and country to the end of his unsullied life, first as Master of the Ordnance, and then as commander-in-chief. The military strength of the United Kingdom had been allowed to sink to a dangerously low

¹ He wrote to Henry Lawrence: 'I confess I think the probability is against the continuance of a Sikh government' (*Life of Sir H. Lawrence*, p. 385).

level during the long peace between the battle of Waterloo in 1815 and the beginning of the Crimean War in 1854. No one man could remedy the neglect of two generations which resulted in the deplorable scandals of the campaign in the Crimea. Lord Hardinge, who did his best, has to his credit several valuable reforms, including an absolutely necessary increase of the artillery, the introduction of the Enfield rifle, the foundation of the School of Musketry at Hythe, and the purchase of the site for the camp and manœuvre ground at Aldershot. In 1855 he was promoted to the rank of Field-Marshal, and on September 13, 1856, he died in his seventy-first year. The regrets of his grateful sovereign are inscribed on his tomb.


The Earl of Dalhousie.

The chosen successor of the veteran Viscount Hardinge was a young Scots nobleman, the Earl of Dalhousie, only thirty-five years of age. He had made a reputation as an industrious and able official while in the ministry as President of the Board of Trade, at a time when the duties of the post were exceptionally arduous owing to the rapid development of the railway system, then a novelty. His appointment was received with general approval, but he had good reason for doubting his ability to stand the strain of governing India. In the year following he wrote :

'I was broken down in health when I started and had no business to come. I landed in Calcutta an invalid, almost a cripple.' During the whole eight years of his term of office he was never really well, and usually was suffering from acute pain. The day he quitted India he crawled on board the ship with the aid of crutches. Notwithstanding his physical disability and almost incessant suffering, the marvellous strength of his will enabled him to perform an amount of work of the highest quality which exceeded the powers of most statesmen, even when blessed with perfect health.

The first four years of his government were largely occupied by the second Sikh and the second Burmese war. It will be convenient to narrate in outline the history and results of those campaigns before discussing Lord Dalhousie's manifold activities in other fields.

Revolt of Mūlraj. Dīwān Mūlraj, who occupied a semi-indepen-



LORD DALHOUSIE.

dent position as Governor of Mūltān, combining the business of trade on a large scale with that of administration, was called upon by the government at Lahore to render accounts. After some delay he intimated that he preferred to resign. Two young officers, Vans Agnew of the Civil Service and Lieutenant Anderson, were then sent by the Resident to take over charge of the fortress of Mūltān and install the Sikh Governor who had been appointed to succeed Mūlrāj. In April 1848 both these officers were suddenly attacked and hacked to death. Mūlrāj, who rewarded the murderers for their deed, regained possession of Mūltān, which was far too strong to be taken from him except after a regular siege. Lord Gough, the commander-in-chief, with whom Lord Dalhousie reluctantly but resolutely concurred, decided that it would be unwise to attempt the siege of Mūltān during the hot weather and without adequate force or a suitable siege train. He therefore, in spite of all entreaty, deferred operations until the cold weather. He has been much blamed for that decision, but so far as I understand the matter he was right. The correctness of his judgement is not impugned by the fact that during the hot season Lieutenant Herbert Edwardes pressed Mūlrāj hard with a small force locally raised, and compelled the chieftain to remain within the walls of his fortress.

The siege of Mūltān began in September 1848 ; but, after a few days, had to be raised, because the apparent success of Mūlrāj had tempted the Sikh troops to revolt, so that the besiegers soon found themselves in danger of being cut off by a hostile host.

Anticipating a little the order of time, it may be stated that the citadel of Mūltān, after a gallant defence, capitulated on January 22, 1849. Mūlrāj was tried, convicted, and transported.

War. Lord Dalhousie immediately recognized that the outrage at Mūltān necessitated a final war with the Sikhs. His decision was announced in the famous phrase : ‘ Unwarned by precedent, uninfluenced by example, the Sikh nation has called for war, and, on my word, sirs, they shall have it with a vengeance.’¹

Extensive preparations were made. The Governor-general moved up to the frontier, and Lord Gough, the commander-in-chief, crossed the Panjāb with 20,000 men and nearly 100 guns. Another large force was brought up from Bombay.

Chiliānwālā. Before Mūltān fell the battle of Chiliānwālā had been fought by Lord Gough on January 13, 1846. The Sikhs entrenched themselves with their backs to the Jhelum river, as they had done with their backs to the Sutlaj at the battle of Sobrāon in the first Sikh war. Lord Gough reached Chiliānwālā about noon, with the intention of reconnoitring the position, encamping for the night, and fighting the next day. But when the enemy's guns suddenly opened fire, and the Sikhs in full force advanced from their entrenchments, all possibility of encamping

¹ The idiom ‘ with a vengeance ’ has been sometimes misunderstood. It simply means ‘ to extremity ’, or in French, *à outrance*, and has nothing to do with ‘ vengeance ’ in the sense of revenge.

vanished, and Lord Gough was forced to fight at once. The firing began about one o'clock in the afternoon, and consequently the daylight hours available at that season were few. The result of the fight was that the enemy was driven back to Tupai on the river bank, and if daylight had lasted would have been forced into the water. But the coming on of darkness, combined with certain errors committed by subordinate commanders, especially the faulty handling of the cavalry on the British right, prevented the attainment of complete success. The Sikhs were even able to recover some of their guns during the night. The British force suffered severely, losing 2,338 men killed and wounded. Lord Gough also lost four guns and the colours of three regiments. On the other hand, twelve or thirteen guns were taken from the enemy.

The news of the battle produced a painful impression in both India and England, the Sikh strength having been much underrated by public opinion, which had expected an easy triumph. The home authorities hastily ordered the recall of Lord Gough and his supersession by Sir Charles Napier, the conqueror of Sind.

March to Gujarāt. The battle of Chīlīānwālā had been necessarily fought by Lord Gough with inadequate force. The fall of Mūltān a few days later released a large body of troops, who made their way northwards by forced marches, and more than replaced the heavy casualties of the battle. The British now became for the first time superior to the enemy in artillery. Want of supplies prevented the Sikh general from retaining his strong entrenched position at Rāsūl near Chīlīānwālā. When he moved eastwards to Gujarāt, a town near the Chināb, Lord Gough perceived that the right time for the final conflict had come. Refusing to be tempted into premature action by the enemy's provocations, he marched slowly in February towards his chosen battle-ground, where he intended to deliver the decisive blow with concentrated forces adequately supplied with guns.¹

Battle of Gujarāt, February 21, 1849. The Sikh position was established to the south of the town of Gujarāt, with the Chināb on their left. The battle began about 9 a.m. on February 21 by a vigorous artillery duel which greatly weakened the Sikh defence. The general advance of the British began at 11.30, and an hour later the whole Sikh army was in full flight. By one o'clock the town, camp, and baggage of the enemy, with most of their guns, were in the hands of the victors.

The decisive victory was gained at the comparatively small cost of 96 killed and 670 wounded. The fugitive army was hotly pursued as far as the Afghan frontier by an active force of 12,000 men, and the conquest was completed by the occupation of Peshāwar.

Lord Gough observed in his farewell orders that 'the tide of

¹ Lord Dalhousie's advice is entitled to some of the credit due for the adequate use of artillery preparation at the 'battle of the guns', as Gujarāt has been called.

conquest, which heretofore rolled on the Punjaub from the west, has at length reached it and overcome it from the east; and that which Alexander attempted, the British Indian army has accomplished.⁷ The fierce controversy which has raged round Chillianwālā and certain less important actions fought by Lord Gough found no fuel for its fires in the story of the battle of Gujarāt. The preparations for the final struggle were carefully thought out and successfully matured, while the conduct of the battle itself left no opening for hostile criticism. The news was received with intense pleasure at home, and fresh honours and rewards were gladly bestowed on everybody concerned, from the Governor-general and the commander-in-chief down to the rank and file.

Annexation. The Panjāb having twice become the prize of war, and two attempts at maintaining a Sikh administration having failed disastrously, Lord Dalhousie rightly decided on avowed annexation. The decision was his alone, taken without reference either to the council in Calcutta or to superior authority in England. The Governor-general explained that



SIR HENRY LAWRENCE.

'there was no government in the Panjāb, and if I had not proclaimed a distinct policy of one kind or another, I should have had the country in one month in riot and utter anarchy, and harm would have been done which years and years could not have made good. What I have done I have done as an act of necessity.'¹

The boy Mahārāja Dhu-leep Singh was required to resign for himself, his heirs and his successors, all right, title, and claim to the sovereignty of the Panjāb, or to any sovereign power whatever.

Form of government.

Lord Dalhousie, who did not see eye to eye with Sir Henry

Lawrence the late resident, was unable either to dispense with the services of that able officer, or to entrust him with the control of the civil administration, a task for which his romantic temperament and unmethodical habits were thought to render him unsuitable.

As a temporary arrangement the provincial government was

¹ Lord Dalhousie, in acting thus promptly, followed the advice of John Lawrence. Henry thought annexation inexpedient.

placed in the hands of a board, consisting of Sir Henry Lawrence, his brother John, and a civilian colleague from Bengal. As soon as opportunity offered Henry Lawrence was transferred to Rājputāna, the board was abolished, and John Lawrence was appointed chief commissioner. Whoever might be in local charge, the government was directed by the Governor-general, who insisted that his policy, not that of anybody else, must be carried out.

Organization of a new administration. The new government had everything to do. The administration of Ranjit Singh, even when he was at his best, had been of the rough-and-ready kind. He did not concern himself for a moment with the welfare of the people; concentrating his attention on the army, and the extraction of every rupee from the cultivators on which he could lay hands. No civilized rulers could possibly continue to govern on such principles. Lord Dalhousie selected the best men in the Indian services, civil and military, in order to construct a reasonably regular, though flexible and informal, machinery of government, and was rewarded by seeing that prosperity and contentment in the Panjāb resulted from his efforts. The Lawrences, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, Richard Temple, and many other officers whose names are more or less familiar, contributed to the organization of the model province; but they always worked under the eye of their indefatigable master, who, perhaps, deserves, even more than his brilliant subordinates, the credit for the results obtained.

Reforms in all departments. External security was provided for by a chain of forts and cantonments and the constitution of the mobile Frontier Force, including the Corps of Guides; while internal order was assured by general disarmament and the enrolment of civil and military police. Ranjit Singh had been accustomed to take as land revenue in kind half of the gross crop produce. The new government was content with a moderate cash assessment. Communications, which had been wholly neglected, were rapidly improved, and all possible steps were taken to encourage the people to settle down to peaceable occupations. Village schools were founded, and an informal judicial system was brought into operation. The province was divided into convenient districts, administered by picked officers, of whom about half were military and half civil servants. Care was taken not to crush the newly conquered people under the weight of the Bengal Regulations, the administration being organized on the more elastic non-Regulation pattern. By those measures and many others equally beneficent the Panjāb quickly became not only prosperous but generally contented, and the men who had fought the British so bravely in 1849 willingly stood shoulder to shoulder with them in 1857. The old ruling classes, however, for whom Henry Lawrence felt warm sympathy, had some reason to complain of the heavy hand of his brother John.¹


¹ The fundamental differences of temperament and opinion between the Lawrence brothers are expounded at length in the *Life of Sir Henry*

Second Burmese War. The war with Burma, although involving consequences not much inferior in importance to those of the Sikh War, was of less military interest, and may be described sufficiently in few words. The humiliations inflicted on and the losses endured by Burma in 1826 had not lowered the pride of the court of Ava, which never missed an opportunity of expressing its contempt for Europeans or for insulting the representative of the Governor-general, who had to be withdrawn in 1840. Certain acts of oppression on British merchants in 1851 were brought to the notice of Lord Dalhousie, who required reparation and the payment of a trifling sum as damages. No satisfaction having been obtained, Commodore Lambert was sent to Rangoon to demand redress. That officer, contrary to his orders, seized one of the king's ships. The Burmese then fired, the Commodore returned the fire, and so hostilities began, more by accident than by design.¹ But, even if the naval officer had been less hasty, war could not have been long postponed, because the Burmese Government declined to abate its arrogance, or to deal on friendly terms with the Government of India. The operations were brief and successful. The great pagoda of Rangoon was gallantly stormed on April 14, 1852; Prome was occupied by General Godwin in October, and the whole of the Pegu province in November. Dalhousie declined to obey instructions from England to advance to Ava, contenting himself with the annexation of Pegu, the inland boundary on the river being fixed at Meaday, above Prome. The king having resolutely refused to sign a formal treaty, the new province was annexed by proclamation. The brilliant success of the second Burmese War was mainly due to the Governor-general himself, who avoided all the errors of Lord Amherst, and saw personally to every detail of the equipment of the troops. He also visited the country, and organized the administration, as he had done in the Panjāb.

Results. The Government of India thus acquired control, direct or indirect, of the entire eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal from Chittagong to Singapore, while the Burmese kingdom was absolutely shut out from access to the sea except through British territory. Such a condition could not last indefinitely, and the third Burmese War in the time of Lord Dufferin was the natural and inevitable consequence of the second. Pegu, for the most part an alluvial plain of extraordinary fertility, now constitutes the Pegu Division, comprising five Districts. The population increases rapidly, and British administration has brought an

Lawrence, by Sir Herbert Edwardes and Herman Merivale (Smith Elder, 3rd ed., 1873).

¹ 'There is no doubt that Lambert was the *immediate* cause of the war by seizing the King's ship, in direct disobedience of his orders from me. I accepted the responsibility of his act, but disapproved and censured it. He replied officially that he had written home, and he was sure Palmerston would have approved!' (*Private Letters*, July 23, 1853, p. 260). Lambert was promoted.



enormous growth of material prosperity. Prome is connected with Rangoon by railway.

Until 1862, when Sir Arthur Phayre became the first chief commissioner, British Burma was administered under the Government of India by two commissioners, one of Pegu (Sir Arthur Phayre), and the other of Tenasserim.

Sikkim. A third annexation of foreign territory on a very small scale had been effected in 1850, when a portion of the Sikkim State situated between Nepāl and Bhutān was taken from the Rājā as a penalty for his treacherous seizure in the previous year of Dr. Campbell, the frontier political officer, and Dr. (Sir John) Hooker, the eminent botanist.

Annexation by lapse. We now turn to the much debated question of Lord Dalhousie's action in relation to the Native States, and the numerous cases in which the doctrine of lapse to the paramount power on failure of heirs was enforced. The doctrine was no new thing, and in every case the annexations actually effected were approved by the Home Government.

The test case is that of Sātārā, the little Marāthā principality in the Western Ghāts created by Lord Hastings in 1819. The Rājā appointed by the Marquess having been deposed in 1839 for treasonable practices, his brother was substituted, and ruled well until his death without heirs in 1848. The Rājā, immediately before his death, had adopted a son without the consent of the paramount power. Everybody was agreed that the son so adopted should inherit the private estate of the deceased. The question whether or not he should succeed to the Rāj was quite a different matter. As far back as 1834 the directors had laid down that the recognition of an adoption as securing a political succession was an indulgence, and that such an 'indulgence should be the exception, not the rule, and should never be granted but as a special mark of favour and approbation'. The principle thus enunciated was extended in 1841 by the decision of the court 'to persevere in the one clear and direct course of abandoning no just and honourable accession of territory or revenue, while all existing claims of right are at the same time scrupulously respected'. The case of Sātārā obviously came within those rules, and the only issue was whether or not it was expedient to apply them.

Lord Dalhousie and almost all the leading officials in India who were consulted concurred in holding that no sufficient reason existed for treating Sātārā as an exception to the rule. The Court of Directors confirmed the action of the Governor-general, saying :

'We are fully satisfied that by the general law and custom of India, a dependent principality like that of Sātārā, cannot pass to an adopted heir without the consent of the Paramount Power ; that we are under no pledge, direct or constructive, to give such consent ; and that the general interests committed to our charge are best consulted by withholding it.'

'That clear ruling places on the shoulders of the Home Government the full responsibility for all the cases of annexation by reason of lapse effected by Lord Dalhousie. In one instance only, that of

Karauli in Rājputāna, was his recommendation disallowed ; the reason being that Karauli was an ancient Rājput principality. Lord Dalhousie, although personally in favour of annexation, did not press his opinion, and expected it to be overruled. He declared that he was 'very well content' with the final decision in the matter'.¹

Pension of the ex-Pēshwā. The two other principal cases of annexation by lapse, namely those of Nagpur and Jhānsī, as well as several minor instances, like Jaitpur in Bundēlkhand and Sambalpur in Orissa (now in Central Provinces), were all covered in principle by the Sātārā ruling. The annexation of Oudh in 1856 and the stoppage of the pension of the ex-Pēshwā, after his death in 1852, had nothing whatever to do with the doctrine of lapse. Dhondhū Pant, the adopted son of Bājī Rāo, and afterwards infamous as the Nānā Sahib, was allowed to inherit without question the enormous treasure accumulated by the ex-Pēshwā, and was given a *jāgīr* besides. The extravagant pension of eight lakhs of rupees a year secured by Sir John Malcolm to Bājī Rāo unquestionably was merely a personal allowance for his lifetime. His adopted son's claim to continuance of it was baseless and unreasonable.

Annexation of Oudh. The annexation of Oudh was ordered directly and peremptorily by the Home Government in a mode more drastic than that recommended by Lord Dalhousie, who was then on the eve of departure. He had not time to take all the precautions needed to ensure the safety of the transaction. The refusal of Lord Canning, his successor, to enforce disarmament in Oudh had serious consequences. Dalhousie, who had not been afraid to disarm the Panjāb, would not have shrunk from a similar operation in Oudh, on which he had actually resolved.²

Sleeman's opinions. Sir William Sleeman, resident at Lucknow from 1849 to 1856, while convinced that the persistent misgovernment of Oudh should not be allowed to continue, held strong opinions adverse to direct annexation. His words are :

'If our Government interpose, it must not be by negotiation or treaty, but authoritatively on the ground of existing treaties and obligations to the people of Oudh. The treaty of 1837 gives our Government ample authority to take the whole administration on ourselves, in order to secure what we have so often pledged ourselves to secure to the people ; but if we do this we must, in order to stand well with the rest of India, honestly and distinctly disclaim all interested motives, and appropriate the whole of the revenues for the benefit of the people and royal family of Oude. . . . Were we to take advantage of the occasion to *annex* or *confiscate* Oude, or any part of it, our good name in India would undoubtedly suffer ; and that good name is more valuable to us than a dozen Oudes. . . . We suffered from our conduct in Scinde ; but that was a country distant and little known, and linked to the rest of India by few ties of sympathy. . . . It will be otherwise with Oude. Here the giant's strength is manifest, and we cannot

¹ Lee Warner, ii. 173.

² *Private Letters*, February 12, 1858, p. 401.

"use it like a giant" without suffering in the estimation of all India. Annexation or confiscation are [*sic*] not compatible with our relations with this little dependent state. . . . I shall recommend that all establishments, military, civil, and fiscal, be kept entirely separate from those of our own Government, that there may be no mistake about the disinterestedness of our intentions towards Oude. . . . By adopting a simple system of administration, to meet the wishes of a simple people, we should secure the goodwill of all classes of society in Oude, and no class would be more pleased with the change than the members of the royal family themselves, who depend upon their stipends for their subsistence, and despair of ever again receiving them under the present Sovereign and system. . . . We have only the right to interpose to secure for the suffering people that better Government which their Sovereign pledged himself to secure for them, but has failed to secure. . . . The native States I consider to be breakwaters, and when they are all swept away we shall be left to the mercy of our native army, which may not always be sufficiently under our control.'

Sleeman appears to have desired that the Government of India should arrange to manage the country by European agency in perpetuity, leaving the surplus revenue to the royal family. He suggested as an alternative that the European management might last only during the minority of the heir apparent, then about eleven years of age, who should be bound on coming of age to govern in accordance with the advice of the resident.¹

Dalhousie's action. The annexation was actually effected by Sir James Outram, who had succeeded Sleeman as resident early in 1856. Lord Dalhousie, being anxious to secure the appearance of the king's consent, availed himself of the discretion as to the method of procedure allowed by the directors' orders, to offer a treaty, with the intimation that, if it should not be accepted within three days, the resident would assume the government of Oudh. The treaty propounded vested the government of the country in the Company for ever; guaranteed the royal title to the king and his lawful heirs, with allowances amounting in all to fifteen lakhs of rupees (then 1,500,000 pounds sterling); and a limited jurisdiction in the palace and royal parks. On February 7 the king definitely refused to sign the treaty. The annexation was then effected by proclamation without opposition. The trouble which ensued was of later date.

Space fails to justify the decision of the British Government by adducing proofs of the frightful and increasing misrule in Oudh. The ghastly picture is faithfully exhibited in Sleeman's famous book describing his tour in 1849-50. Outram's reports fully confirmed the statements of his predecessor. Nobody who knows the facts can deny the necessity for taking over the administration, but it would have been wiser to follow Sleeman's advice without modification as to the method of effecting the necessary change. Lord Dalhousie certainly made a mistake in trying to extort an ostensible consent from the king, who was right in refusing to set his signature to a sham 'treaty'. The Governor-general

¹ *A Journey, Private Correspondence*. vol. ii, pp. 377-93.

should have proceeded, 'not by negotiation or treaty', but 'authoritatively', as Sleeman rightly advised him.

Berār and the Carnatic. Two other transactions in connexion with the Native States require passing mention. Incessant troubles about the Nizam's payments for the support of the Hyderabad Contingent were settled for a time by an arrangement made in 1853, which assigned Berār with certain adjoining districts, all estimated to pay a revenue of fifty lakhs, in order to provide for the maintenance of the force. The arrangement did not work as smoothly as was expected, and required modification some years later. Difficulties continued to be experienced, and in 1902 the Nizam agreed with Lord Curzon to assign Berār to the Government of India under a perpetual lease, so that it is now, all but in name, part of British India, and is attached to the Central Provinces.

The death of the titular Nawāb of the Carnatic in 1855 gave an opportunity for the revision of the rank and allowances of his family. Careful investigation in England and India satisfied the responsible authorities that the rank of Nawāb, which carried with it a semi-sovereign position, had been held since 1801 by each Nawāb as a purely personal honour, and that Government was not bound to continue it after the death of the holder. Lord Dalhousie, concurring with the Government of Madras, therefore decided on the abolition of the rank of Nawāb, and the abatement of many attendant evils. The present representative of the family is known as Prince of Arcot, and is officially recognized as the premier nobleman in the presidency.

Administration. A large volume would be needed to describe with particulars Lord Dalhousie's incessant, almost feverish activity in supervising every department of the state, and introducing innovations or improvements. He made the machinery of the Supreme Government more workable by getting rid of antiquated survivals in procedure and by arranging the work on a sensible departmental basis. The absurd arrangement by which the Governor-general in person, or in his absence the next senior member of council, administered the provincial government of Bengal, was terminated, and a lieutenant-governor was appointed (1854). A particularly inefficient body called the Military Board, which was supposed to look after public works, was suppressed, and the Department of Public Works (P.W.D.) was constituted nearly in its existing form. The expenditure on public works, which had been on the most niggardly scale, was enormously increased, and works of great magnitude, such as the Grand Trunk Road, were undertaken. Due attention was paid to irrigation canals, especially the Ganges Canal. Lord Dalhousie utilized his English experience as president of the Board of Trade to sketch a well-considered plan of trunk and branch railways, which forms the basis of the existing railway system. The earliest line, a short one from Bombay to Thāna, was opened in 1853. A year later Calcutta was connected with the Rāniganj coal-fields, and a few miles of rails were laid in the Madras presidency. Various

difficulties prevented Lord Dalhousie from seeing any more lines open, but preliminary operations on a large scale were proceeding when he retired.

The Governor-general also founded the electric telegraph system, with the help of a clever medical professor of chemistry, named O'Shaughnessy, for whom he obtained a knighthood with much difficulty, because the gentleman was not a member of either the army or the covenanted civil service. The expedients to which O'Shaughnessy was reduced in order to circumvent the innumerable obstacles in his path were very strange. The utterly inefficient postal arrangements which had satisfied 'John Company' were boldly swept away, and the uniform half-anna postal rate was introduced. Before Dalhousie's reforms it cost a rupee to send a letter from Calcutta to Bombay. During several years of Lord Dalhousie's administration the North-Western Provinces, now the Agra Province, were well governed by Mr. James Thomason, who was lieutenant-governor from 1843 to 1853. Thomason warmly supported and in part anticipated the Governor-general in the policy of extensive public works, the promotion of education, the reform of the jail administration, and every other form of activity proper to a government claiming to be civilized. The famous education dispatch sent out by Sir Charles Wood (Lord Halifax) in 1854, which laid the foundation of the existing system of vernacular schools, was thoroughly in accordance with the ideas of both Dalhousie and Thomason. The Governor-general lost no time in giving the fullest possible effect to the instructions sent from England, which had been prepared with the help of Macaulay, Marshman, and other capable advisers.

Last, but not least, the subject of army organization must be mentioned. Lord Dalhousie prepared nine elaborate minutes on the question, which were put on one side at the India House, and scarcely noticed. In fact, two of them were mislaid and could not be traced. Hunter was of opinion that if the advice recorded in those masterly documents had been heeded, it is possible that the Mutiny might not have occurred. But the validity of that opinion is extremely doubtful.

Renewal of Charter, 1853. In 1853 the charter of the East India Company was renewed for the last time, not for any definite period, but during the pleasure of Parliament. The constitution of the Court of Directors was improved, the covenanted civil service was thrown open to competition, and power was taken to appoint a separate provincial government for Bengal.

Lord Dalhousie's achievement. No summary confined to a reasonable space can do justice to the manifold activity of Lord Dalhousie, who never allowed ill health and pain to hinder him from giving all his boundless energy to the service of the state. Many of his actions aroused hostile criticism, often drawing down on his head unmerited abuse. He felt painfully the wounds inflicted by the darts of unfair calumny, but was not moved by the smart to swerve from the path which he had marked out for

himself. A saying of his quoted by Hunter has, as that author observes, 'the ring of a great soul'.

"I circulate these papers;" he wrote hastily on one case in which he had successfully insisted on justice being done at the risk of a tumult, "they are an instance of the principle that we should do what is right without fear of consequences. To fear God and to have no other fear is a maxim of religion, but the truth of it and the wisdom of it are proved day by day in politics."

Undoubtedly Dalhousie always sought to do what he considered right from his point of view, which did not always command the whole field as seen by others, who were not affected by his limitations. He was a masterful man, and had some of the defects inseparable from his type of character. When it was suggested that he should take office in the ministry at home after leaving India, he explained to his confidential correspondent that various reasons prevented him from accepting any official position, and added: 'Moreover, you have hit another reason. I should never act with other men. It is not (I hope and believe) that I arrogantly insist on my own opinion, but I can't take the same views as other fellows seem to do—in fact, I suppose I am crotchety.' The writer of the last clause did not do himself justice. It is, however, true that he was ill-fitted to work smoothly with colleagues, and a man with temperament so autocratic was bound to make enemies and develop heat in official business. His intellectual power is undeniable; but he worshipped efficiency a little too zealously, and sometimes forgot that even inefficient people have sentiments which need consideration. An unmethodical sentimental person like Sir Henry Lawrence irritated his practical mind intensely. No criticism can alter the fact that Lord Dalhousie must always be allowed a place in the front rank of the Governors-general, by the side of Warren Hastings, Wellesley, and the Marquess of Hastings.

The examination of the question as to how far his policy provoked the Mutiny will be undertaken more conveniently in the next chapter.

CHRONOLOGY

Sir Henry (Lord) Hardinge Governor-general (July)	1844
First Sikh War began; battles of Mudki and 'Ferozeshah' (December)	1845
Battles of Aliwāl (January) and Sobrāon (February); treaties of Lahore	1846
Successful operations in Hill Tracts of Orissa	1847-54
Lord Dalhousie Governor-general (January); revolt of Mūlraj; second Sikh War; annexation of Sātārā by lapse	1848
Battles of Chilianwālā and Gujarāt; annexation of the Panjāb	1849
Penal annexation of part of Sikkim	1850
Second Burmese War; annexation of Pegu	1852
First Indian railway opened; renewal of charter	1853
Sir Charles Wood's education dispatch	1854
Crimean War; many reforms	1854-6
Departure of Lord Dalhousie; Lord Canning Governor-general; annexation of Oudh; death of Lord Hardinge	1856

AUTHORITIES

Viscount Hardinge (R. I., 1900) by the second Viscount HARDINGE, who was on his father's staff, contains much matter previously unpublished, and ranks as a primary authority. The standard work on the Sikhs generally is *A History of the Sikhs* by J. D. CUNNINGHAM (1st ed., 1849, suppressed; 2nd ed., 1853, written largely from the Sikh point of view). It should be read with *Ranjit Singh* by Sir LEPEL GRIFFIN (R. I., 1898), a brilliant and wise little book, which gives the best account of the Mahārāja. Further light is thrown on both the Sikh Wars in *The Sikhs and the Sikh Wars* by General Sir CHARLES GOUGH and A. D. INNES (Innes & Co., 1897); and in the *Life and Campaigns of Hugh Gough, Field Marshal, first Viscount*, by R. S. RAIT (1903). The story of the suppression of the Khond horrors is told by Major-General JOHN CAMPBELL in the *Narrative of his Operations in the Hill Tracts of Orissa for the Suppression of Human Sacrifices and Female Infanticide* (London, Hurst & Blackett; printed for private circulation, 1861).

MARSHMAN devotes much space to the time of Lord Dalhousie. Special books dealing with the subject are: *The Marquess of Dalhousie* (R. I., 1905) by Sir W. W. HUNTER; the large *Life* by Sir W. LEE WARNER (1904); *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*, ed. by J. A. BAIRD (Blackwood, 1910); and *The Marquis of Dalhousie's Administration of British India*, by EDWIN ARNOLD (2 vols., Saunders & Otley, 1861). The second Burmese War is treated by Colonel W. F. B. LAURIE in *Our Burmese Wars and Relations with Burma* (Allen, 1880).

Biographical works dealing with the doings of individual officers are too numerous to specify. Two little books on Thomason may be mentioned, namely, *James Thomason*, by Sir W. MUIR (Edinburgh, Clark, 1897); and another with the same title by Sir R. TEMPLE (R. I., 1893).

CHAPTER 5

Lord Canning; the Mutiny; the Queen's Proclamation and the passing of the East India Company.

Viscount Canning. Viscount Canning, son of Mr. George Canning who had been Prime Minister in 1827, was in his forty-fourth year when he relieved Lord Dalhousie on the last day of February 1856, and had had considerable political experience as a member of Parliament and a minister, his last office being that of postmaster-general. Lord Dalhousie, although rather more guarded in his farewell utterances than some of his predecessors had been, was disposed to believe that all was well in India, and that his successor would enjoy a peaceful time. Even the dangerous annexation of Oudh had been effected quietly without any serious opposition.


No prevision of the Mutiny. The outgoing Governor-general certainly had not the slightest prevision of the storm that was to break the next year in May, and had not made any arrangements to meet it. Although Lord Dalhousie had displayed anxious forethought in the preparations for the Burmese War, and had organized

admirably the supply and transport services, he was not a military genius. His minutes on army organization, which have been mentioned, were mainly directed to the purpose of maintaining in India an adequate proportion of European troops. He deplored and resisted as far as he could the orders from home which required him to send a considerable portion of his small European garrison to China and Persia. So far his views were perfectly sound, but he must share with his predecessors the censure due for permitting the continuance of a most dangerous military situation in India. He had not taken any precautions to protect the enormous store of munitions at Delhi, which was left in the hands of the native army, or to secure the essential strategical position of Allahabad. Whatever thought was devoted to military preparation in India was directed to the Panjāb. Everywhere else the old haphazard distribution of the troops continued; and nobody in authority, military or civil, seems to have realized the obvious perils incurred.

Crimean, Persian, and Chinese Wars.

Those perils were much aggravated by the wars in which Great Britain was involved in 1856. The Crimean War came to an end in March, but in the closing months of that year India was drawn by Palmerstonian policy into a connexion with two wars which did not properly concern her, and both of which were unnecessary.

Under orders from the Home Government, which had taken alarm at the occupation of Herat by Persia, an expedition under Sir James Outram was sent from Bombay to the Persian Gulf in October, and did not return until March 1857. The high-handed action of the representatives of Great Britain in China brought on hostilities over a trifling incident in November, which lasted with certain interruptions until 1860. British troops proceeding to India were then ordered to go round by China, and help in the operations at Canton. The knowledge that the English were engaged in so many wars, and that the proportion of European troops in India was dangerously low, while the most important strategical points in the interior were in sepoxy hands,¹ fostered



LORD CANNING.

¹ The Delhi arsenal contained not less than 300 guns and mortars, 20,000 stands of arms, 200,000 shot and shell, and an enormous quantity

the unrest which then prevailed in the native army, and to a considerable extent among the general population. The circumstances of the time were favourable to designs of rebellion against the foreigners, who seemed to be weaker than usual.

Discontent in native army. Long before 1856 Lord William Bentinck had denounced the sepoy army as being the most expensive and inefficient in the world. Many incidents proved its deterioration, and the constant extension of frontiers involved the service of the men in strange countries which they disliked. While serving in such places they expected extra allowances, and whenever difficulty was experienced in satisfying their claims mutinies occurred. At least four mutinies are recorded during the thirteen years preceding the great explosion; the regiments concerned being the 34th N.I. in 1844, the 22nd N.I. in 1849, the 66th N.I. in 1850, and the 38th N.I. in 1852. Lord Canning in his first year of office directed that all recruits for the Bengal army should be attested, like the Madras sepoys, with an obligation to serve wherever required. Although the change did not directly affect the men already in the ranks it was unpopular, because the service was to a large extent hereditary and movements by sea endangered caste.

Strength of army. On May 10, 1857, the strength of the Company's army in India, including Pegu, was 238,002 of all ranks, of whom 38,000, or 19 per cent. (including officers of the native army), were Europeans, the remainder 200,002 being natives of the country. The strength of the Bengal Army, which alone revolted to a serious extent, was 151,361, comprising 22,698 Europeans and 128,663 Indians. About 40,000 troops were in the Panjāb beyond the Sutlaj, including 8,631 Europeans, besides 11,049 in the Cis-Sutlaj districts, including 4,790 Europeans. Thus 13,421 Europeans were concentrated in the Panjāb and Cis-Sutlaj territories.¹

The proportion of British troops in the region now called the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh was extremely small, while the strategical points and most of the guns were left in the hands of the native army. No European force existed in Bengal and Bihār, except at Calcutta and at Dinapore near Patna. It is astonishing that successive Governors-general and commanders-in-chief should have been content to allow the continuance of such a dangerous distribution.

Lax army discipline. The state of discipline in the native, and especially in the Bengal army, had sunk very low, largely owing to the inveterate Bengal practice of promoting both British and Indian officers by strict seniority and retaining them long of other material. The only Europeans employed were a few officers and non-commissioned officers of the Ordnance Department. The palace enclosure was inhabited by about 12,000 discontented dependants of the titular emperor. The key position of Allahabad was treated with similar carelessness.

¹ The figures are given by G. D. (see *Authorities post*), p. 731.

after they had become useless.¹ General Godwin, for instance, who commanded in the second Burmese War, was seventy years of age, and Sūbadārs of forty or even fifty years' service were not uncommon. About 40,000 of the men came from Oudh, and with the native officers formed close family parties subversive of discipline. The large percentage of Brahmans recruited fostered the caste spirit to a mischievous extent. Other causes contributed to the laxity of discipline, which it would be tedious to expound. The fact of the laxity is certain.

Unrest of civil population. It is equally certain that the minds of the civil population of all classes and ranks, Hindus and Muhammadans, princes and people, were agitated and disturbed by feelings of uneasiness and vague apprehension. The disturbance of sentiment was not manifested by insurrections, as the discontent of the army had been signalled by mutinies, but events showed clearly that men's minds had been long unsettled. The ruling classes were rendered uneasy by the numerous escheats and annexations. They knew nothing about subtle distinctions of 'dependent' or 'subordinate' states, and the like, which filled so large a space in the correspondence between the Government of India and the Home authorities. They simply saw that principality after principality was escheated and annexed for one reason or another, so that no ruler of a native state felt safe. Every one of the escheats, lapses, and annexations which marked the eight years of Lord Dalhousie's rule could be justified by sound arguments and the general principles enunciated by the Government in England; but the pace was too fast, and the cumulative effect of the transactions was profoundly unsettling. The introduction of British law and the revenue settlements with village zemindars diminished everywhere the authority of the classes accustomed to rule their estates and chieftainships as petty autocrats; and the establishment of general internal peace threw multitudes out of employment. The annexation of Oudh, in particular, let loose swarms of unemployed men in various ranks. When Outram was obliged to take leave the chief commissionership at Lucknow unfortunately was given by Lord Canning to Mr. Coverley Jackson, a man of violent and overbearing disposition, who quarrelled incessantly with his colleagues, especially with Mr. Gubbins, the equally hot-tempered judicial commissioner. The administration took too little heed of the susceptibilities of the great landholders, and Lord Canning's refusal to disarm Oudh left abundance of weapons in every village.

Both the army and the civil population were pervaded by fear that the Government intended to make everybody Christians, as the old Muhammadan governments had often manufactured 'converts' wholesale.² The Indian people, as a rule, do not

¹ In Madras and Bombay the native officers were promoted by selection.

² 'Never were the natives more grievously mistaken than they have been in adopting the notion foisted on them by designing and ambitious men—that their religion was at stake; for that notion I believe to have

bother about doctrines. They recognize as a Muhammadan any circumcised person, who is willing to repeat the short Muslim formula and to submit to the external conditions of Muslim life. Hinduism, of which caste is the essential institution, does not trouble about any man's beliefs, but public opinion insists that every man should follow the *dharma*, or Law of Duty, of his caste. Christians had no caste, and no regard for the rules of ceremonial purity and diet, whether Muslim or Hindu. Popular opinion regarded as a *Kristān* (Christian) anybody who was prepared to eat beef or pork indifferently, and consume strong drink without scruple, while disregarding all the conventions about ablutions and ceremonial which Hindus and Muhammadans, each in their own way, hold dear. Many circumstances conduced to the widespread apprehension that the people were to be made Christians. Missionary activity was largely increased and openly favoured by powerful officials, especially in the Panjāb. The introduction of European improvements, railways, telegraphs, and the like, which now are accepted as part of the natural order of things, was a shock to the people of the middle of the nineteenth century, and seemed to portend a general Europeanization, which was considered to be much the same thing as general Christianization. It would be easy to elaborate the subject at much greater length, and to adduce other causes which contributed to fill the powder magazine in which the sepoy mutiny of May 1857 exploded.

Greased cartridges. The introduction of the Enfield rifle, one of the necessary reforms effected by Lord Hardinge, while commander-in-chief in England, led directly to the explosion. An ill-considered regulation directed the sepoys to bite the end of the cartridge, and in January 1857 reports were made that the sepoys believed the cartridges to be greased with cows' and pigs' fat for the express purpose of destroying their caste and making them all Christians. At first the alarm was believed by the Indian authorities to be wholly unfounded, but subsequent inquiry proved that the fat of cows or oxen really had been used at Woolwich, and that in consequence the men would have lost caste by biting cartridges so greased.¹ The regulation demanding that the end of the cartridge should be bitten was rescinded, directions were given that ready greased cartridges should not be issued, liberty being allowed to the men to make their own arrangements, and elaborate explanations and assurances were freely promulgated. But it was all of no use. The terror had seized the minds of the whole army, and the men would not believe the assurances of their officers or the Government.

Chupatties and lotus-flowers. The general unrest was indicated by the mysterious *chupatties*, or griddle-cakes, which began to circulate from village to village about the middle of 1856, been at the root of the late rebellion' (Baboo Ramgopal Ghose, quoted by G. D., p. 612).

¹ 'On this inflammable material, the too true story of the cartridges fell as a spark on dry tinder' (Sir C. Aitchison, *Lord Lawrence*, p. 76).

and the similar circulation of lotus-flowers which went on at the same time, but among the regiments only.

‘A messenger would come to a village, seek out the headman or village elder, give him six chupatties and say : “ These six cakes are sent to you ; you will make six others, and send them on to the next village.” The headman accepted the six cakes, and punctually sent forward other six as he had been directed.’

Nobody could say where the transmission of the *chupatties* began. Some witnesses opined that it started near Delhi ; others, perhaps with greater probability, thought the arrangement originated in Oudh. The process continued for many months.

‘ It was a common occurrence for a man to come to a cantonment with a lotus-flower, and give it to the chief native officer of a regiment ; the flower was circulated from hand to hand in the regiment ; each man took it, looked at it, and passed it on, saying nothing. When the lotus came to the last man in the regiment, he disappeared for a time, and took it to the next military station. This strange process occurred throughout nearly all the military stations where regiments of the Bengal native army were cantoned.’¹

The exact meaning of the symbols used for such cryptic messages was never divined. The Indian Government of those days had no organized secret service or intelligence department ; but even if such an institution had existed probably it would have been baffled. All the resources of modern detective agencies were unable to explain the ‘ tree-daubing ’ mystery which accompanied the cow-killing agitation in the eastern districts of the United Provinces in my own time. I often tried to obtain a reasonable explanation, without success.

Beginning of the Mutiny. On January 23, 1857, the troops at Dumdum near Calcutta openly displayed their aversion to the cartridges. On March 29, at Barrackpore, the adjutant of the 34th N.I. was cut down on the parade-ground by a Brahman sepoy, his comrades looking on without stirring, except one, a Muhammadan named Shaikh Paltū, who gallantly ran to defend his officer. The necessary punishments followed. Meantime the growing excitement among the sepoys was marked by numerous incendiary fires at Barrackpore. During March and April twenty-five similar fires occurred at distant Umballa, on the border of the Panjāb. At Meerut the men of the 3rd Cavalry refused the cartridges, and on May 3 the 7th Oudh Infantry mutinied at Lucknow. Eighty-five of the cavalry mutineers at Meerut having been sentenced to long terms of imprisonment, their sentences were promulgated at a special parade on Saturday, May 9. Next day, Sunday, while evening service was being held, the cavalry and two infantry regiments broke open the jail, released their comrades, burnt the officers’ houses, murdered every European on whom they could lay hands, and hurried off to Delhi. The beginning of the Mutiny is usually counted from that day, May 10.

General Hewitt, the imbecile officer commanding at Meerut, did nothing, although he had 2,200 European soldiers at his disposal. He made no attempt to pursue the mutineers, who reached Delhi early on Monday morning, and soon made themselves masters of the city and palace. All Europeans whom the rebels could find—men, women, and children—were ruthlessly massacred. Happily a gallant telegraph operator was just in time to telegraph the news to Lahore, and so warn the authorities in the Panjāb. Lieutenant Willoughby, the officer in charge of the magazine, supported by eight brave comrades, defended the position against a raging mob for several hours, and, when it was impossible to hold out longer, blew up the place. The tremendous explosion killed large numbers of the assailants, and destroyed a considerable part of the munitions, but unfortunately much remained. The mutineers, who were quickly joined by other regiments and by all the disorderly elements in the city and neighbourhood, proclaimed the restoration of the Mogul Empire, and placed the aged titular emperor, Bahādur Shāh, on his throne. They showed him little respect, and such government as existed appears to have been administered by the military leaders. The disorders rapidly spread over the Agra Province, then known as the North-Western Provinces, which soon became 'a sea of anarchy', from which all control had vanished. Murder, burning, and plundering raged unchecked in almost every district. The presence of six hundred European troops enabled the lieutenant-governor, Mr. John Colvin, who had succeeded Mr. Thomason, to retain possession of the fort at Agra, the capital.


On June 8 a few thousand troops from Umballa, reinforced from Meerut, took up a position to the north of Delhi on the Ridge, a low and narrow eminence of sandstone rock which is the northernmost spur of the Aravalli Range, running along the western side of the city, and beyond it in a direction slightly east of north until it reaches the bank of the Jumna. Lack of numbers and of heavy artillery rendered the capture of Delhi impossible until the arrival of additional troops and a siege train from the Panjāb, collected by the skill and energy of Sir John Lawrence and his colleagues, gave reasonable hopes of success. On September 14 the Kashmir gate was blown in. In the course of a few days the whole city was occupied and the rebels were driven forth in headlong flight. The joy of the victors was marred by the death of John Nicholson, the most renowned of the many heroes of the siege and storm. All India had watched breathlessly for the fate of the ancient capital. Its fall was the turning-point of the Mutiny. From that date the ultimate success of the British Government was no longer in doubt, and the waverers, who had held back while the issue was doubtful, hastened to render aid to the Government. Much hard fighting had to be done and much suffering endured before peace and order could be fully restored. That end was not attained until late in 1859. The Cis-Sutlaj Sikh chiefs and their retainers gave gallant and loyal help in the retaking of Delhi and afterwards.

Five areas of operations. The military operations during the Mutiny years, 1857-9, which took place in several distinct areas, do not admit of brief relation in a continuous narrative. The serious fighting was mostly confined to the North-Western Provinces, in which Delhi was then included, and to Central India with Bundēlkhand. Within those limits five areas may be distinguished, namely: (1) Delhi, where the capture of the city was the end of operations on a large scale; (2) Lucknow; (3) Cawnpore; (4) Rohilkhand; and (5) Central India with Bundēlkhand.

Lucknow. At Lucknow, Sir Henry Lawrence, who had replaced Mr. Jackson as chief commissioner, was obliged to retire at the beginning of July into the residency with all the European and Christian population, and a small force of loyal sepoys. Sir Henry Lawrence having been killed early in the siege, the command was taken over by Brigadier Inglis. The defence was maintained with extraordinary courage and resource against swarms of assailants until September 25, when Outram and Havelock forced their way in after desperate fighting, bringing a much needed reinforcement and rendering possible an extension of the position. The final relief was deferred until November 15-17, when Sir Colin Campbell, who had been sent out from England, as commander-in-chief, succeeded in overcoming fierce opposition, and in entering the city. On November 23 the British evacuated Lucknow, which could not be held by the small numbers available. In March 1858 three weeks of incessant conflict made Sir Colin Campbell master of the city. The back of the Oudh rebellion was thus broken. The remnants of the rebel regiments in the province were gradually surrounded by Lord Clyde (Sir Colin Campbell) during the autumn of 1858, and driven across the frontier into Nepāl, where most of them perished miserably.

Cawnpore. At Cawnpore, General Sir Hugh Wheeler commanding the station, who was seventy-five years of age, made a grievous mistake by refusing to occupy the strong magazine, which was easily capable of effective defence.¹ He relied with astounding folly on a weak entrenchment about two hundred yards square, constructed in an open parade-ground, and enclosing two barracks, one of which was thatched. The rampart, 'a fence not high enough to keep out an active cow', as Trevelyan observes, was a mere field dike four or five feet in height made of loose earth, which had not been consolidated. Behind such a mockery of defences the gallant garrison, consisting of about four hundred men capable of bearing arms, and a multitude of women, children, and helpless people, in all nearly a thousand, held out with astonishing endurance for twenty days from June 7 to 27, when a capitulation was arranged. Bājī Rāo's adopted son, Dhondhū Pant, commonly called the Nānā Sahib, who resided in a palace at Bithūr, near Cawnpore, and had always pretended to be on the most friendly terms with his European neighbours, had assumed the

¹ Trevelyan, p. 115. The magazine was blown up by the rebels when evacuating Cawnpore (*ibid.*, p. 354).



THE RESIDENCY, LUCKNOW.
(Before the Mutiny.)

command of the rebels. He promised solemnly to convey the garrison safely to Allahabad, but shamelessly and pitilessly massacred the whole, save a very few who escaped in various ways. Most of them were shot down at the river side, where boats had been collected on pretence of conveying the victims to Allahabad. About two hundred women and children were confined in a small building known as the Bibighar, and hacked to death on the night of July 15 by express orders of the Nānā and his colleague Tantia Topi. The relieving force under Havelock, which entered Cawnpore on the 17th and drove the Nānā out, was just too late to prevent one of the most atrocious crimes on record. The justly



THE WELL AND BIBIGHAR, CAWNPORE.

infuriated troops took terrible vengeance. The bodies of the women and children had been all cast into a well close to the house of slaughter. That well, transformed beyond recognition, is now enclosed by an elaborate stone screen and surrounded by a carefully kept garden. The inscription records that the monument is 'sacred to the perpetual memory of a great company of Christian people, chiefly women and children'. The exact number of the 'great company' never can be known.¹

The Nānā, who had proclaimed himself as Pēshwā, deliberately aimed at the extermination of all Europeans and Christians, with their friends and associates. His savage slaughter of women

¹ Trevelyan states the number confined in the Bibighar as 206, including five men. The *I. G.* (ii. 512) gives the tale of women and children butchered as 125. Shepherd provides incomplete lists of names. One lady was carried off alive. The five men were killed separately.

and children was an essential feature of his policy. During his few days of rule at Cawnpore numerous other murders were committed besides the two massacres on a large scale above mentioned. The horrors of Cawnpore, a 'memory of fruitless valour and unutterable woe', surpass by far those which occurred at any other station.

The military operations at and about Cawnpore, which were closely associated with the movements for the relief and capture of Lucknow, were too complicated to admit of summary description. The Gwālior Contingent, which had rebelled, defeated General Windham and occupied Cawnpore on November 27 and 28. Sir Colin Campbell recovered the town on December 6.

Rohilkhand. At Bareilly, the capital of Rohilkhand, the sepoys mutinied on the last day of May 1857. Khān Bahādur Khān, a grandson of Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, slain in the Rohilla War of Warren Hastings, was proclaimed governor under the title of Nawāb Nāzim. He retained power for nearly a year until the city was reoccupied by the British under the command of Sir Colin Campbell (Lord Clyde) in May 1858. During the interval several rebel chiefs, including for a time the Nānā, had taken refuge in Bareilly. The Nawāb of Rāmpur, notwithstanding his kinship with Khān Bahādur, and the purely Muhammadan character of the local rebellion, maintained throughout unswerving loyalty to the British Government. His services received due recognition after the suppression of the disturbances.

Central India and Bundēlkhand. The operations in Central India and Bundēlkhand were protracted and difficult, executed throughout in country which presented obstacles of every kind. The task of clearing the enemy out of that region was entrusted to Sir Hugh Rose (Lord Strathnairn), a general of division in the Bombay army, supported by a distinct force from Madras under Brigadier Whitlock. The brilliant operations of the small army under Sir Hugh Rose, only about 4,500 strong in all, including four sepoy regiments, were summarized by Lord Derby in these words :

'In five months the Central India Field Force traversed 1,085 miles, crossed numerous large rivers, took upwards of 150 pieces of artillery, one entrenched camp, two fortified cities, and two fortresses all strongly defended, fought sixteen actions, captured twenty forts; and never sustained a check against the most warlike and determined enemy, led by the most capable commanders then to be found in any part of India.'

The merit of that wonderful record is enhanced when it is remembered that most of the operations were conducted in extreme heat, deadly to the European soldier, and distressing to men of any race. Sir Hugh Rose himself experienced sunstroke five times. Although the fighting on several occasions was desperate, the sun probably caused losses to the Field Force greater than those inflicted by the enemy.

The Rānī of Jhānsī. At the beginning of June 1857 the native troops had mutinied at Jhānsī. On the 7th of that month they

committed a perfidious massacre of the Europeans, men, women, and children, comparable in wickedness with the slaughter at Cawnpore, but on a smaller scale. Three days later Rānī Lakshmi Bāī, a young woman twenty years of age, principal widow of the late Rājā Gangādhār Rāo, was proclaimed ruler of the state which Lord Dalhousie had annexed as a lapse. The Rānī was supported by Gangā Bāī, another consort of the deceased prince. It is uncertain whether or not Lakshmi Bāī was privy to the massacre which preceded her assumption of authority. When she had been installed, she certainly proved herself to be a resolute and bitter enemy of the British Government, earning from Sir Hugh Rose the compliment that she was the 'best and bravest' of the rebel leaders. She showed courage far superior to that of Tantia Topi, the Nānā's general, with whom she co-operated. She was left undisturbed until 1858, when Sir Hugh Rose advanced to attack her.

Tantia Topi. Leaving Indore at the beginning of 1858 he advanced northwards, fighting his way, and early in February relieved the garrison of Sāgar (Saugor), which had held out for more than seven months. After a siege lasting a fortnight Jhānsī was taken in April; a large force under Tantia Topi which attempted to relieve the fortress having been beaten off. Kālpi, the principal arsenal of the rebels, fell in May. The Rānī and her ally then retired on Gwālior. By a bold stroke they occupied that important stronghold, and compelled Sindia, who had remained loyal, to take refuge at Agra. In June the Rānī, wearing male attire and fighting bravely, was killed by a Hussar, and Gwālior was recovered by a specially gallant feat of arms. Tantia Topi became a hunted fugitive, until, in April 1859, his career was ended on the gallows. Although he stoutly denied that either he himself or his chief the Nānā was responsible for the Cawnpore massacres, the guilt of both was established by a mass of testimony. During the year 1859 order was gradually restored.

The leading military events of the Mutiny campaigns have been indicated in the foregoing pages, but many subsidiary operations took place in Rājputāna and elsewhere. A rising in Bihār is remembered for the glorious defence of a small house at Arrah by a few Englishmen and loyal Sikhs against a host of rebels. The Bombay presidency, under the competent rule of Lord Elphinstone, kept quiet on the whole; although in the Marāthā country the excitement was dangerous, and at Kolhāpur (Kolapore) developed into open mutiny, which was quickly suppressed. In the Madras presidency no serious disturbance occurred.

The Native or Protected and friendly States. The rulers of all the larger native or protected states remained faithful, even when their troops showed signs of disaffection or revolted. Intelligent ministers able to read the signs of the times and to appreciate the reserves of strength at the disposal of the Government preserved from ruin the states under their administration. The services of Sir Dinkur Rāo at Gwālior and Sir Sālār Jang at Hyderabad were

particularly memorable. Jung Bahādur, the powerful minister and real ruler of independent Nepāl, declared openly for the British, and sent troops who gave effective help in the restoration of order. The inestimable aid given by the Sikh chiefs has been already

mentioned. Dōst Muhammad, the Amīr of Kābul, adhered to his treaty obligations, and resisted the temptation to regain Peshāwar.

Reserves of British

strength. The Home Government showed no remissness in sending out reinforcements, which were collected from every quarter, including China. Some came by the overland route across Egypt, but many had to come round the Cape. The close of the foolish little war with Persia fortunately enabled the Government of India to utilize the troops set free from the Persian adventure. The defence of the empire was materially simplified by the long lines of telegraph constructed under Lord Dalhousie's orders. The few miles of railway in existence at the



SIR JUNG BAHĀDUR.

beginning of the disturbances were not of much military use ; but, before the troubles came to an end, important lines had been constructed up-country which facilitated the extinction of the smouldering embers of rebellion. The sepoys, and even the Nānā and some other people who should have known better, were silly enough to imagine that they could destroy the British Empire in India by massacring all Europeans or Christians within their reach. They wholly failed to understand the latent strength of a great European nation holding command of the sea, and in their ignorance rushed blindly upon destruction. The rebel proclamations conclusively prove the intensity of the delusions cherished by the insurgents.

Partial popular rebellion. The rising, although primarily a military mutiny of the Bengal army, immediately provoked by the greased cartridges, was not confined to the troops. Discontent and unrest, as has been explained, were widely prevalent among the civil population, and in several places, as, for instance, at Sahāranpur and Muzaffarnagar, the populace rose before the sepoys at those stations mutinied. The vague fear that the

Government meditated the forcible conversion of the people to Christianity, as they understood the term, had penetrated into the villages and disposed men's minds to rebellion. The disorderly elements in the population naturally took advantage of the disturbances caused by the dread of interference with religion, and utilized the opportunity for mere pillage. In a large part of the North-Western Provinces, in the districts where Muhammadans are numerous and the influence of the Delhi court was strongly felt, the revolt took a Muslim colour, and assumed to some extent, especially at Bareilly, the character of a holy war against the infidel. Persons whose experience was confined to that region often erroneously assumed that the rebellion was the result of a Muhammadan conspiracy. But elsewhere the revolt was more Hindu than Muhammadan. The Nānā, who had no desire to become a subject of the Pādshāh, proclaimed himself Pēshwā, and sought to restore the Hindu Marāthā empire. During the first few days of his brief rule at Cawnpore he even ventured to cut off the hands of a Muhammadan butcher who had slaughtered a cow in the course of his business, and by that act forfeited all hopes of cordial Muhammadan support. The Rānī of Jhānsī seems to have fought as a strict Hindu for her own hand. The special circumstances of Oudh caused a general rebellion in that province, without distinction of creed. Very few of the large landholders remained loyal. The jealousy between Hindus and Muhammadans, the political rivalry between Pēshwā and Pādshāh, and innumerable animosities of various kinds so divided the rebels everywhere that they never were able to combine effectually for the execution of a well-considered plan. The campaigns degenerated into a bewildering maze of local risings, massacres, sieges, attacks, and reprisals, indescribable except by means of interminable detail. No leader of considerable capacity arose among the rebels, who never had the remotest chance of ultimate success against the forces of an organized government.

Good and evil. The two years of disturbance were marked by many deeds of horror, by infinite suffering, and not a few acts on both sides which it is painful to recall. On the other page of the account may be reckoned uncounted deeds of heroism, and numerous instances of loyalty, kindness, and unselfish devotion which do honour to human nature.

The last of the Moguls. Bahādur Shāh, the aged titular emperor, was throughout only a tool in the hands of his sons and the leaders of the rebel soldiery, powerless for good or evil, and not fully responsible for the acts of the men who professed to be his subjects—the mere shadow of a king. On September 21, after the fall of Delhi, he was arrested by Lieutenant Hodson, head of the Intelligence Department, with the promise that his life would be spared. In January 1858 he was brought to trial, and after two months' investigation was condemned to exile.

The old man was sent down to Calcutta, and thence to Rangoon, where he died in 1862, at the age of eighty-seven. On the day

after the surrender of the emperor, his two sons and a grandson were arrested at the same place, Humāyūn's mausoleum. No promise to spare their lives was given. Hodson, who had only a small force with him, carried them off in the face of an excited mob, and on the way shot them dead with his own hand. His act has been the occasion of much bitter controversy. The evidence seems to point to the conclusion that in all probability it would



BAHADUR SHĀH II.
(The last of the Moguls.)

have been feasible to prevent a rescue and to carry the princes safely to Delhi for formal trial. If that view be correct, and it is open to dispute, Hodson's passionate action was at the best unnecessary and unseemly. His victims undoubtedly had been concerned in the massacre of Europeans, and if they had been arraigned certainly would have forfeited their lives.

Thus ended the dynasty of Akbar.

The slayer of the princes was killed at Lucknow in March 1858.

The Delhi territory. The recovery of Delhi having been mainly due to the unremitting exertions of John Lawrence and his brilliant officers, the Governor-general deemed it fitting that the imperial city with the surrounding territory should be placed under the government of the man who had reclaimed it from the grasp of the rebels. The Delhi territory accordingly was transferred, in February 1858, from the control of the government of the North-Western Provinces to that of the Panjāb. Since the beginning of 1912, when the official capital of India was moved from Calcutta to Delhi, the group of ancient cities, enlarged by the addition of a new imperial city, and associated with a small adjacent district, has been committed to the charge of a chief commissioner directly subordinate to the Government of India.

The Mutiny a fortunate occurrence; Sir Lepel Griffin ventured to affirm that 'Perhaps a more fortunate occurrence than the Mutiny of 1857 never occurred in India'. The saying, which may seem to be a hard one, suggests so much that it might be made the text on which to build a treatise. If we can place ourselves, so far as may be, in the attitude of a general who knowingly sends thousands of men to their death, counting their lives well bestowed to serve a worthy cause, and can close our eyes to the horrors of Cawnpore and a hundred other scenes, the hard saying may be understood and accepted as true. The ultimate explanation of the Mutiny and partial rebellion of the people, expressed in general terms without regard to specific grievances, is that the movement was a revolt of the old against the new, of Indian conservatism against aggressive European innovation. The conflict between the old ideas and the new had to be fought out somehow; and the inevitable fight, if it had not been begun in 1857 on the issue of the greased cartridges, was bound to have been started a year or two later on some other pretext. A conflict so momentous could not be decided without infinite suffering and copious shedding of blood.


The Mutiny, to continue the quotation, 'swept the Indian sky clear of many clouds. It disbanded a lazy, pampered army, which, though in its hundred years of life it had done splendid service, had become impossible; it replaced an unprogressive, selfish, and commercial system of administration¹ by one liberal and enlightened; and it attached the Sikh people to their rulers, and made them what they are to-day (1898), the surest support of the Government. Lastly, it taught India and the world that the English possessed a courage and national spirit which made light of disaster, which never counted whether the odds against them were two or ten to one; and which marched confident to victory, although the conditions of success appeared all but hopeless.'

The death of the Company. The shock of the news of the revolt, which brought sorrow and mourning into so many homes, roused the Government and people of England to a sense of their responsibility for British rule in India, and gave the deathblow

¹ Rather a harsh description of the Company's administration after 1833.

to the antiquated system which interposed the mechanism of the East India Company between the Crown and the Indian Empire. The day for that mechanism, which had done good work in its appointed time, was past. In January 1858 the Company put the case for their administration before Parliament and the nation by means of a petition expressed in stately, dignified language, which produced little appreciable effect upon public opinion. Another equally able document followed in April, and a third in June, without result. The directors put their claims to favourable consideration on high ground, boldly averring

'that your petitioners . . . do not seek to vindicate themselves at the expense of any other authority ; they claim their full share of the responsi-



EAST INDIA HOUSE, 1858.

bility of the manner in which India has practically been governed. That responsibility is to them not a subject of humiliation, but of pride. They are conscious that their advice and initiative have been, and have deserved to be, a great and potent element in the conduct of affairs in India. And they feel complete assurance that the more attention is bestowed, and the more light is thrown upon India and its administration, the more evident it will become that the government in which they have borne a part, has been not only one of the purest in intention, but one of the most beneficent in act, ever known among mankind ; that during the last and present generations in particular, it has been, in all departments, one of the most rapidly improving governments in the world ; and that, at the time when this change is proposed, a greater number of important improvements are in a state of rapid progress than at any former period. And they are satisfied that whatever further improvements may be hereafter effected in India, can only consist in the development of germs already planted,

and in building on foundations already laid, under their authority, and in a great measure by their express instructions.'

The well-phrased periods fell on deaf ears. The Bill finally approved by the Conservative Cabinet easily passed through both Houses, in spite of the opposition of Lord Ellenborough, and on August 2 received the royal assent as 'An Act for the Better Government of India' (21st and 22nd of Victoria, cap. 106). On the first day of September the Court of Directors held its last solemn assembly¹, and the East India Company issued 'its last instructions to its servants in the East'; and offered to its Sovereign an empire in these touching words, worthy of a great occasion:

'Let Her Majesty appreciate the gift—let her take the vast country and the teeming millions of India under her direct control; but let her not forget the great corporation from which she has received them, nor the lessons to be learned from its success.'¹

Compliment to the services. The generous language in which the ancient Company took leave of its servants deserves quotation:

'The Company has the great privilege of transferring to the service of Her Majesty such a body of civil and military officers as the world has never seen before. A government cannot be base, cannot be feeble, cannot be wanting in wisdom, that has reared two such services as the civil and military services of the Company. To those services the Company has always been just, has always been generous. In those services lowly merit has never been neglected. The best men have risen to the highest place. They may have come from obscure farmhouses or dingy places of business; they may have been roughly nurtured and rudely schooled; they may have landed in the country without sixpence or a single letter of recommendation in their trunks; but if they have had the right stuff in them, they have made their way to eminence, and have distanced men of the highest connections and most flattering antecedents.'²

The Act established the Government of India in its still existing form (1918). The President of the Board of Control was replaced by the Secretary of State for India, and the expert advice formerly obtained from the directors was provided for by the establishment of the council of India, a body consisting largely of retired high officials.

The East India Company continued as the shadow of a great name to retain a formal existence until 1874 for the purpose of financial liquidation in accordance with the Charter Act of 1833.

The Queen's proclamation. The transfer of the government to the Crown was announced on November 1, 1858, to the princes and peoples of India by a proclamation read at Allahabad and other principal stations. The manifesto, which was admirably drafted, owed some of its merits to suggestions made by Her Majesty. The text is as follows:

Victoria, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the Colonies and Dependencies thereof

¹ The full text of the documents is printed by G. D. in his Appendix, with a careful abstract of the provisions of the Act.

² G. D., p. 575.

in Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australasia, Queen, Defender of the Faith.

Whereas, for divers weighty reasons, we have resolved, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, to take upon ourselves the government of the territories in India, heretofore administered in trust for us by the Honourable East India Company.

Now, therefore, we do by these presents notify and declare that, by the advice and consent aforesaid, we have taken upon ourselves the said government ; and we hereby call upon all our subjects within the said territories to be faithful, and to bear true allegiance to us, our heirs and successors, and to submit themselves to the authority of those whom we may hereafter, from time to time, see fit to appoint to administer the government of our said territories, in our name and on our behalf.

And we, reposing especial trust and confidence in the loyalty, ability, and judgement of our right trusty and well-beloved cousin Charles John, Viscount Canning, do hereby constitute and appoint him, the said Viscount Canning, to be our first Viceroy and Governor-General in and over our said territories, and to administer the government thereof in our name, and generally to act in our name and on our behalf, subject to such orders and regulations as he shall, from time to time, receive through one of our Principal Secretaries of State.

And we do hereby confirm in their several offices, civil and military, all persons now employed in the service of the Honourable East India Company, subject to our future pleasure, and to such laws and regulations as may hereafter be enacted.

We hereby announce to the native princes of India, that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the East India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part.

We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions ; and, while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others.

We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own ; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and that social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.

We hold ourselves bound to the natives of our Indian territories by the same obligations of duty which bind us to all our other subjects, and those obligations, by the blessing of Almighty God, we shall faithfully and conscientiously fill.

Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal will and pleasure that none be in any wise favoured, none molested or disquieted, by

reasons of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law ; and we do strictly charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure.

And it is our further will that, so far as may be, our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be freely and impartially admitted to office in our service, the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, ability, and integrity duly to discharge.

We know, and respect, the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State ; and we will that generally, in framing and administering the law, due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.

We deeply lament the evils and misery which have been brought upon India by the acts of ambitious men, who have deceived their countrymen by false reports, and led them into open rebellion. Our power has been shown by the suppression of that rebellion in the field ; we desire to show our mercy by pardoning the offences of those who have been misled, but who desire to return to the path of duty.

Already, in one province, with a desire to stop the further effusion of blood, and to hasten the pacification of our Indian dominions, our Viceroy and Governor-General has held out the expectation of pardon, on certain terms, to the great majority of those who, in the late unhappy disturbances, have been guilty of offences against our Government, and has declared the punishment which will be inflicted on those whose crimes place them beyond the reach of forgiveness. We approve and confirm the said act of our Viceroy and Governor General, and do further announce and proclaim as follows :

Our clemency will be extended to all offenders, save and except those who have been, or shall be, convicted of having directly taken part in the murder of British subjects. With regard to such the demands of justice forbid the exercise of mercy.

To those who have willingly given asylum to murderers, knowing them to be such, or who may have acted as leaders or instigators of revolt, their lives alone can be guaranteed ; but in apportioning the penalty due to such persons, full consideration will be given to the circumstances under which they have been induced to throw off their allegiance ; and large indulgence will be shown to those whose crimes may appear to have originated in too credulous acceptance of the false reports circulated by designing men.

To all others in arms against the Government we hereby promise unconditional pardon, amnesty, and oblivion of all offences against ourselves, our crown and dignity, on their return to their homes and peaceful pursuits.

It is our royal pleasure that these terms of grace and amnesty

should be extended to all those who comply with these conditions before the 1st day of January next.

When, by the blessing of Providence, internal tranquillity shall be restored, it is our earnest desire to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer the government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength, in their contentment our security, and in their gratitude our best reward. And may the God of all power grant to us, and to those in authority under us, strength to carry out these our wishes for the good of our people.

VISCOUNT CANNING'S PROCLAMATION

Issued at Allahabad, November 1, 1858

Her Majesty the Queen having declared that it is her gracious pleasure to take upon herself the government of the British territories in India, the Viceroy and Governor-General hereby notifies that from this day all acts of the government of India will be done in the name of the Queen alone.

From this day, all men of every race and class who, under the administration of the Honourable East India Company, have joined to uphold the honour and power of England, will be the servants of the Queen alone.

The Governor-General summons them, one and all, each in his degree, and according to his opportunity, and with his whole heart and strength, to aid in fulfilling the gracious will and pleasure of the Queen, as set forth in her royal proclamation.

From the many millions of her Majesty's native subjects in India, the Governor-General will now, and at all times, exact a loyal obedience to the call which, in words full of benevolence and mercy, their Sovereign has made upon their allegiance and faithfulness.

LEADING DATES OF MUTINY PERIOD

Viscount Canning Governor-general (Feb.); end of Crimean War (March); general service order; circulation of symbols	1856
Persian War	1856-7
War in China	1856-60
Local mutinies and incendiary fires (Jan.-April); outbreaks of mutinies at Lucknow, Meerut, and Bareilly (May); massacre at Jhānsī; occupation of the Ridge (June); massacres at Cawnpore (July); recapture of Delhi, and slaughter of the princes (Sept.); reinforcement of Lucknow garrison (Sept.); final relief of Lucknow; and defeat of Windham at Cawnpore (Nov.); recovery of Cawnpore by Sir Colin Campbell (Dec.)	1857
Relief of Sāgar (Saugor); trial of the titular emperor (Jan.-March); recovery of Lucknow (March); recovery of Jhānsī (April); recovery of Bareilly and Kālpi (May); Rāni of Jhānsī killed; Gwālior reoccupied, and Sindia restored (June); Act for the Better Government of India (August); Queen's Proclamation (Nov.)	1858
Execution of Tantia Topi (April); gradual restoration of order	1859
Death of Bahādur Shāh, titular emperor	1862

Four volumes in the R. I. series deal with the Mutiny, namely, *Earl Canning* (1903) by Sir H. S. CUNNINGHAM, moderately good; *Lord Lawrence* (1905), excellent, by Sir C. U. ARCHISON; *Clyde and Strathnairn* (1895), a lucid military narrative with little biographical matter, by Sir OWEN T. BURNE; and *John Russell Colvin* (1912), by Sir AUCKLAND COLVIN, describing affairs at Agra. *The History of the Indian Revolt, &c.*, by G. D., is a valuable illustrated chronicle, coming down to November 1858, and published by Chambers in December of that year. The book includes many dates, details, statistics, and documents not to be found easily elsewhere. It seems to be accurate. The best book on the subject for most readers is the compact one-volume *History of the Indian Mutiny*, by T. R. E. HOLMES (publ. Allen, 1883; 4th ed., 1891). The huge work by Kaye and Malleeson, 6 large vols., is too big and detailed for most people. Its bibliography is complicated. The whole was published by Allen. Vols. i-iii, entitled *A History of the Sepoy War, 1857-8*, are by J. W. KAYE, who died in 1876. The remaining vols. are by G. B. MALLEESON. But his first vol. deals with the same period as Kaye's third, seen from a different point of view. Malleeson's other two vols. finish the story. Details are: vol. i, 9th ed., 1880; ii, 5th ed., 1881; iii, 4th ed., 1880. Vol. iv (= vol. i of Malleeson's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, 2nd ed., 1878 = vol. iii of Kaye); vol. v, 1st and 2nd ed., 1879. Malleeson's 3rd vol., completing the work, is dated 1880. In the same year F. PISCOTT added an *Analytical Index* to the whole, in a separate volume. The large *History of the Indian Mutiny* by Sir G. W. FORREST (vols. i, ii, 1904; vol. iii, 1912) corrects certain errors in earlier writers; but lacks unity, a large part consisting of reprints of treatises previously published. For Cawnpore, the rare book, *A Personal Narrative, &c.*, by W. J. SHEPHERD, 2nd ed., Lucknow, 1879, is a valuable original authority. I have also used G. O. TREVELYAN, *Cawnpore* (Macmillan, 1865). The multitude of publications on the Mutiny is legion. I have looked into many of them. Numerous incidents are the subject of controversy, and the evidence often is conflicting.

BOOK IX

INDIA UNDER THE CROWN; THE VICEROYS FROM 1858 TO 1911

CHAPTER 1

Lord Canning continued ; reconstruction ; Lord Elgin I ; Lord Lawrence ; Lord Mayo ; and Lord Northbrook ; from 1858 to 1876, a period of almost unbroken peace.

Policy of Lord Canning. The policy of Lord Canning during the trying times of the Mutiny period was exposed naturally and legitimately to keen criticism, which too often degenerated into coarse abuse. The European business community of Calcutta, especially, pursued him with rabid hostility until near the close of his career. A petition was sent to the Queen praying for his recall, and averring that the calamities of the country were 'directly attributable to the blindness, weakness, and incapacity of the Government'. The Governor-general desired to temper stern punishment with mercy, and to restrain within reasonable limits the bloodthirsty proposals of panic-stricken people, who felt that their lawful business was interrupted by the long-continued disturbances. Queen Victoria rightly refused to act on the hostile petition, and subsequently expressed the warmest opinion of her Viceroy's 'admirable administration'.¹ Even Calcutta opinion veered round towards the end, and probably everybody would now accept the view of his Finance Minister that Lord Canning was 'a nobleman who never, in the midst of the greatest peril, allowed his judgement to be swayed by passion, or his fine sense of honour and justice to be tarnished by even a passing feeling of revenge'. That just appreciation is not weakened by the admission that the Viceroy was human and made some mistakes. In 1861 he went home, worn out by his public labours and domestic sorrow, to die a few weeks after his arrival in England.

The Oudh proclamation. One of the Viceroy's errors was the preparation of a draft dispatch and proclamation confiscating, with a few exceptions, the whole land of Oudh, as a penalty for the almost universal rebellion of the landholders and people of that province. Lord Ellenborough, then President of the Board of Control, disapproving strongly of the terms of the document, most improperly published it in substance with his censure, before his communication could reach India. His action almost

¹ *Letters*, cr. 8vo ed., iii. 453. The title of Viceroy conferred by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858 has not yet been recognized by statute.

caused a Cabinet crisis, which was avoided by his resignation. He never held office again. The proclamation, although not officially published in its original too drastic form, was not cancelled or withdrawn. The application of the principles of general confiscation and regrants to suitable persons were wisely left to the discretion of Mr. Montgomery, the Chief Commissioner of Oudh. The province was 'settled' on terms sufficiently satisfactory to the great landlords, but adequate arrangements for the protection of under-proprietors and tenants were left to a later time. The Oudh tenures differ materially from those of the Agra Province. During the course of 1860 Oudh was thoroughly pacified. Since that time the province has enjoyed unbroken peace.¹

Army reorganization. The Bengal army was almost completely destroyed during the two years of disturbances, about 120,000 out of 128,000 men having mutinied. Probably most of the mutineers were killed in battle, executed, or done to death in the pestiferous jungles of the Nêpāl border. The annihilation of the principal Native army was reason enough for a radical military reorganization, which was necessary also on other grounds. The problem naturally divided itself into two main branches concerning respectively the Native or Indian army, and the European forces, which again comprised Queen's regiments and Company's regiments. The abolition of the Company necessarily involved the dissolution of the Company's army. All troops, whatever administrative arrangements might be adopted, became soldiers of the Queen. The experience of the Mutiny led to the decision that in the Bengal Presidency, including the Panjāb, the proportion of British to native troops should normally be one-half. In the Madras and Bombay armies the proportion of one-third Europeans was considered sufficient. Nearly all the artillery was made over to the charge of Europeans. The British officers of the whole Native army were organized as three presidential Staff Corps. That arrangement has been cancelled, and the Native army is now designated as the Indian Army. The fine services rendered by that army in France, Mesopotamia, Egypt, Palestine, and East Africa are fresh in the memory of all readers, and will not be forgotten quickly. Many experienced persons, including Lord Canning, wished to retain a local European army. The Home Government overruled that recommendation and decided on complete amalgamation of the Queen's and the Company's forces. About 10,000 out of 16,000 men in the Company's army took their discharge rather than continue to serve under the changed conditions. Some of the men displayed a mutinous spirit. So far as I can judge the policy of amalgamation was right. It is useless to go into details of the reformed army organization. Innumerable changes have since been effected from time to time, and no man can tell what further developments may follow the Great War and its endless surprises.

¹ The author served for a considerable time in Oudh both as Deputy Commissioner and as Commissioner.

Indigo disputes. In 1859 and 1860 disputes between the European indigo planters and the Bengal peasantry became acute; and in some districts, especially in Nuddea (Nadiyā), serious disturbances occurred. The planters endeavoured to enforce the cultivation of indigo against the will and interests of the tenantry. A commission which was appointed to investigate the complaints of the ryots found them to be substantiated. The Secretary of State rightly refused to sanction a proposal that a tenant should be liable to criminal prosecution for refusal to fulfil a civil contract to grow indigo. The Bengālī drama by Dīna Bandhu Mitra, entitled *Nīl Darpan*, or *The Indigo-planting Mirror* published in 1860, gives, as already mentioned, a painfully realistic picture of the oppression practised by some of the planters and their agents. The play aroused angry passions, and the translator of it into English was fined and imprisoned for libel.¹

Legal changes. The useful work of codification, for which preparations had been made many years before by eminent legal experts, actually assumed definite shape in Lord Canning's time. The Penal Code, enacted in 1860, has required wonderfully little substantial change since. The first edition of the Criminal Procedure Code appeared in 1861, and in the same year the old Supreme Courts and the *Adālat*s of the Company were replaced by Chartered High Courts.² The appointments reserved ordinarily for members of the Civil Service of India were scheduled about the same time, but power has been taken by the Secretary of State to depart from the schedule for adequate reason. Changes were made in the constitution of the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Governor-general, which have been much developed in later years, and are still (1918) in progress.

The Rent Act X, of 1859, applicable to Bengal, Bihār, the Agra Province, and the Central Provinces, but not to the Panjāb or Oudh, attempted to protect the tenantry against tyrannical eviction by enacting the arbitrary rule that twelve years' continuous occupation of a particular field, not of an entire holding, should confer tenant-right or 'a right of occupancy' in that field. The hard and fast rule thus laid down did not accord with the ancient vague customs of the country. The Act, since replaced by later provincial legislation, did some good, but at the cost of an enormous mass of litigation, to which no end is in sight. The problem of 'tenant-right' is one of immense difficulty.

Famine of 1861. A grievous famine, the result partly of two seasons of deficient rainfall and partly of the Mutiny disturbances, desolated portions of the Agra Province, the Panjāb, Rājputāna, and Cutch in the year 1861. The distress was worst in the tract

¹ Grierson, *I. G.* (1908), ii. 433.

² 'The Indian High Courts Act of 1861 closed the series of constitutional statutes consequent on the transfer of the government of India to the Crown. Such Acts of Parliament as have since then been passed for India have done little more than amend, with reference to minor points, the Acts of 1858 and 1861' (Ilbert).

between Agra and Delhi. The mortality was estimated at 8½ per cent. of the population in the districts most affected. The Government expended considerable sums on relief measures, and the administrative arrangements for the emergency showed an advance on the methods used in dealing with earlier famines.

Finance. The Mutiny had not only destroyed the Bengal army, it had shaken the old system of government to its foundations and utterly discredited the crude methods of finance which had come down from early times. The long-continued military operations had necessarily produced an enormous deficit. Lord Canning accordingly applied for and obtained the services as Finance Minister of Mr. James Wilson, an experienced English official who had been Financial Secretary to the Treasury. When he died in 1860, after only nine months' work in India, he was succeeded by Mr. Samuel Laing. Those two ministers filled up the deficit by introducing an income tax and other new imposts, and by enforcing large economies in military expenditure. The system of financial administration also was much improved. Mr. Laing came to the conclusion that 'the revenue of India is really buoyant and elastic in an extraordinary degree', an opinion confirmed by more recent experience. In railways, canals, and other public works India possesses assets of enormous capital value, and there is no reason to be uneasy about the financial stability of the country. Unfortunately the Indian Government is prone to panic on the subject, and far too ready to resolve on short-sighted petty economies whenever it finds itself slightly embarrassed. Such an official panic occurred in 1911, without any substantial justification.

Education. The comprehensive dispatch on education sent out by Sir Charles Wood (Lord Halifax) in 1854, and warmly welcomed by Lord Dalhousie, had borne fruit at once by the rapid development of vernacular schools in the villages. The application of the principles of the dispatch to the higher branches of education had to be deferred for a short time. The revolt of the Bengal army and the resultant disturbances were not allowed to interfere with the evolution of educational policy. In 1857, the first year of the Mutiny, the three universities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras had been founded, their constitution being modelled on that of the University of London, at that time a purely examining institution. At a later date additional universities were established at Lahore and Allahabad. It is impossible to foretell how many universities ultimately may be needed to satisfy the wants of the Indian Empire. The formation of new administrative areas, such as the Province of Bihār and Orissa, separated in 1912; the growing desire for provincial autonomy, so that each of the larger governments may be equipped completely with its own High Court, university, and all the other departments of a fully organized administration; the marvellous development of education and administrative skill in the more advanced Native or Protected States, are factors which render inevitable a large increase in the number of Indian universities.

The Nizam, the ruler of the premier Protected State, has resolved on the establishment of a Hyderabad University, in which Urdu will be the primary language of instruction, although a knowledge of English will be compulsory on the students. A special and well-paid staff of translators is now (1918) engaged in preparing the necessary Urdu text-books. The Urdu language, which resembles English in the simplicity and flexibility of its syntax, and in the extraordinary wealth of its vocabulary, drawn from Western Hindi, Sanskrit, Persian, Arabic, English, and other sources, should be capable of expressing ideas on any subject, literary, philosophical, or scientific. The Hyderabad experiment, which is being conducted by capable hands, may be expected to result in a marked improvement in the Urdu language, and the formation of a recognized authoritative literary form of the tongue.

Even the small Hindu State of Travancore, in the extremity of the peninsula, desires to be independent of Madras leading strings and to possess a university of its own.

Each of the larger provinces and sub-provinces, such as Burma, eastern Bengal, and Bihār with Orissa, has either obtained a provincial university, or will obtain such an institution in the course of a few years.

There is no necessity that Indian universities should be modelled on one type. Plenty of room exists for diversity of type and function, while all may be fitted to supply the necessary stream of educated officials and members of the learned professions. England finds its advantage in the differentiation between the ancient universities of the south, with their store of venerable traditions, and the vigorous, practical, yet truly educational modern institutions of the north. The Indian Empire requires variety of education still more.

Effect of the universities. It is impossible to measure or estimate the effect of the foundation of the three original Indian universities. Whatever hostile criticisms might be justly directed against their constitution or administration, the absurdity of the early choice of books for study, and the comical results of imperfect acquaintance with the English language exhibited in the utterances oral or written of the first generations of graduates, there can be no question that the new institutions acted as a powerful stimulus both to thought and to the acquisition of knowledge. Notwithstanding the mistakes made, the universities served as a bridge between East and West which could not have been provided in any other way. Many of the defects which disfigured the administration of the universities in their earlier days have been removed, although much remains to be done, and room for improvement will always exist.

The Government of India before the Mutiny was little more than a continuation of the old Mogul administration, somewhat more orderly and systematic, but deeply saturated with old-world prejudices and habits. A shock of no ordinary violence was needed to wake up the sleepy hollows both at the India House and at the

Council Chamber in Calcutta. The Mutiny administered that wholesome and indispensable shock. The foundation of the three universities in the very year of the Cawnpore massacres and the siege of Delhi symbolized the birth of a new India. The old fogies, many of them men of renown, but still old fogies so far as all questions of reform were concerned, could not have conceived the idea of the establishment of institutions where all the wisdom of the West would be offered to and eagerly accepted by the East. Nor could they have believed that in a few years the possession by Indian-born graduates of an absolutely perfect command over the English language, and familiar intimacy with the best European works on literature and science would become accomplishments so widely diffused as no longer to attract special notice. Both the Indian Government and large sections of the population are now in touch with the outer world so closely that they have become acutely sensitive to every breath of western thought and feeling, in the political, social, intellectual, and ethical provinces. On the other hand, the influence exercised by India on Europe and the United States of America is no longer negligible. East and West have met for good or evil, and cannot remain apart. The meeting is largely the work of the Indian universities.

Lord Elgin I. Lord Canning's successor, the Earl of Elgin and Kincaidine, commonly called Lord Elgin, took over charge in March 1862. Previous service as Governor-general of Canada and Special Envoy to China seemed to mark him as a person well qualified to conduct the government of India. But in November 1863 he died of heart disease, and was buried at Dharmasāla in the Panjāb. The only noticeable event of his brief term of office was the 'Umbeyla campaign' on the north-western frontier, rendered necessary by an outburst of Muhammadan fanaticism to the west of the Indus. The expeditionary force met with strenuous resistance, and at one time was in danger of destruction, but vigorous action brought the campaign to a tolerably satisfactory conclusion before the close of 1863. The government was carried on by two acting officers until the appointment of a permanent successor could be arranged.

Sir John Lawrence. The justifiable dissatisfaction of the Home Government with the conduct of the Umbeyla campaign had much to do with the selection as Governor-general of Sir John Lawrence the saviour of the Panjāb. His special services and his intimate acquaintance with frontier politics were considered to outweigh the familiar and sound objections to the appointment of a member of the Civil Service as Governor-general. He was not raised to the peerage until after he had left India. Ministers would have been well advised if they had conferred the higher rank upon him at the beginning of his term of office, and so elevated him above his fellows.

Peaceful administration. The heaviest part of the task of reconstruction necessitated by the mutiny storm had been accomplished by the government of Lord Canning. The process was

continued by Sir John Lawrence, who made it his business, in the words of the Queen's Proclamation, 'to stimulate the peaceful industry of India, to promote works of public utility and improvement, and to administer the government for the benefit' of all Her Majesty's subjects. The story of the government of Sir John Lawrence consequently is almost wholly concerned with matters of internal administration.



SIR JOHN LAWRENCE.

War with Bhūtān. A little war with Bhūtān, a small and backward state on the hill frontier of Bengal, and more or less dependent on Tibet, was occasioned by the misconduct of the Rājā in kidnapping Mr. Ashley Eden, who had been sent to negotiate on the subject of frontier raids. The business, which had been mismanaged by the Government of Bengal, was patched up in 1865 by a treaty which enforced the cession of a strip of territory about a hundred and eighty miles long and twenty or thirty broad.

Withdrawal of doctrine of lapse. Sir John Lawrence, who had been at one time a disciple of Lord Dalhousie's annexation policy, changed his attitude in consequence of the events of the Mutiny, which had proved the inestimable value of loyal Native States. In 1859 Lord Canning, with the full approval of Sir John Lawrence, announced the withdrawal of the doctrine of lapse, and informed all concerned that in future the adopted son of a chief would be allowed to succeed to the state as well as to the private property of his adoptive father.

Relations between the Crown and the Protected States. The assumption by the Queen of the direct government of British India, previously administered by the East India Company in trust for the Crown, did not effect any formal legal change in the relations between the Sovereign and the Protected States. The Proclamation of 1858, on the contrary, sharply distinguishes between the people of the States and Her Majesty's subjects. The relevant passages are :

'We hereby announce to the native princes of India, that all treaties and engagements made with them by or under the authority of the East

India Company are by us accepted, and will be scrupulously maintained, and we look for the like observance on their part.

We desire no extension of our present territorial possessions; and while we will permit no aggression upon our dominions or our rights to be attempted with impunity, we shall sanction no encroachment on those of others.

We shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own; and we desire that they, as well as our own subjects, should enjoy that prosperity and social advancement which can only be secured by internal peace and good government.¹

That language clearly maintains the position of the chiefs of the Protected States as allies of the Paramount Power. It does not convert either them or their people into subjects of the Crown. The Act of 1876, in virtue of which the Queen assumed the title of Empress of India with effect from January 1, 1877, undoubtedly changed the legal relation, and brought the Protected States inside the boundary of the Indian Empire. The practical difference between the position in 1858 and that brought about in 1877 is not great. From the earlier date every ruling chief had become conscious of a definite personal subordination to the Queen of England, not dependent on formal treaties made between his ancestors and the East India Company. The formulæ of international law, although still embodied in state documents and officially recognized to some extent, obviously had ceased to be applicable to the new state of facts. The Supreme Government no longer felt any scruple about interfering in the internal affairs of a Protected State for adequate reason, or even in changing the ruler, if such a drastic course should be necessary. Nobody, however, desired to make a change of ruler the pretext for the annexation of the principality and its absorption into British India. The conviction so strongly held by Lord Dalhousie and the Home Government of his day that the administration of any ordinary British District must necessarily be superior to that of any Native State, so that absorption or annexation could not fail to be beneficial to the population concerned, was no longer prevalent. The grounds for that conviction were disappearing daily; and during the half-century following the Mutiny they ceased to exist. At the present day (1918) the administrative machinery of the best governed Protected States, adapted from the British model, is all that can be reasonably desired; and the actual administration, it is believed, gives little cause for complaint. A sentiment of strong personal loyalty, supported in many cases by close personal friendship, now binds the leading chiefs to their Sovereign, who on his part esteems and trusts them as supporters of his throne and pillars of the Empire.¹

¹ Ilbert, after enumerating the restrictions on the full sovereignty of the Protected States, observes that 'the result of all these limitations on the powers of the Native Indian States is that, for purposes of international law, they occupy a very special and exceptional position. "The principles of international law", declared a resolution of the Government of India in 1891 (*Gazette of India*, No. 1700 E., August 21, 1891), "have no bearing

Afghan policy. Sir John Lawrence rigorously acted on his decision to abstain from interference in any degree with the internal affairs of Afghanistan. When the Amīr Dōst Muhammad died in 1863 at an advanced age, the Governor-general deliberately allowed his relatives to fight out their claims to the succession among themselves for years, and openly proclaimed his readiness to recognize any competitor who should emerge victorious from the strife. After much contest, Shēr Ali, a younger son of the late Amīr, won the prize in 1868 and became ruler of the whole territory. The Government of India then recognized him as Amīr without hesitation, as it had recognized one of his rivals at an earlier stage of the struggle. That policy, sometimes described by its admirers as 'masterly inactivity', had the advantage of being cheap and cautious. On the other hand, it seemed to the Afghan chiefs rather cold-blooded and selfish, and made it difficult to establish really friendly relations between the Governor-general and the Amīr.

In those days the Russian power was making rapid advances across the Khanates of Central Asia, and ambitious Muscovite generals sometimes permitted themselves to dream dreams of the conquest of India. Neither the Home Government nor the Government at Calcutta could regard with indifference movements which seemed at the time really to threaten the safety of the empire. Sir John Lawrence, while willing to safeguard the independence of the actual ruler of Afghanistan, whoever he might be, against foreign aggression, whether Russian or Persian, refused to enter into a binding alliance with the Amīr, preferring to retain in his own hands perfect freedom of decision as to the methods by which aggression should be repelled. When Shēr Ali had finally established his power, the Governor-general helped him to maintain it by a modest gift of arms and cash.

The Orissa famine. The famine resulting from the early failure of the rains in 1865 and the consequent destruction of the main rice crop due to be harvested in December is commonly mentioned as the Orissa famine of 1866. But in reality famine conditions extended along the whole of the eastern coast from Calcutta to Madras, and penetrated far inland. The Districts of Mānbhūm and Singhbhūm in Chutiā Nāgpur, as well as the Ganjām Division of Madras, suffered severely. The Madras Government of Lord Harris dealt effectively with the districts under its jurisdiction. The Bengal administration and the Government of India failed disastrously. The isolated province of Orissa was affected so terribly that probably nearly a million of persons upon the relations between the Government of India as representing the Queen-Empress on the one hand, and the Native States under the sovereignty of Her Majesty on the other. The paramount supremacy of the former presupposes and implies the subordination of the latter.' Roughly speaking it may be affirmed that the inhabitants of a Native State are aliens as regards British India, and are British subjects as regards foreign powers.

died within its limits. The failure of the rains in that region was immensely aggravated in September 1865 by floods from the rivers which overwhelmed a thousand square miles of low-lying country, and submerged for many days the homes and fields of a million and a quarter of people.

Famine policy. In the great majority of cases, where the distressed region is connected by passable means of communication with more favoured countries, sound famine policy dictates absolute non-interference with private trade in grain. The Government should abstain from prohibition of export, from commandeering stocks, from fixing prices, and from importing food through its own agents. Provided that communication with better supplied districts is physically possible and that considerable reserve stocks exist in the grain-pits of the stricken region, that policy is absolutely sound, although it will always be unpopular. Sleeman, disregarding loud clamour, civil and military, acted on those principles in the Sagar and Narbadā territories during the famine of 1833 with complete success.¹

But when stocks have been depleted, practicable communications are lacking, and private enterprise is unable to work at a profit, the policy of non-interference is no longer applicable. The Bengal Government, forgetting that obvious distinction, failed to realize the fact that in Orissa 'the people, shut up in a narrow province between pathless jungles, and an impracticable sea, were in the condition of passengers in a ship without provisions'.

Sir John Lawrence, who had seen the necessity of importing rice as early as November 1865, permitted himself to be talked over by the members of his council and the Bengal Government, who blindly relied upon private enterprise. He should have used his powers as Governor-general and overruled his council. When the attempt to import food was made it was too late. Inadequate measures to prevent suffering in 1865 and 1866 were followed by extravagant expenditure in 1867 and 1868. The record of the famine administration, taken as a whole, has been rightly characterized as having 'left a deep stain on the reputation of the Bengal authorities': nor can Sir John Lawrence be acquitted of failure to exercise timely and effective control.

Competent expert opinion offers the assurance that 'so far as human foresight can judge, it is not possible for such a spectacle to recur. . . . There is now no difficulty in respect to communications', by means of railways, roads, and navigable canals: while irrigation, not needed in ordinary years, has been provided for by costly works, which, although they do not pay directly, are effectual as insurance.²

The failure to meet the emergency in Orissa stimulated the Government of Sir John Lawrence to increased exertion in the construction of public works of various kinds in other provinces.

¹ *Rambles and Recollections*, ed. V. A. Smith, 1915, pp. 149-60 (Oxford University Press).

² C. W. Odling, *Orissa*, a paper read before the Victoria Institute, 1907.

The Governor-general established the sound financial principle that reproductive public works, that is to say, those which earn the interest on their cost, should be paid for by loan.

Commercial failures. The civil war in the United States of America produced an abnormal demand for Indian cotton, and consequent extravagant speculation. The management of the Bank of Bombay unfortunately lent itself to the support of wild schemes, which in 1865 resulted in a commercial crash involving the suspension of payments by the Bank. Many people who had believed themselves to be wealthy were ruined in a moment.

Tenancy legislation. Sir John Lawrence, throughout his career, took a deep interest in the fortunes of the peasantry, and always was inclined to support their cause as against that of the greater landholders. He succeeded in passing a measure (Act XXVI of 1866) for the protection of under-proprietors and tenants in Oudh ; but was warned by the Secretary of State ' to take especial care, without sacrificing the just rights of others, to maintain the talookdars of Oude in that position of consideration and dignity which Lord Canning's Government contemplated conferring on them '.

The talookdars, who are combined in a powerful association, have been able to take good care of their interests, while the country as a whole is densely populated and prosperous.¹

The Panjāb Tenancy Act, passed at a later date, was drafted in the time of Sir John Lawrence.

Sir John Lawrence as Viceroy. The validity of the arguments against the appointment of a member of the Civil Service of India to the office of Governor-general was confirmed rather than discredited by the history of the viceroyalty of Sir John Lawrence. He was never able to shake off the habits of the Panjāb official of old days, and admittedly was too indifferent to the ordinary daily maintenance of the dignity of his great office. His reputation rests upon his administration of the Panjāb after the annexation and on the invaluable services rendered by him at the time of the Mutiny, not on his work as Viceroy, which could have been done as well or better by a worse man.


He was created a Baron on his retirement. He then filled up his time by accepting the office of Chairman of the London School Board and by much active work in connexion with the Church Missionary Society and kindred institutions. In June 1879, when he had become almost blind and wholly worn out, he died at the age of sixty-eight. His memory was fitly honoured by burial in Westminster Abbey and the erection of statues in Calcutta and London.

Lord Mayo. In January 1869 Sir John Lawrence made over charge to a man of a very different type, Richard Bourke, Earl of Mayo, an Irish nobleman, then almost forty-seven years of age,

¹ The term *talukdār* in Oudh has a meaning quite different from that which it has in Bengal. For a summary history of revenue and rent legislation in Oudh see *I. G.*, 1908, vol. xix.

who had served his native country as Chief Secretary with distinction. His selection as Viceroy by Mr. Disraeli, although sharply criticized, was not disturbed by the Radical Government which came into power in 1868 under the leadership of Mr. Gladstone. Lord Mayo during his three years of office justified the hopes of the statesman who had appointed him, and proved himself to be a thoroughly efficient Governor-general and Viceroy. His exceptional personal charm endeared him especially to the rulers of the Protected States, who regarded him as the ideal representative of the Sovereign. He worked hard at all the problems of administration, and lost his life owing to his zealous efforts to improve the defective system of government in the convict settlement of the Andaman Islands.

Afghanistan and Russia. A personal interview between Lord Mayo and the Amīr Shēr Ali at Umballa (Ambāla), in March 1869, removed the unpleasant impression left on the mind of the Afghan ruler by Sir John Lawrence's cynical declarations and secured the personal friendship of the Amīr, although his specific requests were not granted. Lord Mayo increased his cash subsidy and supplied him with arms. Informal negotiations conducted in Russia by Sir Douglas Forsyth with the sanction of the Home Government induced the Tsar to recognize the Oxus as the northern boundary of Afghanistan, and also, after some delay, to admit the justice of the Amīr's claim to Badakhshān.



LORD MAYO.

Protected States. A serious case of misgovernment in the Alwar State, Rājputāna, was disposed of by transferring the powers of the vicious young Mahārāja to a council. Difficult problems arising in the turbulent little states of the Kāthiāwār peninsula were dealt with judiciously. Lord Mayo founded the Mayo College at Ajmēr for the education of the sons of chiefs and nobles, but the institution was not actually opened until 1885. Similar colleges have been established at Lahore and at Rājkhōt in Kāthiāwār. The obstacles to complete success in the working of institutions of the kind are so great that too much must not be expected from them.

Visit of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh. The visit in 1869 of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh, Queen Victoria's second son, was an event of high significance as marking the beginning of close personal relations between the Sovereign and her Indian peoples. The policy thus initiated was continued in later years by the tour

of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII, by the Indian service of H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, and by the visit of the late Prince Edward. It was crowned by the memorable solemnity at the close of 1911, when the King-Emperor George V and his gracious consort received in person the fervent homage of all India.

Finance. Lord Mayo was firmly resolved to adjust the finances of the Indian Empire so that the expenditure in normal years should be within the income. He succeeded in his purpose by imposing certain additional taxes and enforcing rigid economy. He reorganized the Public Works Department, and paid the closest personal attention to the working of every department in order to secure efficiency without waste. He introduced the system of state railways.

His most memorable financial reform was a measure of decentralization which made every Provincial Government responsible for its own finance within certain defined limits. Previously every local government had engaged in a scramble for grants from the Supreme Government, so that the provincial administrations had no interest in economy, while the Government of India was unable either to make accurate estimates or to exercise effective control over imperial finance.

Murder of Lord Mayo. The administration of jails and the penal settlement at the Andaman Islands was one of the many subjects which engaged Lord Mayo's untiring energy. When inspecting the convict settlement at the Andamans he unfortunately prolonged his visit until after dark. Just as he was stepping into the boat a Muhammadan frontier tribesman, who had been transported for a blood-fend murder, sprang out of the bushes upon the Viceroy's back and stabbed him to death, on January 24, 1872. The murderer had determined to kill some high European official and was proud of his success in slaying the Viceroy. Lord Mayo was dead when brought on board the frigate. The crime excited universal horror in India and Europe.

Lord Northbrook. The duties of the head of the Government having been carried on by two officiating incumbents, the newly appointed permanent Governor-general, Lord Northbrook, assumed charge of his office in May 1872. He was a member of the wealthy banking house of Baring, and brought to the discharge of his novel functions excellent business capacity and varied official experience. His period of office presents few incidents worthy of special notice.

Afghan policy. Lord Northbrook lacked the personal charm of his predecessor. In his relations with the Amir of Afghanistan, acting under instructions from the Duke of Argyll, then Secretary of State, he resumed the cold, repellent attitude of Sir John Lawrence, with the result that Shēr Ali developed feelings of hostility to the English and turned to Russia for the support which India refused. When the Conservative Government came into power in 1874 the Viceroy was unable to concur in the policy

suggested by Lord Salisbury, who desired to send a special mission to Kābul.

The Gaikwār. The strange case of Malhār Rāo, Gaikwār of Baroda, was the only remarkable incident marking the relations between Lord Northbrook and the Protected States. Malhār Rāo, who had become Mahārājā in 1870, grossly misgoverned his dominions, behaving with folly, extravagance, and cruelty. Colonel Phayre, the Resident appointed by the Government of Bombay, devoted all his energy to the exposure of abuses, with the result that the Government of India ordered an inquiry, which resulted unfavourably to the Gaikwār. Sir Lewis Pelly was then appointed Special Commissioner and Agent to the Governor-general. He arrived at Baroda in December 1874. Meantime, in November, an attempt had been made to poison Colonel Phayre by the administration of diamond dust in his food. Grave suspicion resting on the Gaikwār, he was arrested in January 1875 under the orders of the Government of India, which arranged for the constitution of a commission to try his case and report. The commission was composed of six members under the presidency of the Chief Justice of Bengal. The three Indian members, namely, the Mahārājās of Gwālior and Jaipur, with Sir Dinkur Rāo, the eminent minister, found a verdict of 'not proven'; while the three English members were fully satisfied as to the Mahārājā's guilt. The Government of India, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, although declining to formally convict Malhār Rāo of attempted murder, deposed him as the penalty for 'his notorious misconduct, his gross misgovernment of the State, and his evident incapacity to carry into effect necessary reforms'. The deposed prince ended his days at Madras in 1893. A boy named Sayājī Rāo, a distant relative of the family, was placed on the throne and carefully educated. During his minority the state was ably administered by Sir T. Mādhava Rāo. The Baroda Government continues to be of a progressive and enlightened character (1918).

Bihār famine. The authorities had been so frightened by the censure passed on the mismanagement of the Orissa famine in 1866, that in 1873-4, when a calamity of the same kind, but on a much smaller scale, occurred in Bihār and part of Bengal, relief operations under the direction of Sir Richard Temple were conducted regardless of expense with unnecessary extravagance. Nearly seven millions sterling were spent.

Tour of Prince of Wales. The Prince of Wales, afterwards King Edward VII, made an interesting tour through the Indian Empire in 1875-6, and received many proofs of cordial loyalty.

Retirement of Lord Northbrook. Lord Northbrook had the misfortune to differ from the Home Government, not only with regard to Afghan policy, but on the question of taxing Manchester cotton goods. His retirement in 1876, ascribed officially to domestic reasons, must have been influenced by the discomfort of his relations with the ministry in London.

CHRONOLOGY

Withdrawal of doctrine of lapse ; army amalgamation ; Rent Act X of 1859	1859
Indigo disputes and riots in Bengal	1859-60
Enactment of Indian Penal Code	1860
Establishment of High Courts ; enactment of Code of Criminal Procedure ; Indian Civil Service Act ; famine in N.W. India	1861
Lord Elgin I Governor-general	1862
Umbeyla or Black Mountain campaign	1862-3
Death of Amīr Dōst Muhammad	1863
Sir John Lawrence Governor-general	1864
Failure of Bank of Bombay	1865
Famine in Orissa and on eastern coast	1865-7
Shēr Ali established as Amīr of Afghanistan	1868
Lord Mayo Governor-general ; meeting with Shēr Ali at Umballa ; visit to India of H.R.H. the Duke of Edinburgh	1869
Murder of Lord Mayo (January 24) ; Lord Northbrook Governor-general (May)	1872
Bihār famine	1873-4
Deposition of Mulhār Rāo Gaikwār	1875
Tour of Prince of Wales	1875-6
Retirement of Lord Northbrook	1876

AUTHORITIES

In addition to the books cited in the notes and in the last preceding chapter, reference for the most authoritative account of the legal changes in the time of Lord Canning may be made to ILBER, *The Government of India*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2nd ed., 1907 ; 3rd ed., 1914. Famines, relations with the Native or Protected States, and other administrative subjects are well discussed in *I. G. (Indian Empire)*, 1907, vols. iii, iv. For Lord Mayo, Sir W. W. HUNTER, *The Earl of Mayo* (R. I., 1892) suffices. The larger *Life* by the same author in two vols. was published in 1875. I have looked into *Thomas George, Earl of Northbrook, a Memoir*, by BERNARD MALLET (large 8vo, Longmans, 1908).

CHAPTER 2

Lord Lytton ; Royal Titles Act ; famine ; finance ; Vernacular Press Act ; second Afghan War ; Lord Ripon ; reversal of Afghan policy ; internal administration ; Lord Dufferin ; Panjdeh incident ; third Burmese War ; Tenancy Acts.

Lord Lytton. Mr. Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield) selected as Lord Northbrook's successor, Edward Robert, second Baron Lytton, son of the first Baron, the well-known novelist, dramatist, and politician. The appointment in 1875 of the second Lord Lytton to the government of India was a surprise to everybody, because the Viceroy designate, then forty-four years of age, was a diplomatist by profession, wholly lacking in administrative experience, and known outside of the Foreign Office chiefly as a man of letters under the name of 'Owen Meredith'. In a private

letter, the Prime Minister explained his choice by observing that 'the critical state of affairs in Central Asia demands a statesman', adding that his nominee by accepting the post would have an opportunity not only of serving his country, but of winning enduring fame. Lord Lytton, who had already refused the Governorship of Madras on account of his delicate health, was unable to resist the pressure put upon him by Mr. Disraeli, and felt constrained to accept the offer of the Viceroyalty as 'a high and glorious command, which it would be a dereliction of duty to disobey'. He assumed charge at Calcutta in April 1876, and retained office for a little more than four years until June 1880. After spending some years quietly in England he became Ambassador at Paris, where he died in 1891 at the age of sixty.

The administrative inexperience of Lord Lytton did not hinder him from dealing brilliantly with one of the worst famines on record; from carrying into effect indispensable measures of financial reform; or, generally speaking, from maintaining a high standard of executive efficiency. His state papers and speeches are models of clear thinking expressed in an admirable style.

His reputation has been obscured by the lack of an adequate biography; by certain foreign peculiarities of manner and habits which offended conventional opinion; and, above all, by reason of the bitter partisan controversies aroused by his Afghan policy, executed by him under the instructions of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury. The equally venomous criticism of the Vernacular Press Act further discredited him in popular opinion. Those causes have prevented Lord Lytton from attaining the 'enduring fame' promised by the Prime Minister, and perhaps may be said to have left a general impression that he was a failure as a ruler of India. If such an opinion exists it is based upon insufficient grounds. The best parts of his internal policy were of permanent value, and served as the basis of developments effected by his successors; while the most essential measures of his Afghan policy, by which I mean the occupation of Quetta and the securing



LORD LYTTON.

of the Kurram valley, either remained undisturbed, or, if reversed for a time, had to be reaffirmed a few years later.

The Royal Titles Act. The necessity for official recognition of the patent fact that Queen Victoria since 1858 had become the paramount sovereign of all India, including the Native or Protected States, had been emphasized by incidents during the tour of the Prince of Wales in 1875-6. Lord Northbrook's Government recommended that Her Majesty should be designated as Sovereign. The Prime Minister took up the idea, and intimated in the speech from the throne in 1876 that a measure would be introduced for making the desired change in the royal titles. Unfortunately the proposal met with considerable opposition in Parliament, and came to be regarded from a party point of view. The Bill, however, passed, and the duty of giving effect to the Act devolved upon Lord Lytton. He regarded the enactment as the beginning of 'a new policy by virtue of which the Crown of England should henceforth be identified with the hopes, the aspirations, the sympathies and interests of a powerful native aristocracy'. He believed strongly in the appeal to the loyal sentiment of the princes and nobles, and was right. The form of title chosen, 'Kaisar-i Hind', 'the Caesar of India', on the analogy of 'Kaisar-i Rûm', the well-known designation of the Byzantine emperors, was generally approved as being the best that could be devised.

The proclamation of Her Majesty's assumption of the new dignity was made with due solemnity in an Imperial Assemblage at Delhi on January 1, 1877; the 'Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire' was founded; and the occasion was marked by the release of prisoners and other acts of grace. Lord Lytton, however, was not able to carry out all his intentions. General agreement has been attained that the formal acknowledgement of the already existing suzerainty of the British Crown may be described correctly as 'an act of political wisdom and foresight'.

Famine of 1876-8. The rejoicings of the solemn assembly were marred by the development of an exceptionally severe famine due to the failure of the rains of 1876 in Mysore, the Deccan, and large areas of the Madras and Bombay presidencies. Short-sighted critics grumbled at the expense of the ceremonial, but Lord Lytton rightly decided against suggestions for postponement. The meeting with the Governors of Madras and Bombay and with the princes whose dominions were involved in the famine proved to be of high administrative value. The Viceroy observed in a private letter that 'as regards the famine difficulties the Imperial Assemblage has been a godsend'. The opportunity for personal conference was especially fruitful with reference to the Madras presidency, where the Governor, the Duke of Buckingham and Chandos, although animated by the best intentions, insisted with perverse obstinacy in pursuing an erroneous and ruinous policy. Even after the conversations at the Assemblage the Duke persisted in his opposition to the instructions of the Supreme Government, so that the Viceroy was constrained to make a toilsome and perilous

journey to the south in order to enforce his decisions.¹ He succeeded by the display of much tact and forbearance, but not until immense mischief had been done. In the Bombay Presidency the business was so well managed that the cost was about four millions sterling as against ten millions spent in Madras with less effect in the saving of human life.

The famine lasted for two years, from 1876 to 1878, extending in the second year to parts of the Central Provinces and the United Provinces (then the N.W.P.), with a small area of the Panjāb. The total area affected was estimated at 257,000 square miles, with a population of more than fifty-eight millions. The excess mortality in British India alone was supposed to exceed five millions, exclusive of the immense number of deaths in the Native States.

The Madras errors. The Madras administration erred by strangling private trade from the first, and attempting the impossible task of providing all supplies through Government agency. Lord Lytton insisted on applying the principles of Turgot, which, as we have seen, had been successfully applied on a small scale by Sleeman to the Sāgar and Narbadā Territories in 1833. The Madras authorities, overwhelmed by the magnitude of the disaster, failed completely in organization. The Viceroy found that 'the whole action of the Calcutta grain trade was on the point of being paralysed by the conduct of the Madras Government'; that the mortality in Madras was terrible, and 'not a little attributable to the defective management and unsound principles of the local government'; that the population on the relief works was a 'mere mob'; that there was no organized system of village relief; that the relief camps in and around Madras were 'simply huge popular picnics'; and that the whole system was 'rotten to the core'.

Lord Lytton's achievement. The drastic reforms introduced checked the abuses, but nothing could prevent an exceptionally heavy mortality. Large regions were bare of food of any kind. The injudicious early interference with private trade no doubt had much to do with the failure of supplies. Lord Lytton explained the sound principles of famine relief in an elaborate address to the Legislative Council in December 1877, and obtained sanction to the appointment in the following year of the first Famine Commission, which submitted its Report in 1880. That document is the foundation of the existing elaborate provincial Famine Codes. The Viceroy, who desired to spend freely on railways and irrigation works as preventives of famine, was checked by orders from England restricting expenditure within narrow limits.

Few people ever think of Lord Lytton except either as the man whose policy resulted in the Afghan War and the murder of Cavagnari; or as the author of the much abused Vernacular Press Act. Whatever may be thought about those matters, he deserves

¹ Lord Lytton was obliged to undergo an operation before he could start.

high credit for sound views on famine policy, thoroughly thought out and expressed with forceful lucidity. The whole existing system of famine administration rests on the foundations well and truly laid by him. Lord Lytton's singularly logical mind was constituted on a French rather than an English model. The foreignness of his mental constitution as well as of his manners made him more or less unintelligible to many of his countrymen.

Finance. Lord Lytton's intelligent appreciation of finance was not confined to the formation and enunciation of sound views upon famine problems. He also paid much attention to the complicated question of the cotton duties, and desired if possible to dispense altogether with sea customs revenue. He extended the decentralization scheme initiated by Lord Mayo. The inequalities of the salt tax were remedied in a large measure ; and he succeeded in abolishing the barbarous salt customs hedge, described by Sir John Strachey, the Finance Minister, in the following words:

' A Customs line is maintained extending from a point north of Attock to near the Berar frontier, a distance of more than 1,500 miles. Similar lines some hundreds of miles in length are established in the Bombay Presidency, to prevent untaxed salt from Native States entering British territory. Along the greater part of this enormous system of inland Customs lines, which, if they were put down in Europe, would stretch from London to Constantinople, a physical barrier has been created comparable to nothing that I can think of except the Great Wall of China. It consists chiefly of an impenetrable hedge of thorny trees and bushes, supplemented by stone walls and ditches, across which no human being or beast of burden or vehicle can pass without being subjected to detention and search. It is guarded by an army of some 8,000 men, the mass of whom receive as wages 6 or 7 rupees a month. The bare statement of these facts is sufficient to show the magnitude of the evil.' ¹

Vernacular Press Act. Nearly the whole period of Lord Lytton's administration was overshadowed by the strained relations between Russia and England, arising out of the events which led to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, the treaty of San Stefano in March 1878, and the congress at Berlin in June of that year, from which Lord Beaconsfield claimed to have brought back 'peace with honour'. At that time all parties in England were opposed to the passing of Constantinople under Russian dominion ; and when the British Prime Minister was successful at the last moment, in defeating Muscovite ambition, his action was almost universally applauded. The successes of Russia had excited the minor journalists in India and led to the publication in vernacular newspapers of many seditious articles, extolling Russia, depreciating England, suggesting the assassination of British officers,

¹ I cannot find any record of the date of the construction of the hedge, which replaced innumerable inland customs posts scattered throughout the interior of the country. 'The whole customs line was abandoned in 1879, with the exception of a portion along the Indus, maintained to prevent the still lightly-taxed Kohât salt being smuggled across the river' (*I. G.*, 1907, iv. 251). The same authority states the strength of the former salt 'army' as being 'nearly 13,000 officers and men'.

and advocating combination for the purpose of overthrowing the British Rāj. The Government of India came to the conclusion that the safety of the state required immediate preventive legislation to curb the excessive license of the papers not printed in English. The Bill was strongly supported by all the members of the Legislative Council who spoke, as well as by all the provincial governments consulted, except that of Madras, where the vernacular press was insignificant. Accordingly, in 1878, the Vernacular Press Act was passed.

The object of the Act, prevention not punishment, was to be attained chiefly by the requisition of security bonds under strictly regulated conditions. During the four years of its currency the Act was put in force only once. It was repealed under Lord Ripon's Government in 1882, reliance being then placed on an amended section (124 A) of the Penal Code, which provided penalties for seditious writing. Later emergencies, and especially the necessities of the Great War, have rendered more stringent legislation unavoidable.

Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Lytton. Having thus dealt with the more prominent features of Lord Lytton's internal administration, we now proceed to discuss briefly his relations with Afghanistan. The general outlines of his policy were laid down by Lord Beaconsfield, the Prime Minister, and Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary. The Viceroy cordially concurred with the policy of the ministry, and, when quitting office, addressed Lord Beaconsfield as his 'dear and honoured chief', to whom the writer owed 'unreserved allegiance', and felt bound 'by every tie of personal gratitude, political sympathy, and public duty'. The outgoing Prime Minister marked his sense of the Viceroy's services by raising Lord Lytton to an earldom.

Hostility of Amīr Shēr Ali. In 1873 the refusal of Lord Northbrook, acting under instructions from the Gladstone ministry, to give Shēr Ali definite assurances of protection, had determined the Amīr to take the side of Russia, which then seemed to him to be the more formidable power. In 1876, when Lord Lytton became Viceroy, the hostility of the Amīr to England was manifest. The ministry and the Viceroy were agreed on the policy of forcing the ruler of Afghanistan to declare himself to be either a friend or an enemy, of preventing his country from falling under the control of Russia, and, if necessary, of taking effective steps for destroying the Amīr's capacity for mischief to British and Indian interests.

Occupation of Quetta. An important preliminary step was taken in 1876 by the occupation of Quetta (also called Kwatah or Shāl) in Balōchistan, which was effected by amicable arrangement with the Khān of Khelat (Kalāt). The strategical position thus secured dominated the road to Kandahār and gave the Government of India full control over the Bolān Pass. The occupation, which was not disturbed by Mr. Gladstone's Government in 1880, is the most important permanent result of the Beaconsfield and Lytton policy. The Afghan flank was turned, and the direct

routes to Kābul became matters of secondary importance. Quetta, with the surrounding territory, now forms a prosperous British district, with much trade. The large cantonment is connected with India by a railway.

Second Afghan War. In 1878 the crisis was brought on by the Amīr's public and honourable reception of a Russian envoy, and his refusal to receive a representative of the Viceroy. When Sir Neville Chamberlain, under instructions from Lord Lytton, presented himself at Ali Musjid, and demanded passage through the Khyber Pass in order to communicate the views of the Government of India to the Amīr at Kābul, he was turned back. The deliberate affront necessarily led to war, which began on November 21, 1878.¹ The military operations, admirably planned and brilliantly executed, involved the simultaneous advance of General Browne through the Khyber, of General (Lord) Roberts from the Kurram Valley, and of General Biddulph from Quetta. The combination was so completely successful that Amīr Shēr Ali fled into Russian territory, from which he never returned. He died at Mazār-i Sharīf in February 1879, having failed to obtain the expected Russian help.

Difficulties. So far all had gone well with the British plans. Hostile criticism could find little scope, and the military success attained was beyond expectation. Difficulties then began to be felt owing to the non-existence of any responsible Afghan authority. The late Amīr's declared heir apparent had died just before the war, and Shēr Ali had been obliged unwillingly to release from confinement his other son, Yākūb Khān, whom he acknowledged as his successor.

Treaty of Gandamak. Lord Lytton was disposed to separate Kandahār as a distinct principality and to reduce Kābul to such comparative insignificance that it could not be formidable, whoever might be its chief. When Yākūb Khān was accepted by the Afghans, the Viceroy recognized him in May 1879 as Amīr of Kābul, and, as a concession, promised to restore both Jalālābād and Kandahār. The treaty of Gandamak, negotiated by Major (Sir Louis) Cavagnari with Yākūb Khān, provided for the control of Afghanistan foreign affairs exclusively by the Government of India, for British occupation of the passes, and for the posting of a British minister or envoy resident at Kābul.² • Lord Lytton would have preferred that the envoy should be stationed elsewhere, but when Yākūb Khān insisted on his residing at Kābul the Viceroy accepted the obvious risk.

Massacre. Sir Louis Cavagnari, the envoy, arrived in Kābul on July 24, with a small escort, and was assigned quarters in the Bālā Hissar. On September 3 he and all his men were massacred by two or three regiments described as being mutinous. The

¹ The text of the Viceroy's declaration of war, dated at Lahore, November 21, 1878, is given in App. II of the *Official Account*.

² The text of the treaty is given in App. V of the *Official Account* of the

residence was burnt. Yākūb Khān certainly did nothing to save his guests, and probably was cognizant of the intended attack. Credible information showed that he had incited his troops to a religious war, but the exact extent of his personal share in the crime necessarily remained obscure.

Retribution. Measures of retribution were taken with commendable promptitude and skill. General Stewart at once re-occupied Kandahār, General Roberts led a force of 5,000 men to the Peiwār Kotal on the Kurram route, and the troops on the Khyber line were rapidly reinforced. On September 27 Yākūb Khān, the Amīr, took refuge in the British camp. General Roberts arrived before Kābul on October 8, and entered the city four days later. After a time he was obliged to withdraw to the entrenched camp at Shērpur, which was defended successfully against vigorous attacks. Kābul was then reoccupied.

Resignation of Lord Lytton. On April 28, 1880, the Conservative ministry of Lord Beaconsfield was replaced by a Radical cabinet under Mr. Gladstone, pledged to reverse the policy of its predecessors. Lord Lytton resigned, and the Marquess of Ripon was appointed his successor. The Marquess, who was fifty-three years of age, had become a Roman Catholic. The appointment for the first time of a member of the Roman Church to be Governor-general and Viceroy of India aroused a storm of opposition in England.

Ayūb Khān and Maiwand. Complications were caused by the action of a son of Shēr Ali, named Ayūb Khān, who had made himself Governor of Herat after the flight of his father. On July 27, 1880, Ayūb Khān, who had assembled a large force, defeated General Burrows at Maiwand and drove the remnant of the vanquished brigade to take shelter within the walls of Kandahār.¹ The garrison was relieved by General Roberts, who made his celebrated march from Kābul with a force of 2,800 Europeans, 7,000 Indian soldiers, and 8,000 followers. The distance of 318 miles was covered in twenty-three days.

Amīr Abdurrahmān. In the end a nephew of Shēr Ali named Abdurrahmān, who had long lived in Russian territory as a pensioner, received sufficient support from his countrymen to be recognized as Amīr of Afghanistan, including Kandahār, which was definitely evacuated by the British forces. The Government of India undertook to support and defend the Amīr against foreign enemies. Ayūb Khān, after recovering possession of Kandahār for a time, was finally defeated by Abdurrahmān, who proved himself to be a strong ruler. Lord Lytton's policy of breaking up Afghanistan into separate states was disallowed and has not been revived.

Results of the Lytton policy. But, as already observed, tangible and valuable results of his action remained. Khelat

¹ The strength of the brigade was 2,476. The casualties amounted to almost half of the force, being: killed and missing, 971; wounded, 168. Ayūb Khān's army numbered about 20,000, including irregulars.

(Kalāt) had passed permanently under British control; the occupation of the strong strategical position at Quetta secured the uninterrupted use of the Bolān Pass, and commanded the road to Kandahār so effectively that the evacuation of that city became a matter of slight importance. The decision to restore it to the Amīr probably was right. Although the Kurram valley also was given up in 1880, it was reoccupied in 1892 at the request of the Tūri tribe, and is now administered by an agency of the North-West Frontier Province. The cantonment is at Pārachinār. The Afghan policy of Lord Lytton, looked at broadly, cannot be justly described as a failure, notwithstanding its partial reversal by Lord Ripon under the direction of Mr. Gladstone's Government. Subsequent developments in the time of later Viceroys, effected by the construction of strategical railways and other methods, were rendered feasible by the action of Lord Lytton. A moderate exertion of military power would now suffice at any time for the occupation of Kābul, Kandahār, Ghaznī, or any other important point in Afghanistan on the Indian side of the Hindu Kush. The events of 1917 and 1918, by which Russia has been extinguished as a political and military force for many years, to say the least, have altered the situation so radically that it is difficult for the younger generation now living to realize the reasonableness and intensity of the apprehensions concerning Russia's approach to India which led to the second Afghan War. It should be remembered that all parties, Lord Lawrence as well as Lord Lytton, were agreed that Russia should be excluded from exercising political control over Afghanistan, or from advancing towards the Indian frontier beyond certain limits to be defined. The differences of opinion concerned the methods to be pursued for the attainment of the objects concerning which everybody agreed.

Lord Lytton's error. Lord Lytton at times permitted his imagination to play with visionary schemes for the extension of British influence in Central Asia and for the advancement of the Indian frontier to a dangerous extent. But he did not attempt to realize such dreams. The logical policy actually pursued was carefully thought out and skilfully executed, with one lamentable exception. Nothing should have induced him to yield to Yākūb Khān's request for the stationing of a permanent British envoy at Kābul, a step practically certain to result in disaster. It is impossible to ascertain the Amīr's motive in making the request. He may have made it with the deliberate intention of provoking a massacre, or he may not. However that may be, an attack on the envoy was almost a certainty, and Cavagnari ought not to have been sent to Kābul. With that important reservation Lord Lytton's Afghan policy does not seem to me deserving of censure, when the circumstances of the time are realized and duly considered.

The 'twin gates of Hindostan'. The proposed separation of Kandahār as a principality under British protection did not involve any violation of national feeling or ancient sovereignty.

The tribes of the Kābul province are totally distinct from those of Kandahār, and the political connexion of the two regions under Bārakzai princes was quite recent. With reference to the 'forward policy' generally and the question of a 'scientific frontier', it is well to remember that the close connexion of Kābul, Ghaznī, and Kandahār with India Proper dated from ancient times, and had endured for many centuries with interruptions. The Mauryas in the third century B. C., whose capital was at Patna, held the whole country now called Afghanistan as far as the Hindu Kush. Bābur was lord of Kābul when he gained the throne of Hindostan in 1526, and the Kābul province continued to be ruled by his descendants as an integral and important part of the Indian Empire until 1739. Akbar was appointed Governor of Ghaznī in his boyhood, and Kandahār, regained by him in 1595, had been in his father's possession. It would be easy to illustrate at great length the intimate relations which existed for ages between India and the region extending to the Hindu Kush, but it will suffice to quote the explicit statement of Abu-l Fazl, Akbar's learned Secretary of State and historian.

'The wise of ancient times', he justly observes, 'considered Kābul and Kandahār as the twin gates of Hindostān, the one leading to Turkistān and the other to Persia. The custody of those highways secured India from foreign invaders, and they are likewise the appropriate portals to foreign travel.'¹

When the modern advocates of a forward policy thought of drawing a line of 'scientific frontier' so as to include the 'twin gates of Hindostān' they had ample historical justification for their ideas. The expediency of an advance at any given moment must be judged according to the circumstances of the occasion. Questions of international law or abstract justice rarely arise out of dealings with the many diverse tribes of Afghanistan or the military adventurers who have acquired dominion over the country from time to time. Even now, in 1918, we may accept as true the remark of Lord Lytton's daughter that 'impartial observers can only conclude that after many vicissitudes of policy, and a large expenditure of men and money by the Indian Government, the problem of our permanent relations with Afghanistan is still awaiting a durable and satisfactory solution'.

Rendition of Mysore. In 1867 during the viceroyalty of Sir John Lawrence the Secretary of State and the Government of India had decided to restore the Mahārājā of Mysore to power when he should come of age. That event took place in 1881, when the promise made fourteen years earlier was duly fulfilled. The young Mahārājā, an adopted son, who had been carefully trained, succeeded in governing his dominions creditably, with the aid of capable ministers, until his much lamented death in 1894. Another minority followed, which came to an end in 1902, when the present Mahārājā assumed power. Mysore, as already observed, is

¹ *Āin*, tr. Jarrett, ii. 404.

administered admirably, the half-century of direct British management from 1831 to 1881 having given opportunities for the development of a succession of efficient, well-educated officials.¹

General census. In the same year (1881) the first general census of all India, except Nepāl and Kashmīr, was taken. The statistics then collected disclosed an enormous mass of important and novel information. Since that date a fresh enumeration has been effected every ten years. The Reports of the various census Commissioners are storehouses of facts and observations concerning the social conditions of the infinitely diverse peoples of India.

Local self-government. The action of Lord Ripon's government concerning Afghanistan and the Vernacular Press Act has been noticed sufficiently. The name of the Marquess is chiefly remembered for a series of Acts passed in 1883-5 introducing the so-called scheme of local self-government, based on the creation of District Boards and subordinate bodies, modelled more or less closely on the English system of County Councils and Rural District Boards. At the same time the powers of Municipal Boards were extended, and the Government of India intimated that the chairman of a municipality should be a non-official, whenever possible. The Supreme Government recognized the fact that one general system could not be imposed upon all provinces. A large discretion necessarily was left to local governments and administrations concerning the manner in which the new institutions should be constituted and operated. The degree to which the elective principle has been introduced varies greatly in different parts of India. The practice of appointing to office by popular election, which is not in accordance with the general sentiment, is difficult to work in a country where caste is the predominant institution, and the electors are sharply divided by differences in race, religion, traditions, and other respects.

The District Boards are concerned primarily with local roads, but are expected to take an interest in education, sanitation, famine relief, and several other departments.

The actual working of the Boards has hardly justified the hopes of Lord Ripon. He avowed that 'it is not primarily with a view to improvement in administration that this measure is put forward and supported. It is chiefly desirable as a measure of political and popular education. His Excellency in Council has himself no doubt that, in the course of time, as local knowledge and local interest are brought to bear more freely on local administration, improved efficiency will, in fact, follow.'

Perhaps.

The Ilbert Bill. A great turmoil was caused in the year 1883 by the introduction of a measure commonly known as the Ilbert Bill, because it was introduced by the Legal Member of Council,

¹ For everything concerning Mysore see the revised ed. of the *Mysore Gazetteer*, an excellent work by B. Lewis Rice, C.I.E., in two thick vols. (Constable, Westminster, 1897).

Mr. (afterwards Sir Courtenay) Ilbert. Up to that time no persons other than Europeans, or in more technical language, 'European British subjects', could be appointed justices of the peace with jurisdiction over persons of the same category, in districts outside the limits of the Presidency towns.¹ The bill proposed to remove from the Code of Criminal Procedure 'at once and completely every judicial disqualification based merely on race distinctions', and consequently to confer on many native or Indian-born magistrates authority to deal with Europeans, as with anybody else. The proposal, although in appearance reasonable and fair, roused the most violent opposition among the planters in the indigo and tea districts and among other classes of the non-official European population in all parts of India. They feared, and not altogether without reason, that their safety in up-country places might be endangered in certain contingencies. A strong counter-agitation was started among the educated Indians, the result being an outbreak of bitter racial feeling such as had not been experienced since the days of the Mutiny. The excitement of the public mind became so threatening that the Government was obliged to withdraw the Bill, and to be content with a much less drastic amendment of the Code, which reserved to European alleged offenders the right to claim trial by jury. The ill-feeling roused by the unlucky Bill did not die down for a long time.

Resignation of Lord Ripon. Lord Ripon resigned office in December 1884. Although he was in reality a commonplace man of moderate abilities, who had never attained in his own country a reputation higher than that of a steady, experienced official, with hereditary rather than personal claims to cabinet rank, the occasion of his departure aroused the most extraordinary demonstrations of enthusiasm for his person among his Indian admirers who lamented his resignation. Hundreds of addresses were presented to him, and his journey from Simla to Bombay resembled a triumphal procession. It is hardly necessary to add that the attitude of his countrymen was different.

The chosen successor of Lord Ripon, Frederick Blackwood, Earl of Dufferin, was a person of a totally diverse type, who may be justly described as a man of genius. He was then fifty-eight years of age, and was specially fitted by reason of his exceptional tact to heal the soreness caused by his predecessor's proceedings.

Qualifications of Lord Dufferin. Sir Alfred Lyall, who was well qualified to judge, believed that

'no Governor-general ever came to India so well equipped by antecedent experience for the work as Lord Dufferin. The appointments previously held by Lord Dufferin had been of such a kind that if they had been purposely undertaken as a course of preparatory training for the Indian Vicerealty, a more appropriate selection could hardly have been made. In Syria, and long afterwards in Turkey, he had learnt the difficult art

¹ The terms 'British subject' and 'European British subject' as used in Indian legislation have technical meanings open to much diversity of interpretation. See Ilbert, *The Government of India*.

of dealing with Asiatic rulers and officials ; he had studied their weakness and their strength. At St. Petersburg and Constantinople he had represented the interests of England on the Eastern Question, and all the issues connected with the wider field of Central Asia were familiar to him. Lastly, in Egypt he had been entrusted with a task that has been continually imposed upon the English Government in India—the task of reforming and reconstructing under European superintendence the dilapidated fabric of an Oriental State.

Those observations, which demonstrate that Lord Dufferin was unusually well qualified to deal with foreign policy, must be

subjected to the reservation that he did not possess any specialized knowledge of Indian affairs, such as that possessed by some of his predecessors who had served on the Board of Control, and that he had little aptitude or taste for the problems of internal administration, which he usually left for the disposal of his colleagues and secretaries.

Lord Dufferin's success.

Lord Dufferin, after he had been at the head of the Government of India for some time, became keenly sensible of the unknown dangers which beset the ruler of the Indian Empire. 'I have now', he wrote, 'been two years and a half in this country, that is to say, one-half of my term, and I feel now, and have always felt, like a man engaged in a very dangerous

LORD DUFFERIN.

steepclimb over a course interspersed with horribly stiff fences and exceedingly wide brooks. . . . One feels that there can be neither rest nor peace nor breathing time until one has got safe past the winning-post at the end of one's five years.'

He rode his fences so skilfully that he never had occasion to lament a fall. When about to retire he was able to offer the customary congratulations on the peaceful state of the country ; and had the good fortune to find that his hopeful language was not falsified by the event, as had happened to so many of his predecessors.

Mr. Lecky's well-phrased appreciation of Lord Dufferin's character deserves quotation. 'He was a great diplomatist and a great statesman ; a man who possessed to a degree that was hardly

equalled by any of his contemporaries, the qualities of brilliancy and the qualities of charm ; a man of unequalled tact and versatility, and who combined with these gifts a rare sagacity of judgement and a singularly firm and tenacious will.' His 'rare gift of carrying out great works with the minimum of friction was perhaps the most distinctive feature of his great Indian career'.

The Panjdeh incident. After the conclusion of Lord Lytton's Afghan War, the advance of the Tsar's armies in Central Asia continued rapidly and without serious check until the beginning of 1885, when a Russian force came into contact with the Afghan outposts at Panjdeh. On March 29 the Russian commander sent an ultimatum to the Afghans requiring them to withdraw from their position. The Afghans, claiming to be within their own boundary, refused. A sharp action ensued. The Russians, who were victorious, then proclaimed the annexation of Panjdeh, which lies between Herat and Merv. This incident aroused a storm of warlike passion in both India and the United Kingdom, before which even Mr. Gladstone's pacific Government had to bend. Active preparations for a war with Russia began, and the Muscovite authorities, seeing that England was in earnest, withdrew some of their pretensions, so that the affair was adjusted by negotiation.

Immediately after taking over charge Lord Dufferin had occasion to apply the personal qualifications which have been described to the troubled waters of Afghan politics, and especially to securing the goodwill of the Amīr, Abdurrahmān. The Viceroy arranged an interview at Rāwalpindi with the Amīr, who crossed the frontier on the very day on which the Russians attacked his troops at Panjdeh.

The Amīr, taking the sensible view that the affair at Panjdeh should be treated merely as a frontier skirmish, did not much care whether or not the Russians secured the disputed bit of territory. The thing he really cared about was 'the exclusion at all hazards of British troops and officers from Afghanistan'. Being equally resolved to keep out the Russians, he wished to be allowed to defend himself with English aid in the shape of arms and money only, not men. That resolve of the Amīr's was a relief to Lord Dufferin, who much disliked the prospect of being compelled by existing engagements to risk an army on the Russo-Afghan frontier. He remarked that 'we have undertaken to defend the inviolability of a frontier nearly a thousand miles from our own borders'; and felt that it was much more satisfactory not to be obliged to stake anything beyond so many lakhs of rupees. He recognized that the obligations undertaken by Lord Ripon to defend Abdurrahmān were 'very absolute and specific'—not to be evaded, whatever the cost might be.

The Amīr went home pleased. The immediate difficulty was ultimately settled by diplomacy and the appointment of a boundary commission, which gave the disputed tract at Panjdeh to Russia. In business of this kind the personal gifts and special experience of Lord Dufferin were invaluable.

Burmese intrigues with France. Early in the same year, 1885, the Governor-general learned that Theebaw, the King of Burma, had concluded a treaty with the French Government, under which France obtained certain peculiar consular and commercial privileges of a threatening character. A trained diplomatist like Lord Dufferin could not allow the intrusion of France into the affairs of Burma, which the Government of India regarded as its own exclusive concern. About the same time King Theebaw showed his dislike and contempt for the British by imposing an enormous fine of twenty-three lakhs of rupees upon the Bombay and Burma Trading Company and ordering the arrest of the employés of the Company. His action is believed to have been suggested by Monsieur Haas, the over-zealous French agent.¹

Third Burmese War. Lord Dufferin then, with the sanction of the Home Government, dispatched an ultimatum to the Burmese court demanding the immediate settlement of all matters in dispute. The king, who, like his predecessors, was disposed to overrate the strength at his command, sent an evasive reply, and ordered his troops to resist the British advance. On November 14 the Indian army crossed the frontier. The lessons of previous campaigns had been so well learned that no serious opposition was encountered. On the 27th of the same month King Theebaw agreed to surrender, and on the following day, Mandalay, then the capital, was occupied. The war, which had been of a merely nominal character, was thus ended in a fortnight. King Theebaw and his family were deported at once to India, and ultimately settled at Ratnagiri in the Bombay Presidency, where the deposed monarch lived for many years. His personal fate need not excite sympathy or regret. His accession had been marked by the ruthless massacre of about eighty of his relations, and during his short reign he had shown himself to be an intemperate and cruel tyrant.

Annexation of Upper Burma. Lord Dufferin, from the first, had made up his mind to annex the country. Before the war he had written to the Chief Commissioner of Lower Burma: 'If, however, the French proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt to forestall us in Upper Burmah, I should not hesitate to annex the country; and, as at present advised, I think that this mode of procedure would be preferable to setting up a doubtful prince.'

The Viceroy's action seems to have been determined chiefly as a matter of high politics in order to exclude the threatened French interference from the side of Siam. The grievances of the Trading Company, although real and serious, evidently occupied a secondary place in his thoughts.

¹ For a good account of the intolerable provocations offered by Theebaw, who had come to the throne in 1878, see pp. 33-43 of *Burma* by J. G. Scott, 'Shway Yoe' (London, Redway, 1886), a little book of permanent interest, long out of print. Theebaw was encouraged by knowledge of the British difficulties in Afghanistan and South Africa in 1879 and 1880. The British Resident at Mandalay was withdrawn in 1879.

A formal proclamation of annexation was issued on January 1, 1886. The absorption of the whole Burmese Empire had thus been effected in sixty years, beginning with the annexation of Arakan and Tenasserim in 1826. Pegu had followed in 1852.

The easy conquest of Upper Burma completed the tale of annexations on a considerable scale open to a Governor-general of India. Nothing more remained to be taken.

India and Burma. The natural bonds connecting the Indian Empire with Burma are slight. The Burmese, although they had obtained Buddhism and various elements of civilization from India in ancient times, had little in common with the peoples of India. Caste, the distinctive Indian institution, is unknown in Burma, which is more akin to China than to India. Those facts make it difficult for the Supreme Government of India to do full justice to the claims of its great dependency to the east of the Bay of Bengal. It is not improbable that Burma would be better administered and would enjoy improved opportunities for progress if it were detached from India, as the Straits Settlements are. Those settlements might be treated as a dependency of Burma.

Guerilla warfare. The deposition of King Theebaw and the formal annexation of his dominions were accomplished with facility which proved deceptive. The real trouble began when the formal war was finished. The robber bands, which had long infested the country and were regarded by spirited young men as affording suitable outlets for their love of adventure, were now reinforced by swarms of disbanded soldiery led by sundry pretenders to the throne. The irregular resistance of such bands lasted for five years, and became so formidable that at one time 30,000 regular troops were employed against them. Civil government was gradually introduced during that long period of disturbance, and in the end the country settled down. In 1897 Upper and Lower Burma were united so as to form a single immense province administered by a Lieutenant-governor. In due time he will develop into a Governor with all the trappings of the ruler of a Presidency. The country possesses infinite material possibilities, and the people have many virtues, as well as some faults.¹

Restoration of Gwālīor Fort. A graceful concession to sentiment was made in 1886 when Lord Dufferin handed over to the Mahārājā Sindia the famous fort of Gwālīor, 'the pearl in the necklace of the castles of Hind'. Morār was given up at the same time, the town of Jhānsi being taken in exchange. The arrangements pleased all parties, and the military strength of the empire was not impaired, changes in the art of war having destroyed the strategical value of the ancient fortresses.

Queen Victoria's jubilee. The 'jubilee' of Queen Victoria, marking her completion of fifty years of sovereignty, was celebrated

¹ 'The potential wealth in Upper Burma, not to speak of Western China, the Shan States, and Karennee, is simply incalculable. . . . Upper Burma is, undoubtedly, more fertile and promising than our older provinces' (Scott, op. cit., p. 162).



COUNCIL CHAMBER, MANDALAY.
(Since demolished.)

in 1887 at every station and town throughout India with appropriate ceremonial and genuine enthusiasm. The character of Her late Majesty commanded the spontaneous veneration of all classes.

Rent or Tenancy Acts. Lord Dufferin's Government passed three important Rent or Tenancy Acts regulating the rural economy of large provinces. The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885, designed as an improvement on Act X of 1859, was based on the principles of fixity of tenure and judicial rents. The objection that it violated the terms of the Permanent Settlement was rightly disallowed. The Governor-general had no difficulty in showing that the Act aimed at putting into practice the unfulfilled intentions of Lord Cornwallis.

The conditions in Oudh being different, and tenant-right or 'right of occupancy' being enjoyed by only a small minority of the peasantry, the legislature sought to strengthen the position of the numerous tenants-at-will by granting them a statutory holding for seven years, with a right to compensation for improvements (1886).

In the Panjāb, where the land is largely cultivated by the owners, the question of 'right of occupancy' is less urgent than it is in Bengal and the United Provinces. The Act of 1887 gave the protected tenants a limited guarantee against eviction and enhancement of rent. The relations between landlord and tenant everywhere present problems of such extreme complexity and difficulty that legislation on the subject never can attain more than an imperfect and moderate degree of success.

Retirement of Lord Dufferin. In 1888 Lord Dufferin, who felt the burden of advancing years and was influenced by domestic anxieties, expressed a desire to retire from India and resume diplomatic employment. Lord Salisbury, who had returned to power in 1886, willingly complied with the wishes of the Viceroy and kept the embassy at Rome open for him until he should be ready to assume charge. At the close of the year Lord Dufferin was relieved by the Marquess of Lansdowne, another brilliant Irish nobleman, and was rewarded for his services by a step in the peerage as Marquess of Dufferin and Ava.

If Lord Dufferin may not be given a place in the front rank of the Governors-general, he certainly merits recognition as one of the most successful. His premature retirement was generally regretted.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Lytton Viceroy ; Royal Titles Act ; occupation of Quetta	1876
Famine in Deccan and south	1876-8
Imperial Assemblage (January 1)	1877
Vernacular Press Act	1878
Second Afghan War	1878-80
Abolition of customs hedge	1879

Resignation of Lord Lytton ; Lord Ripon Viceroy (April) ; battle of Maiwand (July 27) ; march of Roberts to Kandahār (August) ; reversal of Afghan policy	1880
Rendition of Mysore ; first general census of India	1881
Repeal of Vernacular Press Act	1882
Education Committee's report	1883
Ilbert Bill controversy	1883-4
Lord Dufferin Viceroy	1884
Panjdeh incident ; third Burmese War	1885
Tenancy Acts (Bengal, Oudh, Panjāb)	1885-7
Annexation of Upper Burma (January 1) ; restoration of Gwālior Fort	1886
Queen Victoria's 'jubilee'	1887
Resignation of Lord Dufferin ; Lord Lansdowne Viceroy	1888

AUTHORITIES

The R. I. series ends with Lord Mayo. No large scale biography of the first Earl of Lytton, the Viceroy, exists. The leading authority is *The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876 to 1880 ; compiled from Letters and Official Papers by Lady BETTY BALFOUR*, his daughter (Longmans, 1899). That volume (551 pp.), prepared with the help of Sir J. Strachey and Sir A. Lyall, contains many documents not accessible elsewhere. All military details are stated authoritatively in *The Second Afghan War 1878-80 ; Official Account produced in the Intelligence Branch, Army H.Q., India* (734 pp., Murray, 1908) ; originally 'secret', but revised in 1907 for publication and sale.

The Second Afghan War, 1878-79-80 ; its Causes, its Conduct, and its Consequences, by Col. H. B. HANNA (3 vols., Constable, 1899-1910), is virtually a huge Radical pamphlet, bitterly hostile to Lords Beaconsfield, Salisbury, and Lytton, and their advisers, and avowedly designed to 'deal a deadly blow to the Forward Policy'. Sir ALFRED LYALL, *Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*, 2 vols., 1905.

The following secondary authorities may be consulted : R. C. DUTT, *India in the Victorian Age*, 1904, written from the National Congress point of view ; L. J. TROTTER, *History of India under Queen Victoria, 1836-1880* (1886) ; and MARSHMAN and E. M. D., *Abridgment* (Blackwood, 1901).

CHAPTER 3

Lord Lansdowne ; frontier defence ; Manipur ; exchange and currency ; Lord Elgin II ; Chitrāl and Tirah campaigns ; plague and famine ; Lord Curzon ; famine ; foreign affairs and frontier arrangements ; internal administration ; Lord Minto II ; constitutional changes ; anarchist crime ; Lord Hardinge of Penshurst ; visit of Their Majesties.

Lord Lansdowne. The Marquess of Lansdowne, who succeeded Lord Dufferin, had gained official experience in his earlier days as Under-Secretary for War and also for India. Later he had served, like his predecessor, as Governor-general of Canada. He remained in office as Viceroy a little longer than the customary period of five years, and enjoyed a generally quiet time, notwithstanding

two small frontier expeditions. The third Burmese War had closed the paths of conquest, and the alarms about Russian aggression had gradually faded away.

Frontier defence. The Viceroy devoted special attention to questions of frontier defence, and adopted measures well calculated to prevent future panics. He established friendly relations with the Amīr of Kābul by sending Sir H. Mortimer Durand as a special envoy on a temporary mission. The envoy travelled without any escort, trusting himself unreservedly to the honour and hospitality of his host. The result was eminently satisfactory. Various frontier difficulties were then settled in a friendly spirit, and arrangements were made to demarcate the southern and eastern frontiers of Afghanistan by a boundary since known as 'the Durand line'. The subsidy to the Amīr was raised from twelve to eighteen lakhs. Efficient arrangements had been made at an earlier date for guaranteeing the security of Quetta, and in 1889 the Viceroy, when visiting that station, was able to announce that the once dreaded Bolān Pass had become 'a safe and peaceable highway'. The pass proper is fifty-four miles in length. The North-Western Railway now extends to Chaman, about fifty miles beyond Quetta. An extension to Kandahār could be constructed without much difficulty. All political arrangements in the Balōchistan region were effected through Sir Robert Sandeman, an officer of extraordinary ability, endowed with a singular faculty for exercising personal influence. He died in 1892. Critics in the Indian National Congress party, who were incapable of appreciating the value of an insurance policy, and could not see anything beyond the immediate expense, rashly accused Lord Lansdowne of 'silly imperialism' and 'wasteful expenditure'. The value of the Viceroy's foresight has been tested and proved by the prolonged crisis of the Great War. The strength of the frontier defences has justified the Government of India in denuding the country of troops to an extent which would have been madness if Lord Lansdowne, building upon the foundations laid by Lord Lytton, had not provided the means for guarding against attack and for sending up reinforcements as required.

Hunza and Nagar. In 1891 and 1892 a gap in the defences of the north-western frontier was closed by the occupation of Hunza and Nagar in the Gilgit Valley, two strongholds commanding the road to Chitrāl and certain passes over the Hindu Kush. The capture of the almost inaccessible forts was effected by Indian troops with extraordinary gallantry.¹

Manipur. The small hill principality of Manipur, situated on the borders of Assam to the east of Kāchār (Cachar), was the scene of an unexampled and audacious crime in 1891. Troubles having arisen owing to a disputed succession, the Government of India decided to exile the Sēnapati, or commander-in-chief of the local

¹ The little campaign is vividly described in one of the best books of travel ever written, *Where Three Empires Meet*, by E. F. Knight (1893). The three empires mean India, Russia, and China.

forces, who was a brother of the Rājā lately deposed. Mr. Quinton, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, with an escort of five hundred men, was ordered up to Manipur to make the necessary arrangements. The Sēnapati not only refused to obey the summons of the Viceroy's representative, but offered armed resistance. Fighting went on until sunset on March 24. An interview between the Chief Commissioner and the Sēnapati having been arranged, the British officers were treacherously attacked. Mr. Quinton and certain members of his staff were captured and deliberately beheaded by the public executioner. The escort retired towards Kāchār. During the retirement strange incidents happened, some of a highly creditable, and others of a painful nature. At the end of April the outrage was avenged, the Sēnapati and some of his accomplices being hanged. A boy was appointed Rājā. During his minority the state was administered by the Political Agent, who introduced many reforms. The young Rājā, who had been educated at the Mayo College, Ajmēr, was invested with powers in 1907.

Khelat (Kalāt) and Kashmīr. After the death of Sir Robert Sandeman in 1892 the Khān of Khelat (Kalāt) committed so many acts of violence, including the murder of a bedridden cripple aged ninety-four, that he was required to abdicate in favour of his son. The Mahārājā of Kashmīr, who had found the difficulties of government too much for him, surrendered his powers for a time to a council of regency. Reforms having been effected, the Mahārājā subsequently resumed his functions.

Exchange. In India the standard of value for several centuries had been silver, that is to say, all debts, public or private, had to be paid in silver rupees. Early in the nineteenth century the rupee had been worth sometimes as much as one-eighth of an English gold sovereign, or, as expressed in British silver currency, two shillings and sixpence. About 1870 the rupee was commonly reckoned as being worth the tenth part of a sovereign or two shillings in silver, and it was customary to convert rupees into pounds sterling or sovereigns at the rate of ten to one, a thousand rupees being taken as equivalent to a hundred pounds. About 1873-4 the value of silver in relation to gold was disturbed by various causes, with the result that in 1878 a thousand rupees were worth little more than fifty pounds. The Government of India being obliged to make large payments in England for diverse purposes, the heavy and fluctuating fall in exchange threw Indian finance into confusion, while European officials and other persons who could not avoid remitting family charges and savings to England in order to make payments there in gold under English law were gravely embarrassed, and injured by the loss of a large percentage of their income. Proposals to remedy the intolerable state of affairs were discussed for many years without result. At last, in 1893, the Government of India and the Home Government decided to close the mints against the free coinage of silver, and subsequently resolved to admit gold as a legal tender, so that debts, whether

public or private, might be lawfully paid in either silver or gold. The result of Lord Lansdowne's legislation, as modified some years later in Lord Curzon's time, has been to steady the rate of exchange, which long remained at about 1s. 4d. to the rupee. In other words, a sovereign was valued at fifteen rupees, and a thousand rupees were worth about sixty-six sovereigns. The limitation of coinage has given the rupee an artificial value as money, usually far exceeding its intrinsic value as silver bullion. The disadvantages of the arrangement are two, namely, that a premium is placed on the counterfeiting of rupees even in good silver, and that the value of the large hoards of silver bullion in the hands of the Indian population is depreciated. But, notwithstanding those disadvantages, and the necessary loss of income to European residents in India, nobody has been able to devise a better plan. The subject is too intricate and technical to admit conveniently of further exposition. The currency measures initiated by Lord Lansdowne's government secured financial prosperity, and provided the yearly surplus of revenue which enabled Lord Curzon to effect his numerous reforms. The Great War has disturbed the exchange.

Lord Elgin II; frontiers. In 1894 Lord Lansdowne was relieved by Lord Elgin, son of the nobleman who had been at the head of the Government for a short time in 1862-3. The new Viceroy had never held any important office and could not be credited with the possession of any conspicuous personal distinction. His administration lasted for four years. Relations with Russia were improved by a treaty settling the frontier of the two empires in the lofty mountains of the Pâmirs; the demarcation of the Afghan boundary was completed; and the frontier line between Burma on one side and China and Siam on the other was marked out.

Chitrāl. A disputed succession in the little state of Chitrāl, lying among the mountains to the west of Gilgit and south of the Hindu Kush, led to a small war in 1895, during which the Political Agent underwent a siege and a detachment of a hundred Sikhs was destroyed. In due course the fort was relieved and the leaders of the opposition were deported. Since then Chitrāl has been quiet.

Tirāh. Two years later a more serious frontier operation was rendered necessary by the rising of the strong Afridī clans, who closed the Khyber Pass. The valleys south of the pass, until then unexplored, were penetrated, and the active resistance of the clans was broken. The campaign was on an unusually large scale, 40,000 troops or more being employed. The thorough subjugation of the tribes seems to be as far off as ever.

Plague and famine. The latter part of Lord Elgin's term of office was clouded by the calamities of pestilence and famine. Bubonic plague, the same dread disease which had ravaged London and other parts of England in 1663-5, was known to be endemic or locally indigenous in certain places in India, especially on the slopes of the Himalayas, where it had existed without

attracting much notice. An epidemic spread over a considerable region in Cutch and Sind in 1812, where it lasted for ten years. In 1836 the disease extended over a large area in Rājputānā. But no very widely diffused outbreak in India seems to be recorded after 1616, in the reign of Jahāngīr, when the pestilence wrought havoc in almost every locality of northern and western India, lasting for eight years. Jahāngīr, an acute observer, described the symptoms accurately, and noted how the disease affected rats and mice. The Deccan was smitten in 1703 and 1704.

The great modern epidemic, which has not yet disappeared (1918), began at Bombay in 1896, having been introduced apparently from China. It spread by degrees into nearly every province. Up to the end of 1903 more than two million deaths had been reported, and the actual mortality must have been much greater. While the disease was a novelty and confined to a comparatively small area the various provincial authorities tried to combat it by strict quarantine regulations and other measures which offended the sentiment of the population, especially that of the Hindus. Violent opposition was aroused. At Poona two young British officers employed on plague duty were murdered deliberately, while sanguinary riots occurred at Bombay and other places. Experience having proved that it was impossible to prevent the disease from spreading the early regulations were modified, and everybody was forced to recognize that the pestilence had come to stay. A method of inoculation with a serum has been efficacious when given a fair trial. It is impossible to predict when the plague will disappear, as it disappeared long ago from Europe as an epidemic disease. The stray cases which have reached Europe of late years have not developed any general pestilence.

The famine of 1896-7, believed to have been the most severe ever known, was estimated to have affected a population of nearly seventy millions. It was especially intense in the United Provinces, the Central Provinces, Bihār, and the Hissār District of the Panjāb. All the statistics of the visitation are on a gigantic scale. The calamity was fought as effectively as possible by Sir Antony MacDonnell, the Lieutenant-governor of the United Provinces and Oudh. The administration of the Central Provinces, where special difficulties were encountered, was far less successful. A Commission under Sir James Lyall reported in 1898 on the results, and again discussed the principles of famine relief, a subject on which general agreement is not easily attained. No system can do more than mitigate the horrors of an intense and extended famine due to failure of rain in an enormous area.

Lord Curzon. At the beginning of 1899 Lord Elgin was succeeded by Lord Curzon of Kedleston, then not quite forty years of age, the youngest of the Governors-general, excepting Lord Dalhousie. Although the new Viceroy had not enjoyed the exceptional experience of Lord Dufferin in offices of the highest rank, no ruler of India before or since took up the task of governing the Indian Empire with an equipment of special, laboriously

acquired knowledge so vast as that possessed by Lord Curzon of Kedleston. He had spent a large part of the ten years preceding his assumption of the Viceroynalty in travels of extraordinary range, chiefly in Asia. His immense book on Persia is a lasting monument commemorating the zeal and intelligence with which he accumulated exact knowledge concerning the strange countries which he explored.

‘He had spent nearly one year at the India Office and three years at the Foreign Office. He had visited India four times and had travelled widely within its borders. He knew at first hand the North-west Frontier, always an object of deep anxiety. He had a close personal acquaintance with the other countries of Asia, and had studied and pondered the problems they presented. He had met a singular variety of Asiatic rulers, including such diverse potentates as the Shah of Persia, the Amir of Afghanistan, the King of Korea, the King of Siam (with whom he frequently corresponded), the Emperor of Annam, and the King of Cambodia. Among administrators of lesser rank may be mentioned Li Hung Chang, with whom he was on terms of considerable intimacy. This preliminary experience of intercourse with Asiatics of exalted position was of great value in his new office, which brought him into contact with the princes and chiefs of India.’¹

In addition to those peculiar qualifications for office in India, Lord Curzon was endowed with gifts fitted to win eminence in any field of human activity, gifts which included eloquence, style, industry, imagination, sympathy, a faculty for



LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

¹ Lovat Fraser, 3rd ed., p. 16.

organization, and other merits rarely combined in one man. Such manifold capacity naturally tempted the possessor to exercise his powers, and to embark on a course of reform, which led him to deal with every department of the administration, and to leave his personal mark on each. Most critics are agreed that Lord Curzon, like Lord Dalhousie, whom he resembled in some respects, went too fast. India does not like to be 'hustled', and unrestrained activity in reform is certain to produce a reaction. The feverish energy of Lord Dalhousie undoubtedly was one of the elements in the great reaction of the Mutiny; and it is not unjust to affirm that the outbreak of unrest and grave political crime which ensued after Lord Curzon's resignation was in some measure stimulated by feelings of irritation induced by the cumulative effect of incessant change. Lord Curzon, like everybody else, of course, made mistakes from time to time; but it may be said with truth that almost every one of the innumerable administrative changes effected by him was in itself an improvement. Yet, the pace was too fast, and the improvements were too many.

The calm judgement of history cannot now be passed upon the achievements of a ruler of India who happily is still (1918) engaged in important public duties at a time of unexampled difficulty. The administration of India by Lord Curzon is too near to be viewed in true perspective, and impartial consideration of his more disputable acts is hindered by the passions of contemporary party politics. Moreover, the inner history of events so recent has not been, and cannot at present be disclosed. That difficulty, the lack of authentic documents with the consequent paucity of information, hampers the historian more or less throughout the period since the Mutiny. The books dealing with the administration of the Viceroy, even when of considerable bulk, have been so discreetly edited as to leave much untold. After the time of Lord Lansdowne authentic accessible records are particularly scanty.

A slight outline sketch of a few of the more outstanding features of Lord Curzon's brilliant administration is all that can be attempted in this work.

Famine of 1900. At the very beginning of his term of office he was confronted by a formidable famine, which became intense in 1900 and smote with especial severity the favoured province of Gujarāt, usually exempt from such distress. The calamity was encountered with untiring energy by the Viceroy and multitudes of brave men and women working under him, who often sacrificed their lives in the cause of the suffering millions. A Famine Commission under the presidency of Sir Antony Macdonell, which reported in 1901, was disposed to think that relief, especially in the Central Provinces, had been distributed with too lavish a hand. Excessive liberality results, not only in financial embarrassment, but in the demoralization of the people. The exact line between excess and defect is not easily drawn.

Afghan affairs. In 1901 Abdurrahmān, Amīr of Afghanistan, was succeeded by his son Habibullah. Lord Curzon managed to

keep on friendly terms with the new Amīr, although not without difficulty. The Amīr claimed the title of King, and was conceded the style of 'His Majesty' in official correspondence. The allowances promised by Lord Lansdowne continued to be paid. The Great War has seriously affected the political position of Afghanistan, as of almost every country in the world, to such an extent that the policy of previous times has little applicability to the present. The future is incalculable.

Persian Gulf. All British statesmen have been and are agreed that foreign powers should be excluded from political control over the Persian Gulf, where British naval power should be supreme. In Lord Curzon's time Turks, French, Russians, and Germans all tried to secure a footing on the shores or islands of the Gulf. The Viceroy himself visited the region and took effective steps to protect the interests of his country. In the course of the world conflict the utter impotence of Persia has been revealed, and new prospects have been opened by the operations in Mesopotamia.

Tibetan expedition. The most notable and most debatable incident in Lord Curzon's foreign policy was the Tibetan expedition of 1903-4. The friendly relations between the governments of the Grand Lama and of India which existed in the time of Warren Hastings had come to an end long before Lord Curzon entered upon his office. The Tibetans showed a resolve to keep their country sealed against all intercourse with India, and disregarded conventions laboriously arranged. When Lord Curzon assumed charge the relations of India with Tibet were at an 'absolute deadlock'. A Russian agent having been received at Lhasa, and the attitude of the Tibetans having become unmistakably hostile, the Viceroy thought that the time for action had arrived, his letters to the Grand Lama's government not having been accorded any reply. In November 1903 he persuaded the Home Government to sanction a limited advance to Gyantse, about half-way to Lhasa, in order to obtain reparation. Strict instructions were given by the Secretary of State that the operations should be temporary, and that the mission should be withdrawn as soon as its object was attained. The Tibetans having offered armed resistance, the further advance to Lhasa was sanctioned in July 1904. In August the mysterious city was 'unveiled', and temporarily occupied. The expedition, which had crossed a pass 19,000 feet above the sea, returned safely during the autumn. Differences of opinion between the home and viceregal governments developed, so that little was gained by the operations beyond an extension of geographical knowledge, and the satisfaction of reaching Lhasa, which had been so long inaccessible. Tibet had to pay a small indemnity, and the suzerainty of China over the country was confirmed by the diplomacy of the British Foreign Office. Since the establishment of the Chinese Republic, Tibet seems to have become independent again. So far as I can judge the expedition was unnecessary and all but fruitless.

North-West Frontier Province. Lord Curzon is entitled to

the credit of eminent success in his management of the tribal frontier. Previously the dealings with the tribes to the north of Sind had been in the hands of the provincial government of the Panjāb, which had the Frontier Force and Guides at its disposal. The results had been unsatisfactory and scores of raids or punitive expeditions had failed to produce any permanent effect. Lord Curzon, adopting and modifying an idea of Lord Lytton, created in 1901 the North-West Frontier Province, administered by a Chief Commissioner with head-quarters at Peshāwar, and responsible directly to the Government of India. The reform was carried out in a manner needlessly irritating to the Panjāb Government, which lost all the territory to the west of the Indus, except the Dēra Ghāzī Khān District. The new province also received the Hazāra District and was thus provided with charming sites for hill stations. The measure, although it might have been brought into operation with less friction, deserves unreserved commendation on its merits. The province as at present constituted has a ragged appearance on the map, and is so constructed that its administration must be difficult. Means to make it more compact and manageable may be found at some future time. The large area formerly known as the North-Western Provinces (N.W.P.) was rechristened in order to avoid confusion, and was styled the Agra Province. The whole region, including Oudh, under the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-governor, whose head-quarters are at Allahabad and Naini Tāl, is now called the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh (U.P.). The designation is not convenient, the capital being Allahabad, not Agra. Oudh was mentioned in the name in order to gratify local sentiment, which objected to the complete merger of the small kingdom in its large neighbour. The local government spends some time each year at Lucknow, the capital of Oudh.

Frontier tribes. In his transactions with the frontier tribes on the Panjāb border the Viceroy sought to apply, so far as differences of conditions would permit, the system of peaceful influence worked so successfully by Sir Robert Sandeman in Balōchistan. He based his arrangements on the principles of 'withdrawal of British forces from advanced positions, employment of tribal forces in the defence of tribal country, concentration of British forces behind them as a safeguard and a support, and improvement of communications in the rear'.

The policy, which involved the organization of a considerable force of Frontier Militia, has been justified by success. Only one little frontier war, that against the Mahsūds, occurred during Lord Curzon's time. It was called a 'blockade', for the sake of appearances.

Native States and Berār. The Viceroy, who took the most lively interest in the Native or Protected States, forty of which he visited, has been criticized, and apparently with justice, for showing too much readiness to interfere in their affairs. His successor, Lord Minto, was more restrained in his action. The most important transaction with a Native State was the settlement in 1902 of

the long-standing Berār difficulty by means of a confidential personal discussion with the Nizam, at which no one else was present. The little province was made over to the Government of India under the fiction of a perpetual lease, so as to preserve the nominal sovereignty of Hyderabad. Berār ceased to exist as a separate province and was attached as a Division to the Central Provinces. The financial terms arranged were favourable to the Nizam, who is said to have been satisfied. The opportunity was taken to get rid of the Hyderabad Contingent as a distinct force, and to merge it in the Indian army. So far as is known the arrangements work well.

Viceregal energy. The inexhaustible energy of Lord Curzon, which ill health could not quench, attacked the problems of internal administration on every side. He explored minutely the details of every department and overstrained his strength by doing too much himself. The marked tendency to draw all business up to head-quarters had a pernicious effect upon the more independent members of the services, who felt that their power of action was unduly restricted and that the exercise of responsible discretion was discouraged.

Land revenue. The land revenue administration having been made the subject of much hostile criticism, the Viceroy replied in January 1902 by an exhaustive 'Resolution', written by himself. He demonstrated that famines were due to drought, not to over-assessment, and laid down principles designed to ensure greater elasticity both in assessment and in collection.

Land Alienation Act. All observers are agreed that the almost universal indebtedness of the peasantry and the numerous transfers of ownership or tenant-right to members of the trading and money-lending classes are evils to be deplored. But they are evils more easily deplored than remedied. It is extremely difficult to prevent a willing seller from concluding with an eager buyer a transaction in no way immoral, although deemed by authority to be contrary to the public interest. The mischievous effects of the alienation of land were felt with especial severity in the Panjāb, where agitators have not been slow to take advantage of the discontent of dispossessed landholders. The Government of Lord Curzon attempted a remedy by passing the Land Alienation Act (XIII of 1900) applicable to that province. The broad effect is described as being that 'money-lenders, shopkeepers, and professional men cannot buy land from hereditary cultivators, or hold such land on mortgage for more than twenty years without the consent of the State'. The sale of land to the excluded classes under decree of court is also forbidden. The difficulty of working such an arbitrary prohibition and the facility of evasion are obvious. The principle of the Act has been extended to certain other territories. Co-operative rural banks, modelled on a German system, have been established in the hope of lessening the burden of debt on the peasantry.

Higher education. The Viceroy bestowed intense study on

the education problem, even to the injury of his health. His labours, aided by those of a preliminary committee and a commission, resulted in the enactment of the Universities Act, 1904. The Act reduced the excessive numbers of members of the Senates, reformed the constitution of the Syndicates or executive bodies, placed in the hands of the Government of India the final decision concerning the affiliation or disaffiliation of colleges, and provided for the official inspection of affiliated colleges.

Grave abuses loudly calling for reform undoubtedly existed, especially in Bengal. The Bill on which the Act was founded excited opposition far greater than its author had expected. The resistance to the official proposals was based upon the belief that the intended legislation would fetter unduly the independence of the universities and colleges, while enhancing excessively the power of the executive government. Other circumstances contributed to the excitement. Notwithstanding the Viceroy's earnest assurances that the 'main principle' of his reforms was 'to raise the standard of education all round, and particularly of higher education', he was denounced fiercely as the enemy of the university system and of higher education generally. Lord Curzon's unpopularity during the latter part of his term of office was due in large part to the dislike of his methods of educational reform. The problem was not solved finally by his action. In 1919 a new University Commission has submitted fresh proposals.

The 'partition of Bengal'. The so-called partition of Bengal was not originally planned by the Viceroy. The discussion about the rearrangement of certain provincial boundaries had begun among his subordinates in 1901, but no definite proposal was made until two years later, in 1903, when the Lieutenant-governor of Bengal propounded a certain plan for lightening the intolerable burden resting upon his shoulders. At that time he was supposed to administer a territory comprising 189,000 square miles with a population of seventy-eight millions. The task could not be performed with any approach to success. Eastern Bengal especially was utterly neglected, financially starved, and allowed to present 'the most astounding record of modern crime in existence'.

Lord Curzon, after paying a visit to Eastern Bengal, recognized the absolute necessity of reducing the jurisdiction of the Lieutenant-governor. Various possible arrangements were considered and publicly discussed. In 1905 the proposals of the Government of India took definite shape. Their main features, as modified by the Secretary of State in Council, were the separation from the Calcutta Government of the Divisions of Dacca, Chittagong, and Rājshāhi, the suppression of the Chief Commissionership of Assam, and the formation of a new province called 'Eastern Bengal and Assam' under a Lieutenant-governor with his capital at Dacca. The scheme was sanctioned, and different Secretaries of State repeatedly declared that the decision was irrevocable. The arrangement, contrary to expectation, provoked intense and passionate hostility in Calcutta and throughout Bengal, where

a cry was raised that the Bengālī nation was being maliciously torn asunder. Serious crimes were committed in support of the agitation, but by the end of 1910 the excitement had died down, and Eastern Bengal had begun to experience the benefits of a government on the spot which cared for its interests. Unfortunately, as I think, the ministry in power in 1911 thought fit to reverse the decision so often affirmed. H.M. the King-Emperor was advised to announce at the Coronation Durbar the adoption of the plan now in force which restored the Chief Commissionership of Assam, and created the new province of Bihār and Orissa, including Chutiā Nagpur, with its capital at Patna-Bankipore. Bengal proper thus remained undivided under the Calcutta Government. The sufferer was Eastern Bengal, with its preponderance of Muhammadan population, which was again made over to the administration of Calcutta. Perhaps the most neglected part of India will now be given better treatment than it ever received in the past. The withdrawal of the Bihār and Orissa province has given material relief to the over-worked Government of Bengal, which can now spare some time and money for the eastern districts.

The relics of the past. Although some of Lord Curzon's predecessors, notably Lord Lytton, and now and then a provincial governor, had displayed some sense of the duty incumbent on a civilized government to cherish the crumbling relics of the past and to explore the treasures of ancient art buried in the soil of innumerable forgotten cities, high authorities were, as a rule, too much immersed in the current business of war, policy, or administration to pay serious attention to the less obvious claims of science upon their attention.

The official efforts made from time to time to preserve the monuments of former ages and to investigate the hidden remains of antiquity were spasmodic, desultory, unscientific, and planned on a penurious scale. Lord Curzon stands alone as the reverent liberal guardian of the heritage of the present from the past, and as the earnest advocate of adequate, instructed exploration. He justly claimed credit for initiating a 'scientific and steadfast policy' in the matter.

'I hope', he said, when addressing the Asiatic Society of Bengal in 1900, 'to assert more definitely during my time the Imperial responsibility of Government in respect of Indian antiquities, to inaugurate or to persuade a more liberal attitude on the part of those with whom it rests to provide the means, and to be a faithful guardian of the priceless treasure-house of art and learning that has, for a few years at any rate, been committed to my charge.'

The promise then made has been nobly redeemed.

Lord Curzon's achievement. Every important building or group of monuments known to exist in any province or state has been examined, and in the great majority of cases decay has been arrested by processes of conservation, usually executed with discretion. Research has not been neglected. The exploration of buried remains and the study of inscriptions have been prosecuted

vigorously in conjunction with the urgent work of a comprehensive scheme of conservation. The Government of India has at present no reason for self-reproach with regard to its care for the extant memorials of the past, and in most provinces research and exploration of many kinds have been active. The Protected States have become deeply interested in the process of recovering the ancient history of India. Several states, notably Mysore, Travancore, and Hyderabad, maintain admirable archaeological departments of their own, directed by competent Indian experts. The enormous development of historical and archaeological study in India since the beginning of the twentieth century owes much to the example set by Lord Curzon and to the fascinating Reports published by Sir John Marshall, the Director-General of Archaeology, and his colleagues since 1902. Other influences have contributed to the advance made, but none has been more potent than the encouragement liberally given by the Government of India.

Utilitarian economists. The congratulations of a historian on the brilliant success attained need to be balanced by some words of caution. The Indian Government, saturated with traditions of cheeseparing economy, is exceptionally liable to unreasonable financial panic and usually is disposed to be severely utilitarian, grudging every rupee not devoted to the ordinary purposes of commonplace administration. When control happens to be in the hands of officials destitute of imagination and the historic sense, as is too often the case, expenditure on the conservation of ancient monuments or on the prosecution of scientific research is apt to be regarded as an extravagance to be pruned away whenever the slightest financial stringency is felt. Such a combination of unfavourable conditions occurred in 1911, when the Government of India committed itself to the absurd assertion that the work of the Archaeological Department was substantially complete, and that the administrative structure so carefully built up by Lord Curzon might be shattered. Energetic efforts were needed to save the organization, and happily were successful on that occasion. But the attack is not unlikely to be renewed. All persons who care to preserve the links uniting the present with the past or are able to appreciate the grandeur and beauty of the work done by the men of the olden time should be on their guard against the narrow-minded prejudices of utilitarian economists. The notion that the survey and study of the monuments and hidden remains of ancient India have been substantially completed to such an extent that little more remains to be done is so ludicrously false that formal refutation is hardly necessary. In reality the field for investigation is practically infinite, and centuries hence a Director-General of Archaeology may still find plenty of work to do.

Resignation of Lord Curzon. Lord Curzon went to England in 1904 for six months on the understanding that he should return to India for a further term of office. An acute controversy between him and Lord Kitchenor, then Commander-in-Chief, concerning

army organization and especially the position of the Military Member of Council, ended in the acceptance of Lord Kitchener's views by the Secretary of State. The offices of Commander-in-Chief and Military Member were combined, so that the head of the army alone became responsible for military advice to the Government. Lord Curzon, who held that the change involved the undue supersession of the civil power, resigned in 1905. During his six months of absence the government had been conducted by Lord Amptill, previously Governor of Madras.

Lord Minto II; opium trade. The permanent successor selected was Lord Minto, great-grandson of the Governor-general who had conquered Java and Mauritius almost a century earlier. The government of Lord Minto (1905-10) was mainly occupied with two subjects, constitutional changes and an outbreak of violent anarchist crime. Before briefly noticing those topics an important measure affecting the Indian revenue may be mentioned. The export trade in opium, which brought a large profit to the Indian treasury, had long been under diplomatic discussion between the Governments of Great Britain and China. In 1907 the arrangements for putting an end to the traffic had been so far advanced that the Anti-Opium Society announced its own dissolution, because it had accomplished the purpose for which it had been founded, namely, the advocacy of the 'act of national righteousness' now sanctioned. Many reasons make it difficult to foretell the ultimate effects of the change on the manners and morals of the Chinese, whose virtuous regulations have been modified. India certainly loses an annual revenue of eight to ten crores of rupees.

Indian Councils Act, 1909. The constitutional changes effected under authority of the Indian Councils Act of Parliament of 1909 were the result of long discussions carried on for nearly three years between the Government of India under Lord Minto and the India Office, presided over by Viscount Morley, then Secretary of State. The reforms, which concerned both the Executive and the Legislative Councils of the Governor-general and the provincial governments, were designed as a continuation of the Charter Act of 1853, and the Councils Acts of 1861 and 1892.

The Act of 1909 empowered an increase in the number of members of each of the Madras and Bombay Executive Councils from two to four. The Secretary of State took the opportunity of exercising the power he already possessed to appoint an Indian member to a seat on the Governor-general's Executive Council. Thus, for the first time, a native of India was admitted to share in the innermost secrets of the Supreme Government. Similar appointments to the provincial Executive Councils have been made, and Indians have been given seats in the Council of India which advises the Secretary of State.

The membership of the Imperial Legislative Council has been raised from twenty-one to a maximum of sixty. Similarly the provincial Legislative Councils, which are no longer confined to Madras and Bombay, have been more than doubled in membership.

A large proportion of the councillors is elected by Chambers of Commerce and other bodies.

Class representation. Elaborate arrangements, varying in each province, have been made for the representation of minorities and special interests, such as the Muhammadan population, the tea and jute industries, and the communities of European planters.

'The object aimed at', Sir Courtenay Ilbert observes, 'was to obtain, as far as possible, a fair representation of the different classes and interests in the country, and the regulations and rules were framed for this purpose in accordance with local advice and with reference to the local conditions of each province. The consequent variety of the rules makes it impossible to generalize their provisions or to summarize their contents. All of them may be regarded as experimental; some of them are avowedly temporary and provisional.'

The principle of sectional and class representation, which was opposed by several prominent Indian politicians in closely argued papers, has obvious disadvantages, and was accepted reluctantly by Lord Morley. Opponents of the representation of particular religions and interests urge that 'the principle of class representation is always objectionable, on the ground that it makes a distinction between the different classes of the community and makes the fusion of their interests impossible'; that other communities, especially the Sikhs, have as good a claim as Muhammadans; that the best men should be elected or appointed without regard to their creed; that, as a matter of fact, Hindu electors often choose a Muhammadan representative; and that, generally speaking, the idea of class representation is unnecessary and retrograde.

Such objections have much force, but on the whole the advantages of a class system of representation in India, where the different sections of the population are sharply divided, seem to outweigh the disadvantages.

The future. Liberty for the discussion of the annual budget and other matters of public interest has been accorded to the Legislative Councils. No approach to finality in the development of the Councils, whether executive or legislative, has been attained in 1918. The certainty that further extensive changes in the constitution of the Indian Governments must follow the close of the Great War renders superfluous more detailed discussion of the essentially transitory arrangements based on the Act of 1909.

Political machinery. Political reformers are prone to pay undue attention to the mere machinery of government and to attach excessive importance to reforms such as those effected by Lords Morley and Minto. The warning language of Lord Curzon merits consideration.

'I wonder', his Lordship said in the House of Lords, 'how these changes will, in the last resort, affect the great mass of the people of India—the people who have no vote and who have scarcely a voice. Remember that to these people, who form the bulk of the population of India, representative government and electoral institutions are nothing whatever. . . . The good

government which appeals to them is the government which protects them from the rapacious money-lender and landlord, from the local *wakil* [attorney], and all the other sharks in human disguise which prey upon these unhappy people. I have a misgiving that this class will not fare much better under these changes than they do now. At any rate I see no place for them in these enlarged Councils which are to be created, and I am under the strong opinion that as government in India becomes more and more Parliamentary—as will be the inevitable result—so it will become less paternal and less beneficent to the poorer classes of the population.'

India and Parliament. The profound change in the relations between the Home Government and the Government of the Viceroy and Governor-general in Council which has taken place since Queen Victoria assumed the direct sovereignty of the Indian Empire is far more important than the repairs of constitutional mechanism. Although the formal, legal position of the Government of India with regard to the Home Government is much the same as it was in 1858, and the powers of the Governor-general in Council seem on paper to be unchanged, the practical difference between the conditions of 1918, to take that year, and 1858 is enormous. When an Under-Secretary of State in Lord Morley's time ventured to describe the Viceroy as the 'agent' of the Secretary of State the blunt phrase jarred on the ears of many. But it gave expression in a form too emphatic to the truth that the old semi-independent authority of the Governor-general in Council has gone for ever. The main lines of the policy of the Government of India and the action of that Government in all grave matters now are and will continue to be either prescribed or sanctioned in advance from Whitehall, while the control exercised by Parliament tends to become more and more stringent. The task of governing India so as to reconcile the paternal despotism still necessary on the spot for many purposes with the ideas of a democratic Parliament at Westminster becomes daily more difficult, and will become impossible unless Parliament is content to wield its supreme authority with restraint. The problem may possibly be solved by Parliament giving its sanction to the development in India of self-government to an extent hitherto regarded as beyond the vision of practical politics. Nearly the same, but not quite the same idea is expressed by Sir Valentine Chirol in the following passage :

'The future of India lies in the greatest possible decentralization in India, subject to the general, but unmeddlesome control of the Governor-general in Council, and in the greatest possible freedom of the Government of India from all interference from home, except in regard to those broad principles of policy which it must always rest with the Imperial Government, represented by the Secretary of State in Council, to determine.'

Stress must be laid on the words 'in Council', because, ever since the resignation of Lord Curzon, both the Secretary of State and the Viceroy have shown a strong and mischievous tendency to ignore the existence of their Councils. The authorities recognized by law for the ordinary conduct of the Government, apart from exceptional emergencies, are the Secretary of State in Council and

the Governor-general in Council, not the Secretary of State and the Viceroy as autocrats settling the affairs of the empire by private, 'demi-official' correspondence between themselves. Long ago Sir Philip Francis and his colleagues pressed their claim as of right to see the so-called 'private' correspondence between Warren Hastings, then Governor-general, and the Resident in Oudh. If the copious 'private' correspondence between different Secretaries of State and Viceroys since 1905 should be published the extent of the existing abuse would become manifest and might be abated.

Anarchist conspiracy. The termination in August 1905 of the Russo-Japanese war in favour of Japan produced a wave of intense excitement throughout Asia. The significance of the defeat of an apparently mighty European empire by a comparatively small Asiatic state could not be mistaken, and India did not fail to note it. The outbreak of atrocious political crime, which marked Lord Minto's term of office and was at its height in 1909, undoubtedly was stimulated by the meditations of discontented young men upon the Japanese success. The agitation concerning the Universities Act of 1904, the partition of Bengal in 1905, and other local grievances arising from Indian administrative measures became merged in a dangerous revolutionary and anarchist conspiracy, directed in India from Bengal and Poona, and supported by foreign organizations in Europe and America. That conspiracy, which could not be regarded as extinct even in 1918, was partially countered in 1910. Constant incitement to crime having been offered by many newspapers and other publications, restrictions on the licence of the press and other emergency measures were necessarily enacted. Many Bengālī and other officers who displayed the highest courage in the execution of their duties sacrificed their lives in the cause of social order and in the service of their sovereign lord the King. The nature of the dangers to which the State was exposed in February 1910 is indicated sufficiently by the following extract from Sir Herbert Risley's speech in the Legislative Council :

'We are at the present moment confronted with a murderous conspiracy, whose aim it is to subvert the Government of the country and to make British rule impossible by establishing general terrorism. Their organization is effective and far-reaching; their numbers are believed to be considerable; the leaders work in secret and are blindly obeyed by their youthful followers. The method they favour at present is political assassination; the method of Mazzini in his worst moods. Already they have a long score of murders or attempted murders to their account. There were two attempts to blow up Sir Andrew Fraser's train, and one of the type with which we are now unhappily familiar, to shoot him on a public occasion. Two attempts were made to shoot Mr. Kingsford, one of which caused the death of two English ladies. Inspector Nanda Lal Banerji, Babu Ashutosh Biswas, the Public Prosecutor at Alipore, Sir William Curzon-Wyllie, Mr. Jackson, and only the other day Deputy-Superintendent Shams-ul Alum have been shot in the most deliberate and cold-blooded fashion. Of three informers two have been killed, and on the third vengeance has been taken by the murder of his brother in the sight of his mother and sisters. Mr. Allen, the magistrate of Dacca, was shot through the lungs

and narrowly escaped with his life. Two picric acid bombs were thrown at His Excellency the Viceroy at Ahmedabad, and only failed to explode by reason of their faulty construction. Not long afterwards an attempt was made with a bomb on the Deputy Commissioner of Umballa.

These things are the natural and necessary consequences of the teachings of certain journals. They have prepared the soil in which anarchy flourishes; they have sown the seed and are answerable for the crop. This is no mere general statement; the chain of causation is clear. Not only does the campaign of violence date from the change in the tone of the Press, but specific outbursts of incitement have been followed by specific outrages.¹

The case for the restraint of criminal writing in the press was unanswerable. The development and long-continued existence of a formidable murderous conspiracy of the nature as outlined in the extract quoted is a disagreeable fact needing to be steadily remembered. It suggests many reflections and cautions. The plot in its later developments spread to the Panjāb and received support from German intrigues and money. Serious attempts to undermine the loyalty of the Indian army have been made, and the execution of a considerable number of the leading conspirators has been absolutely necessary.

Lord Hardinge of Penshurst. The anarchist crimes continued in the time of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, who succeeded Lord Minto in 1910. Lord Hardinge, whose previous service had been in the Foreign Office, is grandson of the Governor-general who conducted the first Sikh war. A bomb attack made on the Viceroy at Delhi wounded him and killed an attendant who was immediately behind Lord Hardinge on the elephant. The criminals escaped.

Census of 1911. The census of 1911 disclosed the population of the Indian Empire as being more than 315 millions, an increase of 7·1 per cent. since 1901.

	1901.	1911.
Population of Indian Empire . . .	294,361,056	315,156,396
Population of Calcutta and suburbs . .	1,106,738	1,222,313
Population of Bombay city . . .	776,006	979,445
Population of Delhi city . . .	208,575	232,837

Visit of Their Majesties. The Viceroyalty of Lord Hardinge of Penshurst will be for ever memorable by reason of the visit of Their Majesties the King-Emperor and his consort at the close of 1911.² and for the beginning of the Great War in 1914. I do not

¹ Sir Andrew Fraser was Lieutenant-governor of Bengal; Mr. Kingsford was magistrate of Muzaffarpur; Mr. A. M. T. Jackson, magistrate and collector of Nāsik, was a learned Sanskrit scholar, and a special friend of Hindus. Yet he was shot by a young Hindu fanatic. Sir William Curzon-Wyllie, Political Aide-de-Camp to the Secretary of State, was killed at the Imperial Institute by a student.

² Their Majesties left London, November 11, 1911; arrived at Bombay, December 2; made state entry into Delhi, December 7; held Coronation Durbar, December 12; left Delhi, December 16; arrived at Calcutta, December 30; left Calcutta, January 8, 1912; arrived in London, February 5, 1912.

attempt to describe the events subsequent to the momentous visit of Their Majesties, or to give details of the splendid ceremonies arranged by the Viceroy and his colleagues for the fitting reception of the Sovereign. The programme was thoughtfully devised and well executed with due regard to the requirements of the occasion.

His Majesty, speaking under the advice of his responsible ministers, made two unexpected announcements. That concerning the reversal, described officially as the 'modification', of the partition of Bengal has been sufficiently discussed on an earlier page. The other, informing an astonished world that the official capital of the Indian Empire would be transferred forthwith from Calcutta to Delhi, where a new city would be built for the accommodation of the Supreme Government, is open to criticism at least as damaging as that invited by the sudden change of policy on the Bengal question. The arguments adduced by the Government of India in support of the transfer of the capital to Delhi are so unconvincing and so liable to easy refutation that it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that the Secretary of State was influenced by unavowed motives. However that may be, the unconstitutional manner in which the policy of the ministry was proclaimed secured the act against reversal or modification, and no useful purpose would now be served by dissecting the assertions put forward by Lord Hardinge's government.

Results of the visit. The happy results of the visit of Their Majesties are not in any way dependent on the opinion which may be held concerning the merits of the two chief announcements made by the King-Emperor on the advice of his ministers, with whom alone the responsibility for policy rested. The intense and profound emotion which greeted the Sovereign and his gracious consort was the spontaneous, heartfelt offering of India to their royal persons. An eyewitness writes :

'That incomparable moment when the Monarchs seated themselves upon their high thrones, beneath a shining golden dome, in the midst of a hundred thousand of their acclaiming subjects, will assuredly remain in the minds of those present as the most vivid memory of their lives. It was a majestic and a moving rite, fraught with deep emotion, compelling thought into unwonted channels. The greetings of the multitude set the final seal upon the validity of the British Empire in the East.'

The writer of those words felt that the solemn assembly was 'the ultimate expression of the potent force of kingship, which in that resplendent scene reached a height we may never see again'.

Since that auspicious day the devouring lust of Germany for riches and dominion has plunged the whole world into misery beyond the power of words to express, and has constrained almost every other nation under heaven to join in the fight for right and all that makes life worth living against the demoniac armed might of the nation which lives by and for war, which knows no pity, and jeers at any arbitrament save that of the sword. In that noble fight, still, at the moment of writing (April 1918), in one of its most critical stages, India has borne and is bearing her part.

The brotherhood in arms sanctified by the blood of myriads of gallant men shed on the battle-fields of Asia, Africa, and Europe will, we trust, develop into a still more comprehensive community of sentiment between Englishmen and Indians and between all the sections of the vast population of Hind, so infinitely diverse on the surface, and yet so subtly bound together by hidden cords woven on the looms of immemorial antiquity.

The momentary apparition of Their Majesties to receive the eager homage of their Indian lieges will not be forgotten when these present horrors are overpast, and a bleeding, but purified world resumes its normal course.

CHRONOLOGY

Lord Lansdowne Viceroy	1888
Manipur massacre	1891
Occupation of Hunza and Nagar	1891-2
Lord Elgin II Viceroy	1894
Chitrāl expedition	1895
Plague epidemic began	1896
Famine	1896-7
Tirāh expedition	1897
Lord Curzon Viceroy	1899
Famine ; Land Alienation Act	1900
Death of Queen Victoria ; Habibullah, Amīr (King) of Afghanistan ; creation of North-West Frontier Province	1901
Tibetan expedition	1903-4
Universities Act ; Lord Curzon in England ; Lord Ampthill tem- porary Viceroy	1904
Partition of Bengal ; Lord Minto II Viceroy	1905
Indian Councils Act ; anarchist crimes	1909
Lord Hardinge of Penshurst Viceroy	1910
Visit of Their Majesties ; announcement of change of capital and reversal of partition of Bengal	1911

AUTHORITIES

[Sir] G. FORREST, *The Administration of the Marquis of Lansdowne, 1888-94* (Calcutta, Supert. of Govt. Printing, 1894) ; LOVAT FRASER, *India under Curzon and After*³ (Heinemann, 1912), a very useful book ; *Lord Curzon in India*, being *A Selection from his Speeches, &c.*, ed. by Sir T. RALEIGH (Macmillan, 1906) ; *Speeches of Lord Curzon of Kedleston* (Calcutta, Thacker, Spink & Co., 1901) ; W. H. HUTTON, chap. vii in TROTTER, *History of India* (S.P.C.K., 1917) ; ILBERT, in *The Government of India*³, 1914 (or Suppl. to ed. 2), discusses the Indian Councils Act of 1909. I have also used the blue books on the subject. Sir VALENTINE CHIROL, in *Indian Unrest* (Macmillan, 1910), with Introduction by Sir A. LYALL, describes the earlier stages of the criminal conspiracies. The Royal and Imperial visit is fully described and illustrated in *The Historical Record of the Imperial Visit to India, compiled from the Official Records* (Murray, London, 1914, publ. for Government of India ; 4to, illd.).

APPENDIX A

Some events from 1912 to October 1918 specially concerning India and the Indian Army.

1912

- Jan. 8. Departure of Their Majesties from Calcutta.
- Feb. 5. Arrival of Their Majesties in London.
- April 1. Province of Bihār and Orissa constituted ; Lord Carmichael Governor of Bengal.
- Oct. 1. Chief Commissionership of Delhi constituted.
- Dec. 22. Lord Hardinge wounded by a bomb.

1913

Conference of British, Chinese, and Tibetan representatives at Simla ; decisions not ratified by China.
Trade, both import and export, exceptionally active.

1914

- Aug. 4. Declaration of war by Great Britain against Germany.
- Sept. 26. Indian Corps began to land in France.
- Nov. 5. Declaration of war by Great Britain against Turkey.
- Dec. 18. Prince Kāmil Husain Pasha appointed Sultan of Egypt.

1915

- Mar. 10. Battle of Neuve Chapelle.
- Nov. 22. Battle of Ctesiphon near Baghdad.
- Nov. 29. Retreat of British force in Mesopotamia.
- Dec. 3. General Townshend enters Kut-el Amara.

1916

- Mar. Failure of Indian Government to supply Mesopotamian force.
- April 4. Lord Chelmsford Viceroy.
- April 29. Kut-el Amara taken by the Turks.
- July. The Sharif of Mecca declared his independence as King of the Hedjaz.
- Dec. 7. Mr. Lloyd George Prime Minister.

1917

- Feb. 24. Kut-el Amara retaken by the British.
- Mar. 11. Capture of Baghdad by the British.
- Mar. 12. Revolution in Russia.
- Mar. 15. Abdication of the Tsar.
- April 5. Declaration of war on Germany by the United States.
- June 27. Report of Mesopotamian Commission published.
- July 19. Wholesale retreat of Russian army.
- Aug. 27. Pronouncement of Secretary of State intimating that the policy of H.M. Government aims at 'gradual development of self-governing institutions' and 'progressive realization of responsible government'.
- Oct. British successes on the Euphrates ; Mr. Montagu arrived in India.

- Dec. 3. Germans driven out of East Africa.
 Dec. 9. Surrender of Jerusalem to the British.
 Dec. 11. Entry of General Allenby into Jerusalem.

1918

- Feb. 22. Jericho occupied.
 Feb.-Mar. Collapse of Russian power.
 Mar. 21. Beginning of renewed German offensive in France; retreat of 3rd and 5th British armies.
 April Long advance of British force in Mesopotamia.
 July Execution of the ex-Tsar by the Bolsheviks.
 July-Oct. Continued defeats and retreat of the Germans in France and Belgium.
 Aug. 6. Debate in Parliament on Montagu-Chelmsford *Report*.
 Sept. 30. Surrender of Bulgaria.
 Oct. 1. Damascus taken by British, Indian, and Arab troops.
 Oct. 24. Debate and division in House of Lords on reform question.

APPENDIX B

EAST INDIA COMPANY

- 1600 (December 31). Queen Elizabeth's charter.
 1661. Charter of Charles II.
 1708. Final fusion of rival Companies.
 1773. Regulating Act (Governor-general of Bengal).
 1784. Pitt's India Act ('Board of Control').
 1793. Charter renewed.
 1813. " " (India trade thrown open.)
 1833. " " (Company's trading functions abolished; China trade thrown open.)
 1853. " " (Competition for Civil Service.)
 1858. Government of India Act (Direct government by Crown; Queen's Proclamation).
 1874. Formal dissolution of the Company.

APPENDIX C

GOVERNORS-GENERAL

I. *Governors-general of Bengal or of Fort William (Regulating Act of 1773).*

(*Temporary and officiating in italics.*)

- 1774 (October). Warren Hastings, Esq. (Right Honourable).
 1785 (February 1). *Sir John Macpherson.*
 1786 (September). Earl (Marquess) Cornwallis.

- 1793 (August). Sir John Shore (Lord Teignmouth).
 1798 (March). *Sir Alured Clarke*.
 1798 (May). Earl of Mornington (Marquess Wellesley).
 1805 (July 30). Marquess Cornwallis (for second time).
 1805 (October 5). *Sir George Barlow*.
 1807. Baron (Earl of) Minto I.
 1813 (October 4). Earl of Moira (Marquess of Hastings).
 1823 (January 1). *John Adam, Esq.*
 1823 (August 1). Baron (Earl) Amherst.
 1828 (March 8). *William Butterworth Bayley, Esq.*
 1828 (July). Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck.

II. *Governors-general of India (Charter Act of 1833).*

1833. Lord William Cavendish-Bentinck.
 1835 (March 20). *Sir Charles (Lord) Metcalfe*.
 1836 (March 1). Baron (Earl of) Auckland.
 1842. Baron (Earl of) Ellenborough.
 1844. Sir Henry (Viscount) Hardinge.
 1848. Earl (Marquess) of Dalhousie.
 1856. Viscount (Earl) Canning.

III. *Governors-general and Viceroys (Queen's Proclamation).*

- 1858 (November 1). Earl Canning.
 1862. Earl of Elgin I.
 1863. *Sir Robert Napier (Lord Napier of Magdala)*.
 1863. *Sir William Denison*.
 1864. Sir John (Lord) Lawrence.
 1869. Earl of Mayo.
 1872. *Sir John Strachey*.
 1872. *Lord Napier of Merchistoun*.
 1872. Baron (Earl of) Northbrook.
 1876. Baron (Earl of) Lytton.
 1880. Marquess of Ripon.
 1884. Earl of Dufferin (Marquess of Dufferin and Ava).
 1888. Marquess of Lansdowne.
 1894. Earl of Elgin II.
 1899 (Jan. 6). Baron (Earl) Curzon of Kedleston.
 1904. *Lord Amthill*.
 1904. Baron (Earl) Curzon of Kedleston (reappointed).
 1905. Earl of Minto II.
 1910. Baron Hardinge of Penshurst.
 1916. Baron Chelmsford.

Note.—*India in Transition* by H.H. the Aga Khan (Lee Warner, 1918) is an important work containing many valuable observations and ideas. The remarks of H.H. concerning Indian universities in chap. xxiii coincide with those recorded independently on p. 736 *ante*.

INDIAN EMPIRE AND CEYLON

